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Foreword

The

International Studies "Blue Book" series was initiated by the Naval

War

College in 1901 to publish essays, treatises, and articles that contribute to the

broader understanding of international law.

volume of the

historic series,

we honor

With

the seventy-seventh

this,

the late Professor Richard B. Lillich by

publishing his final book, a long-awaited volume

on the use of

force in the

protection of nationals abroad.
Professor Lillich

is

Naval

part of the

War

Charles H. Stockton Chair of International

ued

to support the

Naval

War College

Volumes 61 and 62 of the Blue Book
Naval

the
sor,

War

He was

I

in

one of

their

safety of U.S. citizens overseas. This

Law from

& 2. As the Stockton Profes-

his colleagues in discussions of the

Navy and Marine Corps

contin-

the co-editor of

Readings in International

College Review 1947-1977, vols.

he would engage

held the

Law from 1968-1969, and

after his tenure.

series:

He

College family.

proper use of the U.S.

most enduring missions, ensuring the

volume experienced

a long gestation since

then, with years of meticulous research and thoughtful analysis culminating in
a manuscript shortly before Professor Lillich's untimely

death in 1996. His con-

clusions, while not necessarily official positions of the

United States Govern-

ment, are firmly supported by exhaustive historical research and clearly
presented case studies, and are an invaluable contribution to the

On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy,
the

Commandant of the Marine

Corps,

I

field.

the Chief of Naval Operations, and

extend to the family, friends and

leagues of Professor Lillich, our gratitude for

tl^is,

col-

his final service^ to his

country.

Piff
LODNE^P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President,

Naval

War

College

Introduction

The

War

Charles H. Stockton Chair of International
College in 1951.

Over the

Law was

established at the

Naval

past half-century, the Stockton Chair has

been

many esteemed professors of international law. Professor Richard B. Lillich
was one such Chairholder. Volume 77 of the International Law Studies (the "Blue
held by

Book")

series, Lillich

on

the Forcible Protection of Nationals

and

his

work.

Professor Lillich

The commentary and

Abroad, memorializes

case studies he wrote clearly

show that foreign intervention to protect one's citizens has always been
and dynamic part of international law, and will continue to be so.

a relevant

made possible only through the efforts of its principal editor, LieuCommander Thomas Wingfleld, U.S. Navy Reserve. Tom was in the right

This volume was
tenant

place at the right time at the
stint as

a reservist.

Naval

War College while serving his

annual active duty

He shepherded the process of turning rough notes, documents and

papers into a published book.

ant Colonel James Meyen,

Working closely with Tom as the co-editor was Lieuten-

USMC,

Law Department.
by Dean Alberto Coll, Center

of our International

book was made possible
for
Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College. His leadership and support
are key to the Blue Book Series. Invaluable contributions were also made by retired Professor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt and Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC,
Funding

USN,

for this

(Ret.),

who

volunteered

many hours

of their personal time in reviewing

manuscripts and offering advice. Further assistance was provided by the rest of

Law Department.

the staff of the International

Volume 77

will serve as a

standard reference work of case studies in this

area, continuing the solid, scholarly tradition of the "Blue Books."

published by the Naval

War

academic

libraries,

institutions,

The

series

is

College and distributed throughout the world to

and both U.S. and international

military

commands.

DENNIS MANDSAGER
Professor of

Law

Chairman, International Law Department

Preface

was only one

"It

life.

What

is

one

life

Benito Mussolini, after running

General Smedley Butler, 193 1)

Richard
advocate

Bonnet

—spent

Lillich
his life

—

down

a state?"

a child in his automobile (as reported by

1

lawyer,

professor,

human

answering that question.

have proven very troubling

done more

in the affairs of

The

rights

expert

results of his

for the Mussolinis of the world, in that

to chart the limits to

which

a State

life's

and
work

no one has

may go in protecting its citizens.

had an unusually long gestation. As early as 1980, he wrote in the introduction to another volume in this
series, Readings in International Law from the Naval War College Review
1 947- 1 977, vol 2: The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General International Leu
gal Issues:
[t]his Introduction is not the place to discuss the Entebbe Raid in
detail. Interested readers will find it considered at some length in my forthcoming monograph in the "Blue Book" series
Forcible Self Help to Protect Nationals Abroad." 2 As Professor Lillich continued writing through the 1980s and
into the 1990s, 3 he kept this manuscript close at hand, continually revising and
updating the text to reflect each new example of State practice. With his unThis particular work, Professor

timely death in

1996, his colleagues gathered the largely complete but

uncompiled work, and
It

was

Lillich's last,

set

about preparing

it

for

its

long-awaited publication.

my honor to be entrusted with overseeing this

task during the last

two

Long a student of Professor Lillich's work (if, sadly, not the Professor
himself), I had already published two articles based on his work in this area. 4
The first begins with a statement of why Professor Lillich's work in this particular area mattered so much:
years.

the

[PJerhaps

democracies

undertaken

life.

for

The

non-pretextual reasons,

is

The academic

upon the value of a

when

challenge in evaluating such

from other legitimate uses of

from other,

to distinguish the uses

from

the clearest expression of that

to distinguish such protection

and then

force,
force.

is

tyrannies

forcible protection of nationals abroad,

distinction in state practice.

uses of force

discriminating

for

the sincere, proven emphasis placed

is

human

single

criterion

best

illegitimate uses of

5

In this volume, Professor Lillich rose to this challenge,
for future scholars to

match.

It

and

set the

standard

was decided against including additional case
academic

studies covering the post- 1996 period to "update" his work. Their

value did not justify making the text not purely Lillich. Without them, every

which is more appropriate for a memorial volume such as this one. To say more about the text which
follows is unnecessary, as its scope, depth, and clarity speak for themselves.
There is also no need to say more about Professor Lillich himself, because Proword, except for the Conclusion,

is

Professor Lillich's,

fessor

Robert Turner, also of the University of Virginia, has written movingly

about

his lost friend

Editing a Blue
to

thank

first

Book

is

as far

in the personal

memoriam which

from a solo undertaking

as

follows.

any could be.

I

wish

now of the George C. Marshall Eufor introducing me to the world of the Na-

Professor Michael N. Schmitt,

ropean Center

War

and colleague

for Security Studies,

me

him in the editing of an earlier Blue
Book, and advocating to the College's Oceans Law and Policy Department
(now the International Law Department (ILD)) that I be given a crack at this
project. Mike is one of the finest men I know, and to the extent that any of us
can approach the level of his intellect, passion, humor, and thoughtfulness, we

val

College, allowing

to assist

do so only asymptotically. The College was indeed lucky
George Marshall Center is lucky now.
I

would

also like

thank

have him,

as the

Commander Dean Markussen, USNR, who,

burst of academic insight, set this chain of events in
to the College for a

to

in a

motion by dispatching me

two-week period of active duty training

as a reservist.

Great

thanks are also due to the faculty of ILD

—

Grunawalt,

Dennis Mandsager; Captain Ralph

his

Thomas, JAGC,

successor,

USN

Professor

(Ret.), his successor,

Lieutenant Colonel James Duncan,
onel James Meyen,
all

particularly Professor Emeritus Jack

USMC,

Colonel Frederic Borch,

and

his

USA; and

successor, Lieutenant Col-

USMC, for accepting me into the ILD family and providing

the support and guidance an editor could need. Their faith in this project,

and

in

me,

is

greatly appreciated.

xvi

Professor Robert Turner, author of this text's true introduction,

is

deserving

of special praise. Given his already hectic schedule of writing, teaching, and

—made the more demanding
nation— he could have declined
speaking

all

in

wake of the recent

this writing project

However, drawing on

his limitless reserves of energy,

friend with the thoughtful tribute

which

with a clear conscience.

he made time to honor his

Bob Turner

follows.

on our

attacks

is

living proof of

Professor Lillich's talent for friendship.

No acknowledgments would be

complete without thanking the people

who

actually undertook the steps to physically produce a hardcover book. First

LtCol Jim Meyen,

my official co-editor and whom I mentioned

is

above, for tak-

ing the finished manuscript through the process of publication in Newport.

The
ing,

sheer

number of steps

in such a task

from indexing to printing

—from word processing

—make

their

to proofread-

coordination a challenging,

time-consuming, and sometimes frustrating task. For handling the entire project with grace under pressure, Jim

mous debt

is

also

owed

to be sincerely

is

two-week training period, and a considerable
nizing Professor Lillich's manuscript.

An enor-

USNR, who
amount of his own time,

Captain Donald C.

to

complimented.

Hill,

The book's current organization is

spent a
in orgaa result

no overstatement to say that the project could
not have moved forward without his dedication and patient work. Ms Patricia
Goodrich, of the Naval War College Press, is also to be commended for her proof Captain Hill's vision, and

it is

fessional editorial assistance; as

is

the technically adept staff in the Publications

who made this volume a reality. Last, but certainly not least, is Lieutenant David Poff, USNR, who put considerable time and effort into updating Pro-

Office,

fessor Lillich's

work for publication. His contribution, completed after his recall

to active duty in the current hostilities,
Finally,

I

would

like to

thank

my

friends

Corporation, Georgetown University
ginia School o{

Law

Law

and colleagues

now know was enjoyed just

is

at

this text.

Aegis Research

Center, and the University of Vir-

for their patience, understanding,

and studying with such fine people
I

may be seen throughout

and support. Working

one of life's greatest rewards, and one that

as deeply

by Professor Richard Bonnet

Thomas

Lillich.

C. Wingfield

Counsel and Principal National
Security Policy Analyst

Aegis Research Corporation
xvii

NOTES
1.

Benito Mussolini, quoted by Gen. Smedley Butler, reprinted

QUOTATIONS 379 (Henry

in

THE POCKET BOOK OF

Davidoff ed., 1952).

INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
1947-1977 (v. 2), The Use of Force, Human Rights and General International
LEGAL ISSUES (NAV. WAR C. INT'L L. STUD., v. 62, Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore
2.

READINGS

IN

eds. 1980), at xi.
3.

For the most complete

Tribute to Richard B.

(1933-1996), 38 VA.
4.

See

Thomas

Lillich:
J.

listing

of Professor Lillich's writings, see Samuel Pyeatt Menefee,

a Bibliography of the Legal Publications of Professor Richard B.

INTL

L.

C. Wingfield, Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad, 104 DICK. L. REV. 439

(2000) [hereinafter FORCIBLE PROTECTION], and

5.

Lillich

85 (1997).

Law: U.S. Naval Regulations, Star Trek, and
[hereinafter

A

the

Thomas

Use of Force

C. Wingfield,
in Space,

INTERSTELLAR LAW].

See Wingfield, Forcible Protection, supra note 4, at 439.

xvin

46

S.

Lillich

D.

L.

on

Interstellar

REV. 72 (2001)

Richard B. Lillich (19334996):

A Tribute
Robert

F.

Turner

Richard Bonnot Lillich was born in Amherst, Ohio, on January 22, 1933. After
undergraduate training at Oberlin College, he earned his LL.B. at Cornell and

LL.M. and SJ.D. (academic law doctorate) at New York
University. He served ten years on the faculty of Syracuse University, where he
was Director of International Legal Studies. During 1968-69, he held the
prestigious Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law at the U.S. Naval

went on

to earn his

War College. He

then joined the faculty of the University of Virginia School of

Law, where he served

Howard W. Smith

as the

untimely death twenty-seven years

later,

Professor of

from a heart attack

Law

until his

at the age of

sixty- three.

To
in

that,

one might add

London; service

as

Thomas

Cambridge; other fellowships
delberg;

Ford Foundation and Guggenheim Fellowships

his

Jefferson Visiting Fellow at

at

Oxford and the

Max

and assorted short-term teaching assignments

Downing

College,

Planck Institute in Heiat Indiana, Georgia, St.

—

and Florida State where at the time of his death he also served
part-time as the Edward Ball Eminent Professor of International Law.
Louis,

We

on the Executive
Law, twenty-six years on the

can't forget his leadership positions: a dozen years

Council of the American Society of International

Board of the American Journal of International Law, founding member
of The Procedural Aspects of International Law (PAIL) Institute, founder of
Editorial

DC-based International Human Rights Law Group; just to
mention some of the highlights. He was also a prolific writer, co-editing the nation's first law school casebook on human rights law among his more than forty
books, sixty chapters in books edited by others, and more than one hundred
the Washington,

published

articles.

Then

there was his role as valued adviser to the Office of the Legal Adviser

Department and to numerous non-governmental organizations in
the United States and around the globe. As an advocate, he was often called
upon by the United States Government and by numerous private clients to ar-

at the State

gue before international tribunals.

These are the data that inevitably make

their

way

into

New York Times obit-

and they are important. They tell us that Professor Richard Lillich was a
man of remarkable professional accomplishment and ability. But they don't
capture the full measure of the man whose early experiences as an adopted
child may have contributed to the loyalty and friendship he displayed to colleagues as an adult. In a tribute that appeared in the American Journal of International Law, University of Iowa Law School Professor Burns Weston recalled
approaching Professor Lillich about sharing some materials he had collected for
an unwritten study of the British Foreign Compensation Commission:
uaries,

me free
office, gave me all
provided

me

where he was then teaching,
room and board at home with his family, found me a quiet
his research cards and notes to examine, and authorized me to
needed, asking only that I put things back in the order that I

[H]e not only said

yes,

but invited

to Syracuse

Xerox whatever I
found them. And I barely knew him! Richard Lillich always defied the
conventional wisdom of jealously guarding one's hard-won unpublished
research. He was uniquely generous and trusting in a profession not known for its
deference to could-be

I

first

human
text

had

met Dick

Lillich while a student in his first

rights at the University of Virginia

International
just

rivals.

Human Rights:

seminar on international

School of Law. The assigned

Problems of Law and Policy, the casebook he

co-authored with Judge Frank C.

Newman

—did not

arrive

from

Lit-

tle-Brown until several weeks into the term.

some trepidation. Even then, Dick had established a well-deserved reputation as one of the nation's foremost authorities on
both international claims and human rights law. But he had also been a vocal
opponent of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and my involvement on the other
side of that debate was no secret. Never one to withdraw from a good argument, I anticipated that our different perspectives would surface and I was unsure of the potential effect on my grade point average.
I was right about one thing. Not only in his human rights seminar, but in two
I

enrolled in that seminar with

other courses
peatedly.

I

later

He was

took from him, our divergent points of view surfaced

outraged over

human

rights abuses in

South Korea, and

sponded that cutting aid could play into the hands of the regime
xx

—
I

rere-

in Pyongyang,

whose human

rights record

we were

spect, perhaps

was incomparably worse across the board. In

just describing opposite

retro-

ends of the same elephant.

seemed to me that we disagreed about everything of significance, I
knew even then that we were both deeply committed to the cause of human
rights and human dignity.
While

it

When

the time

came

to pick topics for our research papers,

Director of the International

Dick

in the seminar, that

human

rights in the

view of Professor

I

Lillich's

was hoping

strong views

issue,

on the

I

topic.

human

that might be a mistake in
I

guess

my passions

rights in the

can only imagine the impact

get the last shot in our duel,

an "A-" and convinced that

for

reflect his political biases.

quent courses

on

me

it

were a

two Vietnams.

had on poor Dick

blood pressure.

knew Dick would

I

assisting

was leaning towards doing a comparative piece on

wrote instead about

Given my views on the

informed the

Law Group, who was

Rights

two Koreas. She cautioned

Lillich's

bit intense, too, as

I

Human

I

I

To my

he gave

me below

a "B"

it

I

would

shock, in that seminar and the two subse-

took from him, Dick gave

a strict 3.0 curve,

if

and when grades arrived

me

"A"s.

At

the time, Virginia was

and to give an "A" required a professor

to

award another

student a "C" or to downgrade several papers to balance off the 4.0. "A"s were

uncommon.

thus

I

honestly don't think

I

earned three "A"s from Dick Lillich,

my only explanation for his behavior is his strong sense of professional
honor. He wanted there to be no question that he was not penalizing me for our
and

strong disagreements in class.

When

I

applied for admission to the graduate law

program, Dick served on the admissions committee that decided to waive the

LL.M. requirement and admit me
I still

key

think he viewed us as being at opposite ends of the political spectrum on

issues.

After several years working in Washington,

and

even though

directly into the S.J.D. program,

as

an additional duty volunteered

I

returned to Virginia in 1987,

to teach the introductory international

law course in the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs until they
could

fill

that faculty vacancy.

man rights,

I

asked Dick

if

When it came time to discuss international hu-

he would come over

as a guest lecturer

—neither of

had scheduled him for Wednesday of Thanksgiving week. He
accepted, and year after year he returned on the same day to share his vast
knowledge of international human rights law with a couple of hundred underus realizing that

graduates.

He

I

never received a penny

for his efforts,

young daughter with him so they could head
delayed to do me a favor.
xxi

off

and twice he brought

on the

brief vacation

his

he had

We

talked a lot over the years, until

I

departed in 1994 for Newport to oc-

cupy the Stockton Chair that Dick had held twenty-five years
took part in several conferences where

The more

I

I

We also

earlier.

could hear his views as a colleague.

listened to him, the fewer points of disagreement

knowledge of the law was superb. As the present volume

I

could

reflects,

find.

he shared

His

my

strong belief in the importance of using original sources, of understanding the
historical

development of legal

rules

through the writings of people

like

Grotius

and Vattel, and the importance of careful research. The values he expressed
1

grew older were

as

my own. And on issue after issue, our bottonvline con-

largely

clusions were fully in accord.

To

this day,

I

know what happened. Perhaps the change
matured over the years my own views moved gradually

do not pretend

was within me, and

as

I

to

towards where Dick had always been. Perhaps the end of the Cold

moved some

filters

that

haps Dick changed.
gradually changed.

teacher

I

re-

had influenced our vision during that controversy. Perdon't know, but, in the end,

The man who

who was wrong on

at first

my

the issues but honorable and

on more and more

issues

was perhaps best known

perception of him

appeared to be an exceptionally able

had become a cherished friend and colleague
policy preferences

War

I

—

fair

almost to a

a world-class scholar

fault,

—whose

strongly shared.

work on international claims
and State responsibility. I thought of him as a "Liberal" and on occasion, in the
early days, a man of the "Left." But, in retrospect, he did not champion radical
Dick

Lillich

positions in either of these fields.

for his

Dick believed that

it

was important

for States

to be held responsible for their conduct, irrespective of any perceived injustices
in their past,

had

and he believed that when they took the property of others they

a duty to pay fair compensation.

Few

issues

have more divided international lawyers than that of unilateral

intervention by one State in the territory of another for the purpose of protecting nationals.

doxy of the

Once

again,

Dick

Left, arguing that

Lillich rejected the "anti-imperialist" ortho-

when one State violated the clear rights of foreign

nationals and endangered their safety, in the absence of an effective multinational

remedy the victim State had

tional force to safeguard

pre-Charter era, and
2 (4)

.

I

its

litical

nationals. This

was

clearly the majority

view of the

that an intervention limited to protecting the safety

own nationals is not a use of force against the

territorial integrity or

independence of the host State, or argues that the

are predicated

and propor-

share Dick's view that the doctrine survived Article

Whether one reasons

of one's

a legal right to use necessary

upon the host State abiding by
xxn

its

po-

rights set forth in 2(4)

own duties

not to threaten or

use force improperly and are qualified by the right of self-defense, the outcome
is

the same.

Dick
tion.

also did

groundbreaking work on the issue of humanitarian interven-

He understood that human dignity and human freedom are of fundamen-

importance, and that people needed to be protected against at least the

tal

most flagrant abuses of internationally recognized human rights norms. Ideally,
this should be done by a united world community under the leadership and direction of the United Nations Security Council. But Dick understood that the

Security Council could be blocked from acting by the negative votes of any of

Permanent Members. And when the United Nations was unwilling or unable to act, Dick understood that individual States
or, preferably, multinational coalitions
had a right and duty to act to prevent the most egregious

five

—

—

violations of

human

rights.

Another dear friend, Professor R. J. Rummel, has in recent years called atthe slaughter of human betention to the problem he defines as "democide"
ings outside of war by their own governments. I first learned of this theory in

—

1987 while serving

as the first President of the congressionally-created

United

mandate was to make grants to
institutions and scholars to do research and write books; and when I first read
Rudy Rummel's initial proposal I could not believe his thesis. Surely, if he was
right, we would have known this before now. But as I examined his preliminary
work and contemplated his thesis over time, I became persuaded that he was
correct and was delighted when our Board of Directors voted to support his research. Quite properly, he was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his
groundbreaking scholarship on Democide and the Democratic Peace.
States Institute of Peace. Part of our statutory

Rudy Rummel has argued
Twentieth Century,

own governments

—very

persuasively, in

at least three times as

many

—

my view

that during the

people were killed by their

unrelated to war than were killed in every war across the

globe during the same period. This includes Stalin's purges of class enemies,

Mao's land reform and other campaigns to
caust, Pol Pot's butchery of an estimated
lesser crimes.

kill class

enemies, Hitler's Holo-

two million Cambodians, and assorted

And very importantly, Rummel has shown that there is a tremen-

dous inverse correlation between democide and democratic governance. The

mega-murderers are

all

totalitarian tyrants.

Arguably the two most important developments in international law during
the Twentieth Century were the outlawing of aggressive war through the

Kellogg-Briand Treaty and

UN

Charter, and the recognition in the Charter

and subsequent instruments that sovereign States have a duty to protect certain human rights of both their own nationals and aliens who are under their

xxm

control. In both categories, the primary violators
tarian regimes

The

—whether from

have been the world's

"Left" or "Right."

much

world's leading scholars of international law are very

whether

it is

totali-

on

divided

permissible for any State, or any group of States in the absence of

Security Council authorization, to use lethal force inside the territory of an-

—

human rights even if the alternative is massive genocide. This debate is much like the dispute over the scope of the right of
self-defense under Article 5 1 of the Charter, and for much the same reason.
The scholars who oppose "humanitarian intervention" do so not because they
other State to protect

favor genocide, but because they fear that
will use the

excuse of such intervention to

Saddam Hussein could

1990,

Kuwait

ings in

reasons, they

easily

unconstrained sovereign States

if left

Thus, in August

justify aggression.

have pointed out

human

rights

to excuse his desire to take control of that country. For similar

want

to

narrow the right of States to use lethal force in

fense" because they recall that

when

Hitler

One can acknowledge and even share
attack

is

must be able

these concerns and yet

to defend themselves

masked by the use of paramilitary

ganda designed

"self-de-

went into Poland, and Kim

invaded South Korea, both told the world they had been attacked

that States

shortcom-

when

forces

attacked

II

Sung

first.

still

recognize

—even when

the

and accompanied by propa-

to mislead the world. Ultimately, the world

community can

and pass judgment upon the resort to lethal force.
the world should be able to tell between genuine humanitarian

usually ascertain the facts

And,

similarly,

intervention and the use of that doctrine as a facade to

At

its

core, the theory that there

promote peace and

back

in silence

if

justice. If

it

on the wrong

I

become
Lillich

am honored

friend

primary purpose

religion, or similar factors,

part of the problem

sit

understood

then interna-

and must be changed. For no

such a result deserves the respect of

civilized

set of

men

or

this.

to be able to write a

few words in tribute to

this great

man

—

and colleague who, in retrospect, was throughout our years of friendship

also a cherished mentor.

I

commend

the Naval

War College

for its decision to

bring out this important volume even after the untimely death of

Like so

many

other volumes in this extraordinary

tool for legal scholars for generations to

my

is

another Hitler surfaces and begins slaughtering millions of in-

rules that preordains

women. Dick

side. Its

holds that the world community must

nocent people because of their race,
tional law has

aggression.

can be no lawful exercise of humanitarian

intervention places international law
to

mask

friend

Tom

Wingfield,

who

come.

series,

Finally,

I

it

will

its

author.

be a valuable

am deeply indebted

to

agreed to undertake the important task of
XXIV

completing

this

manuscript

when it became apparent to everyone

my doing so.
remarkable man to whom

that

my own

schedule would preclude

Dick

Lillich

was a

all

who

cherish the rule of law

on August 3, 1996, left the
world poorer for the loss. But those of us who knew and admired him can take
solace in the knowledge that his scholarship and ideas will live on both through
the work of his former students and in the remarkable body of professional literare indebted. His untimely death by heart attack

ature he has

left

behind. This will presumably be his final publication, and

it

re-

make Dick Lillich such a remarkable
scholar and human being. As with all of us who have had the distinction to
hold the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law at the Naval War
flects

the exceptional talents that helped

College, Dick cherished that association.
lighted to

will

am

confident that he would be de-

know that the commitment he made more than
Book has been satisfied. I am all the more
be welcomed by scholars around the globe.

write a Blue

work

I

three decades ago to

certain that this fine

Charlottesville, Virginia

November
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2001

Author's Note

The

development and implementation of the

tion, is

State's right of forcible protec-

the primary focus of this document.

As with many international law norms,
to protect the lives

and property of

the juridical origins of a State's right

nationals abroad

its

may be

traced to the

views of the early, classical publicists. Their writings routinely included a
State's right of diplomatic protection of

its

nationals abroad.

State's right of forcible protection of its nationals

The

validity of a

abroad necessarily grew out of

the practical aspects of the right of diplomatic protection of a State's nationals.

Although often addressing the subject
significant

indirectly, the classical publicists

had

a

impact upon the development of the State's right of forcible protec-

tion of its citizens abroad.

To

the contributions of the classical writers, the later traditional writers

on

international law added descriptions of the evolving practice of States inter-

vening to protect their nationals transiting or living in other States.

One group

of writers, including Phillimore, Bluntschli and Westlake, viewed the right of

protection as limited primarily to the use of diplomatic measures. Recognizing
the justifications offered by the classical writers, as well as the developing State
practices,

a

second group of

Oppenheim and

writers,

Fauchille, asserted

measures of protection as

well.

A

including Bonfils,

an established principle

Pradier-Fodere,
justifying forcible

third group of writers, primarily

from the

United States, including Moore, Stockton, Clark, Hodges, Borchard, Hyde and
Offutt, also recognized the then established principle of using forcible
sures,

mea-

supplementing their theoretical reasoning with extensive appendices de-

tailing instances of such protection, primarily in the

form of prior US practice.

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

A fourth group o( traditional writers, including Dunn and Hindmarsh, with
world

crisis

imminent, grudgingly admitted the existence of the principle of

forcible protection, but

made

clear their disapproval of

exercise in an in-

its

community.
Following the summary of the classical and traditionalist

creasingly interdependent international

historical views

on

the State's right of forcible protection of its nationals abroad prior to the signing of the United Nations Charter, the impact of post-World
tice will

With

War II State prac-

be discussed.
the signing of the United Nations Charter and

its

broad prohibition of

the use of force found in Article 2(4), the right of forcible, as opposed to diplomatic, protection entered a

new phase

as the provision seriously questions the

concept of forcible protection of nationals abroad. However, the

human expe-

rience in dealing with the practicalities of traversing a foreign State having different laws, socio-economic experience

and

political differences, will

no doubt

representatives and nationals

keep the issue of the State's protection of

its

abroad, a very timely and dynamic topic for

some time

to

come.

Richard B. Lillich

xxvm

Chapter
The

To

facilitate

cept of the

I

Classical Publicists

an understanding of the

historical

right of forcible protection,

development of the con-

the earliest publicists are denomi-

nated herein as the "classical" writers. This group, spanning the Seventeenth

and Eighteenth Centuries include Grotius, Wolff and Vattel. During this historical period the European State system assumed a preeminent position in the
world.

A. Grotius. Grotius, the "father of international law," developed two funda-

mental principles that have influenced
ject of the protection of the lives
First,

much

of the later thinking

first

and

subjects, either those

sub-

and property of nationals abroad.

he maintained that a sovereign's concern

mount. "[T]he

on the

for his subjects

must be para-

particularly necessary concern," argued Grotius, "is for

who

are subject to authority in a family, or those

subject to a political authority."

who

are

1

Second, Grotius contended that under the law of nations there existed a
principle that "for
fulfilling

what any

the law, for

all this

civil society,

or

its

there are held and

incorporeal possessions of those

who are

head, ought to finish ... by not

made

liable all the corporeal or

subject to such a society or

its

head." 2

Grotius viewed this latter principle, which countenanced collective responsibility, as

pragmatic, the "outgrowth of a certain necessity, because otherwise a

great license to cause injury

As

would

arise." 3

a corollary to this forerunner of State responsibility, Grotius considered

two remedial measures open to the protecting sovereign: the "seizure of
persons" and the "seizure of goods." As to the former, Grotius cited the practice
at least

of the ancient Greeks, in the form of Attican law which stated: "If anyone die

Forcible Protection of Nationals

by a violent death, for his sake,
to proceed to

apprehend men,

shall

it

Abroad

be right for his relatives and next of kin

until either the penalty has

murder, or the murderers are given up."

4

nothing in

is

for the

Grotius extended this approach to

justify a sovereign's resort to self-help to protect his subjects

jury, stating that "there

been paid

this that

is

from potential

repugnant to nature, and

in-

it is

the practice not only of the Greeks, but of other nations also." 5

Grotius also discussed briefly "the right of detention of citizens of another
state in

which

a manifest

his recovery." 6

wrong has been done

to a national, in order to secure

While admitting the existence of such

theless rejected

its utility.

a right, Grotius never-

In this regard, he described the reasons advanced

against the seizure of Ariston of Tyre by the Carthaginians.

ment was

that

if

The principal argu-

Ariston were seized "(th)e same thing

happen

will

to

Carthaginians both at Tyre and in the other commercial centers to which they

go in large numbers." 7

With
he

cited,

reference to the "seizure of goods," Grotius' second remedial measure,

without discussion, the "withernam" of the Saxons and Angles and

the "letters of marque" authorized by the King of France. 8

pointed to Homer's description in the

and herds of the
Finally,

Grotius

men of Elis

Iliad

of Nestor's seizure of "the flocks

in revenge for the horses stolen

recounted an instance from

Aristodemus, the heir of the Tarquins, held
sation for Tarquin property seized by the

Additionally, he

Roman

from

his father." 9

history

which

in

Roman ships at Cumae as compen-

Romans. 10

For Grotius, the sovereign's right to use self-help to protect his subjects was a
far-reaching one, justifying resort to force.

may be understood

As he put

to be warranted not only in case a

it:

"Seizure by violence

judgment cannot be ob-

tained against a criminal or a debtor within a reasonable time, but also

very clear case (for in a doubtful case the presumption

have been chosen by the

state to render

is

if

in favor of those

in a

who

judgment) judgment has been ren-

dered in a way manifestly contrary to law; for the authority of the judge has not
the same force over foreigners as over subjects." 11

However, such resort

to force did not include the taking of life.

the "law of love," "particularly for Christians, the
greater value than our property.

life

of a

man

According to

ought to be of

," 12
.

.

Thus, although Grotius did not directly address the question of the protection of the lives

and property of nationals abroad, he did adopt certain premises

that influenced subsequent writers in the
tions for such protection.

development of theoretical

justifica-

Subsequent to Grotius, the importance of the

citizen

to the sovereign, as well as the recognition of the right of a sovereign to protect

The

a citizen, by force

Classical Publicists

became recurrent themes

necessary,

if

on

in the literature

this subject.

B. Wolff. Wolff, writing in the

duty of a nation to preserve

by Grotius. "Every nation

who make

is

when

a nation,

mid-Eighteenth Century, elaborated upon the

itself,

a topic that

bound

had

been considered

also

earlier

to preserve itself," wrote Wolff, "for the

men

they have united into a state, are as individuals

bound to the whole for promoting the common good, and the whole is bound to
the individuals to provide for them those things which are required as a compe13
tency for life, for peace and security." Thus, although Wolff did not expressly
mention the protection of nationals abroad, it can be inferred that, to the extent that such protection was required "as a competency for life, for peace and
security,"

he believed that a State was obliged to extend

its

protection to

its

na-

tionals abroad.

Moreover, Wolff recognized

"The

as valid the use of force to enforce a State's rights.

right belongs to every nation to obtain

by force,

if

the other

is

its

unwilling to allow that right. For the right belongs to ev-

ery nation not to permit any other nation to take
also

not to permit

it

right against another nation

not to allow that

right.

away

Therefore

it is

does not wish to allow a right, that the other compel

right,

its

it

consequently

when one

necessary,

by force to allow

it.

Therefore the right belongs to the one nation against the other nation to obtain
its

right by force,

if

the other does not wish to allow

Indeed, a State had the right to defend
State

15

and

The

first

and its rights against another
which had injured it. 16 Thus, the

abroad can be brought under either of these

concepts, especially the latter, without

C. Vattel.

14

itself

to punish another State, by force,

forcible protection of nationals

it."

much

writer to focus directly

difficulty.

upon the protection of

abroad was Vattel. Amplifying Grotius' concern for the
justification for a State's

enforcement of its

rights against

nationals

citizen, as well as his

another State, Vattel

argued that:

Whoever offends

the State, injures

prejudice in any

manner whatsoever,

himself to be justly punished for
the state, which

is

bound

it.

its

rights, disturbs its tranquillity, or

declares himself

Whoever

uses a citizen

to protect this citizen;

of the

full

reparation; since otherwise the citizen

civil association,

which

is,

safety. 17

it

a

enemy, and exposes
ill,

indirectly offends

and the sovereign of the

should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and,

make

its

does

latter

him to
would not obtain the great end
if

possible, oblige

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

Thus, building upon the Grotian premise that a State has a right to protect
its

argued that forcible protection not only was

citizens, Vattel

that

was an obligation owed by States to

it

To

illustrate the

justified,

but

their citizens.

breadth of the principle of protection, Vattel used several
u

hypothetical and real examples. For instance,

made

[t]he sovereign

who

refuses to

damage done by his subject, or to punish
the offender, or, finally, to deliver him up, renders himself in some measure an
accomplice in the injury, and becomes responsible for it." 18 Vattel cited the example o( King Demetrius' imputed responsibility for the murder of a Roman
cause reparation to be

for the

ambassador by one of the King's subjects in

King Demetrius delivered the
ment, the

Roman

this regard. 19 In that case, after

guilty persons to

King ultimately was responsible
guilty persons to

it

on the King himself, or on his

interesting to note that Vattel, although agreeing that the

It is

conduct unjust,

for appropriate punish-

Senate sent them back, "resolving to reserve to themselves

the liberty of punishing that crime, by avenging

dominions." 20

Rome

for the acts of his subject,

as appropriate reparation

Rome.

found the Senate's

had been offered by sending the

Vattel's analysis of this incident, applicable to

many of

the instances of forcible protection described herein, was that the Senate's decision

was "but a pretext to cover their ambitious enterprises." 21

Another instance, described by Vattel, where forcible protection may be exercised is when a State "accustoms and authorizes its citizens indiscriminately
" 22
In the face of such a situation, "all nato plunder and maltreat foreigners
tions

and

have a right to enter into a league against such a people,

to treat

them

as the

common

enemies of the

human

them,

to repress

race."

23

As

instances

of this use of the principle of protection, Vattel cited the "guilt" of the nation o(
the Usbecks for the robberies

its

had committed,

citizens

hypo-

as well as the

thetical justification for a Christian confederacy against the Barbary States, "in

order to destroy those haunts of pirates, with
fear of just

punishment,

Vattel's

is

whom the love of plunder,

the only rule of peace and war."

or the

24

seeming endorsement o( a broad right of forcible protection was

tempered somewhat by

concern with the concept of sovereignty.

his

"We

should not only refrain from usurping the territory of others," argued Vattel,

"we should
sovereign
ritories

and abstain from every act contrary to the rights of the
cannot, then, without doing an injury to a state, enter its ter-

also respect

We

with force and arms.

of the state, and a trespass
in the sovereign." 25

.

.

.

This would at once be a violation of the safety

on the

rights of empire or

Thus, "[t]he prince

.

.

.

ought not to interfere in the causes

of his subjects in foreign countries, and grant
cases

where

justice

is

refused, or palpable

supreme authority vested

them

his protection, excepting in

and evident

injustice done, or rules

The

and forms openly

Classical Publicists

violated, or, finally,

an odious distinction made, to the preju-

dice of his subjects, or of foreigners in general." 26

Being the
the

first

of the classical international law writers to expressly discuss

protection o{ nationals

far-reaching.
his later

The

abroad,

Vattel's

right to protection that

he

analysis

initially

is

not particularly

developed

is

qualified by

emphasis on the rights o{ the sovereign. The fact remains, however,

that Vattel recognized a State's right (obligation) to forcibly protect

its

citizens

abroad by avenging the wrongs done to them and punishing their aggressors, at
least in cases of flagrant injustice. 27
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Chapter
The

Traditional Writers

The

classical writers

tional law of the

II

on International Law

were followed by the "traditional writers" on interna-

Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries, they

in-

clude Phillimore, Bluntschli, Bonfils, Pradier-Fodere, Westlake, Oppenheim,

Moore, Stockton, Clark, Hodges, Borchard, Fauchelle, Hyde, Winfield, Offutt,

Dunn, Hindmarsh and Accioly.
These

writers witnessed the developing State practices

which provided an

interesting counterpoint to the theoretical foundations developed by the earlier classical scholars.

A.

Phillimore. Phillimore,

an English

publicist writing in 1854, buttressed the

theoretical premises of the "classical" textwriters with the actual practice of

States as

it

had developed by the mid-Nineteenth Century. The general con-

clusion he reached was that "[t]he state, to
terfere for his protection

when he

he has been denied ordinary

which the foreigner belongs, may

has received positive maltreatment, or

justice

in

the foreign country."

Phillimore specified certain preconditions that must be

1

in-

when

However,

met before such self-help

could be undertaken. "[I]t behooves the interfering State to take the utmost
care,"

he cautioned,

first,

that the commission of the

wrong be

clearly estab-

lished; second, that the "denial of the local tribunals to decide the question at is-

sue be

no

less clearly established."

2

In addition to citing Grotius, Phillimore

supported his assertion with a reference to the reply of Great Britain to the King
of Prussia in 1753, wherein

it

was maintained that a State may exercise protec-

tion only "in cases of violent injuries directed or supported by the State;
tice absolutely

denied ... by

all

and

jus-

the tribunals, and afterwards by the Prince."

3

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

Phillimore also distinguished between domiciliary and transient nationals in
foreign countries.

The

essence of the distinction was that, while a national of

one State who becomes domiciled in another State accepts conditions in that
State for what they are, the transient national does not. According to
Phillimore, the domiciliary

"must be held to have considered the habits of the people, the laws of the
country, and their

household gods

mode

[sic]

of administration, before he established therein his

and made

it

the principal seat of his fortunes.

which he may be disposed

therefore expect, that every complaint,
his native

Government, with respect

He

cannot

to urge

upon

to these matters, will o{ necessity be

considered as requiring national interposition." 4

Phillimore devoted an entire chapter to the then topical aspect of the protection

and collection of debts owed by one State to another

Citing Vattel, Phillimore stated that

a

State, for the purpose of enforcing the

a foreign State, stands

State's nationals.

[t]he right of interference

performance of justice to

on the part of a
its

citizens

upon an unquestionable foundation, when the

from

foreign

become itself the debtor of these citizens."
Building upon this theoretical foundation, Phillimore invoked relevant
5

state has

State practice, exemplified by the famous Palmerston Circular of 1848. 6 This

statement of policy by the British government recognized that

had the right
to bring claims on behalf of British subjects who held public bonds and money
securities of defaulting foreign States, but that the decision whether or not to
assert

such a claim was entirely within

its

discretion. "It

is

it

therefore simply a

question of discretion with the British Government," wrote Palmerston,

"whether
tion,

[a]

matter should or should not be taken up by diplomatic negotia-

and the decision of that question of discretion turns

entirely

upon

British

and domestic considerations." The circular suggested that only in exceptional
cases would the government's discretion be exercised in the subject's favor.
7

Phillimore, drawing

upon the

and Vattel,

theoretical foundations of Grotius

substantiated his assertions with examples from ongoing State practice.
his discussion,

it

From

would seem that Phillimore was contemplating primarily the

diplomatic protection of nationals abroad. In any event, he considered that a
principle of international law

which justified

in theory

a State's protection of the lives, property

tionals living abroad, perhaps

B. Bluntschli.

had developed, both

To

and

in practice,

and debts owed

its

na-

even by the use of forcible measures.

Bluntschli, writing in 1874, the right of a State to protect

nationals abroad appeared unquestionable. Bluntschli wrote:

8

its
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The

state has the right

means authorized by

When

a)

and the duty

Law

International

to protect

its

nationals abroad by

all

the

international law:

the foreign state has proceeded against

them

in violation of the

principles of this law.

When

b)

ill

treatment or injuries received by one of its nationals was not caused

directly by the foreign state, but

it

did nothing to oppose such

ill

treatment or

injuries.

Each state has the

right to request reparation for the injustice,

reimbursement

for

the injuries caused, and to demand, according to the circumstances, guarantees
against the commission of similar acts. 8

Bluntschli illustrated this principle with several examples, including a
State's enslaving of

another State's nationals, depriving them of their religion,

destroying their goods, treating

them with

merce, and not respecting the law of nations governing the relations
States. 9

As an example

combetween

cruelty, violating treaties of

of State practice in this regard, Bluntschli cited the

King of Abyssinia in 1867 who refused to
the king illegally held. 10 According to Bluntschli,

British military expedition against the
free British nationals
this

whom

example involved an exercise of the right of

forcible protection par

excellence.

Bluntschli expanded his examination to the situation where the foreign

commits the injurious act. In such a case,
he argued, the allegedly injured person or persons first must seek a remedy in
the courts of the State in which the injury occurred. However, if that State refuses or otherwise fails to render justice, the State of which the injured party is a
State citizen, and not the State

national

At

may

intervene. 11

the same time, Bluntschli limited the principle of protection

non-forcible protection

war

itself,

—

in the foreign State.

to times

12

where there was no internal

be the case in such circumstances.

trates Bluntschli's

strife

at least

or civil

His rationale for this position appears to be that a

State should not be held responsible for acts over which
likely to

—

As

is

it

has no control, as

apparent, this reasoning

is

illus-

assumption of the inseparability of the corollary principles of

the right of diplomatic protection and State responsibility.
In support of this limitation
several examples, including the

upon the

Don

right of protection, Bluntschli cited

Pacifico case in 1849; the notes of Prince

Schwarzenberg on 24 April 1850 and Prince Nesselrode on 2
effect that a State forced

by revolution to take one of

May

its cities

1850, to the

controlled by
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insurgents should not be obliged to indemnify foreigners

who by chance

are in-

jured in the process; the refusal of the United States to indemnify Spanish nationals injured in

New Orleans in

185

1

;

the U.S. Civil War; and the decision of

the Great Powers in resolving the Greek-Turkish conflict on 15 January 1869. 13

made no

In contrast to Phillimore, Bluntschi
writings of Grotius

reference to the "classical"

and Vattel. Instead, he merely stated that

protection existed and cited several supporting examples.
the

above

discussion,

however,

Bluntschli

—

a right

As can be seen from

Phillimore

like

and duty of

—apparently

viewed the right of protection as involving principally diplomatic, rather than
measures.

forcible,

C. Bonfils. Writing in 1894, the
right of a nation to protect

its

Frenchman

Bonfils similarly recognized the

nationals abroad stating,

tionals to the authorities of the country in

"To recommend

which they have established

residence, to defend their interests in diplomatic notes, to
for the
it is

wrongs which they have suffered

... is

Although the above formulation may appear
his principal

concern

it is

clear

from

demand

na-

their

reparation

not to intervene; on the contrary,

to recognize the sovereignty of the State addressed."

diplomatic protection,

its

14

to support only the principle of

Bonfils' description of State practice that

with forcible protection. As examples, Bonfils cited

lay

the French blockade of Argentine ports in 1838-1840, 15 as well as the

initial

combined action of England, Spain, and France against Mexico in
According to Bonfils, this latter example began as a joint effort to ob-

stages of the

1861.

16

tain reparation for
ico's

into

damages

compliance with

its

to nationals of the three States

international agreements.

an attempt by Napoleon

to install

and

When

to ensure

Mex-

the effort turned

an empire under Maximilian of Austria,

the character of the action changed from the protection of nationals to that of
flagrant intervention. 17

Turning to the question of the

right to protect nationals

governments, Bonfils again relied on State practice, citing the

foreign

Palmerston Circular. 18 He observed that

have intervened
." 19
.

.

u

[i]n fact, the

in favor of their nationals

ernments, against weak
States.

who are creditors of

states,

As an example

who had

European Governments

lent

money

to foreign gov-

incapable of resisting, but not against strong

of such intervention, Bonfils cited the control ex-

erted by France and Britain over Egypt in 1876 to protect the investments of
their nationals. 20 Clearly, for Bonfils the right of forcible protection

to both creditor

and property

extended

rights of a State's nationals as well as the protec-

tion of their lives.

10
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D. Pradier-Fodere. The Frenchman Pradier-Fodere, writing in 1885, described
the right of forcible protection of nationals and their property abroad as rooted
in the writings of the "classical" publicists, particularly Vattel.

Pradier-Fodere,
countries by

" [i] t is

the duty of all states to protect their nationals in foreign

means which international law

all

According to

authorizes."

21

Citing Vattel, he

stated further that States possess "the right to obtain justice by force,

not be done otherwise."

if it

can-

22

upon the exercise
of the right of protection. Thus, a foreigner who had become domiciled in a
State had less justification to call upon his government for protection than a
transient foreigner. 23 In addition, he observed that in most cases protection was
accomplished more effectively by diplomatic demands for compensation than
by forcible self-help. 24 Nevertheless, he pointed to certain examples where rePradier-Fodere, however, recognized certain restrictions

sort to force or the threat thereof

was

justified as a protective

measure. In

this

regard he cited the Anglo-French control of Egypt in 1876 to protect the interests of British

and French

intervention in the

E. Westlake.

creditors, 25 as well as the threatened

Ottoman Empire

in

1859 to remodel

its

Anglo-French

financial laws. 26

Westlake, an Englishman writing in 1904, offered an extensive

dis-

cussion of the right to protect nationals abroad under the heading of "denial of
justice." "If [foreign States] are

trative

wanting either to the

judicial or to the adminis-

department," he argued, "the state to which a foreigner belongs has a

claim to step in for his protection which often has this in
claims, that the justice

which the foreign power demands

measurable by definite rules."

27

Westlake cited Vattel,

28

sition,

pean

civilization,"

government.

on the

30

29

and

Westlake,

In support of this

"the best will

on the

for its subject

it

is

several

statements

like Bluntschli,

by

officials

of

U.S.

the

recognized an important limitation

"During an insurrection," he stated,

part of the state government, backed by the best laws,

not usual for a state to indemnify

can have no better claim than nationals
." 31
recognized as one for indemnity.
foreigners

.

Westlake

not

somewhat amorphous propo-

unable to prevent or to punish regrettable occurrences.

circumstances

is

the "general conscience of the peoples of Euro-

right to protect nationals abroad.

often

common with political

its

own

In

is

those

subjects,

and

in a matter not generally

.

also considered the right of protection in the case of contractual

claims. Examining,

first,

U.S. practice in this regard, he noted the adoption of a

cautious policy. Citing statements by Secretary of State Seward in 1866 and

11
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Secretary of State Fish in 1870, Westlake concluded that U.S. nationals invest-

had "assumed the risk" of such ventures, and that the U.S.
government normally would not intervene on their behalf. 32 Here can be seen
the developmemt of the concept that in financial matters, (contracts,
debtor-creditor relationships) that States would not intervene with force on being in foreign States

half of a national

F.

who had

contracted with a foreign State or one of its citizens.

Oppenheim. Oppenheim, another Englishman writing in 1905, recognized

the validity of the right of forcible protection. According to
a universally recognized customary rule of the

holds a right of protection over

its

was discretionary, not obligatory.

which the
reprisals,

right

"Law of Nations" every State

citizens abroad.

34

Oppenheim, "[b]y

33
.

.

.

In his view, this right

Oppenheim recognized

means by
retortion and

several

might be enforced, including diplomatic notes,

and intervention or war where necessary. 35

Oppenheim

offered

little

guidance about which protective technique was

appropriate in a particular case. Instead, he merely stated that "[e] very thing

depends upon the merits of the individual case and must be
tion of the State concerned."

36

left

to the discre-

However, he did mention certain

criteria that a

State might consider in exercising

its

discretion, including

"whether the

wronged foreigner was only traveling through or had settled down in the country, whether his behavior has been provocative or not, how far the foreign Government identified itself with the acts of officials or subjects, and the like." 37
G. Moore. Writing in 1905 on the subject of U.S. diplomacy, John Bassett

Moore

also addressed the question of

to protect nationals

the proposition that

and
u

whether

their property abroad.

[a]mong the

rules of

who formulated

forcible self-help could be used
38

Underlying

his discussion

conduct prescribed

for the

was

United

none was conceived
to be more fundamental or more distinctively American than that which for39
bade intervention in the political affairs of other nations." However, Moore
u
maintained that [t]he right of the government to intervene for the protection
of its citizens in foreign lands and on the high seas never was doubted; nor was
4
such action withheld in proper cases." Moore supplemented this brief analysis
with a careful description of a large number of instances of intervention for
States by the statesmen

such protective purposes.

H. Stockton.

its

foreign policy,

41

A brief discussion of the right of forcible protection of the lives and

property of nationals abroad

is

afforded by the

work of Charles H. Stockton,

a

U.S. naval officer and legal scholar writing in 1911. Departing from the
12
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traditional emphasis

upon diplomatic

International

pressures to protect nationals abroad,

Stockton proposed that special measures be

"weak

states with unstable

Law

utilized in situations involving

governments." In such situations, he argued,

"it at

times occurs that citizens abroad must be protected at once, not by diplomatic
representation; there
force."

42

is

not time for that, but by the employment of naval

Stockton invoked

regulations governing the use of naval force.

measures that might be

Navy

as authority for his position the appropriate
43

Stockton also discussed

justified in the case of

briefly

another class of governments,

the "semi-civilized or barbarous." In these situations, "intervention by force

behalf of citizens domiciled or sojourning there

employment of naval

these countries the
protection,

I.

added thereto

The

Clark.

at times

is

more common matter. In
the principal means of such
a

by landing of military detachments."

right of a State to protect

was spelled out in considerable

forces

is

detail

its

by

on

44

nationals and their property abroad

J.
45

Reuben

Clark, writing as Solicitor

Department of State in 1912. According to Clark, the existence
of such a right often was obscured by the tendency that many international law
writers exhibited to apply the same strictures to the protection of nationals
for the U.S.

abroad that they applied to

political interventions.

46

When a State's motive in

employing forcible self-help was simply "the protection of citizens or subjects.

.

government concerned is willing or able itself to afford the protection," he believed it not subject to the same criticisms as a purely political intervention. From an analysis of the writings of the many authorities cited in his
48
study, Clark concluded that:
until the
47

There

is

considerable authority for the proposition that such interposition by one

State in the internal affairs of another State for the purpose of affording adequate

protection to

its

citizens resident in the other, as well as for the protection of the

property of such citizens,

upon,

is

in accord with,

is

not only not improper, but, on the contrary,

and

is

is

based

the exercise of a right recognized by international

law.49

The remainder of Clark's study comprises an extensive
which the United States had acted in accordance with

listing

of instances in

this right of forcible

protection.

J.

Hodges. Henry Hodges, a U.S. author writing in 1915, discussed the right of

forcible protection

under the rubric of "non-political intervention."

fiable rationales for

50

His

such intervention consisted of the protection of

justi-

citizens,

the denial of justice and the protection of missionaries. All three of these

13
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categories include situations,

which could

fall

Abroad

within the principle of forcible

protection.

Regarding
"

[

his rationale for the protection of citizens,

w] hen order

the

is

neglected by, or

more advanced

is

Hodges

stated that

impossible for the foreign government, then

state has a right to intervene for the protection of the

life

51

and property of its citizens." According to Hodges the measures a protecting
State could take might involve, "the establishment and enforcement of some
degree of law and order in that community." 52

With

reference to the "denial of justice" justification for intervention,

Hodges adopted the view of Secretary of State Bayard, who had stated "[t]hat
the State to which a foreigner belongs may intervene for his protection when
he has been denied ordinary justice in a foreign country, and also in the case of
a plain violation of the substance of natural justice

recognized."

53

a proposition universally

In contrast to the protection of citizens justification, Hodges'

discussion of denial of justice appears to be geared
forcible

is

measures of protection.

more

to diplomatic than to

54

"Respecting the protection of missionaries," Hodges noted, "the United
States shows about the

same consideration

classes of citizens resident abroad."

55

as she does in respect to other

Thus, according to Hodges, "[t]he United

do some of the European

States does not go so far in these matters as

which undertake
ties,

assume a limited protectorship over Christian communi-

to

especially in Turkey." 56 In addition, the

regard, such as the Caroline case

is

failed,

through

emergency where the

inability or unwillingness, to afford

consisted primarily of a description of U.S. practice with a

The closest he came

international law was to cite the

"when confined

that

for the protection of citizens or

tection to the persons or property of the foreigners in question."

that

suggest

Edwin Borchard observed in 1915

their property in foreign countries in cases of

ical discussion.

this

limited to diplomatic as opposed to

army or navy has frequently been used

ernment has

in 1893,

57

58

K. Borchard. In discussing U.S. practice,
'[t]he

examples cited by Hodges in

and Pelew Islands dispute

that such protection under those facts
forcible measures.

states

local gov-

adequate pro39

His analysis

minimum of theoret-

to justifying such forcible protection

under

Memorandum of J. Reuben Clark which stated

to the purpose of assuring the safety of citizens abroad, or

exacting redress for a delinquent failure to afford local protection, the action

must be considered not
position."

as a case of intervention,

60

14

but as non-belligerent inter-
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purposes for which U.S. military personnel had

listed at least five

been landed

International

for "non-belligerent interposition" reasons: (1) the protection of

U.S. citizens in "disturbed localities";

(2)

the punishment of natives for injuries

to U.S. citizens; (3) the suppression of local riots; (4) the collection of indemni-

payment of
claims.
He observed that most of these landings had occurred in Latin America as the result of the "hegemony of the United States on this continent and
ties;

and

(5)

the seizure of custom houses as security for the

61

the force of the

" 62

Monroe Doctrine

Borchard indicated that such landings

had not always been against the will of the local government; indeed, sometimes they actually had been carried out in response to an express invitation. 63

As examples

of "non-belligerent interposition" involving the use of force,

Borchard cited the joint action of the United States and other nations in China
in

1900

at the time of the

Boxer Rebellion, 64

troops in Nicaragua in 1910.
tions

65

He

as well as the landing of American

maintained, however, that such interven-

were "by accident or unavoidable consequence.

pal design.

66

.

.

,

rather than by princi-

This statement however, seems to be more political than legal

pronunciation.

Borchard concluded
sional action

his analysis

with an examination of whether congres-

was required to authorize the use of the armed forces

tection of U.S. citizens abroad.

67

for the pro-

His conclusion was that such authorization

was unnecessary given the then-predominant view that "the Executive has un-

armed forces of the United States for protective
purposes abroad in any manner and on any occasion he considers expedient." 68
Thus, in contrast to most of the writers discussed previously, Borchard avoided
limited authority to use the

any detailed

justification of the right of protection

under international law.

In-

had developed and attempted to draw
generalizations therefrom. What emerged was the view that forcible protection
was justified, at least for certain "non-belligerent" objectives.
stead,

he analyzed U.S. practice

L. Fauchille. In a discussion

man Fauchille,

as

it

of intervention and international law, the French-

writing in 1922, noted that the use of force to protect nationals

abroad was a recognized exception to the established principle of international
law condemning intervention.
vention "to force a

He noted that many writers thought it not inter-

state, either

by

reprisals or the force of arms, to fulfill its in-

ternational obligations or to compensate for an injustice or an insult.

There

is,

then, according to these writers, coercion, violence, but not intervention."^

As an example

of such use of force, Fauchille cited the combined action of

Great Britain, Spain and France against Mexico in 1861 to obtain compensation for injuries to their nationals

and

to ensure the fulfillment by

15
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contractual obligations vis-a-vis the respective governments. 70 In addition,
Fauchille cited the
bellion in 1900 to

combined action against the Chinese during the Boxer Reprotect the diplomatic representatives and nationals of the

countries concerned, 71 as well as the 1902 blockade of Venezuela by Great Brit-

Germany and Italy to obtain payment on behalf of their nationals who were
victims of civil wars in Venezuela. 72 Thus the views of Fauchille represent a furain,

ther recognition of the right of forcible protection at the levels of both theory

and State

practice.

M. Hyde. Recognition of the right of forcible protection is evident in the work
3
of Charles Cheney Hyde, writing in 1922. Starting from the premise that forcible intervention by one State in the affairs of another was illegal, Hyde recognized

exceptions,

several

nationals.'

be shown

4

.

With
.

.

including

reference to the latter principle,

that

.

.

.

and the protection of
Hyde wrote that "[i]f it can

self-defense

acts [of a foreign State] are immediately injurious to the

nationals of a particular foreign State grounds for interference by

acknowledged."

75

It is

collective, rather
"It is

the

mode

interesting to note, however, that

might be

Hyde seemed to prefer

than individual, measures to accomplish such interference.

of collective interference, through an established agency

which characterize [s] the existing tendency and

ment of a sounder

.

.

.

hope of the develop-

afford [s]

practice than has hitherto prevailed."

"collective interference"

Nations and

it

76

Hyde's principle of

proved to be the cornerstone of present day United

NATO actions throughout the world.

Hyde noted

several instances in

which U.S.

military forces

have engaged in

such interference for the protection of nationals, notably the collective measures in the
in the

Boxer Rebellion in 1900, 77 the unilateral action of U.S. naval forces

punishment of natives on Formosa

forces in Nicaragua

and Honduras

present in most of the cases noted by

in 1867, 78

1910 and 191

in

Hyde was

and the landings of U.S.
1.

79

A common

that such landings were

element

on "for-

eign territory which, in most instances, has been that of a country not familiar

with European civilization, and not, at the time, recognized for

member of the

family of nations. 80 This

forcible protection

was easier to justify

comment suggests

all

purposes as a

that, in

Hyde's view,

in instances involving acts in States not

adhering to the standards of conduct observed by the more "advanced" Euro-

pean

States.

N. Winfield. In

his discussion in

1924 of both valid and invalid grounds

for in-

tervention in international law, Winfield, an Englishman, rejected as unsound
the use of nationality as a justification for intervention.

16

He

observed that such
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arguments tend to present themselves in two forms:

"(i)

Law

Where

the interveners

whose benefit they inter[and] (ii) Where the grievance is not that there exists such an identity
vene
as between the interveners and the party, but that it is lacking as between the
latter and the State of which it forms a constituent part and from which it seeks
are of a nationality identical with that of the party for
.

.

.

violently to dissociate itself."

As

to the

first,

81

Winfield saw only a moral justification, as international prac-

not recognize any legal justification.

tice did

He

cited the intervention of Vic-

and Garibaldi in Sicily in 1860 in this regard. 82 As to the
second, Winfield similarly saw no legal justification, citing two serious objections to its validity. The first was that, if admitted "war might be raised in every
tor

Emmanuel

II

corner of the world in

its

vindication." 83 Second, Winfield argued,

" [i] t is

prob-

would
benefit any
of the assisted races, much more whether the remote and doubtful good to be
derived from them would outweigh the evils of what must almost certainly
prove a long and bloody struggle." 84
lematical whether a single one of the above interventions

Thus, while

it

is

somewhat unclear whether the

.

.

.

situations posited by

Winfield exactly correlate with the right of protection situations discussed by
other writers, his general conclusion as to the doctrine's invalidity certainly
in

O.

marked contrast

is

to their views.

Offutt. In his study of instances in

which the armed

forces of the

United

been used for the protection of U.S. nationals and their property
abroad, Milton Offutt, writing in 1928, offered a brief discussion of the interna-

States have

tional legal principles justifying

such use of force.

He began by noting the obvi-

ous, namely, that "[t]he right of a state to protect by force

foreign country

when sudden

safety of their lives

on

is

shown

a question

international law."

His analysis,

citizens living in a

disturbances in the foreign state threaten the

and property, and when the government under whose

diction they reside has
able protection,

its

itself

juris-

unable or unwilling to afford them reason-

which has engaged the attention of most

writers

85

like that of

most previous

writers, 86

concluded

that,

when

viewed

as "non-political" intervention, the use of force for the protection of na-

tionals

may be justified. Thus,

Offutt observed that "[w]hen, however, the dis-

between political and non-political intervention has been appreciated,
some authorities have held that the use of force for the protection of its citizens
tinction

abroad becomes not only a right but, in certain cases, a duty of a sovereign
state;

and that the

itself

87

aggrieved."

state against

which such force

is

used may not justly consider

In support of this assertion, he relied
17

upon

a

number of the
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authorities discussed previously in this chapter, including

and Pradier-Fodere.
P.

Dunn. Frederick Dunn, writing

in the

decade preceding World

Bonfils,

War

II,

of-

89

on the right of forcible protection. Although the
work was on a State's right to protect its nationals abroad

fered another perspective

central focus of his

Oppenheim,

88

diplomatically, he did recognize the existence of a right to forcible protection in

certain circumstances. "It

is

only occasionally," observed Dunn, "where aliens

which the normal methods of diplomacy cannot extricate them, or where diplomatic negotiation for some
are placed in a situation of grave danger from

other reason
place."

is

believed to be useless, that forceful intervention

is

apt to take

90

Although there can be detected

in

Dunn's work an undercurrent of disap-

proval of this type of forcible self-help, he recognized
ing international legal

and

political context.

its

validity given the exist-

According to Dunn,

u

[i]n the

present stage of organization of the international community, the enforcement
of legal obligations

is still

left in large

measure to the individual

states,

i.e.,

to

what is called 'self-help' (a situation that naturally favors the stronger as against
the weaker states) Armed intervention is only one of various means of enforcement that have been developed." 91
.

Thus, although the primary focus of Dunn's work was on the right to diplomatic protection, he recognized the existence of a right of forcible protection in
cases

that

where the former proved

ineffective. It

is

important to note, however,

Dunn viewed this right not as an absolute one, but as one formed from the

exigencies of the existing international legal and political system.

Q. Hindmarsh. Representative of the thought on forcible protection of nationals abroad in the decade preceding World War II are the observations of Hindmarsh writing in 1933. 92 His analysis was two-fold, the first step being a
recognition of the frequent use of military and naval forces to accomplish such
protection,

and the second step being an exposition and

tional legal principles allegedly justifying

critique of the interna-

such actions.

Hindmarsh recognized that "[t]he use of military or naval force against an
offending state to compel recognition oi alleged international obligations has
been a frequent practice of powerful states." 93 As examples, he singled out as
representative a number of instances of forcible protection by the United
States, particularly those instances analyzed by Offutt. 94 In addition,

Hindmarsh pointed
the Italian

however,

to the actions of other powerful States of the day, including

bombardment

of the Greek island of Corfu in 1923
18

95

and the
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Japanese occupation of Chinese territory in Manchuria in 193 1. 96 Hindmarsh

concluded

his survey of State practice

in a very primitive stage of law

with the sound observation that "[only]

can such

self-help sanctions be tolerated.

Their

and vengeance, evades impartial judgment, and retards the free development of an international legal system. The
continuation of self-help in modern international law is as much an anachroexercise permits the confusion of law

nism

as private

vengeance in the

Hindmarsh's analysis of the

was characterized by
ued

legal relations of individuals." 97

legal

underpinnings of the right of protection

his rejection of precedent as a justification for the contin-

validity of the right of protection in the

modern

international political and

legal system.

Measures of force short of war were constantly employed during the
Nineteenth Century and were

justified as reprisals.

Thus,

after a

century of

became recognized as part of customary
States which employed reprisals defended them as necessary,

practice the validity of such measures

international law.

ultimate sanctions, short of war, for the enforcement of international rights.

some support from vague theoretical
self-defense, and independence. Thus

Finally, the practice of reprisals received

concepts such as the rights of existence,

custom, necessity, and fundamental right were appealed to in order to

continued resort to State self-help in time of peace.
jurists to

the possibility that

new

Little

justify

thought was given by

conditions of international

life

might render

custom obsolete and devoid of practical justification, that new and more effective means of enforcing law might be found, and further, that fundamental
rights are always conditional

Hindmarsh argued

upon fundamental

duties. 98

that such a rationale, while applicable to the Nineteenth

Century system of independent

political units,

was no longer appropriate in

a

System increasingly characterized by interdependence rather than independence among States. Accordingly, in his view, the development of an international organization to settle disputes

Century principles of unilateral
ternational legal

and

among States,

forcible self-help,

rather than the Nineteenth

would best serve modern

political conditions. 99

R. Accioly. Yet another pre-World

War

II

view of the right of protection was

that of the Brazilian jurist Accioly, writing in 1940.

exposition of the right of a State to protect

its

10 °

Following a traditional

nationals abroad through

diplomacy, Accioly proceeded to discuss a State's remedies

matic

efforts fail.

in-

when such

diplo-

"Should the local authorities declare themselves powerless to

grant the claimed protection or demonstrate their indifference to the claims,

an international conflict may

arise;

and

if

19

there

is

shown the

impossibility of an
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amicable solution to the dispute, the claimant State has the right of recourse to
coercive measures."

111

War II,

Thus, Accioly, on the eve of World

demonstrated the continued ac-

ceptance of the broad right to use forcible protection, not limited to situations

wherein the

As

lives

and property of a

State's nationals

were immediately

at risk.

the preceding discussion reveals, the juridical underpinnings of interna-

tional legal principles justifying the use of force to protect nationals

property abroad are rooted in the writings of the "classical" writers
tional law, given the

many references

and

on

their

interna-

to the views of Grotius relative to the im-

portance of the citizen to the State and the right of one State to enforce
rights against

another State, by force

necessary.

Wolffs thoughts, particularly with reference

Similarly,

use of force to enforce a State's rights,
writers

if

on the

also

subject of forcible protection.

obligation to protect

other States,

103

105

its

to the validity of the

have influenced many of the
104

Vattel's position

citizen, albeit limited

its

102

on the

later

State's

by a concern for the rights of

finds restatement in the views of subsequent writers

on the

pro-

tection of nationals abroad. 106

From

this cursory

survey of some of the leading publicists, there can be seen

the gradual development of a principle justifying the forcible protection of nationals
II

and

their property abroad. Nevertheless,

by the outbreak of World

War

the desirability of forcible protection was being questioned by a growing

number of writers.
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Chapter

III

State Practice During the
Pre-United Nations Period

The

State practices reviewed in Chapter

which many of the
pronouncements of the era.
against

III

provide the background

traditionalist writers

based and

justified their

l

A. French Blockade of Argentina. 1838-1 840. Following the adoption of an extremely restrictive import and export tariff policy by the Argentine government

many European powers whose nationals were trading with Argengrew quite concerned. Under Article IV of the Treaty of Amity, Com-

in the 1830s,

tina

merce, and Navigation between Great Britain and the United Provinces of Rio

de

la Plata,

signed at Buenos Aires on 2 February 1825, British merchants had

been accorded most-favored-nation

status.

2

In 1836,

when a frustrated French

diplomat trying to negotiate a similar agreement with the Argentine govern-

ment threatened naval intervention
edy the

alleged

to roll

back

stiff

duties, as well as to

rem-

mistreatment and imprisonment of French nationals,

Argentina responded with an even more stringent

tariff law.

3

Thereupon,

France suspended diplomatic relations and several years later sent a

fleet

under

Admiral Leblanc to initiate a blockade of the capital, Buenos Aires. The blockade was lifted after two years pursuant to a Convention between France and
Argentina that was signed on 29 October 1840. 4 While the specific claims of
France with respect to the protection of her nationals went unmentioned, both
States agreed to accord the nationals of each other most-favored-nation treat-

ment in the future.
The French blockade had a severe impact on Argentina. Between the second half of 1837 and the second half of 1838, imports dropped in value from 19
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to 4 million paper pesos. Indirectly, however, the blockade, together with
earlier

blockade by Brazil in 1826 and a subsequent joint blockade by France

and Great Britain
try.

an

When

greatly.

in 1845,

had a beneficial

effect

on the Argentine beef indus-

the slaughter of animals for export stopped, cattle herds increased

Where

there had been an estimated 3 to 4 million cattle in 1837, the

heads increased to 10 to 12 million head by 1850. 5

Although

Bonfils cited this incident as illustrative of a doctrine permitting

forcible protection, 6

from the perspective of France

it

appears that the block-

ade was merely a military measure with the political and economic objectives of

advancing France's commercial interests in Argentina. Perhaps more importantly France

was defending a "point of honor" by not submitting to the

of the Argentine government.

The

policies

claims o{ French nationals were of tertiary

importance. 7

B. Great Britain, Spain

ongoing in Mexico in the

late

8

86 1. During the internal conflict
1850s, foreign nationals were indiscriminately in-

and France

in

Mexico.

1

and murdered. Moreover, various financial obligations
owed foreign nationals by the Mexican government were not met. The three
major States that had nationals injured and debts unpaid Great Britain,
Spain, and France
collectively agreed in the Convention of London, signed
9
31 October 1861, to intervene in Mexico with forces of sufficient size to seize
and occupy different fortresses and military positions on the coast o( Mexico.
Article II of the Convention specified that:
sulted, robbed, injured,

—

—

The High Contracting

Parties

engage not to seek

for themselves,

through the

employment of the coercive measures contemplated by the present convention,
any acquisition o( territory, nor any particular advantage, nor to exercise in the

Mexico any influence tending to abridge the right of the
Mexican nation freely to decide upon and establish the form of its government. 10

internal affairs of

The

Convention agreed that the expeditionary forces
should consist of 6,000 Spaniards and 3,000 Frenchmen, with Great Britain
contributing a naval division and a landing force of 700 Marines.

On

signatories of the

14

December 1861, the Spanish fleet sailed

into the harbor of Vera Cruz

and three days later disembarked troops that entered the city. The combined
French and British expedition arrived at Vera Cruz on 7 January 1862, and at
once began to disembark more troops. 11
Subsequent conferences between the three Powers revealed growing dissension over the purpose of the intervention. France revealed intentions

26

beyond
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the mere exaction of damages for wrongs done to
Britain

and Spain continued

to adhere to Article

II

its

nationals, while Great

of the Convention of Lon-

don. Nevertheless, negotiations were initiated with the Mexican govern-

ment. 12 As the negotiations proceeded, however, the lack of consensus of the

Convention emerged. France sent substantial reinforcements, alguard against any disaster to the French troops as they marched into

parties to the

legedly to

the interior of the country. Additional disputes arose over France's introduction back into the country of exiled

monarchy

The

in opposition to the

final

Mexicans who had supported the

two ruling Constitutionalists.

prior

13

rupture occurred at a conference held between the three Powers

on 9 April 1862. Great

and Spain declared that, if France did not disassociate herself from the exiled Mexicans and continued to support the exiles'
determination not to take part in pending negotiations with the Mexican government, they would withdraw their troops from Mexico. When the French refused, the British and Spanish terminated their role in the intervention,
lowering their flags at Vera Cruz at sunset on 24 April 1862. France then initiated an independent policy aimed at the installation of a French-controlled
monarch under Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria. 14
Britain

Both Bonfils and Fauchille cited

this incident as

an example of the permissi-

ble use of force by States to rectify injustices to their nationals. 15

It

does not ap-

pear, however, that the intervening States ever justified their actions in such

Convention of London, though, was the notion that
an intervention for such purposes was permissible if conducted within narrow
limits. That is to say, forcible intervention to rectify wrongs was legitimate so
long as it did not severely impair the sovereignty of the country against which
the action was undertaken. 16
legal terms. Implicit in the

C. Great Britain and Abyssinia. 1867- 1868.

11

Following a period of

civil

war,

Theodore (Kassa) became Emperor of Abyssinia on 7 February 1855. Two Englishmen, Walter Plowden, who later was named British Consul to Abyssinia,
and John Bell, aided Theodore's rise to, and consolidation of, power. Both
Plowden and Bell, however, were killed during an uprising against Theodore in
1860. After their deaths, the Emperor began to lose hold over his army resulting in his "killing and burning alive thousands in a desperate attempt to save
face by his frightfulness."

In

November

18

1861, the British government, having scant information re-

garding the situation in Abyssinia, decided to send Captain C.

Cameron

as

Plowden's successor.

19

Upon

receiving

Cameron

Duncan

in July 1862, 20

the Emperor told the British consul the persons that had murdered Plowden
27
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and

Bell

tians.

21

had been

and that he intended

slain

In a letter to

an Abyssinian Embassy
mails, elicited
tion,

no

to crush the

Queen Victoria, Theodore

reply,

in

23

Great Britain.

Theodore took

22

it

Abroad

suggested the establishment of

When
an

as

Turks and the Egyp-

this letter,

delayed in the

insult to himself

and

his na-

summarily imprisoning Cameron and certain other Englishmen. 24

May 1864, the British government sent Hormuzd Rassam, an assistant to
Colonel W. L. Merewether, Political Resident at Aden, to obtain the release of
Cameron and his fellow prisoners. 25 After many delays, 26 Rassam met with
In

Theodore on 28 January 1866, and the latter announced the release of
Cameron and his companions the following day. 27 In July 1866, however, the
King again imprisoned Cameron, along with Rassam and 60 other Europeans,
"on the pretext that
ing troops to

The

.

.

make war

British

[the British]

.

against him."

Government ha[d] an intention of send28

government responded

to Theodore's actions by sending a res-

cue expedition under Sir Robert Napier that arrived in Abyssinia in 1867. 29

Overcoming the rugged terrain, Napier's expedition finally encountered Theodore's army at Arogee on 10 April 1868. The British, possessing modern weapons with superior firepower, soon overwhelmed Theodore's forces and entered
the fortress at Magdala on Easter Monday, 1868. Theodore committed suicide
upon their entry. 30
Although the Emperor's

rivals

urged Napier to

settle the succession,

contented himself with the rescue of the prisoners and began
the coast.

31

his

Napier

march back

to

When Napier left Abyssinia, in May 1868, the country immediately

plunged into

civil

war among

rival chieftains.

Bluntschli cited this incident as illustrative of a "state's right and duty to

protect

and

its

nationals abroad by

all

in this case by the use of force.

mention
stead,

it

[i] t is

this international

means authorized by

international law," 32

Great Britain, however, did not

law argument in

its

explicitly

ultimatum to Theodore.

In-

advanced the broad rationale that
impossible for the

Queen any longer

to

endure such conduct on the part of

your Majesty, and Her Majesty has therefore given orders that a military force

.

.

should without delay enter your dominions, and obtain from you by force a
concession which you have hitherto withheld from friendly representation. 33

The
its

clear import of this language, of course,

is

that Great Britain considered

decision to use force to be a legitimate alternative to "friendly representa-

tion" and/or diplomacy.

28
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Honduras. 1873.

command

M

In the

summer

Honduran forces
at Omoa, Hondu-

of 1873,

of a General Stracber seized the castle

imprisoned the British subjects resident there and destroyed most of their

August 1873, when the British Man-of-War Niobe arrived at
Omoa, its Captain made several demands of General Stracber, including a
$100,000 indemnity for the losses sustained by British subjects, the immediate
property. In

surrender of the British subjects held prisoner and a 21 -gun salute to the English flag.

General Stracber replied that the demands were unjust, as he had no money,

was not responsible

for the British subjects

and that

responsibility rest with the

Honduran government. The captain of the Niobe thereupon reduced the indemnity portion of the demand to $50,000, giving General Stracber until 2
p.m. on 19 August to comply with it and the other two demands. If not satisfied, the Captain warned that the Niobe would bombard the castle. When a satisfactory response was not forthcoming, the bombardment began at 3:45 p.m.,
continuing until the following day
British

at last accepting the

demands, turned over the British prisoners and signed a document

binding the

Clark
als

when General Stracber,

Honduran government

listed this incident as

to pay

all

the losses claimed.

an example of the use of force to protect nation-

by States other than the United States. 35 Again, although Great Britain ap-

no international law argument in support of its use of force, the
circumstances oi this incident illustrate the readiness with which a decision to
employ force to protect British subjects abroad was reached, a readiness preparently offered

sumably buttressed by the belief that such an action was compatible with the

norms of international
E.

law.

Great Britain and France

Said, Egypt in
cial

in Egypt.

1876- 1879.

36

Under the

rule of Mohamed

1854 granted a concession to Ferdinand de Lesseps, a retired

offi-

of the French diplomatic service, for the construction of a ship canal across

the Isthmus oi Suez.

The

grant of the Suez Canal concession was the

first

epi-

sode in an era of extravagant development and foreign speculation in Egypt.

Egyptian

rulers, in their

rush to encourage foreign merchants,

them with short-term loans and acted
government monopolies,

greatly

as

supplied

import and export agents for Egyptian

extended the freedom of Europeans from the

processes of Egyptian civil and criminal law.

them

who

naturally acted as a powerful

magnet

The

privileged position accorded

to attract persons

from

all

over Eu-

rope to Egypt. Between 1854 and 1874, the

dent in

number of European nationals resiEgypt increased from roughly 15,000 to 85,000. More important than

the numerical increase, however, was that European interests

29

—

in

many

cases
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economic

lite

— acquired

Abroad

a virtual stranglehold

on the

of the country.

who succeeded Mohamed Said in 1863, sought simultaneously to
modernize Egypt, to enrich his own extensive private estates and to establish
an enlarged Egyptian Empire. He attempted to accomplish these goals with
money borrowed from foreign merchants and through long-term loans conIsmail,

tracted with foreign banking houses.

However by 1875

Ismail's financial posi-

had deteriorated so greatly that he asked the British government not only
assistance in managing the receipts and revenues of Egypt, but also for ad-

tion
for

vice

on

The

all

financial matters.

British

government

sent, as

an envoy to Egypt, the Paymaster-General,

Stephen Cave. Cave's report recommended that a substantial loan be made to

between Great Britain
number of nationals who were creditors of

aid Egyptian finances. Following additional negotiations

and France, which
Egypt, a joint

had a large
proposal was presented
also

government, with an

to the Egyptian

agreement being reached on 14 November 1875. Under the settlement a substantial portion of the Egyptian debt

tionals

was liquidated and

British

and French na-

were appointed to a number of high financial posts within the Egyptian

government. Pradier-Fodere cited

this incident as a "very striking

example of

foreign intervention in the internal affairs of another state with a view to the

protection of the nationals of the intervening powers." 37

Although the example follows a discussion of the
nationals,

it is

right to use force to protect

clear that the actions of Great Britain

and France involved only

diplomatic, rather than forcible, measures. Bonfils also referred to this incident
in his discussion of the protection of nationals abroad. 38 For

the fact that "European
als

who had

lent

money

Governments have intervened

of resisting, but not against strong States.

though not

.

.

it

illustrated

in favor of their nation-

to foreign governments, against
." 39

him

weak

states,

incapable

Certainly this incident,

illustrative oi the principle of forcible protection, indicates

al-

once

again that strong States were inclined to intervene with weaker ones, financially as well as forcibly, to protect

F.

the interests of their nationals.

France and Portugal. 1893-1894*° Pursuant to a decree of 9

November

1893,

the Portuguese government declared the liquidation of the Portuguese Railway

Company, many of whose creditors were foreigners, including numerous
French citizens. Although the decree provided that a commission was to be
formed to direct the disposition of the company's

members represented the

assets,

only two of

its

nine

interests of the foreign creditors. Coincidentally, the

commission's decision, published on 5 January 1894, had the effect of favoring
30
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the Portuguese government and certain preferred creditors to the detriment of
the foreign creditors.
Frustrated by this turn of events, the French creditors asked their govern-

ment

company's

for assistance in obtaining a fair share of the

French government promptly adopted

their claims

assets.

The

and vigorously complained

to Portugal. 41 Indeed, France

went so far as to threaten the use of force should
the wronged creditors not be compensated satisfactorily. 42 The Portuguese
government quickly acceded to the French demands and compensated the
French creditors in a more equitable manner. Thus, although force actually
was not employed in this instance, it certainly was contemplated by France as
the ultimate means of obtaining redress for its creditors.
an example of the use by States of the
nationals who were creditors of foreign govern-

Bonfils referred to this incident as

threat of force to protect their

ments. 43

He viewed

this type of protection as peculiarly susceptible to unfortu-

nate consequences in terms of popular resentment against foreigners and the
straining of international relations. 44

G. Boxer Rebellion. China.

1

900.

45

The

last

decade of the Nineteenth Century

was marked by violent anti-colonial agitation in China. Behind much of this
turbulence was the Society of Harmonious Fists, or "Boxers." Although opposed to Christianity and Europeans, the Boxers' prime goal was to evict the

Manchus from

Throne and end the Ching dynasty that seemed incapable
of preserving the Chinese Empire intact. By 1899, however, the Boxers increasthe

ingly directed their attacks against the "foreign devils,"

the real source of China's

who they believed were

ills.

During the spring of 1900, attacks on foreigners in China,
stigation of the Boxers,

became

largely at the in-

By 9 June the threat to
Peking, had become very real. News

increasingly frequent.

the foreign legations located in the capital,

of such danger prompted the governments affected (primarily Great Britain,
France, Russia, Germany, the United States, Japan,

and Austria-Huntake any action deemed

Italy,

gary) to direct their naval forces in the area of China to

commander of the British fleet, assembled an international force of about 2,000 men on 10 June to
proceed to Peking to defend the legations. The force made extremely slow

necessary to save the legations. Admiral Seymour, the

had destroyed the railway lines.
On 15 June, when it had become apparent that the relief force could advance
no further, the decision was made to fall back to the coast.
progress toward Peking, however, as the Boxers

Meanwhile, the attacks on the legations in Peking had increased in intensity,

with the

German Minister having been killed. Upon hearing this news,
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Taku

attacked and captured Chinese government forts at

in order to establish a coastal

beachhead. Next, in mid-July, they captured the

where another group of foreigners was endangered. The latter
part of July and early August were spent in building up an expeditionary force
to rescue the legations. On 4 August, a relief column, numbering about 17,000
men, left Tientsin for Peking, arriving on 14 August, 1900.

city of Tientsin,

number of punitive expeditions to
areas with a reputation of anti-foreignism. The most noted of the punitive measures was the destruction of the city of Pao Ting Fu by a joint expedition of Brit46
Moreover, a series of trials were held to
ish, German, and French forces.

The aftermath

of the rescue included a

Many

punish persons responsible for the atrocities committed by the Boxers.
executions and fines followed. Finally, on

1

February 1901, the Boxer Society

was dissolved and membership in any "anti-foreign" society was declared to be
a crime punishable by death. Later that

same

year,

China agreed

indemnity and to prohibit the importation of arms

to pay a large

for a period of

two

years. 47

This incident was cited by Borchard, 48 Fauchille, 49 and Hyde 50 as an example of the forcible protection of nationals abroad. Probably the fact that

was viewed
the

China

semi-barbarous by most Western States, plus the exigencies of

as

moment, accounted most

commentators

all

H. Franco-Turkish

directly for this use of force,

which the above

regarded as permissible under international law.

Conflict. I90I.

51

During the

last

decade of the Nineteenth

Century, several French creditors had difficulty with the Turkish government.

November 1890, a French corporation agreed to construct docks in Constantinople. As soon as the docks were completed, however, the Turkish government seized them without compensating the French
Under a contract dated

builders. Negotiations

7

between the French and Turkish governments on the

matter proved unsatisfactory to the French. In addition, substantial loans

made

government by two French banking concerns went unpaid.
Finally, the Turkish government refused to honor a concession it made in 1894
to cede territory to a French group in return for destroying malaria-carrying
mosquitos in an area of Turkey.
to the Turkish

By 1901,

it

had become apparent

to France that diplomatic measures alone

were not going to resolve the claims. The French government therefore decided to employ forcible measures by seizing the customs house on the Turkish

and retaining the funds and goods contained therein until the
Turkish government honored its commitments. A French fleet was sent to the
Mediterranean which seized and occupied the customs house on 7 November
1901. Little force was involved in this action, since the governor of the island
island of Mytilini

32

State Practice

During

the Pre~United Nations Period

and sent the Turkish garrison to the island's interior to avoid any encounter with the French forces. The Turkish
government promptly agreed to the French demands and the occupation soon
actually acquiesced in the occupation

ended.
Bonfils referred briefly to the Mytilini incident in his discussion of the foreible

protection of nationals

who

are creditors of foreign governments.

Noting

the obvious, however, that such intervention "excites the resentment of the

people against foreigners [and] complicates international relations." 52 Despite
the effects of this incident, one of many,

it

illustrates that the use of force to

protect nationals abroad and enforce creditor's rights in such situations was

common

at the turn of the century.

Great

Germany and

I.

Britain,

Italy in

Venezuela. 1902.

As

the result of civil war

German and Italian nationals sustained large amounts of property damage. The strenuous protests by Great
Britain and Germany yielding no results, on 13 November 1902, the countries
in

Venezuela from 1898 to 1900,

British,

53

agreed on joint action.

54

demands, they agreed to

On 2 December
man governments

In the event that Venezuela failed to accede to their
utilize

coercive measures.

55

1902, the diplomatic representatives of the British and Gerat

Caracas presented an ultimatum to the Venezuelan gov-

ernment which made clear that in the event of an unsatisfactory response,
forcible measures would be employed. 56 On 3 December, Italy asked to be allowed to join in the ultimatum against Venezuela as an ally of Great Britain and
Germany, a request quickly granted. 57 The demands not having been met, on
10 December the three States imposed a blockade under which they seized or
disabled four small Venezuelan ships. 58 Three days later the Venezuelan government, through the U.S. Embassy in London, requested arbitration of the
claims in question, proposing certain conditions.
this

The

allies finally

agreed to

method o( settlement. 59

Fauchille referred to this incident as an example of the justifiable use of force

by a State to compel another State "to

compensate

for

an

injustice or

an

fulfill its

insult."

60

international obligations or to

However,

it

does not appear that

the three States justified their use of force in legal terms at the time. 61

J.

Italian Invasion of Corfu.

Balkan Wars of 1912-1913

I923.
left

62

The

establishment of Albania following the

the delimitation of its borders as one of the un-

resolved issues facing the Great Powers

when World War

1914. Following the war, with Albania's frontiers

still

I

commenced

unfixed and border

in

dis-

putes increasing, the British government proposed that a Conference oi
33
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Ambassadors
to delimit the

fix

the frontiers.

On 9 November

Albanian borders on the

Abroad

1921, that conference decided

basis of lines

drawn up before the war,

with a special delimitation commission to mark the borders.
arrived in Albania
its

on

Italian President,

7

March

1922.

General Enrico

The

The commission

relationship of the commission

Tellini, to the

and

Greek government and the

Greek delegate attached to the commission, was extremely strained throughout. On 27 August 1923, General Tellini and his staff were murdered near the
Greek-Albanian frontier, in Greek territory.
Mussolini, by then in control of Italy, instructed his ambassador in

make

Athens

to

"the most energetic protests" to the Greek government. Following sev-

communications with the Ambassador, on 29 August Mussolini issued a
series of demands to the Greek government. These demands included an apology by the highest Greek military authority, a funeral service in the Roman
Catholic Cathedral in Athens to be attended by all the members of the Greek
eral

government, a criminal investigation to be completed within
arrival of

an

Italian military attache, capital

punishment

five

for those persons re-

sponsible for the murders, an indemnity of 50 million Italian

lire

payable within

honor to be shown the Italian flag, and military honors
the corpses on the occasion of their transfer to an Italian vessel.

five days;

The

days after the

to be paid to

Greek government rejected the bulk of these demands, specifically, the investigation by the Greek authorities, capital punishment for the murderers, and the indemnity. Orders were issued immediately
from Rome to Admiral Emilio Solari, commander of the Italian navy, "to proceed at once to the occupation of [the Greek island of] Corfu." 63 On 31 August, Italian naval units bombarded and occupied the island, an occupation
lasting until 27 September 1923.
following day the

Hindmarsh cited this incident as an example of the practice of powerful
States to employ military force against offending weaker States to compel recognition of alleged international obligations. 64 The incident, on its facts, involved a "point o( honor" in the protection of nationals abroad,

all

that

remained following their murder.

World War

I

included the division

65

The peace settlement following
of parts of the Ottoman Empire into

K. French Bombardment of Damascus. I925.

"mandates" of the League of Nations under the tutelage of the victorious

One

such area was Syria, which was placed under French control until such

was deemed ready to take its place as an independent nation. French
proved oppressive to the Syrian population, however, and the resulting

time as
rule

allies.

it

discontent led to full-scale revolution in 1925.
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moungained momentum. By 18 Oc-

Originating with the Druzes, a fiercely nationalistic sect living in the
tains southeast of

tober 1925,

Damascus, the revolt quickly

Damascus was

severely threatened, the revolutionaries having

entered and occupied a part of the

At
law,

this

city.

point the French authorities, "without notice or declaration of martial

and without warning

to foreign residents other

French troops and then proceeded to bombard the

than French," 66
city

with

first

artillery

evacuated

and

aircraft.

The bombardment, which continued for 24 hours and caused extensive damage,
ceased only when the city officials agreed to pay an indemnity of £100,000 in gold
and 3,000 rifles. The indemnity, in fact, never was paid. The bombardment so increased the resistance of the rebels that the revolt was not put down until 1927.
Bowett has cited
ing

it

this incident as a classic

from the use of force to protect the

which he characterizes

lives

reprisal, distinguish-

and property of nationals abroad,

as a permissible action of self-defense. 67

tion offered by France at the time centered
rebellion

example of a

on the contention

The

justifica-

that the Druze

was merely "banditry and brigandage," and hence any measures used

to suppress

it

were merely police actions clearly within the exclusive

tion of France, the legally constituted authority in Syria.

other principle of international law to support

its

its

mandate by the League of Nations.

L.

japan and China. 193 1 - 1932.

69

its

On

jurisdic-

France cited no

actions. In fact, since

French nationals were being protected by the use of
that France was merely re-establishing

68

force,

it

no

seems apparent

control of the city in accordance with

18 September 1931, an explosion oc-

curred on the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway in southern China.

The Japanese argued
(albeit actually

had caused the incident, a plausible
the time there was serious friction be-

that Chinese soldiers

untrue) claim because at

tween the Chinese and Japanese in the Japanese-leased

way

territory along the rail-

zone. Additionally, the Chinese authorities' desired the reduction and/or

elimination of Japanese interests in Manchuria. Within 24 hours after the explosion, Japanese forces occupied
in

South Manchuria.

Mukden and

several other important towns

70

The Japanese army, which soon controlled all of Manchuria, proceeded to
set up an "independent" State of Manchukuo with a former Emperor of China
at

its

head.

On 25 August

1932, the Japanese government recognized the State

of Manchukuo and concluded a treaty of alliance with

it.

The Manchukuo gov-

ernment assumed control over the custom houses of its ports and thereby became self-sufficient. The League of Nations formed an investigatory body,
named the "Lytton Commission," to investigate the situation. It issued a report
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October 1932, condemning the Japanese invasion as an illegal act of aggression in violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 71

on

1

The Japanese government responded

one of which was that the purpose of the invasion was
protect Japanese nationals and treaty rights in China. To support this

several arguments,

merely to

to these charges of aggression with

72

government asserted not only that such a use of self-defense was recognized as an accepted principle of customary international law,
but also that it was not prohibited by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 that outlawed war as an instrument of national policy. 73
claim, the Japanese

Hindmarsh concluded

that the

Manchurian invasion

illustrated the im-

proper use of the forcible protection rationale by powerful States as a tool to
achieve control over weaker States. 74 His characterization proved correct
given Japan's subsequent resort to the "forcible protection" argument in the
face oi facts rather clearly indicating that
sive,

motives were essentially aggres-

its

and by Japan's subsequent actions leading up

to,

and during, World War II.

M. Germany in Czechoslovakia. I938.' 5 Coincident with the rise of Nazism in
Germany in the 1930s was an intense nationalism on the part of the German
ethnic community in the Sudetenland, an area of Czechoslovakia. Beginning
in 1937, Germany's support for the "Sudeten Germans" became increasingly
overt. In April 1938, at Berlin's urging, the German nationalist party in
Czechoslovakia presented the Czech government with a number of demands,
popularly known as the "Karlsbad Program," relating chiefly to autonomy for
Czech government's rejection of these deescalate its propaganda attacks against Czechoslo-

the Sudetenland. Following the

mands, Germany began to

vakia for alleged mistreatment of its

German

ethnic minority.

During the next several months, intense negotiations were conducted between

Germany and Czechoslovakia and the latter's allies, Britain and France. This diplomatic activity culminated in the Munich agreement of 30 September 1938. Czechoslovakia ceded the Sudetenland to Germany and the Western governments of Great
Britain

and France acknowledged that Czechoslovakia was both politically and eco-

nomically within Germany's sphere of influence. Confronted by a strong neighbor

and with weak
tive

allies,

the Czech government and

but to acquiesce in the

its

armed

German demands. German

and occupied the Sudetenland on

1

forces

had

little

alterna-

troops subsequently entered

October 1938, meeting no

resistance.

The Munich crisis clearly illustrates the abuses to which the principle of forcible protection may be put. 76 Indeed, as Brownlie has argued, the crisis was one of
several incidents that led to the drafting of Article 2(4) of the United Nations

Charter

—which purports

to prevent States

36

from using force

for

such purposes. 77
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have been made and then, if such a demand had not been heeded, a monetary fine should have

been imposed proportionate to the alleged crimes.
69.

Id.

at 274.

For detailed discussing of this incident, see R. Storry,

(1960), and

I.

Nish,

A

A History of Modern Japan

Short History of Japan 157-61 (1968).

The

facts

found

1

86-96

in the following

two paragraphs of the text are taken from these accounts.
70. The explosion and subsequent invasion were part of a plan hatched by Japanese Army
officers, apparently without orders from the military high command, and certainly not with the
approval of the Japanese government, whose "weak diplomacy" Japanese military leaders had
criticized. See R. Storry, supra

71.

note 69, at 186-87.

See generally Lauterpacht, "Resort to

War" and

the Interpretation of the Covenant

Am. J. Int'l L. 43 (1934).
These arguments are discussed in W. Willoughby, Japan's Case Examined 17-67 (1940).
73. Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact or
Pact of Paris), Aug. 27, 1928, 2 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the
United States of America 1776-1949, at 732 (1969).
74. A. Hindmarsh, supra note 64, at 81-82.
during the Manchurian Dispute, 28
72.

75.

For detailed analyses of the events surrounding the Munich agreement, see

J.

Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (1948), and V. Mastny, The Czechs Under
Nazi Rule (1971).
76.

See R. Falk, Legal

Order

in a Violent

World 161

(1968):

To vindicate intervention under certain circumstances

[including the forcible protection

of nationals abroad] raises some serious world order problems.
intervention creates a manipulative nexus that can

abusive intrusion upon the legitimate

may
from

claim to protect
altruism.

human

One need

77.

be used

Any

authorization of

as a justification for

an

autonomy of another state. An intervening state
its dominant motive which is remote

rights so as to hide

only

recall

that

Hitler

Czechoslovakia and Poland by the need to rescue
Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted

United Nations, supra note

itself

Gunmen,

4, at 139, 143.
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explained

German
in

his

invasions

of

minorities from aggression.

Humanitarian Intervention and the

Chapter IV
Contemporary Case Studies of United States
Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad

As

the views of the publicists and the evidence of State practice surveyed

in the preceding chapters reveals, traditional international law has

sanctioned a State's use of force to protect the lives and property of its nationals

With

abroad.

the adoption in 1945 of the United Nations Charter, however, a

new set of international norms governing the use of force emerged to challenge
this traditional right. The impact of these norms and subsequent developments
upon the
chapter.

United

right of forcible protection will be considered in the following

The

present chapter focuses instead

upon those instances where the

States, in the post-Charter period, has claimed to act pursuant to

such

right.

Although occasionally invoked by France and other States during this period, most prominently by Israel involving Entebbe, the main instances where
the protection of nationals rationale has been used to justify forcible protection
since 1945, involve the United States.
1

These case

studies warrant extensive treatment not only because the politi-

cal events surrounding

many

o{ the instances attracted great international at-

The legal debates they generated also shed considerable light on what
one may characterize as a developing international consensus justifying the
tention.

forcible protection of nationals abroad,

on the grounds

ercise of a State's inherent right of self-defense

that

it is

a legitimate ex-

under Article 5 1 of the

UN

Charter.

The

question then arises as to

how one

squares the tenets of Article 2(4),

the broad prohibition oi the use of force, with Article 5

1

?

Can

the notion of

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

self-defense of a State be properly extrapolated to extend protection by force to
a national living or transiting abroad?

A. Lebanon. 1958.

The

spring of 1958 was a period of intense internal unrest for the small Mid-

By midsummer, the convergence of internal, regional and international factors produced a situation where the United States
dle East country of Lebanon.

deemed itself compelled to mount a medium-scale
Lebanon which lasted just over three months.
This brief treatment of the Lebanese

crisis

military intervention in

of 1958 will attempt to outline

the most significant causative factors as well as the various legal explanations
offered by the United States in support of its decision to intervene. 2 Particular

emphasis

will

enced the

be given to the protection of nationals rationale, both as
decision to intervene and as

initial

it

influ-

colored the subsequent

justifi-

countries achieving independence during and after

World

it

cations of this action.

Like

many of the

War II, Lebanon was an artificially constructed State, in that historically it had
no

definite population or territory.

An

autonomous province of the Ottoman

World War I, it originally consisted of the relatively small area
surrounding Mount Lebanon on the Mediterranean coast. Under a Mandate
Empire

until

from the League of Nations, granted in 1920, France transferred land from
Syria to increase
verse,

was and to

Lebanon
this

to

its

present

day remains

size.

The

population, always quite di-

bitterly divided along religious, ethnic

and

more than one-half of the population is ChrisMuslim sects make up the remainder. 3 However, since the

political lines. Officially, slightly

while several

tian,
first

and only

breakdown

With

is

official

open

census was held in 1932, the continued validity of this

to question. 4

Mandate in 1943, Lebanon became a
its political foundation resting upon the "National Covenant,"

the termination of the French

sovereign State,

an "unwritten understanding, or gentlemen's agreement," between the Christian

and Muslim segments of the population. 5 Under the National Covenant,

the contending elements agreed that

West

for 'protection,'

(ii)

neighboring Arab States,

the Christians would not look to the

the Muslims would not aspire for merger with the

Lebanon was to co-operate with all the Arab
Arab disputes, and (iv) political and administra-

(iii)

States but not to take sides in
tive offices

" (i)

would be equitably distributed among the recognized confessional

6

groups." Pursuant to the last requirement, the President was to be a Maronite
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Christian, the Prime Minister a

ment

a Shi'a Muslim.

Following an

Sunni Muslim, and the President oi the

Parlia-

7

initial

period of political instability, Camille

Chamoun was

elected President of Lebanon in 1952 as a reformist. For the next few years Leb-

anese politics were reasonably stable and the Lebanese
prosperous.

8

By 1957, however,

mately led to the

crisis

a

economy grew

number of factors began

quite

to appear that ulti-

the following year. Internally, political opposition began

mount against Chamoun. The parliamentary elections saw the surprising defeat of many important opposition leaders. Rumors began to circulate that the
President wanted to have the Constitution amended so that he might succeed
himself. Charges of political corruption increasingly surfaced. The Muslims
came to believe that they were being treated as "second class citizens" and demanded a larger role in the government. As the result of these internal political
pressures, the opposition forces that had combined to form a "National Union
to

Front" renewed their efforts to oust

Chamoun

as President.

Several regional developments during this period also contributed to the
sis

cri-

in 1958. Relations with Lebanon's neighbor, Syria,

became

increasingly

The disagreement between

the two

Arab

strained during the 1950s.

stemmed

primarily from Syria's adoption of socialist

and nationalist

States

policies in

contrast to Lebanon's laissez-faire capitalism. In addition, the presence of large

numbers of Syrian political refugees in Lebanon led to increased friction between the States. 9 Further, by 1957 Lebanon had adopted policies and positions varying from the ones held and taken by most other Arab States. During
the Suez crisis, for instance, Lebanon, unlike the other Arab States, remained
neutral and refused to sever diplomatic relations with France and Great Britain. 10 Increasingly, Lebanon seemed to be veering in a pro- Western direction,
in contrast to the pan- Arab approach advocated by President Nasser of Egypt
and by the leaders of Syria. 11
These regional

The

stresses

produced conflicting reactions in Lebanon

Christian population regarded

The Muslims, on

Arab unity

itself.

as a threat to its Christian iden-

Arab nationalism as a means
of bettering their position in Lebanese politics and society. As President
Chamoun, through his public statements, increasingly became identified as an
opponent of Arab unity, he accordingly lost what popularity he had retained
with the Muslim population. 12
tity.

The

crisis in

the other hand, supported

1958 also was fueled by developments on the international

By 1957 the United States and the Soviet Union, antagonists in the
"Cold War," had begun to look for potential allies in the Middle East. The Soviet Union viewed Arab nationalism as a vehicle for gaining influence in the
level.
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area, while the

United States, through the Eisenhower Doctrine, sought to en-

Middle East nations

list

Abroad

in

its

efforts to

block Soviet inroads into the area.

The

which took the form of a Joint Resolution of Congress, was that the United States, upon the request of any State in
the Middle East, would use its "armed forces to assist any such nation or group
of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any counbasic thrust of the Eisenhower Doctrine,

controlled by international communism...." 13

try

doctrine, as

it

turned out, was Lebanon.

regard sparked severe criticism from his

The

only State to accept this

Chamoun's decision in this
opponents on two grounds. First, they

14

President

argued that Lebanon's acceptance of the doctrine violated the National Covenant's requirement that the State remain completely neutral. Second, they ar-

gued that

it

brought Lebanon's policies squarely into conflict with Egypt and

Syria, countries

which a

large

number of Lebanese supported. While one need

not accept Garnet's over-generalized assertion that "the dissension stirred up

by the proposed ideological alliance led directly to the
intervention a year later,"

15

it

war and American

cannot be denied that President Chamoun's en-

thusiastic acceptance of the doctrine caused

The above

civil

him more problems than it solved.

and international factors combined to produce
an extremely volatile political situation in Lebanon by the spring of 1958. Following the murder, on 8 May 1958, of Nasib il al-Matni, the editor of the leading opposition newspaper in Beirut, the anti-Chamoun leaders called a general
internal, regional

and a wave of violence spread throughout the country. 16 Although
pro-government and opposition forces soon were engaged in open warfare, the
6,000-man Lebanese army under General Chebab remained neutral. 17 To a
strike

from turning into a

large extent the army's neutrality prevented the civil strife
full-scale civil war.

With

18

Chamoun on 21 May 1958, comand Syria, now comprising the United

the country in turmoil, President

plained to the Arab League that Egypt

Arab Republic, were intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon. 19 On the
following day, 22 May 1958, Lebanon lodged a similar complaint before the
United Nations Security Council. 20 Both complaints, in essence, alleged that
the United Arab Republic was infiltrating men and arms into Lebanon, and
that it was conducting an intense propaganda campaign aimed at the overthrow of the Lebanese government. When recourse to the Arab League proved
fruitless, Lebanon, on 6 June 1958, pressed its case in the Security Council
where Foreign Minister Charles Malik argued

.

.

.

there has been, and there

tion in the affairs of

still is,

that:

massive, illegal and unprovoked interven-

Lebanon by the United Arab Republic
44

.

.

.;
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.

.

this intervention

.

aims at undermining, and does in fact threaten, the inde-

pendence of Lebanon

.

.

.

.

.

.

;

[and]

the situation created by this intervention which threatens the independence

of Lebanon

likely, if

is

continued, to endanger the maintenance of international

peace and security. 21

After a bitter debate, during which the United Arab Republic denied these
allegations, 22 the Security Council,

tablishing the

on

11 June 1958, adopted a resolution es-

United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL),

whose principal task was

"to ensure that there

is

no

illegal infiltration

of per-

sonnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders.

While UNOGIL's

." 23
.

an exhaustive survey of its operations,

findings, according to

"indicated that the Lebanese government had exaggerated the degree of
tration that might

not be regarded

have been taking place

as conclusive

.

.

.

.,

infil-

the Group's observations could

evidence of the degree and nature of infiltration

failure to

achieve anything more than a highly limited access to alleged

infiltration routes

prevented any thorough investigation of the Lebanese allega-

since

its

tions."

24

During
cially

this period,

"hands

off."

intervention was

U.S. policy towards the Lebanese

According

mooted

to President Eisenhower,

as early as

May

1958,

when

crisis

remained

offi-

however, possible U.S.

President

Chamoun was

informed that in such an eventuality "the mission of United States troops in

Lebanon would be twofold: protection of the life and property of Americans,
and assistance to the legal Lebanese government." 25 As a precautionary measure, the Department of State on 16 June 1958, advised U.S. citizens against
travel in or through Lebanon except for "imperative reasons." 26 The protection
of its nationals clearly was secondary as revealed by President Eisenhower's description of the atmosphere in which his 14 July 1958, meeting with Congressional leaders took place: "The time was rapidly approaching, I believed, when
we had to move into the Middle East, and specifically into Lebanon, to stop the
trend toward chaos.
in

Lebanon of a

relatively large

be endangered."

The coup

An additional factor in my deep
number of American

concern was the presence
citizens

whose

lives

might

27

which took place in Iraq on 14 July 1958, triggered a rapid
change in U.S. policy towards Lebanon. The leftist revolutionaries who took
over the country murdered the Iraqi royal family and dragged their dismemd'etat

bered bodies through the streets of Baghdad. In addition, a number of Europeans, plus at least three U.S. citizens, also

were murdered. 28 Fearful that the

45

Iraqi
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coup was the forerunner of similar coups against other pro-Western countries
in the area, President Eisenhower now readily acceded to President Chamoun's
renewed request for military
2,000 Marines in

full

of the Lebanese

civil

assistance.

when

waded ashore near Beirut.

battle gear

15 July 1958, nearly
u

the Marines

soft

drink vendors." 29 Although a near-incident

moved down

the highway toward Beirut, 30

mediation by Ambassador Robert McClintock overcame

convoy proceeded into

Chehab and

bearing both [General]

"The

lead, followed

American

by

and

flags

the Ambassador, followed finally by a con-

No

American marines." 31

skillful

this set-back.

Lebanese army jeep in the

Beirut: a

the Ambassador's limousine flying both Lebanese and

tingent of

In the unique spirit

war," recounts Kerr, "they were greeted at the water's

edge by curious bathers and by
occurred

At about 3 P.M. on

no

shots were fired and

casualties

were

incurred.

On
their

the same day that

began

use

US

flowing

troops landed in Lebanon, legal justifications for

Washington.

from

Although

House

White

decisionmakers evidently accorded the protection of nationals aspects of the

problem a

fairly

low priority, 32 a press release issued in the President's name em-

US

phasized the plight of the 2,500

citizens

Marines had landed "to protect American

still

lives

in Lebanon, stating that the

and by

their presence there to

encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and
integrity." 33

A contemporaneous Message to Congress paraphrased the above

statement, 34 as did a subsequent radio and

evening.

35

However,

TV broadcast by the President that

UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, addressing a hastily

convened meeting of the Security Council, invoked protection of US nationals
only as an ancillary argument. 36 Thereafter, the "protection of nationals" rationale justifying for

US

intervention was heard no more. Instead, the United

States placed exclusive reliance

upon the

fact that the intervention

had been

pursuant to a request from the recognized government of Lebanon, and that
constituted an act of collective self-defense permitted under Article 5

it

1

of the

American

forces

United Nations Charter. 37

By 25

July 1958, ten days after the initial landing, "the

ashore numbered at least 10,600

peak of 14,357 troops

started to recede.

39

—

The

6600 Marines

—more

By 8 August 1958, the number had reached
from which it soon
8,515 Army and 5,842 Marines

than the entire Lebanese Army."
a

—4000 Army,

men

38

—

troops, deployed exclusively in the vicinity of Beirut, 40

engaged in routine patrols with their Lebanese counterparts. 41 Otherwise
42

troops saw

no

cal are the

remarks of Qubain,

real action.

By

all

US

accounts their conduct was exemplary. Typi-

who

mentions:
46
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.

.

the great restraint which they displayed, which indeed [has]

.

modern

times. In the

outside Beirut.

place, the

first

no

main body of troops remained stationed

Only a very small number were assigned duty inside the

these were restricted mainly to guard duty at such places as the harbor,

and certain areas where American

institutions,

parallel in

city.

Even

American

Areas controlled

citizens lived.

by the opposition were completely out of bounds to troops whether on or off
duty. 43 Second, at

no time did Americans

interfere in the internal conflict or give

support to government forces against the opposition. American forces rigidly
abstained from supporting one faction against another. 44

Although occasionally the
and

inflicted

no

casualties

US

targets of snipers, the

upon the

forces held their

local population.

45

second

killed.

With

a political

to his successor

Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy,
country permitting the withdrawal of
October.

47

The Lebanese

crisis

on

political grounds,

landing of US troops.

49

the

all

US

relative

worked out by

calm returned

troops during the

to the

month

o(

of 1958 was over.

While some commentators have
48

wounded and

accommodation that permitted the orderly

power from President Chamoun

transfer of

fire

In turn, they suffered

only two casualties, both army sergeants, one of whom was
46

own

criticized the action of the

United States

few observers have registered legal objections to the

The

strongest basis for their introduction into Lebanon,

of course, was the existence of a formal invitation from Lebanon's recognized

government. 50 The right of a State to furnish military assistance to another
State pursuant to a request from the latter
ternational law. Provided that the right

non,

51

it

affords

self-defense

ample

universally recognized under in-

not abused,

this right

52

as in the case of

Leba-

legal justification for the landing of troops. Collective

under the United Nations Charter

by the United States.

voking

is

is

It

also justified the action taken

must be noted, however, that the

was questioned in some quarters.

factual basis for in-

53

upon initially by the
and most commentators as

Finally, the "protection of nationals" rationale, relied

United States 54 but subsequently ignored by
well, 55 arguably

it

provided additional support for the decision to send in the

Marines.

Contrasting legal views about the availability of the protection of nationals
rationale in the context of Lebanon are set out in forthright fashion in articles

by the

late Professors Potter

have considered the
ter,

in

an

and Wright, apparently the only two authorities

to

legal issues involved in a systematic fashion. Professor Pot-

article entitled Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing, suggests that:

47
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11

.

.

[a]

.

plausible basis tor "intervention

such cases,

and

is

to be

in the instant situation, as in so

tound in the right to use force

tor the

many

protection of nationals,

their property, of the intervening state, in absence of ability or willingness of

the local state to perform this function. While well established in principle,

however, such a right obviously depends upon proof of the need

under the conditions

and

cited. In the present case there

serious danger to

inability,

United States

and

citizens

though not unwillingness, on the part

protect them. President Eisenhower did not

such action

their interests,

of the

fail

for

seems to have been actual

and some

Lebanese Government to

to invoke this basis for

United

States action at Beirut. 56

On the other hand, Professor Wright in The United States Intervention in Lebanon, concentrates exclusively

upon the

UN Charter norms which he regards

as dispositive of the case stating:

has been suggested that the "self which must be immediately

[I]t

menaced

to

permit self-defensive action [under Article 51 of the Charter] includes not only

government and its citizens in foreign territory.
There have been many cases in which states have landed forces in foreign
territory to protect embassies or other government agencies, as in the Boxer
territory but also agencies of the

affair in

1900, or to protect the lives of their citizens.

It is difficult

extensions within the meaning of Article 5 1 of the Charter.

to bring these

The United

has, however, referred to the protection of American citizens in the

States

Lebanon

as

one reason for its intervention in that country. To support this contention, it
would be necessary to show that immediate danger to government agencies or
American citizens in the Lebanon constituted "an armed attack" upon the
United States. 57

Wright's remarks urge that even

if

US citizens had been in clear and present

danger, their country had no right to intervene forcibly to protect them.
is

true,

then

is it

necessary to revisit and redraft Art. 51 and Art. 2(4) to allow

States to intervene with force to protect their nationals

To

If this

US

and consulates?

must be remembered
that for two months prior to the landing of Marines, civil strife had been rampant in Lebanon. 58 With 2,500 American nationals scattered throughout the
country, 59 the possibility always existed that US citizens would get caught up in
place the threat to

citizens into perspective,

it

the fray. 60

The coup

and the death of several citizens there 61 gave the
United States all the more reason for concern over the fate of its citizens in the
Middle East. 62 Murphy, who arrived in Lebanon several days after the first conu
tingents of Marines, records that [s]ince Berlin in 1945, I had not been in a
d'etat in Iraq
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more trigger-happy place than Beirut was at that time. Wild fusillades, bombings and arson were the order of the day and more especially the night." 63
Given this state oi. affairs, it is a happy, and indeed a near miraculous fact that
no instances of harm to US citizens were recorded. 64

The
some

attitude of the

US

Embassy

in Beirut, while admittedly self-serving to

Lebanon
had an emergency plan

extent, also affords a significant insight into the situation in

prior to the landing of US troops. Like

all

embassies,

it

such situations, which consisted of a three-phrase evacuation program.

for

If,

after the initial alert,

.

.

the situation further deteriorated, Phase

.

called for the voluntary evacuation at

members of the

staff.

At

A would be put into operation. This

government expense of dependents o(

the same time the embassy would discreetly

recommend

American community also be sent out of the
country. Phase B called for the mandatory evacuation of all nonessential
government personnel and their dependents, with a similar recommendation for
the private American community. Phase C contemplated the evacuation of all
American citizens from the crisis area. 65
that dependents of the local

A into

The Embassy placed Phase
66

Had Phase C

on

15 June,

when

the civil

strife

B

operative immediately after the Iraqi coup

thereafter

been invoked, obviously a stronger factual

worsened, and declared Phase
d'etat.

effect

predicate would have been laid to justify the measures of forcible protection

subsequently taken. Yet simply because Phase

cause no

US

July, the

key dates in question,

threat to

US

citizens actually

C

was not invoked, or

just be-

were harmed, does not mean that on 14 and 15

US

decisionmakers were not presented with a

citizens sufficiently grave to justify, at least to themselves, the ac-

tion they took. 67

B.

The summer

The Congo. 1964.

Congo (now Zaire) achieve independence
from Belgium. Unhappily, within a week the Congolese Army mutinied against
its

of 1960 saw the

Belgian officers and, following a complete breakdown of law and order, 68

Belgium, on 10 July 1960, sent paratroopers into the country to protect the
lives

the
a

and property of

its

nationals and other Europeans. 69 Shortly thereafter,

UN Security Council, calling upon Belgium to withdraw

its

troops, created

temporary security force whose mission was to cooperate with the Congolese

government in the restoration of order. 70 This temporary force gradually metamorphosed into the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) which
,
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between July 1960 and

its

withdrawal on 30 June 1964 attempted the unenvi-

able tasks of controlling civil
try's largest

ONUC

—

strife,

ending the secession of Katanga, the coun-

province, and creating conditions conducive to the establishment

of a strong and viable

While
Katanga

Abroad

it

maintaining

modern

achieved

State. 71

second objective

its

—ending

the secession of

was unable to fashion a strong central government capable of
civil

peace by the time of its withdrawal.

Indeed, in the spring of 1964 several separate revolts had broken out, the

most serious

in the Eastern

Thereafter events

moved

Congo, where

rapidly.

the Congo's independence, the

in late

On 30 June

UN

May, Albertville

fell

to rebels.

1964, the fourth anniversary of

force withdrew

Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula resigned. Nine days

and the government of

later a

new government,

headed by Moise Tshombe, took office. As the tempo of rebellion increased,
however, the rebels on 5 August seized Stanleyville and, two weeks later,
Paulis.

named Christophe Gbenye,

Proclaiming a revolutionary regime, they

former Minister of Interior, as President.

thereupon began,

72

An

a

unending round of executions

during which:

[w]ave after wave of 'intellectuals' or 'counterrevolutionaries' or 'American
agents' were assassinated in

all

the

main towns held by the

cohesion and control permitted diverse groups to
their rivals

front

in

seize the

The

lack o{

occasion to liquidate

pretexts. Many of the executions were public,
Lumumba monuments, with grotesque cruelty,

on various
of

rebels.

performed
including

consumption oi the heart, liver and other
portions, and various tortures.... In Stanleyville, Paulis, and Kindu alone, the
executions totalled close to 10,000; in all, there were probably at least 20,000. 73
disemboweling of

still

living victims,

This reign of terror apparently was as purposeless as

mediocre talents and often pathological character of
fessor

Young has noted, "rendered them incapable

which they unleashed, even
own newly won power." 74

social tensions

their

After six weeks, the tide began to turn.

ment, the

was despicable. "The

[the] rebel leaders," Pro-

oi directing or controlling

in the interest of consolidating

The

Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC),

darmes and spearheaded

it

forces of the central govern-

"reinforced by Katanga gen-

most but not all cases) by small contingents of
or at
mercenaries," put the rebel army to rout. Seeking to snatch victory
least a stalemate
from the jaws of defeat, Gbenye announced on 26 Septem(in

—

75

—

ber that the approximately 1,600 foreigners remaining in the Stanleyville area,

made up of "500 Belgians, 700 people of other European
Indians and Pakistanis," 76 would not be allowed to
50

nationalities

and 400

leave; his intention
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obviously was to use

them

as hostages for political bargaining purposes. 77

the rebels thus holding "sixteen hundred trump cards,"

78

a feverish

With

round of

negotiations began involving not only the rebels and the central government,

but also the United States, Belgium, Kenya, an

Congo

of the Organization of African Unity

Ad Hoc Commission on

(OAU) and

the

the International

79

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Progress was not forthcoming and tensions heightened. By early November, the ANC, continuing its advance,
neared Stanleyville.

When the ANC, preceded by white mercenary contingents, seized Kindu on
6 November, the plight of the hostages worsened

claiming that

"all

still

further, with

Gbenye

pro-

Belgian and American civilians would be treated as 'prisoners

bombing of our liberated territory." 80 On 11 November, during a radio broadcast, Gbenye stated that "the British, Americans,
Belgians and Italians must get ready to dig their own graves." 81 Three days
of war' in retaliation for the

later, utilizing

the rebel newspaper LeMartyr, he threatened that "'we will

our fetishes with the hearts of the Americans and Belgians, and we
ourselves with the skins of the Americans and Belgians." 82

On

make

will dress

the same day

Radio Stanleyville announced that Dr. Paul Carlson, a U.S. medical missionary
held by the rebels, had been sentenced to death for espionage. 83

The above

threats,

moreover, were not just rhetoric. As Ambassador

Stevenson subsequently recounted to the

vember "the

UN

Security Council, by mid-No-

total of those thus already tortured

and slaughtered amounted

35 foreigners, including 19 Belgians, 2 Americans, 2 Indians, 2 Greeks,
lishman,

1

sionaries

who had

Italian, 2

Portuguese, 2 Togolese and 4 Dutch,

many

of

1

to

Eng-

them

mis-

84

The

spent their lives in helping the Congolese people."

grim prospect that other hostages would meet a similar fate was strengthened

by a captured telegram from a rebel general to an
tages that

had been held

terminate

all

in Kindu.

It

officer in

charge of the hos-

ended: "'In case of bombing of region, ex-

[Americans and Belgians] without requesting further orders

" 85

With the ANC now nearing Stanleyville, negotiations reached an impasse.
Thomas Kanza, the representative of the rebels who had been in direct contact
with the US Ambassador to Kenya, William Attwood, made it crystal clear
that, in Professor

Grundy's words, "the rebels were not about to surrender their

only major bargaining lever." 86 According to Attwood, Kanza would not discuss evacuating the hostages,

whom

he termed "prisoners of war,"

ANC advance had been stopped and a cease-fire put into effect.

87

until the

That

this use

Geneva Conventions 88 did not bother
the rebels, who considered themselves not bound by international agreements
"written by whites." 89 Thus, political and legal arguments having failed, it

of innocent civilians

flatly

violated the

51
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increasingly apparent that military measures

month

extricate the hostages from their three

These measures actually had been put
military planes transported the

He Ascension, where

it

ordeal.

in train in

545-man Belgian

was quartered by the

would have

mid-November when US

First

British

Paratroop Battalion to

government. 91 After

ther unavailing efforts to secure the release of the hostages,

with

the

express

Stanleyville at

authorization of the

to be used to

90

92

fur-

the paratroopers,

government, 93 landed

central

at

dawn on 24 November and undertook an emergency rescue mis-

evacuating an estimated 2,000 people over a four-day period. 95 Included

sion, 94

number were

in this

several

hundred foreigners rescued during a follow-up

landing at Paulis, 225 miles to the north. 96

The evacuees

included "Americans,

Britons and Belgians; Pakistanis, Indians, Congolese, Greeks, French, Dutch,

Germans, Canadians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Swiss, and
zens of Ghana, Uganda, Ethiopia, and the United

To

justify

US

Italians; as well as citi-

Arab Republic." 97

participation in the rescue operation, 98 the

Department of

State initially expressed the view that the action was taken "in exercise of our
clear responsibility to protect

United States

existing in the Stanleyville area."

99

At

citizens

under the circumstances

the United Nations, Ambassador

Stevenson extended the rationale behind the action stating
primary obligation was to protect the
that the mission rescued so
ties

lives of

many innocent

from their dreadful predicament."

case in

its

100

broadest humanitarian terms

for those [decisions]

made

for

American

that, "[w]hile

citizens,

we

humanitarian venture.

Of course,

the

Congo

people of eighteen other nationali-

Finally, President

when he assumed

Johnson put the

"full responsibility

our planes to carry the paratroopers in there in

We

had

to act

of the Congo,"
protection at

all.

and hence,

103

to keep

rescue operation, as the Department of State reiter-

ated several times, was carried out "with the authorization of the
102

proud

are

and act promptly in order
hundreds and even thousands of people from being massacred." 101
this

technically,

Government

was not a case of unilateral

Nevertheless, viewing the operation in

its

forcible

total context,

hard to avoid the conclusion that the United States treated the Congolese
tation

more

as

our

an additional argument

justifying

its

it is

invi-

action than as the sine qua

non of its legitimacy. The statement issued by the Department of State

clearly

was designed to show not only reliance upon an express invitation by the central

government of the Congo, but

also in

compliance with

of the traditional doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

This

operation

bloodshed

—not

—not

is

humanitarian

to

engage the rebel forces in combat.
52

military.

It

is

all

the requirements

104

designed
Its

to

purpose

avoid
is

to
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accomplish

its

task quickly

and withdraw

—not

to seize or hold territory.

Personnel engaged are under orders to use force only in their
the defense of the foreign and Congolese

scene as soon as their evacuation mission

We

are informing the

civilians.

is

They

own

will

defense or in

depart from the

accomplished.

United Nations and the

Ad Hoc Commission

of the

Organization of African Unity of the purely humanitarian purpose of this action

and of the regrettable circumstances that made

it

necessary. 105

Add to this statement the acknowledged fact that both the United Nations and
the

OAU

were unable to cope with a situation which by mid-November

required immediate action,
if

1

and one reaches the inescapable conclusion that

ever there was a case justifying the forcible protection of

rescue operation was

lives,

the

Congo

it.

Reviewing the operation in retrospect, perhaps the United States should not

have been as surprised

as

was

it

at the criticism

heaped upon it for its

role in this

humanitarian venture. 107 In the debates that the operation engendered at the

United Nations, the virulence of many African delegates can be attributed, in
varying degrees, to four principal factors. 108

operation was

rife

First,

they argued that the rescue

with racism, in that not until the

lives

of the white hostages

had been threatened did the United States become concerned, 109 and that
while most of these hostages had been rescued hundreds of blacks had been
110
slain.
When one considers what the world community's reaction would have
been had the United States or other Western powers introduced troops immediately after the United Nations' withdrawal to protect those Congolese threatened by the rebels, however, such criticism must be regarded, to say the least, as
unfair.

Since intervening earlier to protect Congolese surely would have been

branded

as a flagrant violation of the

really a viable one.

UN Charter, this supposed option was not

Accordingly, the United States should not be criticized,

ther expressly or impliedly, for failing to intervene earlier on.
fact that the

ANC slaughtered hundreds of blacks when

shortly after the airdrop

the rescue operation

is

itself.

no argument that

The paratroopers,

it

it

111

ei-

Moreover, the

reached Stanleyville

racist considerations

motivated

should be noted, evacuated 400

more than 200 Congolese, 112 and the venwhile mopping up Stanleyville hardly would

Indians and Pakistanis as well as

geance meted out by the

have been
tages

A

less

had

it

ANC

reached the

had been massacred

in the

city

hours or days

later, especially if

the hos-

meantime.

second factor underlying the criticism put forth by many African dele-

gates was the disrespect the rescue operation allegedly

53

showed

for the

OAU
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and

mediation

its

efforts.

1

1

3

Coming

at a

time

Abroad

when Pan- Africanism was

riding

high on the African continent, the failure to work through the regional organization to secure the release of the hostages engendered considerable
airdrops, according to the delegate

from the Congo Republic

were clearly an attempt to humiliate the

OAU.

ire.

The

(Brazzaville),

114

Such an attitude, while understandable, also is unjustified. Both the United
States and Belgium had turned repeatedly to the OAU for assistance in obtaining the hostages release, but in every instance the OAU had proved to be either
ineffective or uncooperative or both. This failure stemmed not only from the
inherent weakness o{ the organization itself, but also, and perhaps primarily,
from the resentment many African States had for the Tshombe government, a
regime which they wished to see toppled. Given this anti-Tshombe attitude,
the airdrops obviously would not have been approved had the United States
and Belgium sought OAU authorization. 115 Moreover, seeking such authorization not only

was unnecessary, given the central government's approval, 116 but

would have removed the

surprise

element from the airdrops and thus, jeopar-

dized the success of the entire rescue operation.

The

much African criticism was the memory of colonial
minds of many delegates. Such memories naturally

third factor causing

injustices

still

fresh in the

were exacerbated by the dropping of paratroopers of the former colonial power,
assisted by logistical support

from one of the superpowers. As Attwood, in a

passage worth quoting at length, put

it:

We saw the Stanleyville rescue operations as a dramatic effort to save hundreds
of helpless, innocent people.

It

was humanitarian, and

other attempts to release them had

failed.

And

it

was necessary, since

all

the operation had to take place

ANC column entered the city, for the panicky Simbas would probably

before the

have

mowed down

But

you could put yourself in the shoes of an average educated African, you got

if

the hostages before fleeing from the mercenaries.

a quite different picture. When he looked at the Congo, he saw a black
government in Stanleyville being attacked by a gang of hired South African
thugs, and black people being killed by rockets fired from American planes. He
did not know about the thousands of blacks who were tortured and murdered by
the Simbas, but he did know that the mercenaries and their Katangan auxiliaries
left a trail

of African corpses in their wake.

Even more
illusions

was

—

galling to the

that Africans were

a force to be

white

man

educated African was the shattering oi so many of his

now masters of their own continent, that the OAU
man with a gun was the equal of a

reckoned with, that a black

with a gun. For in a matter of weeks, two hundred swaggering white

54
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mercenaries had driven through an area the

size

of France, scattered the Simbas

and captured their capital; and in a matter oi hours, 545 Belgians in American
planes had defied the OAU, jumped into the heart of Africa and taken out nearly
two thousand people with the loss of one trooper.

—

The weakness and impotence

of newly independent Africa had been harshly and

dramatically revealed to the whole world, and the educated African
humiliated: the white
ancestors,

with a gun, the old plunderer

there wasn't a

damn

thing Africa could do about

rape.

117

Just

what the United States could have done

tack

—

who had

felt

deeply

enslaved his

was back again, doing what he pleased, when he pleased, where he

And

pleased.

man

it,

except

yell

to avoid this verbal at-

short of foregoing participation in the rescue operation altogether

difficult to

imagine. Generalities to the effect that

account of African

sensitivities"

118

"it

—

is

should have taken greater

are fine, but they offer

little

guidance to

decisionmakers, past or present. In sum, given the legacies of the colonial past,
the United States could not have avoided African criticism for

part in the

its

how humanitarian its motives may have been.
Finally, the fourth factor disturbing many African delegates was the role the
United States was playing in supporting the Tshombe government, a role
rescue operation, no matter

which included the supplying of military equipment and advisers, the flying of
intelligence and transport as well as occasional combat missions, and the general underwriting, through the US Embassy and the CIA, of the ANC's mercenary-led efforts to reestablish the central government's authority over the

Congo. 119 African

leaders,

who

originally

had opposed the return of Tshombe

and subsequently had condemned his central government, naturally resented
any bolstering of his power, which was the inevitable by-product of the rescue
operation. 120

As Grundy observes,

"Africans hostile to Tshombe's cause would

naturally seek to discredit the legitimacy of an operation that resulted in

Tshombe's increased power." 121

The

four factors discussed above naturally exacerbated the criticism of the

operation leveled at the United States and Belgium during the United Nations
debates. Replying to accusations in the Security Council that often bordered

on and sometimes reached the

slanderous,

Ambassador Stevenson

flatly

stated

that:

.

.

.

We

[w]e have no apologies to
are

make

proud of our part in saving

to

any state appearing before

human

Congo.
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lives imperiled

by the

this

civil

Council.

war

in the
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The United States took part in no operation with military purposes in the Congo.
We violated no provision of the United Nations Charter. Our action was no
threat to peace or to security;

the

OAU:

and

it

constituted

was not an affront

it

—

deliberate or otherwise

no intervention in Congolese or African

—

to

affairs. 122

His views, of course, received support from Belgium 123 and Great Britain, 124

with Bolivia, 125

Brazil, 126

stance of forcible

and the Republic of China 127 also approving this inprotection. Admittedly, most States condemned the rescue

operation, generally because they regarded

counterproductive in
they regarded as an

saved

lives

illegal

128

intervention in the Congo's

upon its

political

affairs.

than

its

129

In general,

resolution finally adopted by the Security Council, "[d]eploring the

demnation of either Belgium or the United

States.

132

approval of the rescue operation.

con-

if

not an express

133

any forcible protection action

issues relevant to

official

Indeed, one writer actu-

has suggested that the resolution constitutes an implied

Two

what

legal aspects. 130

recent events in [the Congo]," 131 not unsurprisingly contains no

ally

have been

or to have served as a "pretext" for

they grounded their complaints more

The vague

in retrospect, either to

it,

for

human

rights pur-

and especially to the Congo rescue operation, warrant further brief discussion. Namely, whether in the present case the operation was not
counterproductive insofar as the saving of lives was concerned, and whether
the operation was not used to impose or preserve a preferred government on
the Congo. 134
poses,

Insofar as the

first

issue

is

concerned, of the approximately 1,600 foreigners

in the Stanleyville area only 27

and

drops,
killed

killed during the initial Stanleyville air-

22 white hostages found dead at Paulis two days later had been

all

by the rebels prior to that follow-up operation. 135 Having fled at the

minute, few

man. 137 The

rebels

and

ran amok,

who carried out the massacre in Stanleyville apparatroopers, 136 who themselves lost only one

their supporters,

the mercenary-led
138

ANC

its

troops

it is

who

true, suffered appalling casualties

subsequently entered Stanleyville

but such atrocities hardly can be attributed to the rescue opera-

tion itself and, in any event,

fought

last

any of the rebels

if

parently were killed by the

when

were

way

would have been no

less

severe had the

ANC

into the city without the airdrop having taken place.

Similarly, although

from the Stanleyville airdrop through the end of Decem-

ber "more than three hundred whites, eight of them Americans, were killed"' 139

by the rebels, these deaths, which occurred throughout the entire Eastern

Congo, cannot be attributed
place.

140

On

solely to the rescue operation

having taken

balance, then, while admittedly a matter oi speculation not
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susceptible of absolute proof either way, the

appear to have saved

far

more

Insofar as the second issue

lives
is

commentators have pointed out

than

Congo

it lost.

rescue operation would

141

concerned, there

is little

doubt, as numerous

in their respective fashions, 142 that the rescue

operation's success contributed to the eventual downfall of the rebel regime.

Since the rebels, contrary to international law, were using the hostages not only
to prevent central

government attacks but

also to gain time to replenish their

depleted arsenals, the rescue operation, by

very nature and success, obvi-

its

ously constituted a severe blow to their cause. However, the fact that the
Stanleyville airdrop appears to

upon the

city,

have been coordinated with the

ANC advance

frequently cited as authoritative evidence that the rescue opera-

tion was undertaken for political rather than humanitarian reasons, 143 certainly

does not overcome the strong evidence that

humanitarian in nature.

144

The reason

its

primary objective actually was

for synchronizing the airdrop

with the

ANC advance was to reduce casualties and to avoid the rebels fleeing with the
hostages.

"The main purpose of the coordination," concludes Weissman, "was

to assure the safety of the
cost." 145

The

maximum number

of hostages with the

fact that a by-product of the rescue operation

minimum

was the collapse of

the rebel regime should not be read back to taint the entire mission, which as

Ambassador Stevenson
C.

On 30 May

rightly stated

was designed to save human

The Dominican

lives. 146

Republic. 1965

1961, an assassin's bullet struck and killed Rafael Trujillo, dicta-

Dominican Republic for over three decades. Trujillo's death presaged
period of unrest within the Dominican Republic that culminated four years

tor of the

a

later in violent revolution followed

by forcible intervention by

quently Organization of American States [OAS]) forces.
case study

is

to assess, in the context of the facts

now

US

(and subse-

The purpose

of this

available, the validity of

the initial legal justification advanced by the United States in support of its intervention, that being the need to protect the lives of

the

US

US

nationals.

To

place

argument in perspective, a short description of the events preceding

and surrounding the

crisis

of 1965

is

required. 147

Following Trujillo's assassination, Dominicans, in the

first free

elections

held in the country in nearly 40 years, elected as their President, Juan Bosch,

founder of the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD).

nedy Administration welcomed Bosch's

The Ken-

election, dispatched Vice President

Johnson to his inauguration in February 1963, and increased Alliance for Progress (AID) programs in an effort "to construct a 'showcase of democracy' in the
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Communist Cuba." 148 Bosch, unhappily, proved to be an ineffective leader once in office and soon came under
heavy attack by opposition critics, especially for allowing Dominican commuCaribbean

as a contrast to neighboring

and reenter political life. 149 After just seven months in
he was ousted by an anti-communist coup d'etat on 25 September 1963. 15 °

nists to return

office

from

exile

The Kennedy Administration reacted to the coup d'etat by suspending diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and halting

economic and
Such pressures had little effect upon the three-man junta that
military aid.
had replaced Bosch, however, and by mid-December the United States, with
all

151

the Johnson Administration

now

new government, and resumed

in office, reversed

foreign assistance.

its

policy, recognized the

152

Despite this development, the junta, which soon

came

to be

dominated by

Donald Reid Cabral, an anti-communist holding decidedly conservative views,
lost popularity steadily during 1964. Reid, in an effort to stave off domestic criticism and improve the junta's reputation abroad, scheduled "free elections" for
15 September 1965, but his subsequent announcement that he intended to run
for the presidency and would win constituted the "final straw." 153 By the late
winter and early spring of 1965, only the timing and not the occurrence of another coup d'etat, this time to oust Reid, was in doubt. 154

The

uprising began in the early hours of Saturday, 24 April 1965,

small group of young colonels acting in concert with

PRD

when

leaders seized

"a

and

Army Chief o{ Staff and declared themselves in revolt against
the government." 155 The rebels, calling themselves the "constitutionalists," oc-

imprisoned the

cupied the government radio station in Santo Domingo, the capital, and
broadcast appeals calling for the ouster of Reid.

took to the

streets,

to fear

from the bulk of the armed

from the regular forces

sponding to Reid's request

were waiting
troops.

157

thousands of civilians

the constitutionalist officers passed out arms to

apparent attempt "to broaden the base of the
ble reaction

When

them

in

an

movement and counter any possi-

forces." 156 Actually, they

had nothing

at this point, since the military's leaders, while re-

for assistance

for the dust to settle before

with pledges of support, obviously

committing either themselves or

their

Certainly they did nothing to crush the uprising against Reid, and the

latter, after

an unsuccessful attempt to obtain

morning of Sunday, 25

April, 158 resigned

US

military intervention

on the

and went into hiding. 159

Later that afternoon, reportedly after conferring by telephone with Bosch, 160

who

at the time

was

living in Puerto Rico, the constitutionalists

named

Rafael

Molina Urena, President of the Chamber of Deputies during Bosch's regime, as
Provisional President. 161 Molina's subsequent announcement that he intended
to hold office only until Bosch's return,

58

which

reflected a pro-Bosch rather
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than merely the anti-Reid view held by a majority of the constitutionalists, had
the unfortunate effect of alienating
a few wavering military

came

to be

known

many revolutionary leaders and driving not

commanders

as the "loyalist")

into the anti-constitutionalist (or

camp. For, according to

what

Slater:

no longer could be much doubt that a victory of the revolution would result
in the direct return of Bosch to the Presidency, rather than in new elections as
had originally been planned. 162 This was another matter, for the regular
military detested and feared Bosch, judging, undoubtedly correctly, that a
triumphant Bosch backed by the defecting constitutionalist military and what
amounted to a well-armed civilian militia would probably seek to destroy their
power and position in the Dominican Republic. As a result, by late Sunday
afternoon the bulk oi the military, particularly the key San Isidro Air Force Base
dominated by [General] Wessin y Wessin, had decided to actively resist the
there

]

[

revolution. 163

The bombing

of the National Palace and constitutionalist military encamp-

ments by planes from the San
the Dominican Republic into

Isidro
civil

Air Base began about 4:30 P.M., plunging

war. 164

—

—

By the following morning Monday, 26 April the military situation had
reached a stalemate and civil authority had broken down completely. While
sensational reports of atrocities allegedly committed by the constitutionalists
subsequently proved to be wildly exaggerated, 165 the carnage in the streets of

Santo Domingo nevertheless was

great, 166

with an estimated 2,000 people

ing their lives in the fighting during a four day period.

prompted

loyalist leaders to

make

their first request for

United States denied.

tion, a request that the

167

168

The

US

los-

military standoff

military interven-

The Department

of State,

US

Embassy "to inform both sides in Santa Domingo
that the US government had received requests from American citizens wishing
to be evacuated, and that the U.S. requested an immediate ceasefire to permit
a safe and orderly evacuation." 169 Preparations for this voluntary evacuation
operation, which had been contemplated since the uprising began, 170 commenced Monday evening with the assembling and registering of US and other
however, instructed the

foreign nationals
tion

—by land

who wished

to leave the country. Their actual evacua-

to the nearby port of Haina,

aboard two ships of a

US

from whence they were to be loaded

navy task force lying offshore, or by helicopter from

the grounds of the Hotel Embajador to the decks of the

USS

Boxer

—was sched-

uled for the following day.

On

that day

—Tuesday, 27 April— an unarmed detachment of about 50

Marines was sent ashore to secure the hotel grounds, establish a helicopter
59
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landing area therein, and to generally facilitate the evacuation process. All

went reasonably smoothly and by
rying out 1,172 of the 2,500
171

The

US

P.M. the operation, which involved

3: 15

fer-

nationals supposedly in the country, had been

when

band of constitutionalists
arrived on the scene and engaged in a brief exchange of fire with unidentified
persons on several upper story balconies o( the hotel. Then, as Slater relates,
they suddenly "burst into the hotel, lined the Americans [gathered in the lobby
waiting to be evacuated] against the wall, and fired a number of machine-gun
bursts over their heads." No one was hurt, and it later turned out that the rebels
had not been seeking deliberately to terrorize the Americans but were looking
for an extreme right- wing propagandist who had taken shelter in the hotel. 172
completed.

only hitch occurred

a small

This incident, however, caused considerable concern at the

US

Embassy,

whose "overwrought reporting" of it to Washington obviously influenced President Johnson's thinking and strengthened the hand of those officials who already were urging a

As

much

larger

US

military intervention. 173

the evacuation took place that Tuesday, the military tide slowly turned

against the constitutionalists.

planes since Sunday, they

Under continuous

now had

Isidro attempting to enter the city.

to

attack from General Wessin's

contend with a force of tanks from San

Faced with impending defeat, the leading

Molina Urena, sought help

constitutionalists, including Provisional President

from the

US Embassy to mediate the conflict. Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett,

no fan of ex-President Bosch and

ever-fearful of a leftist takeover, 174 flatly re-

fused, advising the constitutionalists to surrender. 175

Although they ignored his
advice, a number of them, including Molina Urena, apparently conceded defeat, for they immediately sought political asylum at various Latin American
embassies. 176

who had

One

did not. Surprisingly, Francisco

Caamano,

a career officer

served as chief of the police riot squad under Trujillo and certainly

was not known

Bosch supporter, after a dramatic reply to Bennett,
rushed from the embassy to rally the constitutionalist forces opposing
Wessin's tanks at the Duarte Bridge. 177 Miraculously, the tide turned yet
again: the tanks were driven back, the police stations fell, and by mid-afternoon of the next day Wednesday, 28 April 1 965 the city belonged to the
as a

—

—

constitutionalists.

During

178

this surprising

turnaround,

US

helicopters continued to

uees from the Hotel Embajador to the Boxer.
fied their control of the city,

conducting the

As

airlift

evac-

the constitutionalists solidi-

however, Colonel Benoit, the head of a new junta

Ambassador Bennett that "the
guarantee the safety of Americans or other foreign-

operations, informed

no position to
Santo Domingo." 180 Accordingly, "the junta was requesting

junta was in
ers in

loyalist's

119
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States intervention." 181

While the

junta's formal written request, submitted

about 4 P.M. on the afternoon of the 28th, actually made no mention of the

need to protect US nationals, 182 Bennett relied upon this argument in his
now-famous "critic" telegram recommending the immediate landing of US Ma183
Shortly thereafter, Presirines, which arrived in Washington about 5 P.M.
dent Johnson decided to land a contingent of armed Marines, 184 536 of whom

came ashore

in the early evening. 185 In

an address

to the nation later that night,

Dominican Republic had
informed the United States that the lives of its nationals were in danger, and
that the assistance of US military personnel was necessary to guarantee their
safety. 186 As a result, the President stated, he had ordered the Secretary of Defense "to put the necessary American troops ashore in order to give protection
to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country. This same assistance will be available to
the nationals of other countries, some of whom have already asked for our
the President reported that military authorities in the

help." 187

—Thursday,

The

following day

equipment landed, bringing

The next day

total

29 April

military transports ferried

bank of the Ozama

additional Marines with heavy

US forces in Santo Domingo to

Division to the San Isidro Air Base.
the east

—

River,

1,700 men. 188

two battalions of the 82nd Airborne

They immediately took up

positions along

an area in which there were no

US or other

foreign nationals to be evacuated. 189 Yet, in his address to the nation that evening,

30 April, President Johnson again invoked the protection of nationals

ar-

had made two nights earlier, noting that over 2,400 US and
other foreign nationals already had been evacuated from the Dominican Re-

gument

that he

public. 190

vanced a

More significantly, however, the President, for the first time, adnew argument for US intervention, namely, that "people trained

Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control" of the country.
While not saying so explicitly, Johnson clearly intended to leave the impression
that "outside" communists threatened to take over the Dominican Republic.
In the face of this potential threat, he continued, the Organization of American States (OAS) had the "immediate responsibility" to take prompt action
to achieve a ceasefire before such an "international conspiracy" could take
outside the

control. 191

On

1

May,

after the

apparent failure of a tenuous ceasefire between the two

opposing factions, President Johnson ordered additional troops flown
ing the
ist

number of US

forces to 6,200.

(but apparently not loyalist)

ceasefire.

192

They proceeded

territory

in

in, rais-

to enter constitutional-

an attempt to enforce the

Nevertheless, in a written statement issued the same day the
61

Abroad

Forcible Protection of Nationals

President once again maintained that the mission of the troops was solely to

US

protect and evacuate

Warning of a

and other foreign nationals. 193

"tragic turn" of events, President

The

tion for a third time the following day.

the

of

Dominican revolution had been

Communist

counter

conspirators

.

.

.

President

now publicly asserted that

and placed in the hands of a band
," 194
[m]any of them trained in Cuba.
To
"seized

.

new development,

this alleged

Johnson addressed the na-

men

.

the President reported that he had or-

Dominican Republic.
He did not attempt to justify their dispatch by continued reliance upon protection of nationals arguments. Instead, the President proclaimed what came to be
known as the "Johnson Doctrine," namely, that "[t]he American nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another Communist
government in the Western Hemisphere." 195 To prevent such an occurrence,
he announced, the United States was consulting with the OAS regarding proposals for a multilateral response to this new threat posed by the Dominican
dered an additional force of 6,500

crisis.

to proceed to the

196

on 6 May 1965, the OAS, which much earlier had adopted a
resolution calling for a ceasefire and the establishment of a neutral zone
"within which the nationals of all countries will be given safe haven," 197 approved a US-sponsored resolution creating an Inter American Force. 198 This
force, largely made up of US troops that numbered over 23,000 by the middle of
May, eventually ended hostilities, established a provisional government and
supervised general elections before finally departing the Dominican Republic
on 21 September 1966. 199 During this time, the OAS legal umbrella, not the
protection of nationals rationale, gradually became the principal, if not exclusive, US justification for the continued presence of its troops in the Dominican
In the event,

Republic. 200

Whether

the

OAS

merely acquiesced in the intro-

officially legitimized or

duction of US troops has been the subject of much scholarly debate, 201 as has

been the legitimacy of the

OAS

yond the scope of the present study
the right of forcible protection
criticized,

much

less

—

it

—

itself.

should be underscored that the

condemned, the

Dominican Republic

initial

to protect the lives of

US

OAS never

US

action of sending troops to the

its

nationals and other foreigners.

Nor, for that matter, did the United Nations.
Criticism of the

202

While both issues are bewhich focuses upon the current status of

operation

203

action in general, however, was widespread. Senator

Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who dramatically
broke with President Johnson over the Dominican Republic even before he
Fulbright,

took issue with the

latter's policy in

Vietnam, argued in the Senate that the
62
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Administration had "cooked up" an invitation to intervene on the question-

US

able grounds that the lives of
ting that "Santo

nationals were endangered. 204

Domingo was not a particularly safe

place to be in the last days

of April 1965," the Senator contended that the "danger to

more

a pretext than a reason for the massive

US

While admit-

American

intervention.

." 205
.

.

lives

was

Had

the

and other foreign nationals been the real reason for US action, he argued, the United States could have sent in troops "promptly and
then withdrawn them and the incident would soon have been forgotten." 206
Scholarly comment almost unanimously agreed with the Senator's ap-

protection of

US

praisal. 207

[to be] a
als,"

208

Although regarding "[t]he initial landing of four hundred Marines
permissible self-defense measure to protect the United States nation-

Professor

Nanda pointed out

the obvious, that:

the United States' action was not limited in
its

nationals; furthermore,

it

the United States'

to protect

its

objective [to] protecting the lives of

was not limited in its scope or duration

either.

Hence,

met the required criterion of proportionality to
claim that since it had dispatched armed forces primarily

there are serious doubts that
justify

its

it

the United States' use o( coercive measures in the

citizens,

Dominican Republic should be considered a

permissible use of self-defense. 209

Friedmann took much the same view, although his conclusion had
much harder edge. While acknowledging, like Nanda, that "[t]here is reProfessor

a

spectable authority for the view that the original limited intervention to protect

US

citizens

from imminent danger, in a situation of anarchy, did not

violate international law," 210

he believed the massive build-up and continued

presence of US forces in the Dominican Republic to be "patently, by standards
of international law, an illegal action.

The

present writer and almost

that subsequently debated the
essentially supporting the

tection,
ties

213

.

other participants at a 1972 conference

Dominican crisis

also expressed similar views, 212

continued existence of a limited right of forcible pro-

while at the same time recognizing and warning against the possibili-

of the doctrine's misuse. 214 Today, three decades after President Johnson

ordered in

US

troops,

nominator, that
it is

all

," 211
.

one

"it is far

the prolonged

still

may conclude,

dents overran the

American presence

de-

American response than
the Dominican Republic." 215

in

Iran, 1980,

1979, several hundred armed

US

minimum common

easier to justify the initial

D.

On 4 November

as a

Embassy

in

Muslim fundamentalist stuTehran and took more than five dozen
63
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diplomatic and consular

The

staff,

Abroad

Marine guards and other

US citizens hostage. 216

Iranian government did nothing to prevent the takeover 217 or, subse-

quently, to secure the release of the hostages. 218

The

among
former Shah who

militant students,

other demands, requested the United States to return the

—

on 22 October had been allowed to enter the United States from his exile in
Mexico to receive medical treatment to Iran for trial, a demand that the

—

United States rejected.

219

The United States immediately protested the seizure of the Embassy and its
staff, but when Prime Minister Bazargan, a secular moderate opposed by the religious extremists, resigned

on 6 November,

it

found

itself

with no one in Iran

two emissaries from the
private sector
former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and former Foreign
Service officer William Miller
on a secret mission to Tehran in an attempt to
open up channels of communication. Carrying a letter from the President on
White House stationery addressed "Dear Ayatollah Khomeini," Clark and
to negotiate. Thereafter President Carter dispatched

—

—

no further than Istanbul, Turkey, by which time the Ayatollah had
learned of their trip and ordered that no one in Tehran should see them. 220 After a week in Istanbul, during which time they made dozens of fruitless calls to
Tehran, they concluded that there would be no movement on Iran's part until
a new constitution had been adopted and a new government put in place and
Miller got

thereafter returned to

Washington. 221

While this mission and other efforts to secure the return of the hostages
were under way, the United States requested that the UN Security Council
meet to discuss ways to obtain the hostages release. Eventually it did on 4 December unanimously approving a resolution that called for the hostages immediate release. 222 When this resolution went unheeded by Iran, the Council met
again and on 3 1 December, adopted another resolution demanding that Iran
should free the hostages. 223

It

also decided to

reconvene in January 1980, in the

event of continued Iranian non-compliance, to discuss the imposition of sanctions

under Articles 39 and 41 of the

13 January 1980, to consider a

US

UN Charter. The Council met again on

draft resolution that

A veto cast by the Soviet Union pre-

broad economic sanctions against Iran.

vented

its

would have mandated

adoption and effectively removed the Security Council from the

tlement process.

set-

224

In the meantime, the United States

on 29 November 1979,

instituted pro-

ceedings against Iran before the International Court of Justice, requesting the

Court, pending

measures,
release

all

its

final

Judgment

in the case, to indicate certain provisional

and foremost being that "the Government of Iran immediately
hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and

first

64

Contemporary Case Studies of United States Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad

safe departure

from Iran of these persons and

all

other United States

officials in

225

Acting with commendable alacrity,
and humane circumstances."
the Court took the case, heard oral argument by the United States (Iran did not
appear at the hearing), and on 15 December unanimously ordered Iran to re-

dignified

store the

Embassy

immediate
nationality
as

to

US

release,

who

control and to ensure the:

without any exception, of

are or

who have been held

hostages elsewhere, and afford

accordance with the
international

treaties in force

all

in the

persons of United States

Embassy

protection to

full

between the two

... or

have been held

such persons, in

all

States,

and with general

law. 226

The Court also enjoined both the United States and Iran not to take any action "which may aggravate the tension between the two countries or render the
227
As it had in the case of the two
existing dispute more difficult of solution.
.

Security Council resolutions,

Diplomatic

efforts

228

.

.

Iran refused to obey the Court's Order.

during the winter and early spring of 1980 were no more

successful in achieving the hostages' release. 229

Most prominent among these
efforts was the establishment of a five -member UN Commission of Inquiry that
was to undertake a fact-finding mission to Iran to hear Iran's grievances and to
." 23 °
allow for an early solution of the crisis.
The Commission traveled to
Tehran in early March but returned without having made any progress. A
.

.

seemingly promising initiative involving the transfer of the hostages from the
militants holding the

Embassy into Iranian governmental control

through in early April

when

Council thwarted the

efforts of President

religious

also

fell

elements within Iran's Revolutionary

Bani-Sadr and Prime Minister

——

Ghotbzadeh to end the crisis. 231 Thus, by mid- April 1980 over five months
after the Embassy had been overrun and the hostages seized
"momentum for
232
a negotiated solution seemed to have run out."

On

24 April 1980, some days

after the

beginning of the sandstorm season,

and the "mission cut off date recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff due to
the possibility of sandstorms, with knowledge that a main highway ran adjacent
to Desert

I,

in the face of the failure to secure their release through diplomatic

or judicial means, the United States launched a rescue mission designed to free

them
RH-53

United States. 233 That evening

the hostages and return

to the

time) eight Sea Stallion

helicopters lifted off from the

tioned in the Arabian Sea off the coast of Iran.

They were

USS

to fly

(local

Nimitz sta-

under cover of

darkness over 500 miles inland to a previously-prepared airstrip codenamed

"Desert

I,"

there to rendezvous with six Hercules
65

C-130 cargo

aircraft carrying
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90 commandos. After refueling and loading the commandos and their equipment, the helicopters were to proceed to a remote site in the mountains south
of Tehran, where they would be camouflaged to avoid detection the following
day.

That evening, 25

and

trucks, free the hostages at the Embassy,

ter to

April, "Delta Force"

an abandoned airport

was

to enter

Tehran

in local vans

and then be evacuated by helicopoutside of Tehran codenamed "Desert II." Leaving

the helicopters, they would get aboard transport aircraft waiting for

US

be flown out of Iran under heavy

them and

cover.

air

Unfortunately, while operating through a sandstorm, two of the eight helicopters encountered mechanical and navigational difficulties

reached Desert

l.

upon inspection
five

and never
A third helicopter experienced hydraulic problems, which
the desert site proved incapable of on-site repair. With only

234

at

workable helicopters at hand and knowing that a

needed

minimum

of six were

to accomplish the actual rescue the following night, the mission

mander decided

com-

to abort the operation. Tragically, during refueling operations

one of the helicopters collided with a C-130 and the resulting explosion and fire killed eight crew members and wounded another five.
prior to the withdrawal,

The

force thereupon withdrew in the remaining C-130s. Evidence suggests

that Iran was not even aware that

ident Carter officially informed

US forces had been in the territory until Pres-

it

of the failed rescue operation several hours

later. 235

In a nationally televised broadcast at 7

A.M.

that morning, President Carter

in describing the aborted rescue operation characterized

it

as a

"humanitarian

mission" and specifically disavowed any hostility towards the Iranian people. 236

According to the President, he "ordered
safeguard American

lives,

this rescue

to protect America's national interests,

the tensions in the world that have been caused
crisis

has continued."

237

mission prepared

The

among many

in order to

and to reduce

nations as this

following day, in a report to the Congress, the

President reiterated the humanitarian nature of the mission and briefly ex-

plained
"

why he considered

[i]n carrying

right, in

justified

this operation, the

under international law, stating that

United States was acting wholly within

its

accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to protect

and rescue
located

out

it

is

its

citizens

where the government of the

unable or unwilling to protect them."

temporaneous report to the

238

territory in

The United

which they

are

States, in a con-

UN Security Council, also relied upon the protecwas a permissible
with the aim of extricating Ameri-

tion of nationals rationale, claiming that the rescue operation

"exercise of its inherent right of self-defense,

can nationals who have been and remain the victims of the Iranian armed
tack

on our embassy." 239
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The US
States

still

States

first

argument, based upon the inherent right of self-defense that

legal

enjoy under Article 51,

advanced

a reprise of the

is

in the case of the seizure of the

sequently developed in the

UN

argument the United

Mayaguez

in

1975 and sub-

on

Security Council to justify Israel's raid

Entebbe in 1976.
Since Iran never took the failed

US

rescue operation to the Security

cil,

that body did not have the opportunity to debate or pass

ity

of the operation or the validity of the

US

Coun-

on either the

legal-

argument. Moreover, the

legal

reactions of States, while generally supportive of the United States, 240 shed
tle light

on

tional law.

their views regarding the legal basis of the

lit-

US action under interna-

241

In the case of Iran, however, unlike the other incidents discussed in this

Chapter, the International Court of Justice had the opportunity to consider, at
least in passing, the question of what legal

arguments,

if

any, were available to

support such rescue operations. This opportunity arose from the

be

fact, as will

Order on provisional measures of 15 December 1979, the
Court had instructed both Iran and the United States not to take any action
recalled, that in

its

that might exacerbate the dispute

between the two countries. 242 The

at-

tempted rescue operation, of course, took place on 24 April 1980, over a month
after the

while
later.

it

Court had held three days of hearings on the merits of the case and

was in the course of preparing

Thus,

it

its

Judgment issued exactly

it

violated the

the Court were to have found

if

UN Charter.

In the event, as the late Judge Dillard remarked,

very gentle.

It

month

could be argued that the operation constituted the international

law equivalent of contempt of court, especially
that

a

chided the United States for

judgment on it."

243

While

stating that

it

its

u

[w]hat the Court did was

rescue operation but didn't pass

could not

"fail to

express

its

concern in

regard to the United States' incursion into Iran," the Court nevertheless pointedly passed

considered

up the opportunity
itself

"bound

to question

to observe that

cumstances, from whatever motive,

is

its legality,

noting merely that

an operation undertaken

it

in those cir-

of a kind calculated to undermine re-

spect for the judicial process in international relations

" 244

This mild slap on

the wrist, as the late Professor Stein notes in his perceptive critique of this as-

pect of the Court's Judgment, "was coupled with an express disavowal of any
finding that the rescue attempt was unlawful." 245

To quote from its Judgment:

[T]he Court must point out that neither the question of the legality of the
operation of 24 April 1980, under the Charter of the United Nations and under
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general international law, nor any possible question oi responsibility flowing from
it, is

before the Court. 246

Thus, as Stein aptly concludes, the Court:
another day, a day one suspects

[LJeft to

will

never come, a definitive statement

of its views regarding the law governing the use of force in defense of the lives of
nationals abroad. 247

Should the day ever arrive when the Court addresses
its

decision

may well

the Hostages Case

—

turn

on

its

acceptance or rejection of the

1

of the

US

argument

that the forcible protection of nationals abroad

is

in

a proper

armed attack authorized by

exercise of the inherent right of self-defense against

Article 5

however,

this question,

UN Charter—rather than on whether such actions constitute

an exception to the prohibition against the use of force found in Article 2(4) or
are otherwise permissible under general international law. 248

This characterization of the legal question, after

all,

seems to have been "ac-

cepted without question by the Court," 249 which not only mentions
serted by the United States before the Security Council,
to the

being

its

as-

but also refers twice

"armed attack on the United States Embassy" 251 and the "armed attack

by the militants

...

and

their seizure of Embassy premises

sor Stein has called attention to

what he

UN

and

staff...."

252

Profes-

labels the Court's:

tantalizing suggestions that the category of

the

250

"armed attacks" under Article

Charter extends well beyond major armed

assaults....

If,

5

1

of

indeed, the

Court's references to "armed attack" were studied rather than casual, operations

such as the rescue mission are lawful not because the right of self-defense under
the

UN

Charter

self-defense,

is

coextensive with the preexisting customary law right of

which extended beyond defense against 'armed

because the right of self-defense against armed attack has

The two

attack'

.

.

.,

but

arisen. 253

dissenting judges in the Hostages Case appear to have accepted the

majority's analytical

framework

as well.

Thus, Judge Morozow,

after criticizing

"the so-called rescue operation," which he labeled "an invasion of the territory of
the Islamic Republic of Iran," 254 maintained that the Court should have drawn
attention to the undeniable legal fact that Article 51 of the Charter establishing
[sic]

the right of self-defense,

against a

member

may be invoked

of the United Nations."

It

only

an armed attack occurs

should have added that

no evidence that any armed attack had occurred
68

"if

against the United

.

.

.

there

States. 255

is
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who

Judge Tarazi,
not

my intention to characterize

legal value

256

that "[i]t

any

prefaced his remarks on this score with the observation

is

judgment

in this respect,"

[the rescue] operation or to

make

nevertheless reflected in his opin-

ion some of Judge Morozow's concerns about attempts to treat the operation as

an armed attack. 257 The

a self-defense response to

on the question

is

in place should the issue arise in

Surprisingly, scholarly

been

relatively sparse.

comment on

One US

to be "preemptively illegal."

argument, concluded that

260

"it

tages

Case in

some

for

debate

future case. 258

the legality of the rescue operation has

259

it

was "a

fla-

while another of his colleagues found

it

A German scholar, rejecting the US self-defense

was from the very beginning nothing but

tion of the prohibition of the use of force

who

framework

writer declared categorically that

grant violation of international law,"

Professor Ronzitti,

legal

and of Iran's

a viola-

territorial integrity." 261

repeatedly refers to the rescue operation and the Hos-

monograph, 262 presumably holds the same opinion, since he

his

reaches the general conclusion that "the right to intervene to protect one's

own

abroad does not

citizens

Two more

exist." 263

detailed legal studies of the rescue operation reach the contrary

conclusion, each perhaps by a different legal path. In the

US

argument "subject to considerable

self-defense

first,

while finding the

difficulties," 264 a British

au-

thor nevertheless regards the operation as legally justified pursuant to a "restrictive" interpretation of Article 2(4),

i.e.,

that

it

was not a use of force against

the political independence or territorial integrity of Iran, or in any other

ner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
In the second, Professor Schachter,
action to save lives of nationals ...
territorial

government

instant action

is

is

is

who

also believes that

not prohibited by

man-

265

"an armed rescue

article 2 (4)

when

the

unable or unwilling to protect them and the need for

manifest," 266 applies this test to the rescue operation and con-

cludes that "the action taken did not violate the U.N. Charter or international
law." 267
It is

not entirely clear from his exposition, however, whether his finding that

Article 2(4) was "no problem"

is

grounded upon the

belief that the rescue oper-

ation represented "an exception to the prohibition of article 2(4)" 268 or, alternatively,

that

it

constituted an exercise of legitimate self-defense. 269

balance, both the approach and language of his seminal chapter
are

somewhat confirmed by

fessor

Schachter

justifies

his

subsequent writings.

It is

on the

subject

suggested that Pro-

the Iranian rescue operation not by a restrictive read-

ing of Article 2(4), but rather by an
self-defense

270

On

under Article 5 1
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expanded concept of the

right of
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Finally, as in the case of the
ter,

271

some mention of the

Lebanese

factual

ger

—

much

had been met

tion

lives or safety

that, technically, the

—

273

crisis

is

invocation by the

its

seems warranted here. While

attention in Iranian

showing that the

discussed earlier in this Chap-

crisis

factual predicate behind

United States during the Iranian
has not received

Abroad

crisis

this issue

postmortems, 272 an adequate

of the hostages were in imminent dan-

requirement of the "necessity" of the rescue opera-

the sine qua non of its being a valid exercise of the right

of forcible protection. Put more pointedly by former

Under Secretary of State

Christopher, the question becomes: "was the United States legally justified in

undertaking the rescue mission in April 1980
that

.

.

.

even though the hostages,

moment, may not actually have been in imminent danger?"

The answer

to this question

fact that the real or

is

made more

apparent threat to the

difficult in

lives

and

at

274

the case of Iran by the

safety of the hostages

was

not short-lived, requiring a decision as to whether to undertake a rescue mis-

made once and for all within a relatively narrow time frame, but confor a period of many months. Thus, this case differs markedly from the

sion to be

tinued

other instances surveyed in this Chapter, especially the Dominican Republic
crisis,

US decisionmakers had relatively little

where

fore deciding

time to assess the facts be-

whether or not to mount a rescue mission.

It

also differs

from

these other instances in that here the foreign government involved was not just

unable, but blatantly unwilling, to do anything to protect the lives and safety of

US

nationals, thus accentuating the actual

Since, as the Hostages
is

Convention

and potential danger

reaffirms in

par excellence an "act which endangers innocent

to

deny the

fact that the

US

its

to them.

Preamble, hostage-taking

human lives," 275 it is difficult

hostages at the Embassy were in "imminent dan-

ger" immediately after their seizure

on 4 November 1979,

a seizure that,

it

will

be recalled, was endorsed and confirmed by the Ayatollah Khomeini within a
fortnight.

They were bound,

threatened with

trial

blindfolded, paraded before

TV

cameras and

and possible execution. Clearly the "necessity" require-

ment permitting a rescue mission could have been satisfied easily at
If

once

satisfied,

however, must the necessity requirement be

on 24 April 1980, when the actual rescue operation took

satisfied again

place? Secretary

Christopher's rhetorical question, perhaps shaped by the fact that

ter's analysis

it

was raised

summary and evaluation of Professor Schachter's contripublication effort, implies an affirmative answer. 276 The lat-

in the context of his

bution to a joint

that time.

takes the position that:

70

Contemporary Case Studies of United States Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad

[t]he illegality of their [prolonged] detention

and the

failure of international

organs to obtain their release should not be enough to legitimize the use of force
to effect their release.

To

allow the use of force in the absence of imminent peril

would imply a "necessity" to use force
Charter does not permit]
self-defense to repel

.

It

would be

to redress a legal

wrong [which the

from the necessity of

significantly different

an attack or to save

UN

lives. 277

Professor Schachter's attempt to transmute a permissible exercise of the
right of forcible protection into

an

illegal

use of force to redress a legal wrong,

using the passage of time and possible improvement in the treatment of the

hostages as an alchemist's converter,

The

is

not persuasive on a number of grounds.

taking of hostages being a wrongful act under international law, to then

deny the State of the hostages' nationality the

right to forcibly protect the hos-

tages simply because the State that has seized the hostages has lessened

its

—evidenced, perhaps, by having placed
permitted Red Cross
— eliminate an

threat to the hostages' lives or limbs

them

in

an ordinary prison or

access

important sanction against the hostage-taking State.
takers negotiating position,

Second,
tion

is

if

and thereby encourages

"any taking of hostages

is

—

278
),

why should any remedial

is

appears realistic and

"[i]t

short of the unconditional release of all hostages

Finally,

its

similar acts in the future.

steps taken by the hostage-taking

wrongfulness of the hostage-taking State's

there

improves the hostage

instantly justified in law," (a position Professor Schachter apparently re-

practical"

State

to

so grave a criminal act that a rescue ac-

but admits has "appeal" since to him

jects

It

is

although there appears to be

no data

—

in effect, reduce the

act.

little if

any State practice on point,

that suggests that any State has acknowledged a diminution of

right to protect

its

nationals

who have been

illegally

detained by another

some time and the threat to their
may have diminished somewhat since their wrongful detention

State merely because they have been held for

and safety
commenced. Certainly the United States never took
lives

Iran

crisis.

case, the

this position

during the

Indeed, as Professor Stein perceptively points out, "[i]n the Hostages

United States made no

effort to

demonstrate to the Court that the

rescue mission was undertaken in response to a
the hostages' lives."

Even assuming,

new or more imminent

peril to

279

in

arguendo, that international law required the United

imminent danger at
the time of the rescue operation, that burden of proof certainly would appear to
have been met. As President Carter noted when initially explaining his reasons
States to demonstrate that the hostages actually were in

for ordering the mission, "the steady unraveling of authority in Iran

71

and the
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mounting dangers that were posed

made

the attempt "a necessity

.

.

to the safety of the hostages themselves"

." 28 °

.

Abroad

Secretary of Defense

Brown seconded

the President's remarks, stressing the "danger posed to the hostages by the deteriorating security situation in Iran." 281 Furthermore,

he added, "[w]e have

considerable concern for the physical and psychological effects

of prolonged captivity." 282 Secretary Christopher,

what he had believed

tal, peril

at the

on the assumption

who

were in imminent danger

actually

it

was certainly reasonable

for the

had

to

United

that the hostages were in grave, even mor-

believes the question of

at the

whether the hostages

time of the rescue operation to be unanswer-

even with hindsight, takes a "margin of appreciation" approach

matter.

is

when decisions

time of the rescue mission." 283

Professor Schachter,

able,

crisis,

US concerns in far more detailed fashion before conclud-

ing that, "[b]y any objective measure,
States to operate

subsequently reviewed

to be the risks to the hostages "not in retrospect, with the

benefit of hindsight, but at the time of the

be made," spelled out

who

on the hostages

"The pertinent

to the

point," he observes, agreeing with Christopher:

whether, at the time, the

US

government had reason

to fear that in the

emotional atmosphere of Iranian revolutionary ferment the hostages would be
executed, with or without a

As

trial.

a general rule,

it

seems reasonable to

recognize that the state whose nationals are imprisoned as hostages should have

wide latitude to make the decision whether they are in extreme danger. 284

Applying

this

approach to the publicly available

facts,

he concludes

that:

whether or not the hostages were actually in extreme danger, the conditions
were such as to lead the US government to believe they were. Faced with this fact

and the not

unrealistic conclusion at the time that peaceful

means

offered

no

promise of release, the United States had reasonable grounds to consider military
action necessary to effect a rescue.

On

these premises, the action taken did not

violate the Charter or international law. 285

With

this conclusion, if not

able observers

with

all

his reasoning in reaching

it,

few reason-

can disagree. Moreover, by spelling out and applying a "margin

of appreciation" approach to the determination of whether the requirement of
necessity was satisfied in the case of the rescue operation in Iran, Professor

Schachter has made an important contribution towards refining one of the
teria that will

cri-

be used in judging the validity of future claims by States to exer-

cise the right of forcible protection of their nationals abroad.
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Fundamentally, as in the Iran case, a

state's

embassy and/or consulate con-

which occupies it. If an embassy or consulate is attacked by foreign nationals, it constitutes an attack on
the occupying state (the United States in the Iran case).
stitutes the sovereign property of the foreign state

An

attack

on

a state justifies a "self-defense" response against the attack-

ers/occupiers of the state's embassy or consulate to secure the building

rescue of

its

nationals per Article 5 1 of the

and the

UN Charter.

NOTES
1.

Information about the forcible protection of nationals abroad by States other than the

United States

—

principally France

—

is

hard to obtain and often fragmentary or inaccurate.

Moreover, with the one exception of Entebbe, such instances appear to have generated
legal

little

debate either on the international level or within the States concerned. For a necessarily

cursory and undoubtedly incomplete series of case studies of

non-US

forcible protection of

nationals abroad, see Chapter V.

Background information about the crisis as well as detailed descriptive accounts of it
in M. Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, 1958 (1965); L. Meo, Lebanon: Improbable
Nation (1965); and F. Qubain, Crisis In Lebanon (1961) [hereinafter cited as Qubain]. For
differing views on the legal issues involved, compare Potter, Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing, 52
Am. J. Int'l L. 727 (1958) with Wright, United States Intervention in the Lebanon. 53 id. 112
(1959). For a useful monograph, prepared under the supervision of the present writer and drawn
upon throughout this chapter, see R. Osborne, The Lebanese Intervention and International
Law, 31 Mar. 1969 (unpublished thesis in US Naval War College Library). See also C. Thayer,
Diplomat ch. Ill (1959) for a vivid account of the actual intervention.
3. According to the official census, Lebanon's population consists of 392,000 Christians and
383,000 Muslims. L. Meo, supra note 2, at 229 n. 1 But see text at and accompanying note 4 infra.
4. The most recent estimates place the population at 2,800,000. The Middle East and
North Africa 1989, at 617 (36th ed. 1990). With a higher birthrate and lower emigration, most
informed observers believe that Muslims now account for about 60% of the total population.
5. Qubain, supra note 2, at 17.
6. M. Agwani, supra note 2, at 1-2.
7. Qubain, supra note 2, at 18.
8. "The people of Lebanon enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the Middle East."
2.

may be found

.

Id.

at 3.
9.

Id.

at 35-37.

38.

10.

Id. at

11.

Id.

at 38-44.

12.

Id.

at 42.

13.

Joint Resolution of 9

March

1957, § (1957).

2, 7 1 Stat. 5,

reprinted in

36

DEPT St.

BULL.

481.
14.

See L.

Meo, supra note

2, at

15.

R. Garnet, Intervention

16.

The

117-20.

and Revolution 140 (1968).

violence began in Tripoli, where according to unsubstantiated reports of the

opposition, 168 of their

members were

killed.

succinct account, see R. Osborne, supra note

Qubain, supra note
2, at

73

22-23:

2, at 74. It

soon spread. For a

Abroad
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Violence in Tripoli led to armed rebellion.

by a burning of the

US

On 9 May demonstrations began followed
On 12 May the violence reached Beirut.

Information Library.

The road

Damascus was barred and
a curfew was introduced. Commerce and industry came to a standstill and the large
volume of tourists disappeared from the country. When the news of the upheaval in
Tripoli reached Beirut, the United National Front held a meeting and the decision
was made for armed revolt. On 13 May the United National Front attacked the
Presidential Palace at Bayt al-Din. The Cairo radio began urging Lebanese Moslems
to seize areas where they were in control and accede to the United Arab Republic.
Barricades were set up with burning

The country was
17.

sliding

oil

drums.

to

toward anarchy.

down

Despite Chamoun's demands that the army promptly put

the rebellion and end

the strike, General Fuad Chebab, the commander-in-chief, refused to commit the army against
what he considered a mass protest rather than subversion. From May to July he used his
6,000-man army to patrol the streets and to prevent clashes between Christians and Muslims. He
wanted at all costs to keep the army, which was about two-thirds Christian and one-third
Muslim, above the political fray that threatened to split the county. R. Garnet, supra note 15, at
144.

While the civil strife which occurred in Lebanon from May through July of 1958 went
beyond Garnet's "mass protest," see text accompanying notes 16 and 17 supra, it never really
degenerated into civil war. Moreover, throughout the crisis an element of unreality, if not farce,
often prevailed. Thus, according to Qubain:
18.

well

[h]

ad the Lebanese

crisis

not had such tragic aspects,

it

could have been easily

described as a comic opera. There was something unreal about the whole affair-a
succession of scenes taken virtually

opposition leaders officially declared

fight;

from Ruritania: an army that would not

in toto

'rebels,'

with warrants out for their

blandly walking the streets of Beirut in broad daylight with no one laying so

on them; pitched

between the army and
army trucks could bring water to the rebels and move

finger

battles

president virtually a prisoner in his

'rebel' forces

their

stopped, so that

wounded

own palace for over two months;

arrest,

much as a

to hospitals; a

a parliament that

could not meet; opposition leaders, each with a private army of his own, establishing

—

independent government in his locality levying taxes and administering
and a crisis that was long on bitter words, but short on actual casualties.

virtually
justice;

19.

For President Chamoun's statement to the press reiterating such charges, see M. Agwani,

supra note
20.

2, at

74-76.

For the Lebanese complaint to the Security Council, see 13 U.N.

1958) at 33, U.N. Doc. S/4007 (1958), reprinted in
21.

13

supra note
22.

U.N.

SCOR

Agwani, supra note
23.

13

U.N.

Curtis,

2, at

The

U.N. Doc. StP.V. 823 (1958),

reprinted in

M. Agwani,

2, at

M.

(Apr.-Jun. 1958) at 47, U.N. Doc. S/4023 (1958), reprinted in

M.

at 22-23,

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 823 (1958),

198.

The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, 18
critical

Among Warriors

Int'l

Org. 738, 75 1-52 (1964).

of UNOGIL's operations. See Kerr, The Lebanese Civil War,

International Regulation of Civil

Diplomat

(Apr.-Jun.

120-21.

reprinted in

(823d mtg.)

Other observers are much more
in

at 4,

2, at

147-59.

SCOR Supp.

Agwani, supra note
24.

(823d mtg.)

SCOR Supp.

supra note

124.

2, at

13

SCOR

U.N.

M. Agwani,

War

65, 85-89 (E.

402 (1964); and Qubain, supra note

74

Luard ed. 1972); R. Murphy,
2, at

143-52.
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26.

The White House
39DEPTST.BULL. 31 (1958).

27.

D. Eisenhower, supra note 25, at 270 (emphasis added) See also text infra accompanying

D. Eisenhower,

25.

Years:

Waging Peace 1956-1961,

at

267 (1965).

.

note 32.
28.

Qubain, supra note

16, 1958, at 15, col

2, at

115. See

Baghdad Reports Americans

See also C. Thayer, supra note

1.

2, at

Kerr, supra note 24, at 77.

30.

For a graphic description, see C. Thayer, supra note

2, at

31.

Kerr, supra note 24, at 77.

32.

See supra text at note 27. According to one key official

in achieving a settlement of the crisis, President

when

in a

White House

N.Y. Times, July

thereafter

was instrumental

27.

29.

protect nationals

Slain,

33-36.

who

Eisenhower did not even mention the need to

briefing he:

on his purpose in ordering US Marines to land in Lebanon. He said
that sentiment had developed in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, that Americans
were capable only of words, that we were afraid of Soviet reaction if we attempted
elaborated a

little

military action. Eisenhower believed that if the United States did nothing now, there
would be heavy and irreparable losses in Lebanon and in the area generally. He
wanted to demonstrate in a timely and practical way that the United States was

capable of supporting

its

friends.

R. Murphy, supra note 24, at 398.
33.

39

DEPT ST.

34.

Id.

at 182.

35.

Id.

at 184.

36.

Explaining the landing of Marines he argued that:

[t]heir

BULL. 181 (1958) (emphasis added).

presence

Lebanon

at

its

from outside,

is

designed for the sole purpose of helping the Government of

request in

until

its

efforts to stabilize the situation

such time

as the

brought on by the threats

United Nations can take the steps necessary to

protect the independence and political integrity of Lebanon. They will also afford
security to the several thousand

(827th mtg.) at

7,

Americans who

reside in that country. 13

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 827 (1958),

reprinted in

39

U.N.

SCOR

DEPT ST. BULL

186

(1958) (emphasis added)

Ambassador Lodge's statement before the Security Council on 18 July 1958, to the effect
that the "[fjorces of the United States now in Lebanon at the specific request of the lawfully
constituted Government of Lebanon would not remain if their withdrawal were requested by
that Government," 13 U.N. SCOR (833d mtg.) at 10, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 833 (1958), reprinted in
39 DEPT ST. BULL 196 (1958), demonstrates beyond doubt that the protection of nationals
rationale had been discarded after three days of use. One explanation for the shift in legal
justifications, of course, might be that over the 15-18 July period the safety of US nationals had
been secured, thus depriving the United States of the factual basis for continued reliance upon
37.

this rationale.

38.

R. Murphy, supra note 24, at 399-400. See supra note 17. Cf. D. Eisenhower, supra note

25, at 265,

39.

who

places the Lebanese

army

9,000 men.

D. Eisenhower, supra note 25, at 286. "In support of these troops, the entire Sixth Fleet,

consisting of about 70 ships with ^\0,000

note

at

2, at

men, moved

115.

75

to the east Mediterranean."

Qubain, supra
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According to President Eisenhower, the decision to have the troops occupy only Beirut

40.

and

its

Abroad

airfield was:

... a

one which

political

military.

It

their capital

with so

I

adhered to over the recommendations of some of the

when we had secured
we were backing up a government

the Lebanese army were unable to subdue the rebels

and protected

little

their

government,

popular support that

I

felt,

we probably should not be

there.

D. Eisenhower, supra note 25, at 275 n.8. Would that subsequent Presidents had taken a similar
approach when committing United States forces to the assistance of various governments in
later years!

41.

Qubain, supra note

42.

For a description of their "low profile"

43.

In one semi-humorous incident, "two

2, at

120.
activities, see Kerr,

American

supra note 24, at 81-83.

way and

soldiers in a jeep lost their

strayed into the rebel-held quarter of Beirut called El-Basta. Local irregulars surrounded their
car,

disarmed them and took them to their

chief, Satib

Salam,

gave them a kindly lecture about interference in the domestic

were then sent

off in their jeep,

minus

their

weapons."

Id.

44.

Qubain, supra note

45.

"Two other points should perhaps be emphasized

2, at 1

19-20. See also

id.

at

who

served them Coca-Cola and
of foreign countries.

affairs

They

90 n.12.

at 130.
in this connection: (1) that

on

several

occasions American troops, while on duty, were shot at by snipers, but in most cases, in

accordance with their instructions, did not return the
suffered any injury of any kind
action."
46.

Id.

in his

fire

and

(2) that

person or property

—

not a single Lebanese

as a result of

US

military

at 121.

Schulimson, Marines in Lebanon:

Headquarters,

1958, at 32 (Historic Branch, G-3 Division
Marine Corps, 1966). Accord, Kerr, supra note 24, at 90 n.13; R. Murphy,
408; and Qubain, supra note 2, at 120.

US

supra note 24, at
47.

—whether

The withdrawal began on 8 October

1958, and was completed in less than three weeks.

39 DEPT. ST. BULL. 650-51 (1958).

On October 25,

1958, the final withdrawal of United States troops took place, almost

without public notice. This lack of attention contrasted vividly with attitudes in the
early days of our intervention

when some

international critics were crying that

America's purpose was to establish a permanent and imperialistic foothold in the

Middle

East.

D. Eisenhower, supra note 25, at 288.
note 24, at 754.

48.

See, e.g., Curtis, supra

49.

But see Wright, supra note

50.

"The most

near Beirut

is

plausible

to be

2.

ground

for the recent landing of military forces of the

United States

found in the invitation of the duly elected Government of Lebanon

According to Wright, "[t]he American declaration that

would withdraw
when requested by Lebanon and its actual withdrawal when so requested indicate that this was
the justification mainly relied upon." Wright, supra note 2, at 124 n.38. See supra text at and
Potter, supra note 2.

accompanying note 37.
51
Responding to the argument that the
of abuse, Qubain concludes that:
[tjhis

was

right to intervene by invitation

clearly not the case with respect to the landing of

Lebanon. Free elections had already taken place without the

.

.

.

the presence of

the subject

in

slightest interference
all

American troops did serve

76

may be

American troops

from the troops, and a new President, supported and accepted by
elected. Furthermore,

it

factions,

was

a constructive
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purpose in Lebanon

itself,

and contributed

the area. Qubain, supra note

2, at

to the calming of the tense

101.

See generally supra text at notes 32-37. President Eisenhower,

52.

atmosphere in

who

recognized that any

action by the United States must conform "with the Charter of the United Nations," obviously

upon the concept of

relied

collective self-defense. D. Eisenhower, supra note 25, at 271.

Describing his briefing of Congressional leaders, he notes that at one point Secretary of State
Dulles "had to explain Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which permitted a country to

on an emergency

act

basis

pending the

United Nations was able to

opportunity to turn the problem over as soon as the

See supra text at note 24. For a strong argument supporting the collective self-defense

53.

Qubain, supra note

thesis, see

2, at

123-26.

54.

See supra text at notes 32-37.

55.

See, e.g., Kerr, supra

56.

Potter, supra note 2, at 728.

57.

Wright, supra note

58.

See supra text at and accompanying notes 16-18.

Questioning the motives

Mr.

Hugh

US

action]

all

first

act." Id. at 272.

note 24, and Qubain, supra note

2.

2, at 1 17.

for the action of the

Of

course, this fact cuts two ways.

United States in a debate in the British Parliament,

remarked "that if it [the justification for
was simply the lives of Americans, then they have been in some danger throughout
these last weeks while the civil war has been taking place in Lebanon." 591 Pari. Deb., H.C.

(5th

Gaitskell, leader of the opposition, tellingly

1249(1958).

ser.)

See supra text at note 33. "In addition to our embassy personnel and other government

59.

many Americans lived in Lebanon, most of them as teachers, missionaries,
and businessmen. Beirut also was a popular seaside resort which attracted Americans residing
throughout the Middle East and many tourists." R. Murphy, supra note 24, at 398.
employees, a good

For instances of US citizens being trapped by

60.
at 23.

That they were not

crossfire, see, e.g.,

intentionally the targets of the

C. Thayer, supra note

anti-Chamoun

from the statement of Mr. Sa'ib Salam, the opposition leader, made immediately
landing of US troops. "Our national Lebanese liberation

2,

forces seems apparent

movement is proud of the

after the

fact that

it

has

not threatened foreigners or their property in the two months of an all-out bloody revolution,
because

only aim

its

is

to get rid of [President

61.

See supra text at note 28.

62.

It is

commercial

worth noting
aircraft to

in this regard,

"

Chamounl

coup

d'etat

the

M. Agwani, supra note

US Ambassador seemed

who

them

wish[ed] to leave Iraq,"

all

American

lives

and property.

will

be allowed to

necessary precautions shall be taken to assure safe departure." 39

DEPT.

199(1958).

Also worthy of note
rationale

it

quite content with assurances from the

Assurances have also been given that those Americans wishing to leave Iraq
ST. BULL.

295.

at that time. Indeed, five days

revolutionary regime "that they will honor their promise to protect

depart freely and that

2, at

however, that, while the United States chartered "four

provide transportation for Americans

apparently never contemplated forcible action to protect
after the

See

is

the fact that Great Britain, while accepting the protection of nationals

advanced by the United States

in the case of

Lebanon, 591

Pari. Deb.,

H.C. (5th

ser.)

1243 (1958) (Mr. Lloyd), did not adopt it herself when justifying the subsequent dispatch of
British troops to Jordan. Id. at 1438-39 (Prime Minister). But see the remarks of an opposition

spokesman

to the effect that "[t]here would, in

Jordan with troops. That

is if

British personnel

lives of British

persons in Jordan. Then,

purpose."

1304 (Mr. Crossman).

Id. at

I

my

view, be only one justification for entering

were in danger and

can

77

visualize

it

was our duty to preserve the

our putting troops in for that sole
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63.

Murphy, supra note

R.

Abroad

24, at 400.

64.

R. Osborne, supra note 2, at 61-62.

65.

C. Thayer, supra note

66.

Id.

67.

R. Osborne, supra note

2, at

9-10.

at 20, 28. See supra text at
2, at

note 26.

74-75 (emphasis deleted):

made if "Phase C" had been set, which required the
Americans from the crisis area, it appears that a moment for
deliberation did not exist and an immediate danger did exist after the Iraqi coup in
which Americans were killed. The rebels in Lebanon had clearly announced their
intent to violently overthrow the western aligned government and therefore it would
be reasonable to assume that Americans would be harmed. The threat existed
although no Americans were harmed, but a threat is sufficient to justify the exercise of
Although

a stronger case could be

evacuation of

all

a reasonable degree of self-defense.

breakdown and a day-by-day account of its aftermath, see A.
Merriam, Congo: Background of Conflict ch. VI (1961).
69. For Belgium's legal justification of this action, see McNemar, The Postindependence War
68.

For a description of

Congo, in

in the

The

this

International

Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens

The

Law

Belgian troops intervened

found

of Civil

War

244, 273 (R. Falk ed. 1971),

who

quotes

as stating that:

itself in a situation

when there was imminent danger and the government
The Belgian government like any

of absolute necessity.

government has a duty to observe a rule of international ethics and international law
which imposes upon a country the protection of its nationals. The Belgian
government intervened solely to prevent bloodshed and to offer the protection which
was necessary for the preservation of human lives.

The above

author,

who acknowledges

the continued existence of the right of forcible

protection in such cases, nevertheless concludes that:

The

weak on two grounds. The failure to seek Congolese consent
was a violation of a specific treaty commitment and the aggravation of an extremely
sensitive colonial issue. Second, the Belgian actions in Katanga were more extensive
Belgian case was

than necessary

for the protection of nationals

and

significantly contributed to the

province's ability to remain independent.
Id.

For discussion of the question of consent and the principle of proportionality, see

text at notes 102-104

infra

& 142-146.
SCORSupp. Quly-Sept. 1960) at 16, U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960).
ONUC's operations, see L. Miller, World Order and Local

70.

S.C. Res. 143, 15 U.N.

71.

For a succinct account of

Disorder 66-1 16 (1967).
72.

"One

[witness]

said the rebels carried out thousands of executions during their

He said that 'every day, any time of the day, some Congolese was
Lumumba monument and executed.' Their hands were tied behind their

occupation of Stanleyville.
being dragged to the

backs and they were hacked to death with machetes.
their hearts cut out

and eaten

in public by the rebels."

The more illustrious of those killed had
The Times (London), Nov. 25, 1964, at

12, col 2.

73.

Young, The Congo

concludes that "[a]t
Stanleyville Rescue:

74.

Rebellion, Africa

least

American

Young, supra note

Report

6, 11 (April

1965).

Another commentator

18,000 Congolese were executed by the rebels." Grundy, The
Policy in the Congo,

73, at

56 Yale Rev. 242, 247 (1967).

1 1.
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On the mercenaries

and the key role they played in turning the tide of battle,
see I. Colvin, The Rise and Fall of Moise Tshombe ch. XII (1968); D. Reed, 111 Days in
Stanleyville ch. 10 (1965). There is little doubt that, like most mercenary contingents, they
quickly filled their quotas in the looting and wanton murder departments. One mercenary is
reported to have admitted that "in Kindu we must have shot at least three thousand people. I'll
be honest with you: most of them unnecessarily." Id. at 180. See also infra text accompanying note
75.

Id.

at 10.

138.
76.

D. Reed, supra note 75, at

77.

Case Studies In African Diplomacy, No.

Congo

Crisis 1964-65, at

8.
1,

32 (C. Hoskyns ed. 1969). See

infra text at

of African Unity and the

note 86.

of Chapter 4 of D. Reed, supra note 75.

78.

See the

79.

For an insider's view of these negotiations,

title

The Organization

see

W. Attwood, The Reds and

the Blacks

195-217 (1967).
Colvin, supra note 75, at 190.

80.

I.

81.

Id.

82.

19 U.N.

SCOR

Stevenson), reprinted
83.

in

(1174th mtg.)

at 15,

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1174 (1964) (Ambassador

52 DEP'T. St. BULL. 18 (1965).

D. Reed, supra note 75, at 192.

84. 19 U.N. SCOR (1174th mtg.) at 15-16, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.1174 (1964),
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1964, at 777 (1967). See
accompanying note 90.

—

85.

Id.

at 16, reprinted in

reprinted in

text

infra

52 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 18 (1965). Fortunately, "the mercenary-led

column captured Kindu, 300 miles south [of Stanleyville], just in time to prevent the mass
murder of twenty-four Europeans. (Hundreds of Congolese 'intellectuals' had already been
burned alive there by the
[rebels].)" W. Attwood, supra note 79, at 207. Compare supra text
accompanying note 75.
.

.

.

86.

Grundy, supra note 73,

87.

W. Attwood, supra note

at 247. See supra text at notes 77-78.

Attwood states that he was not authorized to discuss
any event it would have been impossible to impose a

79, at 2 13.

military operations, but points out that in
cease-fire so late in the day. "I

doubt

the gung-ho mercenary-led

column from taking

if

.

.

standing in the road and waving his arms."

we could

Stanleyville

—

stopped
himself

Id.

Compare Attwood's recollection that Kanza
cease-fire put into effect before

now could have
not even Tshombe

[Kanza] realized that nothing

.

talk

"said the

ANC advance had to be stopped and a

about the hostages,"

Garnet's inaccurate and misleading assertion that "[t]here

is little

Id.

(emphasis added), with

doubt from Attwood's

account that had the United States ordered Tshombe to stop bombing Stanleyville,

the

own

US and

Belgian hostages would have been released." R. Garnet, supra note 15, at 251 (emphasis added).

Attwood's "own account," of course, indicates nothing of the kind.

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
6 UST. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. "The rebels' action in holding and
threatening hostages is in direct violation of the Geneva Conventions and accepted
88.

See, e.g.,

War, Aug.

12, 1949, art. 3,

humanitarian principles." 19 U.N.
(1964) (statement by

Law 212
89.

US

SCOR

Government),

Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 189, U.N. Doc. S/6062

reprinted in 12

M. Whiteman, Digest of

International

(1971).

On

25 September,

when an ICRC

delegation flew to Stanleyville for two days of talks

with the rebels about releasing the hostages, Gbenye and his associates professed not to

know

"what the International Committee of the Red Cross was. When told about the Geneva
Conventions and particularly the ban on holding people as hostages, they said they had not

79
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heard about that, either. In any case, they added, they did not consider themselves as bound by
the Geneva rules. The conventions, they scoffed, were 'written by whites.' " D. Reed, supra note
75, at 115.

On

90.

their ordeal, see generally

what he termed "the astonishing

The

id.

Ambassador Stevenson subsequently refuted

passim.

were not

thesis" that the threats to their lives

threats were very real indeed; they

had been carried out

in the past

real.

and we had

every reason to expect that they would continue to be carried out in the future.

mid- August onward

after the rebel forces

foreigners as hostages

months

this

became

had taken

Stanleyville, seizing

a deliberate act of rebel policy,

medieval practice was widely applied.

Many

and

From

and holding

in the following

of those hostages were

By the time the Belgian paratroopers arrived
knew of their impending arrival, the
already tortured and slaughtered amounted to 35 foreigners.

and

deliberately killed.

in Stanleyville,

before the outlaws even

total of those thus

.

SCOR (1 174th mtg.)

19 U.N.

at 15-16,

U.N. Doc. S/P.V.

1

.

.

174 (1964), reprinted

in

52 DEPT. ST.

BULL. 18 (1965). See supra text at note 84.

The

91.

Belgian Foreign Ministry confirmed this development on 20 November, adding by

way of explanation

that "[t]he Belgian

and American Governments have considered

it

their

duty in view of the threat to their nationals and civilians in general in the region of Stanleyville to
take preparatory measures in order to be able to effect,
operation." 51

DEPT.

Documents 1964,

at

ST. BULL. 840 (1964), reprinted in

if

necessary, a humanitarian rescue

American Foreign

Policy

—Current

767 (1967).

W. Attwood,

supra note 79, at 209-14.

92.

See

93.

Prime Minister Tshombe, in a note to the United States dated 21 November 1964,

stated that the

Congo Government had

to authorize the Belgian

decided:

government

humanitarian task of evacuating the
authorize the United States

humanitarian mission.
your mission

as

is

I

fully

to

send an adequate rescue force to carry out the

civilians held as hostages

Government

by the rebels, and to

to furnish necessary transport for this

appreciate that you wish to withdraw your forces as soon

accomplished.

19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 187-88, U.N. Doc. S/6062 (1964),
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1964, at 768 (1967).

reprinted in

—

According to his biographer, Tshombe recalled that three weeks earlier '"the United States
and Belgium, fearing that the army advance would be too slow to rescue the hostages, [had]
asked

my authorisation to organise

at 189.

a parachute attack

Stanleyville.'"

Thus, as in the case of the Dominican Republic,

accompanying note 186, an invitation

and Colvin state that 22 white hostages were
supra note 75, at 194), while
1

7.

Attwood

I.

Colvin, supra note 75,

see infra text at

notes 181-183 and

to undertake a rescue operation apparently

For a vivid description of the actual operation,

94.

79, at 2

on

killed

places the

and

see

at least

40 wounded

number of dead

Apparently the discrepancy stems from the

was

solicited.

D. Reed, supra note 75, ch.
at 27.

(Id.

at 259;

W. Attwood,

fact that five of the

19.
I.

Reed

Colvin,

supra note

wounded later died. D.

Reed, supra at 259. Three of the dead, including ironically Dr. Paul Carlson, were United States

—

American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1964, at 772 (1967).
95. 52 DEPT. ST. BULL. 16 (1965) (Ambassador Stevenson), reprinted in American Foreign
policy
Current Documents 1964, at 776 (1967).
96. 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 195, U.N. Doc. S/6068 (1964) (Letter from
Ambassador Stevenson to the President of the Security Council) reprinted in American Foreign
Policy
Current Documents 1964, at 771 (1967). For a description of this operation, see D.
nationals.

—

,

—
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Reed, supra note 75,

267-69. Prior to

at

it,

the rebels had killed 22 white hostages.

Compare

infra

text at note 97.

Subsequent estimates of the

number of hostages rescued during the four day period
given in the text. "The rescue operation was undertaken on

total

ranged even higher than the figures

November

24-

As

a result,

rescued from Stanleyville.

more than 1,300 non-Congolese and over 1,000 black Africans were
In subsequent air and ground rescues, another 1,600 non-Congolese

were saved." 52 DEPT. ST. BULL. 222 (1965) (Assistant Secretary of State Williams).
97.

See supra note 95.

The Times (London), Nov.

28, 1964, at 8, col

1,

reported that in the

had been killed in Stanleyville and Paulis. Compare supra
accompanying note 94 and at infra notes 135-136.
98. For a comprehensive treatment of Belgium's legal justification of its participation in the
operation, see Gerard, L'Operation Stanleyville-Paulis Devant le Parlement Beige et les Nations Unis,
3 Revue Beige De Droit International 242 (1967). According to the author, the Belgian
four day operation 80 white hostages
text

Government

consistently maintained that the right of self-defense guaranteed States by Article

51 of the United Nations Charter included the right of forcible protection of a State's nationals
abroad.

Id.

accompanying note 69. The British government's position
Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 911 (1964) (Mr. Thomson): "We take the view that

at 254-56. See supra text

was the same. 702 Pari.
under international law a
nationals in an emergency
99.

19 U.N.

M. Whiteman,
100.

state has the right to land troops in foreign territory to protect
if

SCOR Supp.

(Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 188, U.N. Doc. S/6062 (1964), reprinted

supra note 88, at 21

19 U.N.

SCOR

BULL.

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1174 (1964),

at 13,

9

(1965).

12

reprinted in 52

(1964).

See supra note 99. See also Cleveland, The Evolution of Rising Responsibility, 52
7,

in

1.

(1174th mtg.)

Dept. St. Bull. 17 (1965).
101. 51 DEPT. ST. BULL. 846
102.

its

necessary."

DEPT.

ST.

For the Congolese note authorizing the operation, see supra text

accompanying note 93.
103. A point repeatedly made by Professor Brownlie and other critics of the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention. See, e.g., Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in

Humanitarian Intervention and The United Nations 139, 143-44 (R. Lillich ed. 1973).
104- These requirements have been summarized conveniently by Farer, The Regulation of
Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict, 142 Recueil Des Cours (Hague Academy of
International Law) 297, 394 (1974-11), as follows:
(1) that there
(2) that all

be an immediate and extensive threat to fundamental

human

rights;

other remedies for the protection of those rights have been exhausted to the

extent possible within the time constraints posed by the threat;
(3) that

an attempt has been made to secure the approval of appropriate authorities in

the target State;
(4) that

there

is

a

minimal

effect

on the extant

structure of authority

(e.g.,

that the

intervention not be used to impose or preserve a preferred regime)
(5) that

likely to

the minimal requisite force be employed and/or that the intervention

is

not

cause greater injury to innocent persons and their property than would result

if

the threatened violation actually occurred;
(6) that

the intervention be of limited duration; and

(7) that a report

of the intervention be filed immediately with the Security Council and

where relevant, regional organisations.
105.

19 U.N.

M. Whiteman,

SCOR Supp.

(Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 189, U.N. Doc. S/6062 (1964), reprinted

supra note 88, at 212-13.
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See supra text at notes 80-90. "It

106.

is

clear

from the statements of the rescued persons

themselves that further delay would have meant an even greater number of wanton and tragic
killings.

Time,

for the lives

of those people, was calculable only in minutes." 19 U.N.

SCOR Supp.

(Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 195, U.N. Doc. S/6068 (1964) (Letter from Ambassador Stevenson to the
President at the Security Council), reprinted in

(Letter from the Belgian

American Foreign

SCOR Supp.

771 (1967). Accord, 19 U.N.

at

Ambassador

Policy

—Current Documents

1964,

(Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 194, U.N. Doc. S/6067 (1964)

to the President of the Security Council): "All [rescued

owe

hostages] stress their conviction that they

their lives only to the intervention in extremis of the

Belgian paratroops."
See also the statement by

Under Secretary of State

was deteriorating to the point where we
Hoyt,

who is our consul

us, first

would

of

all

all,

that

in Stanleyville

have been executed

A
as

Congo

criticism

something of a

214 (1969) But
108.

it

Ball that prior to the airdrop "the situation

couldn't hold very

—

much longer,

and who has been one of the hostages
if

this

These

Crisis 1964:

—

and, secondly, that

51 DEPT. ST. BULL. 843 (1964).

lives."

heaped upon the United States

for

its

Order

in a Violent

World 326

from an excellent review of the

A Case Study in Humanitarian Intervention,

role in this

official

US

reaction,

humanitarian venture

Human Rights,

surprise." R. Lillich, Intervention to Protect

factors are taken

Mr.

fact,

had gone 24 hours longer they

they were going to be lined up against the wall

see R. Falk, Legal

and, in

months, has told

for 3

quarter century ago the present writer, perhaps unduly reflecting

remarked that "the

comes

that

was the opinion of everyone there that

it

only the airdrop saved their
107.

felt

15 McGill L.J. 205,

(1968).

UN

12 Va.

debates found in a Note, The
J. Int'l

L. 261,

266-74 (1972),

Law and
Member of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bars, under the supervision of the present writer.
109. The following quote from a speech by the delegate from the Congo Republic (Brazzaville) is

written by

Howard

illustrative:

"Why,

L.

Weisberg, Esq., Class of 1973, University of Virginia School of

in a conflict in

which the Congolese

are fighting

between themselves, should there

be no concern for the safety of the civilian population in general and
be the sole consideration?" 19 U.N.

SCOR (1 170th mtg.)

writer, reviewing the operation, has suggested,

somewhat

humanitarian concerns were aroused only when

it

at 14,

why should the fate of the whites

U.N. Doc. S/P.V.

1

170 (1964).

cynically, that "[t]he State

One

Department's

appeared that Americans and Europeans might be

the next victims." R. Garnet, supra note 15, at 249. See infra text at note 111.
110.

They were

slain,

of course, not by the Belgian paratroopers, but by the white mercenary-led

ANC that reached Stanleyville several hours after the airdrop began. The time of the ANC's arrival
has been put at "soon after nine o'clock" by

by D. Reed, supra note 75, at 261. See
111.

I.

Colvin, supra note 75, at 194, and as "[a]t 10:30 a.m."

infra text at

and accompanying note 138.

Garnet's criticism of the United States' slowness in acting

(see

supra text accompanying note

109) seems particularly unfair in view of his caustic comments on the rescue operation

One can

Garnet, supra note 15, at 250-51.

imagine what his reaction to an

earlier

itself.

See R.

humanitarian

intervention would have been!
1

12.

19 U.N.

SCOR (1 173d mtg.)

at 12,

U.N. Doc. S/P.V.

1

173 (1964). See generally supra text at

notes 95-97.
1

13.

See supra text at note 79. See also supra text at notes 86-90.

SCOR

114.

19 U.N.

115.

When Attwood informed President Kenyatta of Kenya, who was chairman of the OAU Ad

Hoc Commission on
operation as a

(1175th mtg.)

16.

79, at 214. Later, in response to

See supra text at

mount

a humanitarian rescue

the latter "look pained" and replied that "'that would be very bad

frankly that '"[w]e can be friends.
1

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1175 (1964).

the Congo, "that the paratroopers might have to

last resort,"

Attwood, supra note

at 23,

.

.

only

if

Attwood's plea to remain

friends,

you stop being friends with Tshombe."

and accompanying note 102.

82

Id.

"'

W.

he stated

at 215.
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W.

end of the second paragraph of the
above quote are parentheses containing the following sentence: "The orgy of looting and killing that
followed the capture of Stanleyville by the ANC was so bad that the Belgian paratroop commander
117.

was glad to

Attwood, supra note

pull his

infra text at

79, at 218-19.

men out of the

Omitted

city for fear they'd start fighting the mercenaries." Id. at 218. See

and accompanying note 138.

R. Falk, supra note 107, at 326. In a clause preceding the extract quoted in the text, Falk

118.

mean that the United States should have refused to

notes that the adverse African reaction "does not
join in the rescue.

."
.

.

Id.

Elsewhere he observes that "[t]he case for intervention

may be

capricious since the alternative

cause."

329. Although his view

Id. at

troubled

by the

less

legality

Grundy, supra note 73,
nevertheless criticizes

who

at 251,

from from a

it

See generally S.

is

to allow one's

than

less

crystal

is

it

affirms the operation's legality

political perspective,

did in the Congo."

not altogether

countrymen to be slaughtered without
clear on this point, it appears that Falk is
" Id. at

than by "the appearances of the Stanleyville Operation

fortunate in getting off as easily as
119.

at the

more

33 1 Cf.
.

but

explicitly,

who

concluding that the United States "was

Id. at

Weissman, American Foreign Policy

255.

Congo 1960-1964,

in the

226-46

at

passim (1974).
1
is

20.

Whether it actually was

a by-product of the rescue operation or

one of its principal objectives

discussed at infra notes 142-146.
121.

Grundy, supra note 73,

122.

19 U.N.

SCOR

at

25 1

(1174th mtg.) at

—Current Documents

Foreign Policy
123.

19 U.N.

SCOR

13,

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1174 (1964),

reprinted in

American

1964, at 777 (1967).

(1173d mtg.)

at 3-10,

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1173 (1964). See supra

text

accompanying note 98.
124.

19 U.N.

SCOR

(1175th mtg.)

at 3-4,

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1175 (1964). See supra text

accompanying note 98.
125.

19 U.N.

SCOR

(1

183d mtg.)

clearly a rescue operation, regrettable

at 14,

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. (1964). "Bolivia thinks that

from the

political point of

morally and duly authorized by the legally responsible
126.

19 U.N.

SCOR

Such an operation
was

all

was

view of sovereignty, but essential

Government of the Congo."

(117th mtg.) at 19-20 U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1177 (1964):
finds

its

justification in the very objective

to frustrate the perpetration of a crime, recognized as

and by

this

the norms of conduct governing relations

which inspired

it,

which

such by international law

among

States,

which

consists in

the use of innocent civilians as hostages, as a bargaining point in wartime.

Therefore the humanitarian action taken to save the

lives of the

legitimate to the delegation of Brazil, both in regard to

its

.

.

.

hostages seems

means and

to

its

motivations.
127.

my

19 U.N.

delegation

is

SCOR (1177th mtg.)
fully satisfied

at 26,

U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1177 (1964): "In the circumstances,

with the statements

made

in this

Council by the repesentatives of

Belgium and the United States that the operation was necessary to save the
that

it

lives

of the hostages, and

was a humanitarian mission, and nothing more."

128.

See infra text at notes 135-141.

129.

"[I]t

is

repugnant to use

as a pretext the uncertainty of the fate of

some 1,500

foreigners in

its domestic affairs
19 U.N. SCOR (1 178th mtg.) at
U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1178 (1964) (Morocco). Several other States used the same or similar
language. "The use of the term 'pretext,' " as has been pointed out, actually "suggests a recognition of

"

order to attack a country and to interfere in
10,

the concept of humanitarian intervention [or forcible protection] for such a charge tacitly admits the
,

legitimacy of the subject matter to
infra text at

which that pretense

notes 142-146.

83

is

applied." Note, supra note 108, at 269. See
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130.

Attempting to rebut an

Interx'entknv.

A Reply to Dr.

The Modern World

earlier

assertion of this thesis, see

claims of

Moore

illegality." Farer,

man

which

131.

after all

is

Law and

Civil

would apparently have

to

War

have

in

legal

have assumed the form of

supra note 104, at 396. This characterization of the present writer's

wont upon occasion, once again setting up a
handful of States condemned the rescue
irrelevant to an assessment of its legality under international
is

his

is

not entirely

the issue at hand.

S.C. Res. 199, 19 U.N.

(100-1), reprinted in
132.

Humanitarian

for easy demolition. Surely the fact that only a

operation on legal grounds
law,

Lillich,

ed. 1974), Professor Farer states that "to

views obviously goes too far and reveals Farer, as
straw

R.

Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in

229, 243 0-N.

significance for [Lillich, the African complaints!
flat

Abroad

SCOR Supp.

American Foreign

Policy

(Oct.-Dec. 1964) at 328, U.N. Doc. S/6129 (1964)

—Current Documents

1964, at 786 (1967).

condemned

Replying to a suggestion by the Ghanaian delegate that the resolution impliedly

the rescue operation, Ambassador Stevenson stated:

made during

this

interpret that paragraph of the resolution.

amended makes

"I

think

it is

quite clear from the statements

debate that the overwhelming majority of the members of

it

U.N. Doc. S/P.V.

perfectly clear that
1

this

Council do not so

The fact that my delegation has voted for the resolution as
19 U.N. SCOR (1 189th mtg.) at 12,
American Foreign Foreign-Current Documents 1964, at

we do not so interpret it."

189 (1964), reprinted

in

789 (1967).
Farer faults the present writer for

condemn Humanitarian

" [finding]

comfort in the

failure of the Security

Intervention as such or the United States and Belgium, as

Council to
if

Security

Council condemnation of those States were a conceivable option in the world of 1964." Farer, supra
note 104, at 396-97. His point
Security Council
relevance.
for

an

Even

illegal

Britain the

condemned

in "the

may be

well- taken, but

does not take one very

it

far.

neither the operation nor the States undertaking

world of 1964" the censure of a permanent

it

The

fact that the

certainly has

member of the

some

Security Council

use of force was not out of the question, as witness the formal condemnation of Great

same year

for a reprisal

Supp. (Apr.-Sept. 1964) at

Congo

9,

it

had undertaken against Yemen. S.C. Res.

U.N. Doc. S/5650 (1964)

188, 19

U.N.

SCOR

(9-0-2). See Lillich, supra note 130, at 244.

what that Article
means has been altered by political evaluation. There is now an unwillingness on the part of the world
community to read Article 2(4) as an absolute prohibition on the use of force in humanitarian
133.

"After the

debates, the legal principle of Article 2(4) remains, but

intervention." Note, supra note 108, at 274.
134-

Compare the

fifth

and fourth requirements,

respectively, of the traditional doctrine of

humanitarian intervention, as summarized by Farer in the supra text accompanying note 104.
135.

D. Reed, supra note 75, at 268.

136.

According to Ambassador Stevenson, "only a very small number of rebels were

consequence of that operation and these only in self-defense or because they were

killed as a

at the

moment

U.N. SCOR (1174th mtg.) at 12, U.N. Doc. S/P.V.
American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1964, at 776 (1967). Cf. D.
Reed, supra note 75, at 259: "As far as anyone could tell, none of the Simbas who carried out the
massacre was killed by the paratroopers. They all ran at the last minute." Compare infra text at and
accompanying note 138.
resisting attempts to rescue the hostages." 19
1

174 (1964), reprinted

137.

the

Id.

at 264.

"Two men were wounded by gunfire and

American airmen was

138.

—

in

hurt."

three were injured in the drop.

None

Id.

See supra text accompanying note 117. See also D. Reed, supra note 75, at 264:

The mercenaries and the ANC were running wild in Stanleyville. They shot every
Congolese they saw. They looted homes and stores. ... A mercenary patrol paid a visit
to the city zoo. They found that the lions were ravenously hungry. Gleefully, they
released the lions, who ran off into the city.
84
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Colonel Laurent, the mild-mannered commanding

was

horrified. "I

They were shot

up, cut

officer of the paratrooper regiment,

my life," he said. "No prisoners were taken.

never saw such a bloodbath in

up or beaten to death.

It

was

brutal."

Laurent did not want the young paratroopers to see what was going on.
to the airfield as

soon

as they

He ordered his men to return

had rescued everyone.

at 273.

139.

Id.

140.

Although one

"revisionist" historian, misciting

Reed
300

airdrops themselves "resulted in the execution of perhaps

for support, has

whites.

.

."

.

S.

contended that the

Weissman

supra note

119, at 248.
141.

In response to a complaint about "the terrible massacre" that occurred at Stanleyville, the

British minister responsible replied that "[i]n

my view,

if

the troops which were advancing overland

had advanced without the intervention of this aerial operation, I am convinced that
the loss of life would have been much greater than it has been." 702 Pari. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.)
1278-79 (1964) (Mr. Thomson). For further speculations pro and con, see S. Weissman, supra note
to Stanleyville

119, at 253.

Colvin concludes that
that were adopted

each other

"

"[a]

parachute drop was probably necessary," but that instead of the tactics

have been planned in

[t]he parachute drops should

at Stanleyville, Paulis

and Bunia."

I.

triple

many

the delay in mounting the Paulis airdrop caused

See, e.g.,

events transpired,

at 271-72.

R. Garnet, supra note 15, at 250; R. Falk, supra note 107, at 333; Farer, supra note

104, at 394-96; Grundy, supra note 73, at 250-52;
143.

As

additional casualties there; moreover, a

contemplated airdrop on Bunia never took place. D. Reed, supra note 75
142.

strength within hours of

Colvin, supra note 75, at 196.

See, e.g., Professor

and

S.

Weissman, supra note 119,

at 249-51.

Frey-Wouters, Remarks, in Humanitarian Intervention and the United

Nations, supra note 103, at 58 n.5.

Even Weissman acknowledges that "[tlhe rescue motivation seems to have been
."
S. Weissman, supra note 119, at 252 n.106. See also id. at 251, where he contends
that a "secondary objective" of the rescue operation was to help the ANC recapture Stanleyville.
145. Id. at 250. See supra text accompanying note 106.
144.

predominant.

.

.

146.

See supra text at note 122.

147.

For background information about the

crisis as

well as detailed descriptive accounts of it, see

The Dominican Revolt (1968); D. Kurzman, Revolt of the Damned (1965); A.
Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (1972); J. Slater, Intervention and Negotiation (1970);
and T. Szulc, Dominican Diary (1965). See also J. Moreno, Barrios In Arms (1970). For differing

T. Draper,

views

on the

legal issues involved,

60

Am. J.

compare Fenwick, The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective

64 (1966), with Bohan, The Dominican Case: Unilateral Intervention,
60 id. 809 (1966). For a useful monograph, prepared under the supervision of the present writer and
drawn upon throughout this Section, see J. Tuttle, The Case Study of the Dominican Crisis 1965:
Self-Defense,

Int'l L.

—

The

Legality of the

United States Action (1969) (unpublished

thesis,

U.S. Naval

War

College

Library).

148.

T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 13.

authorized,
149.

is

not entirely

clear. See

J.

How much assistance actually was given, as opposed to being

Slater, supra

—

For a sampling of opposition criticism

note 147, at 13-14 and accompanying note.

reasoned, biased and vitriolic

see

J.

Moreno, supra

note 147, at 18-19.
150.

Slater absolves

clear that

Bosch of serious charges of maladministration, observing that

anyone could have survived

concessions to the forces of reaction as to

[as President], at least

make

American Foreign

Policy:

Current Documents 1963,

85

at

from

without making such far-reaching

survival almost pointless.

'God Himself would have done a bad job in the Dominican Republic.'" J.
151.

"it is far

As Jose

Figueres has put

Slater, supra

322 (1967).

note 147, at

it,

15.

Forcible Protection of Nationals

152.

at 359.

Id.

The

reversal of policy

was

Abroad

in train long before President

Kennedy's assassination.

this period, seeing great significance in

the fact that Johnson
Dominican
junta
only
three
weeks
after
the
assassination
of Kennedy and stressing
recognized the
the sharp contrast between the Kennedy and Johnson policies toward the coup, is quite wrong." J.

"Thus, the usual interpretation of

note 147, at 16-17.

Slater, supra

153.

14.,

154-

Indeed,

at 19.

US Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, who had become

the deteriorating situation in the

State in early April that

Dominican Republic, wrote prophetically to the Department of
some of them red, are chewing at the grapes
A diminution

"[l]ittle foxes,

of our effort or failure to act will result in a bitter wine." Quoted

World

in

R. Stebbins,

Both Bennett and Reid were

Affairs 1965, at 74-76 (1966).

Dominican Action
155.

156.

J.

was scheduled

—

to start.

Center

The United

States In

in receipt of intelligence reports

about planned coups, but they did not anticipate one before June,
presidential election

increasingly concerned over

when campaigning

for Strategic Studies

for the

(Georgetown University)

1965: Intervention or Cooperation.7 at 9 (1966).
,

Slater, supra

note 147, at

19.

Id at 22.

Until that point, the civilians working with the constitutionalists were mostly
middle-class, college-educated students, lawyers, engineers, technicians,

and young

businessmen, frustrated by a system in which they had no purpose and no meaningful

With

future.

the passing out of the arms large sectors of the urban lower class joined

the ranks, giving the

movement something of a mass base

as well as providing

most of

the actual combatientes.
157.

The

case of General Wessin,

who commanded most of the Dominican Republic's

tanks and

1,500 of its Army's crack troops, best illustrates the response of the military leaders to Reid's appeal.

Neither the tanks nor the troops

Center

for Strategic Studies

moved from

(Georgetown University), supra note 154,

158.

Draper, supra note 147, at 55-56.

159.

Id.

at 57;

J.

Slater, supra

Slater, supra

the San Isidro Air Base while Reid remained in

office.

at 11.

note 147, at 22.

note 147, at 23 note.

160.

J.

161.

T. Draper, supra note 147, at 57.

162.

In 1968,

Antonio Martinez Francisco, the Secretary General of the PRD during the
between Bosch and sympathetic military

revolution, said that the original agreement

men

called for a military junta to rule the country temporarily after the overthrow of

the Reid government, pending the holding of new elections within ninety days.

Reid had

fallen,

Martinez charges, Bosch ignored the agreement and called

return to 'constitutionality,' that
J.

Slater, supra

is,

Once
for a

the immediate restoration of his Presidency.

note 147, at 23 note.

at 23-24.

163.

Id.

164.

Id. at

165.

See infra text at notes 172-173. President Johnson, relying

25.

upon such

reports, subsequently

claimed that "some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off
Johnson,

As

An Assessment of the Situation in the Dominican Republic,

53 DEPT. St. BULL.

19,

not only was not a single American attacked but there were remarkably few
selective,

aimed almost exclusively

at a

What

few attacks did occur were highly

few extreme

86

rightists,

and then mainly

.

20 (1965).

Slater observes:

constitutionalist atrocities of any sort.

."
.

at their
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many more innocent

property. Indeed,

bombing and
J.

at the

citizens died as a result of the Air Force

hands of the constitutionalists.

note 147, at 33.

Slater, supra

166.

than

strafing

For a graphic description of the scene in Santo Domingo at about

this time, see Szulc, supra

note 147, at 18:

Dominican capital blood was flowing freely. Rebel army units and civilian
the city at the positions of the Wessin forces. Planes streaked
overhead, machine gunning the streets and dropping bombs on the rebels and the civilian
population. Casualties were mounting and hospitals were filling up with the wounded.
[I]n the ancient

bands were

167.

Id.

firing across

at 18 (four

day period of April 25-28)

;

J.

Moreno, supra note 147,

at

29 (four day period o{

April 27-30).
168.
169.
1

70.

T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 20-21.

A. Lowenthal, supra note 147,

at 85.

Johnson, supra note 165, at 2 1 "The
.

Commander of Task Group 44.9, Captain Dare, had been

Dominican Republic and prepare to
evacuate approximately 1,200 United States nationals if this action should become necessary." Tuttle,
supra note 147, at 28, citing Dare, Dominican Diary, 91 US Naval Institute Proc. 37, 38 (Dec. 1965).
ordered as early as 25 April to proceed to the vicinity of the

—26

Moreover, on the following day
brigade at Camp Lejeune

April

—

the Department of Defense had put

and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. T.

171.

See generally T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 31-34,

172.

J.

173.

Szulc concludes that:

Slater, supra

and Dare, supra note

alert

a Marine

170, at 38-41.

note 147, at 33.

[T]he embassy's reports on

this incident

must have been

greatly exaggerated because

President Johnson later spoke of armed rebels running up and
firing into

on

Szulc, supra note 147, at 29.

rooms and

closets. Actually,

down

the hotel's corridors

nothing of the sort had occurred, but

this

overwrought reporting by the embassy evidently helped increase the President's concern

and pushed the United States
Dominican Republic.

closer to the ultimate decision to intervene militarily in the

T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 33-34. Other accounts reinforce Szulc's views. See T. Draper, supra note
147, at 105-06,
174.

and

and A. Lowenthal, supra note

US policy even before

after the revolution

147, at

90

& 204 n.27.

the revolution had frowned

on

began nowhere was that policy more

the return of Bosch to the Presidency,
faithfully

implemented than

at the

Embassy:
[T]he State Department had assigned the two top embassy positions to conservatives
instinctively distrusted

not only Bosch but the

with even the moderate
Club,'

one embassy

left.

official is

'Tap didn't seem to

quoted

Chief of Mission, 'seemed to be
J.

Slater, supra

175.

ill

know anyone

as remarking, while

at ease

who

PRD in general, and who had almost no ties

with people

to the left of the Rotary

William Connett, the Deputy

who were

not correctly dressed.'

note 147, at 25.

Although there

is

absolutely

no doubt

US mediation and made
PRD officials had allowed

that Bennett refused

the accusations mentioned in the text [accusations that

"communists" to take advantage of the movement and had tolerated looting and
atrocities],

the former Ambassador has denied he told the constitutionalists to

surrender. However, not only the constitutionalists but Martin

By Events 653 (1966)] maintain that he did
J.

Slater, supra note 147, at

227 n.24.

87

so.

[J.

Martin, Overtaken

US

Abroad

Forcible Protection of Nationals

176.

Id.

at 29.

177.

A

participant at the

now famous embassy

moment when Bennett

confrontation vividly recalls that at the

labeled the revolution 'Communist'

surrender, a big, barrelchested

man whom he had

and

told the leaders to

never seen before jumped to his feet

and said, 'Son of a bitch! I know what I'm going to do.' It was Francisco Caamano, and he
was not going to strangle Bennett on the spot as the startled assemblage for a moment
feared, but was on his way to the bridge to rally his forces for a last-ditch stand.
Id.

at 29-30.

178.

For a succinct account of this turn of events, see

179.

T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 42.

180.

Id. at

181.

Id.

44.

Needless to

say, in

motivated by factors beyond
personal safety. "That night,
Isidro,

at 30.

id.

making

their

second request

just the protection of

US

for

nationals.

US intervention
One such factor

when the first contingents of the 82nd Airborne

the junta was

was

their

own

Division arrived at

San

they found the 'strong man' of the Dominican armed forced, the dreaded Wessin y Wessin, in

tears: 'If you

had not come,' he

cried, 'they

182.

A. Lowenthal, supra note 147,

183.

Id.

at 102-03;

would have

killed us.'"

at 101-02. See infra text

T. Draper, supra note 147, at

1

accompanying note 186.

and

18-21;

note 147, at 30-3 1

Slater, supra

J.

J.

Slater, supra

note 147, at 30.

news conference on 17 June 1965, the President noted that
"[i]t was a decision we considered from Saturday until Wednesday evening. But once we made it, in
the neighborhood of 6:00 or 6:30 that evening, they landed within one hour." Johnson, supra note
184.

Speaking of

this decision at a

165, at 21.
185.

Dare, supra note 170, at 42.

The

President, according to

one commentator, authorized the

landing of only 500 Marines. A. Lowenthal, supra note 147, at 103. Other commentators give the

number of Marines landed that evening as about 400. T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 73.
186. 52 DEPT. ST. BULL. 738 (1965), American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1965, at 956
(1968) [hereinafter cited as American Foreign Policy - 1965] Actually, although Colonel Benoit had
made such representations to Ambassador Bennett, they were not contained in the junta's written
request. See supra text at notes 180-182. Their omission so concerned Under Secretary of State
.

Thomas Mann

that, following President Johnson's decision to land

US

Bennett and asked him to obtain from Benoit "a written statement
military assistance to restore order

and

specifically

troops,

he purportedly called

for the record asking for

mentioning the need to protect American

US

lives."

A. Lowenthal, supra note 147, at 104. Accordingly, by early Thursday morning, 29 April 1965,
Benoit dispatched a follow-up communication to the US Embassy:
Regarding

my

earlier request,

conditions of public disorder

I

wish to add that American

make

it

lives are in

danger and

impossible to provide adequate protection.

and

therefore ask you for temporary intervention

I

assistance in restoring order in this

country.

Senate

Comm. on

the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Organization of American States

Communist Subversion 1 14 (Comm. Print 1965).
As Szulc notes and as Mann, of course, well knew Benoit's

Reports on

—

—

legal justification for a

somewhat reminiscent of the 1958
request of President Camille

Compare supra

text at

situation in

Chamoun

to help

and accompanying notes

request, "if nothing provided the

Washington chose
Lebanon, where United

United States landing

if

him

37,

Combined

to play

it

that way.

It

was

States Marines landed at the

restore order." T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 44-

50

& 93, and infra text at and accompanying note

204.
187.

52 DEPT. ST. BULL. 738 (1965), American Foreign Policy-1965, supra note 186, at 956.

188.

T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 73.
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189.

Id.

190.

52 DEPT. ST. BULL. 742 (1965), American Foreign Policy

at 78.

According to the President,

-

1965, supra note 186, at 956.

US troops eventually evacuated 5,600 people from 46 countries from the

Dominican Republic. Johnson, supra note

165, at 20.

BULL 742, American Foreign Policy - 1965, supra note 186, at 956-57. The US
the OAS, Ellsworth Bunker, had made a similar argument before the OAS

52 DEPT. ST.

191.

Representative to

Council of Ministers

earlier the

same

day.

192.

T. Szulc, supra note 147, at 90.

193.

52 DEPT. ST.

BULL 743

(1965),

Id. at

957-58.

American Foreign

Policy

-

1965, supra note 186, at 959.

194.

Id.

at 745,

American Foreign

Policy

-

1965, supra note 186, at 962-63.

195.

Id.

at 746,

American Foreign

Policy

-

1965, supra note 186, at 963.

196.

Id.,

197.

For the text of

American Foreign

Policy

Background Information Relating
For the text of

198.

resolution,

-

1965, supra note 186, at 963-64.

this resolution, see

to the

N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1966, at

200.

See,

For. Rels.,

89th Cong.,

1st Sess.,

Print 1965).

52 DEPT. ST. BULL. 862 (1965). The vote on the

was 15

majority,

and Uruguay), and one abstention (Venezuela).
199.

Comm. on

Dominican Republic 52 (Comm.

this resolution, see

which required a two-thirds

Senate

for,

5 against (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru

Id.

3, col 1.

the remarks of the Legal Adviser along these lines in Meeker, The Dominican

e.g.,

Situation in the Perspective of International

Law. 53

DEPT ST.

BULL. 60, 62 (1965):

We landed troops in the Dominican Republic in order to preserve the lives of foreign
nationals — nationals of the United States and many other countries. We continued
our military presence in the Dominican Republic for the additional purpose of
preserving the capacity of the

OAS

to function in the

manner intended by the

OAS

Charter.
See generally Humanitarian Intervention

and the United Nations, supra note 103, at 76-82
no doubt that "the US attempted to legitimize its military action by securing approval
of the OAS." Frey-Wouters, The Prospects for Regionalism in World Affairs, in 1 The Future of the
International Legal Order 463, 536 (R. Falk
C. Black eds. 1969). Whether the various OAS
201.

passim.

There

is

&

resolutions constituted legitimation or merely acquiescence, however,

is

another matter. Prof.

Frey-Wouters believes the Dominican intervention an example of how the United States often has
sought

OAS approval to provide "a multilateral legitimacy for essentially unilateral US action." Id.

at

539.
202.

See

e.g.,

A. Thomas

& A. Thomas, Working Paper,

in

The Dominican

Crisis

1965

-

Legal

1967); McLaren, The Dominican Crisis: An
J. Carey ed.
InterAmerican Dilemma, 4 Canadian Y.B. Int'l L. 178 (1966); and Nanda, The United States Action in

Aspects

the

1

(Hammarskjold Forum,

1965 Dominican

203.

On

21

Crisis:

May

Northern Ireland

all

Impact on World Order

-

Part

11,

44 Denv.

L.J.

225 (1967).

1965, the United States, Great Britain, Bolivia, China, Netherlands, and

voted against a Soviet Union-sponsored resolution

initially

submitted to the

on 4 May that would have condemned what it labeled US armed intervention in
affairs of the Dominican Republic. 20 U.N. SCOR (1214th mtg.) at 22, U.N. Doc.

Security Council

the internal

it "fully understood the reasons for the United States emergency
and thanked the United States for evacuating British subjects from the country, 2 UN
Monthly Chron., No. 6 at 6 (1965), while France, acknowledging US interest in protecting its

S/6328 (1965). Great Britain stated
action"

must be limited in objective, duration, and scale, or
armed intervention, for which there appeared to be no need in this case." Id.
at 7. France's position seemed to recognize the necessity of the US action, while gently questioning its
proportionality. On these two limitations on the right of forcible protection, see "Nanda, The United
nationals there, cautioned that "such operations

run the

risk of becoming

89

Forcible Protection of Nationals

States Action

who

m the Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order

-

Part

I,

Abroad

43 Denv.

L.J.

439, 462-71 (1966),

concludes that "while the necessity of the [US] action can be defended on humanitarian

grounds, the proportionality cannot be justified."
204.

Id.

Compare

at 479.

infra text at

note 209.

Ill Cong. Rec. 23855, 23857 (1965):

which had been
on the ground that this

In midafternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of a junta
hastily assembled,

asked again,

time in writing, for

this

US

troops

was the only way to prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the
inability to protect

American

lives.

junta's

This request was denied in Washington, and Benoit

was thereupon told that the United States would not intervene unless he

said

he could

not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus told in
effect that if

And

that

Compare supra
205.

1 1 1

he said American

precisely

is

text

were in danger the United States would intervene.

lives

what happened.

accompanying note 186.

Cong. Rec. 23857 (1965).
23858.

206.

Id.

207.

But

208.

Nanda, supra note 203,

209.

Id.

210.

Friedmann, United

at

see, e.g.,

at 472.

Fenwick, supra note 147.

Compare

(1965), citing Waldock,

at 471.

supra text accompanying note 203.

and

States Policy

the Crisis of International

Am. J.

Law, 59

The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
Academy of International Law) 451, 467 (1952).

Int'l L.

857, 867

International

Law, 81

Recueil des Cours (Hague
211.

Friedmann, supra note 210,

at 869.

He

subsequently reiterated and elaborated his views as

follows:

There was a general consensus on the

original

US

position of intervening to protect

American lives and property and the sending in of a battalion; that is, it can be justifed
in the limited sense that it is strictly limited to nationals, and therefore it is an extension of
national interests intervention. That had been previously stated by international lawyers
.

as a justifiable cause of intervention.

Then came

.

.

the radical shift which Johnson

altered the situation

and made

clear,

it

.

I

made by

think,

his

famous statement that

totally

beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the

subsequent massive and prolonged intervention was contrary not only to the U.N.

Charter but to the

OAS Charter;

namely, intervention in the internal

affairs

of another

small power by a big power, in order to effect a change of political regime.

Remarks, in Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations, supra note 103,
212.

Lillich,

Remarks, in

When you

id.

it

would,

I

at 10:

are talking about evacuating citizens, this

you must evacuate them

as rapidly as possible.

would assume,

22,000 Marines

for six

at 81-82.

justify

is

Applying

perhaps the

first

a limited objective, and, of course,
this to the

day or

so,

Dominican context,

but

it

wouldn't

justify

.

.

the

months.

For the views of other participants, see

id.

at 76-82.

213.

See text accompanying note 211.

214.

For a particularly outspoken warning, see Rogers, Remarks, in Humanitarian Intervention

and the United Nations supra note 103,

We see

at 72:

the constant misuse of the excuse of protection of one's

of Bengal

—

own

nationals for great

movement of the Sixth Fleet into the Bay
which was justified for a short moment by Kissinger's preposterous idea that it

power purposes, most

recently, of course, in the

90
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was going to be used
great

215.

power

for the protection of

—

US nationals

a shocking rationalization for a

ploy.

R. Lillich, Forcible Self Help by States to Protect

Human

Rights,

53 Iowa

L.

Rev. 325, 344

(1967).

216.

For background information about the hostage

crisis as

well as detailed descriptive accounts

The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (1988) W.
al.,
American
Hostages
in
Iran:
The Conduct of a Crisis (1985) [hereinafter cited as
Christopher et
Christopherl G. Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (1985). See also The
of it,

see, e.g., J. Bill,

The

Eagle and the Lion:

;

;

Iranian Hostage Crisis:

on Foreign

Affairs,

A Chronology of Daily Developments,

US House

Report Prepared

for the

Committee

of Representatives, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of

Congress, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
217.

Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US

(Merits),

218.

1980

Id. at

I.C.J. 3,

33-35.

v. Iran)

30-33 (Judgment of May 24) [hereinafter cited as Hostages Case-Merits].

On

November

18-20

1979, however, Iran did release 13

women and

black

hostages "not considered spies." Their release was a unilateral Iranian gesture, not the result of
negotiations. "[It]

was probably seen in Tehran

intent only on exposing the

as a step to portray the

US government and its 'nest of spies.'

"

regime as humanitarian and

Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure.

November 1979-May 1980, in Christopher, supra note 216, at 79. Although another hostage who
became ill was released in July 1980, Saunders, The Crisis Begins, in Christopher, supra, at 68, Iran
continued to hold the remaining 52 hostages until their release on 20 January 1981 following the
so-called Algiers Accords,

219.

20 I.LM. 223 (1981).

The Ayatollah Khomeini,

the de facto head of Iran's revolutionary government, endorsed

demands in a decree issued on 17 November expressly declaring that "the premises of
the Embassy and the hostages would remain as they were until the United States had handed over
the former Shah for trial and returned his property to Iran." Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at
the students'

34.

220.

He

learned of their

trip

from a report on the

NBC

evening news that Press Secretary Jody

Powell had attempted to dissuade the network from carrying. Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure, in
Christopher, supra note 216, at 76. Saunders

knowledge that

it

is

justifiably critical

of NBC's action, taken despite the

might jeopardize a sensitive mission.

at 76-77.

221.

Id.

222.

S.C. Res. 457, 34

223.

S.C. Res. 461,

U.N. SCOR, Res.

34 U.N. SCOR, Res.

& Dec. at 24, U.N. Doc S/RES/457 (1979).
& Dec. at 24-25, U.N. Doc. S/RES/461 (1979). Eleven

States voted for the resolution, with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,
abstaining.

224.

Kuwait and Bangladesh

80 DEPT. St. BULL 68 (Feb. 1980).

The text of the draft resolution may be found in 80 DEPT. ST. BULL. 70-71. Ten States voted
Union and the German Democratic Republic voted against it,

for the resolution, the Soviet

Bangladesh and Mexico abstained, and China did not participate.

Id.

Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran)
1979 I.C.J. 7, 12 (Order of Dec. 15) [hereinafter Hostages CaseProvisional Measures] See generally Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protection and the Use of
225.

(Provisional Measures),
.

Force by States, in

The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 337

226.

Hostages Case-Provisional Measures, supra note 225, at 21.

227.

Id.

228.

See supra text at notes 222-223.

229.

They

are

described

in

considerable

detail

Christopher, supra note 216, at 102-45.
230.

Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at 21.

91

in

Saunders,

(A. Cassese ed. 1986).

Diplomacy and Pressure,

in

Forcible Protection of Nationals

231.

Abroad

See Saunders, Diplomacy and Pressure, in Christopher, supra note 216, at 135:

After an 8-3 vote in the Revolutionary Council, the issue was taken to Khomeini

on April
6. Confirmed reports told us that Khomeini had asked whether the recommendation of
the Revolutionary Council [to transfer the hostages] was unanimous. When he was told
that
there were three negative votes
Ayatollah Beheshti and two other
Khomeini refused to approve the Council's recommendation.
clerics

—

—

232.

Id.

233.

For inside descriptions of the rescue operation and

why

it

failed, see

C. Beckworth

& D.

Knox, Delta Force (1983); P. Ryan, The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why It Failed (1985); Sick, Military
Operations and Constraints, in Christopher, supra note 216, at 154-64- See also the 78 page study by
the Special Operations Review Group, headed by Admiral J. L. Holloway, III, entitled "Rescue
Mission Report," distributed in Washington, D.C., during the
234-

The

first

landed in the desert, with

proceeded to the landing

site.

The second

summer

of 1980.

crew being taken aboard another helicopter that

its

returned to the

USS

Nimitz- Sick, Military Operations and

Constraints, in Christopher, supra note 216, at 158.

235.

Id.

at 159.

operation's failure,

At

1

A.M. [EST] on 25

White House

April the

whose purpose and timing was "intended

the events at Desert

I

for

an invasion attempt and

80 DEPT. ST. BULL. 38 Qune 1980).

237.

Id.

238.

Letter from the President to the Speaker of the

239.

DEPT. ST. BULL

35 U.N.

Great

SCOR

Id.

would not mistake

Qun

House and the President Pro Tempore of the

1980).

(Apr.-Jun.)

at

28,

U.N. Doc. S/13908 (1980)

(Letter

from

to the President of the Security Council).

and the other European Community Member States supported the

Canada, Egypt,

Military Coercion

Iran, the Soviet

42, 43

Supp.

Britain, Italy

action, as did Australia,

Through

to insure that Iran

(emphasis added).

Ambassador McHenry
240.

an announcement of the

retaliate against the hostages." Id.

236.

Senate, 80

issued

Israel

and Japan. See N.

Ronzitti,

US

Rescuing Nationals Abroad

and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity 45-47 (1985). In addition to
as well as India, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, condemned it.

Union, China and Cuba,

at 47-48.

241.

But

see the Italian

statement justifying the action under international law which, while

"hardly a model of legal logicality," appears to reject the

upon

US

self-defense

argument and

a State's purported inherent right to resort to self-help in such cases.

Id.

at 46.

rest instead

As explained by

Professor Ronzitti, the Italian view seems to be that:

The Charter does not

abrogate a State's right to resort to self-help, including the use of

armed force, which belongs

to

it

under customary international law. The Charter simply

suspends the right to resort to self-help, since
task of safeguarding the rights of
function, for

member

it

entrusts the Security Council with the

States.

Whenever

this

example when the action of the Security Council

is

mechanism does not
paralysed by veto, the

States are free to resort to self-help, under the terms permitted by customary international
law.
Id.

at 46-47.

For evaluation of the viewpoint reflected in the Italian statement, one that has received

support in the past from legal commentators, including the present writer, but has not attracted
widespread,

if

any, support from States, see text at supra notes 54-57.

242.

See supra text at note 227.

243.

Dillard,

Remarks, in The Iran

Crisis

and International Law: Proceedings of the John Bassett

Moore Society of International Law Symposium on
The Iran Crisis and International Law]

92

Iran 33 (R. Steele ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
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244.

Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at 43.

245.

Stein, Contempt, Crisis,

Am.

J. Int'l

lawful, a slight

tilt

The

and discussed

the Court:

The World Court and

the

Hostage Rescue Attempt, 76

499, 500 (1982). While the Court did not expressly find the rescue operation to be

L.

towards the recognition of a right of forcible protection of nationals abroad

discernible, at least to

Remarks, in

and

in

some

Iran Crisis

N.

observers, from

its

condemn

failure to

and International Law, supra note 243,

Ronzitti, supra note 240, at 61. In

US

the

29

at

action per

se.

may be

See Lillich,

& 32. This point

is

noted

view of the Dissenting Opinions of Judges

Morozov and Tarazi that condemned and challenged its legality respectively, see infra text at notes
254-257, one might have expected the Court to have denounced the rescue operation had a
substantial number of the 13 judge majority believed that it violated the UN Charter. Thus, as in the
case of the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes story, the Court's silence on the question of
whether a right of forcible protection exists may not be entirely without signifcance. C/. N. Ronzitti,
supra, at 67-68:

The

silence of the

Court certainly does not imply that

acquiesces in the theory of the

mission through the use of force. However, the Court did not block the

legality of a rescue

process leading to the creation of a
nationals abroad,

it

new

rule legitimizing recourse to force to protect

which would have been the case

if it

has censured the use of force in

those circumstances.
246.

Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at 43.

247.

Stein, supra note 245, at

248.

The two main and

249.

Jeffery,

500

n.7.

several other arguments are canvassed in this chapter.

The American Hostages

in

Tehran: The

l.C.J.

and

the Legality of Rescue Missions,

30

Int'l

& Camp. L.Q. 717, 723 (1981).
250.

Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at

251.

Id.

at 29.

252.

Id.

at 42.

253.

Stein, supra note 245, at

18. See supra

note 239.

500-501 n.8. This reading, of course,

light of the Court's later

pronouncements on armed attack

Paramilitary Activities In

and Against Nicaragua

(Nicar. v.

in the

US)

may

require reassessment in

Case Concerning Military and

(Merits),

1986

I.C.J.

14

Qudgment

of June 27).
254.

Hostages Case-Merits, supra note 217, at 55.

255.

Id.

at 56-57.

256.

Id.

at 64.

257. "One can only wonder, therefore, whether an armed attack attributable to the Iranian
Government has been committed against the territory of the United States, apart from its Embassy
and Consulates in Iran." Id. at 64-65.
258.

But

259.

Schweppe,

see supra text
Iran:

accompanying note 253.

World Court Ruling of December

15,

1979 and

May

24, 1980, 14 Int'l

Law.

529,529(1980).
260.
J.

Boyle, International

World Pub. Order

Law as

a Basis for Conducting American Foreign Policy:

103, 130 (1982). See also F. Boyle,

World

Politics

1

979- 1 982, 8 Yale

and International Law 200

(1985).

261.

Schweistfurth, Operations

to

Rescue Nationals

Relation to the Protection of Human Rights, 23

German

262.

N.

Ronzitti, supra note 240, at 12, 41-49,

263.

Id.

at 65.

264.

Jeffery,

265.

Id.

57

in

Y.B.

Third States Involving the Use of Force in
Int'l L.

159, 179 (1980).

& 61-62.

supra note 249, at 725.

at 725-26, citing L.

Henkin,

How Nations
93

Behave 142 (2d

ed. 1979).
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Much

Law

Schachter, Intematiorial

266.

in the

Hostage

Crisis, in

of the material in Professor Schachter's chapter

is

Christopher, supra note 216, at 332.

taken, often in haec verba, from one of his

Law:

earlier articles. See Schachter, Self-Help in Intematunvil

Abroad

US Action

231 (1984). See also Schachter, The Right of States
Rev. 1620, 1628-33 (1984).

37

5

J. Int'l Affairs

Law

Hostage

to

in the Iranian

Use Armed

Hostages

Crisis,

82 Mich.

Force,

L.

Christopher, supra note 216, at 334.

267.

Schachter, Intematioivil

268.

Id.

269.

Professor Schachter introduces his discussion of the topic with the proposition that "article

1

in the

seems on

the seizure,"

first

blush to provide an adequate legal basis for the employment of military force after

at 328,

id.

and

devotes considerable space to considering whether the requirement

later

of "necessity" for self-defense had been met,

danger

Crisis, in

at 331.

at the

whether the hostages were actually

i.e.

in

imminent

time of the operation. See infra text at notes 284-285.

O. Schachter, International Law

270.

See

271.

See supra text at notes 56-66.

272.

But see

e.g.,

Lillich,

Remarks, in

Stein, supra note 245, at

The

Theory and Practice 126, 128, 144 (1991).

and International Law, supra note 243,

Iran Crisis

& n.99.

522-23

in

at

28

& 39;

See also Professor Schachter's consideration of the issue

discussed infra at notes 277-285.

273.

"The requirement of

'necessity'

proposition," Schachter, International

329, and

it

Law

self-defense

for
in the

Hostage

is

not controversial as a general

Crisis, in

Christopher, supra note 216, at

long has been thought applicable in the context of the forcible protection of nationals

abroad. See,

e.g.,

Waldock, supra note 210,

right of forcible protection as follows:
(2) a failure

or inability

on the

at 467,

who formulated

"There must be

(1)

three requirements governing the

an imminent threat of injury

part of the territorial sovereign to protect

protection strictly confined to the object of protecting

them

against injury."

under customary [international] law only an absolute necessity could
protect nationals."

them and

He

justify

to nationals,

(3)

measures of

adds that "[e]ven

an intervention to

Id.

For an unusual but interesting examination of the necessity requirement arguing that
necessity
see

and not

self-defense

is

the proper legal justification of the right of forcible protection,

Raby, The State of Necessity and the Use of Force

to Protect Nationals,

26 Can. Y.B.

Int'l L.

253

(1988).
274.

Christopher, Introduction, in Christopher, supra note 216, at 12.

275.

Paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the International Convention Against the Taking of

GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc.
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 186, U.N. Doc.

Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N.

A/34/46 (1980), incorporates G.A. Res. 31/103, 31
A/31/39 (1977), which in Paragraph 4 of its Preamble contains the language quoted
276.

in the text.

See infra text at note 274.

Law in the Hostages Crisis,

in Christopher, supra

note 2 16, at 332.

277.

Schachter, International

278.

Id.

279.

Stein, supra note 245, at 522-23. In a footnote to the statement in the text,

he goes one step

further:

None

of the documentation submitted to the Court suggested the existence of a

new

had been carried out
threat to the hostages; indeed, the US
"in exercise of its inherent right of self-defense with the aim of extricating American
nationals who have been and remain the victims of the Iranian armed attack on our
assertion that the mission

Embassy," [1980] ICJ Rep.

3, para. 32,

tends to negate the existence of a

the hostages.
Id. at

523 n.99.

280.

See supra note 236.
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new

threat to
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281.

80 Dept. St. Bull 40 Qune 1980).

282.

Id.

283.

See supra note 274.

284.

Schachter, International

285.

Id.

sense

is,

He

pointedly adds:

Law

in the

Hostage

Crisis, in

Christopher, supra note 216, at 334.

"Whether or not the rescue action was wise

of course, a different matter."

95

in a political

and

military

V

Chapter

Case Studies of Non-United States Forcible
Protection of Nationals

There have been at least

Abroad

15 instances since the adoption of the United

Nations Charter in 1945 where legal commentators have claimed that
the doctrine of "protection of nationals abroad" has, or could have, been in-

voked by States other than the United States

to justify forcible measures under-

taken in other States. 1 In most of these cases, the State involved relied
primarily

upon

secondarily,
tions.

if

government request or an international agreement and only

a

at

all,

upon the protection of nationals doctrine

Moreover, even when a State invoked the doctrine

specific international

law arguments justifying

curred during the Suez Crisis in 1956,
that

its

it.

The

when Great

and

as

under Article 5 1 of the
Since the Suez

crisis

its

ac-

advanced

principal exception oc-

Britain claimed, inter

alia,

and property of

such was an exercise of its inherent right of self-defense

UN Charter.

2

there has been very

little

discussion in international or

national forums about the legality of a State's use of forceful
its

rarely

it

actions against Egypt were taken to protect the lives

British nationals

to justify

means

to protect

nationals in another State, aside from various U.S. forays into other

countries.

The extended debate over

Israel's

Entebbe operation being a rare

exception.

While the international law discourse emanating from these instances is
scant, and the data about them often fragmentary, they serve to round out the
international perspective showing that the United States is not alone in supporting and, more importantly perhaps, actually invoking the "forcible protection of nationals" doctrine. 3

Forcible Protection of Nationals

A. Suez
Great Britain has

justified its

Crisis.

Abroad

1956.

1956 action in the Suez

Crisis as necessary for

the protection of its nationals. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

argued that "self-defense undoubtedly includes a situation where the

of the State's nationals abroad are in imminent danger."

4

lives

Asked what armed

attack had occurred against Great Britain to justify the invocation of Article 5

of the

UN Charter, Mr. Lloyd maintained that the British government was not

foreclosed from taking action to "protect the lives of British subjects abroad un-

and

less

He

until they are expressly authorized

countered that

by the United Nations to do so." 5

vention can take place until our nationals are actually

haps

killed." 6

no interbeing attacked and per-

would be a travesty of the Charter

"it

His comments included three criteria for

to say that

when

a protection of

meet the requirements of customary international
law. "The first is where there is an imminent threat of injury to our nationals
The second is where there is a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect the nationals in question. The third is where the
nationals operation would

measures of protection are

During

UN

confined to the object of protecting the na-

These situations are reflected
39, 40 and 41 of the UN Charter.

tionals against injury."

tions of articles

strictly

7

in the self-defense por-

debates, however, other goals also were emphasized, although

Great Britain consistently invoked the protection-of-nationals rationale. In the

words of

Sir Pierce

Dixon, the British representative to the United Nations,

must be safeguarded. I again emphasize.
that we
should certainly not want to keep any forces in the area for one moment longer
than is necessary to protect our nationals, to help bring the fighting to an end
and to deal with the very real danger of fighting across the Canal." 8 This justification for the British operation at Suez has been dismissed by almost all commentators as utterly without merit and illustrative o{ how the right of forcible
protection may be open to abuse. 9
"British

and French

lives

.

.

B. Belgium in the Congo. I960.

independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. On 5
Congolese troops mutinied and attacked Belgian subjects and other Euro-

The Congo gained
July,

its

peans. Belgian paratroops entered the

the

UN

its

July to evacuate Belgian

The next day, the provincial government
independence. The central government, in a letter

nationals and other foreigners.

Katanga proclaimed

Congo on 10

10

of
to

Secretary-General reacting to the Belgian action and the Katangese
98
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secession, requested military assistance

from the United Nations and claimed

that the dispatch of Belgian troops to the
ship that the

Congo

violated the treaty of friend-

two countries had signed on 29 June 1960. Under the terms of

that treaty, Belgian troops could intervene only at the express request of the

Congolese government. 11
In the Security Council,
cited

numerous

M.

Pierre

Wigny, the Belgian Foreign Minister,

and other atrocities by Congolese troops against
He stated that "we had a right to intervene when it was a

reports of rape

Belgian nationals.

question of protecting our compatriots, our

women,

against such excesses.

We

had the most imperative duty to do so." He explained that the operation in
the Congo was purely humanitarian and strictly proportionate to the objective
of protecting Belgian lives, 13 and that Belgium would withdraw its troops as
soon as, and to the extent that, the United Nations effectively ensured the
maintenance of order and the safety of all foreigners. 14
12

On

14 July 1960, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon

Belgium to withdraw

its

troops from Congolese territory. 15 Subsequent resolu-

government to withdraw with haste and requested that
from actions that might undermine Congo's territorial integ-

tions urged the Belgian
all

States refrain

rity

or political independence. 16

Prime Minister

Lumumba

of the Congo, in a letter dated 31 July 1960, in-

formed the Security Council that
army, could protect
presence.

17

The

gium withdraw

all

UN

troops, with the help of the

foreign nationals removing the need for the Belgian

Security Council thereupon once again
its

Congolese

demanded

that Bel-

troops from Katanga "under speedy modalities determined

by the Secretary-General." 18

The

Belgian actions in the

protection of nationals.

Congo seem to be

The French,

British,

proved and expressed their appreciation.
Berard, stated that

"

19

a legitimate use of force for the

and

Italian

The French

[t]heir mission of protecting lives

result of the failure of the

governments

Congolese authorities and

all

ap-

representative,

M.

and property is the
is

direct

in accord with a recog-

on humanitarian
the Soviet Union and sev-

nized principle of international law, namely, intervention

grounds."

20

Several nations were

critical. Predictively,

eral other States, including Tunisia,

Poland and Argentina, denounced the protec-

tion-of-nationals rationale as a device to

mask an

illegal

armed intervention. 21

C. France in Mauritania. 1977.

On May
1

1977, Polisario guerrillas took six French nationals hostage during

an attack on the

city of Zouerate,

an important mining town
99

in northeastern

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Mauritania.

Over the course of 1977, the

rebels

Abroad

made advances and

destroyed

economic centers in Mauritania and on 25 October they took two more
French nationals as hostages. Consequently, in November 1977 France sent ten
Jaguar bombers to Mauritania in support of the approximately 12,000 French
troops who were assisting the Mauritanian army in its fight against the Polisario
Front. 22 This extensive French military operation in support of the Mauritanian
vital

government, known

The

as

first air strikes

Operation Lamentin, continued

until

May

1978.

by the French planes occurred on 12-13 December 1977,

after Polisario forces attacked a train carrying iron ore

from Zouerate to the

port of Nouadhibou. France responded with a second air strike

on 18 Decern-

ber after a Polisario assault on a Mauritanian garrison near the border with

Western Sahara. 23 On 23 December, negotiations between French officials and
Polisario representatives led to the Polisario release of the eight French hostages to

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in Algiers. 24

France invoked humanitarian justifications for the

undertaken

at the request of the

Mauritanian government.

Jacques Leprette, the French representative to the

UN,

that

air strikes
25

A

letter

it

had

by M.

to the president of the

Security Council, stated that "[i]n the face of the persistent threats directed
against our compatriots in undisputed Mauritanian territory.

the French government, as
spect to

its

it

.

.

it is

the duty of

would be the duty of any Government with

nationals abroad, to provide protection for them."

26

The

re-

strikes

were dual-purposed. They were a response to the abduction of French nationals,

and were

also a part of

in Mauritania.

27

Operation Lamentin to combat the Polisario Front

Because no rescue mission occurred, however, the invocation

of the forcible-protection doctrine seems primarily a pretext for the French use

of force to support the Mauritanian government.

D. France and Belgium in

As

in 1964, 28 the lives of numerous

Zaire. 1978.

European

citizens, primarily

Belgian and

French, were put at risk in Katanga during disturbances caused by activities of
the "gendarmes kantangais"
ince.

29

On

11-12

May

who

fought for the independence of the prov-

1978, Katangese rebels had entered the province, arriv-

Angola through Zambia, and occupied the city of Kolwezi. During this
operation and its aftermath, they killed about 900 people, including an estimated 120 Europeans. 30 The lives of French and Belgian citizens, therefore,
ing from

were obviously endangered. 31

On

19

May French

troops were air-dropped just to the north of Kolwezi,

with Belgian troops landing in a separate operation the following day. 32 Both
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France and Belgium

justified their actions as responses to the request for mili-

government. 33 Indeed, Belgian Prime Minister

tary assistance by the Zairian

Tindemans

actually stated before the Belgian Parliament that Zaire "was a sov-

ereign State where Belgium could not simply interfere at will and that, consequently, an authorization from the Zairian authorities was required before

Belgium could proceed with
a far

more

restrictive

its

rescue operation." 34 This statement represents

approach to the forcible-protection-of-nationals doctrine

than the Belgian Foreign Minister had taken during the 1960 Congo operation. 35

On the other hand, French president Giscard d'Estaing justified the op-

eration as a normal exercise of the legitimate and inalienable right of France to

protect

its

citizens abroad. 36

Most Belgian troops withdrew on 22 May, by which time they had evacuated
2,269 people to Europe. 37
June.

38

The French

Neither action was debated in the Security Council, although several

European countries expressed
plicitly

operation, however, continued until 15

endorsing their actions.

undertaken were

justifiable

their appreciation to France
39

There seems

little

and Belgium, im-

doubt that the operations

under the protection-of-nationals rationale.

E. France in Mauritania, 1978.

In

May

1978, French Jaguar bombers struck Polisario rebels near the city of

Zouerate during the

final stages of Operation

Lamentin. In June 1978, Foreign

Minister Louis de Guiringaud of France stressed that the location of the

air

had occurred on Mauritanian territory where
French nationals were endangered. 40 Although the 1978 operation did not involve an evacuation of French nationals, presumably the nationals were indirectly protected by the assistance to the Mauritanian government in opposing
strikes against the Polisario forces

the Polisario Front.

As

in case of the 1977

C, France did not

French

air strikes in

Mauritania, discussed in Section

mount a rescue operation, but rather sought

to assist the rec-

ognized Mauritanian government against Polisario insurgents through military
measures.

claim

is

The 1978 French

air strikes,

again then appear pretextual

if

the

humanitarian intervention.

F.

France in Chad. 1978.

Chadian unrest began in July 1977, mainly in the area of Bardai' in
northern Chad, caused by the rebel group Frolinat (Front de liberation rationale du Tchad). 41 By February 1978, the rebels controlled the strategic cities of
Visible
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Faya-Largeau and Fada. According to M. Olivier, the French Secretary of State
to the Foreign Minister, the 4,000

French nationals

Chad, the majority of

in

whom lived in the capital city N'Djamena, and in southern Chad, were not in immediate danger. 42 He informed the French Parliament that the Chadian government had extended measures

to ensure their safety, with the help of the

French "cooperants" who were present
tion accord that the

two States

Chad under the terms
had signed on 6 March 1976. 43
in

of a coopera-

French Cooperation Minister Robert Galley, however, did not
possibility that the Frolinat

Chadian radio

stations

French nationals.

N'Djamena

propaganda campaign being diffused over seized

might necessitate a rescue operation to evacuate

When

44

rule out the

in April 1978,

km

approached to within 250

the rebels

he invoked the 1976 cooperation accord to

of

justify

any French action taken against the rebellion, which was lead and armed
largely

from outside the country. 45 At the request of the Chadian government,

France also increased the number of cooperants to help train the Chadian army

and sent supplementary units to protect the army training centers. 46 Altogether, France deployed 2,500 troops to

Chad

as part of this action, called

Operation Tacaud, including a regiment of parachutists, two infantry companies,

one Marine infantry company, and several supporting

and Jaguar bombers.

47

tactical airplanes

Foreign Minister Guiringaud described their objec-

tive as helping the legitimate

government

find a political

compromise

to the

rebellion. 48

After three French cooperants were killed, the French government re-

acted vigorously. 49

presence in

French
closely

As Foreign Minister Guiringaud

Chad was both

civilians

in danger.

50

Although French troops

guarded the army training centers and communities with large con-

centrations of French nationals, 51 they
tion.

government and because

at the request of the

and cooperants were

indicated, the French

On

made no attempt

27 April, French Jaguars provided

defending the city of Salal, 52 and on 19
cisive help to

Chadian

forces lent support to

air

May over

to stage

an evacua-

cover to Chadian troops

100 French troops gave de-

forces opposing Frolinat advances at Ati. 53

Chadian forces

in other battles, although the

French

number of

French actively engaged never exceeded 200 to 300 troops. 54 Because French

Tacaud made no effort to evacuate French narather simply helped the Chadian army turn back Frolinat rebels

troops deployed in Operation
tionals but,

in several important battles, to classify the
ible

protection

is

tenuous.
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G. France in Chad. 1979.

The

between the Chadian government and rebel factions worsened over the winter of 1978-79, so again the Chadian government requested
the assistance of France in its defense against armed rebellion. 55 According to
relations

the Minister of Foreign Affairs Louis de Guiringaud,

gan preparations to evacuate
tionals in

Chad were

its

nationals.

56

on

15 February France be-

This time, after four French na-

killed in the fighting, the

French forces in N'Djamena

helped repatriate about 2,500 French nationals, virtually the entire French
population of Chad. Nationals from
ated.

57

Because

operation

this

"cooperants" already in

Chad

many

other countries were also repatri-

was carried out exclusively by French

at the request of its

government,

this

evacuation

does not warrant categorization as an instance of forcible protection.

H. France
In

in Mauritania. 1979.

1979 France again conducted an

nian-ruled area of the Western Sahara.

air

operation over the Maurita-

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs

Guiringaud advised Parliament that involvement occurred to counter the
armed-rebel operations that violated the Mauritanian border and not to target
the Saharan people. 58

"One cannot claim

that our military action in Maurita-

which was in conformity with article 5 1 of the UN Charter in particular,
has been contrary to the international obligations of France, nor to the requirements of international law," he stressed. 59
nia,

The government

of Mauritania in this instance had requested support from

France against outside aggression. Although the French Foreign Minister emphasized that France needed to protect
tionals in

Almost

its

citizens, 60 the safety of foreign

na-

Mauritania was, at best, a secondary factor in France's actions.

consistently, France's actions are difficult to justify by exclusive refer-

ence to the protection-of-nationals-abroad doctrine.

I.

France in Gabon. 1990.

Riots erupted in Libreville, the
ers

Gabonese

capital,

when

opposition support-

accused the government of having killed Joseph Rendjambe, the leader of

the P.G.P. (Parti gabonais du progres) opposition party,

May

61

who was found dead on

Order also collapsed in Port-Gentil, where 10 foreigners, including seven French nationals who were working at the Elf-Aquitaine oil refinery, were taken hostage for 12 hours on 23 May. 62 On 24 May, France
22

1990.
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deployed approximately 600 Marines from their permanent station near
Libreville

who were

there under the terms of a defense and military assistance

two countries on 17 August I960. 63 France dispatched an
additional 200 troops to Gabon, including parachutists based at Calvi, in
Corsica, and infantrymen based at Nimes. All these acts were in conformity
with the treaty: 64 which required that the Gabonese government issue a specific
treaty signed by the

request before France could deploy

its

forward-deployed forces, or introduce

By 25 May the fighting had largely ceased, and
on 29 May oil production resumed at the Elf refinery. The threat to French nationals in Gabon having passed, and on 1 June France withdrew most of its
troops into the country. 65

new

forces. 66

French Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas stated that the French
mission in

Gabon was
and

solely to protect the nearly 2,500

who wished

French nationals

living

67

By the end of the
approximately 1,800 French narescue mission, named Operation Requin,
69
tionals had been evacuated to Paris.
Despite the fact that there may have
been other reasons for the French action, the evacuation of over two-thirds of
the French nationals living in Port-Gentil identifies this as being a legitimate
in Port-Gentil

to repatriate those

to leave.

68

case of forcible intervention. 70

J.

On
otic

France and Belgium in Rwanda. 1990.

October 1990, several thousand armed soldiers of the Rwandan PatriFront invaded Rwanda from Uganda. As the rebels approached Kigali, the
1

capital,

where they sought

to

overthrow President Habyarimana, the Rwandan

and Belgium. 71 Both
countries responded immediately to the request. On 4 October, Belgium dispatched 540 Belgian paratroops and France dispatched 300 French Foreign Legion paratroops to Rwanda, 72 where approximately 650 French and 1,600

government requested

military assistance from France

Belgian citizens were living. 73

The Rwandan government then

asked Belgium to help protect the airport in Kigali. After securing

specifically
it,

the 150

French Foreign Legion troops and 150 Belgian paratroopers 74 evacuated nearly
1

,000 European and

ber

1

US nationals. 75 Belgium withdrew its troops on 2 Novem-

990, 76 with France withdrawing

its

forces a few

weeks

thereafter. 77

Belgian Prime Minister Martens subsequently explained before the

on Foreign

Com-

and National Defense of the Belgian Parliament
that the government's concern had been the security of the Belgian citizens in
Rwanda, which had led to the humanitarian action for their protection and, if
they chose to leave, evacuation. 78 Although the widespread anarchy in

missions

Affairs
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Rwanda
actions,

an extended Belgian and French military presence, their initial
taken at the request of the Rwandan government, certainly qualify as a
led to

legitimate case of forcible protection.

K. France in Chad. 1990.

On

10

November

1990, the Chadian opposition leader Idriss Deby, formerly

the Commander-in-Chief to the dictatorial president Hissene Habre, rebelled

Habre regime. 79 France, which considered the

an internal
Chadian matter, nevertheless proceeded without a request from the Chadian
government to transfer a company of 150 parachutists on 16 November from
against the

affair

80

N'Djamena, the capital, to Abeche, in eastern Chad. These men reinforced the
350 French troops stationed there and combined they were expected to ensure
the security of French citizens should Deby's forces approach. 81 They achieved
this objective. When Abeche fell to the rebels on 29 November, France flew in
a company of parachutists from Corsica, as well as Foreign Legion troops from
the Central African Republic, to protect both French nationals and other foreigners in N'Djamena 82 and prepare for their evacuation. 83 By early December, 84 they had evacuated approximately 1,600 foreigners, including between
960 and 1,120 French nationals. 85 France made no effort to oppose Deby, who,
having entered N'Djamena on 1 December, had installed himself as president,
Habre having fled the country. 86
Unlike the 1978 and 1979 French actions in

Chad

(discussed in Sections

F

and G respectively) in this instance neither followed a request by the Chadian
government nor was it pursuant to the cooperation accord. It surely can be justified under the protection-of-nationals abroad doctrine, however.
,

L.

France and Belgium in Zaire. 1991.

Zairian soldiers mutinied in September 1991
their

paychecks worthless.

them

fell

victim to

random

87

when

Although Europeans were not

pillaging.

targets,

on loan from the United

Belgium sent 500 paratroopers. 88 These forces arrived in

the Republic of the Congo,

some of

France thereupon dispatched 1,200 For-

eign Legion troops aboard military transport planes
States;

hyperinflation rendered

on 23 and 24 September and,

Zaire River, proceeded to Kinshasa, Zaire.

Brazzaville, in

after crossing the

89

After securing the airport, the forces shuttled French and Belgian nationals

from Kinshasa to safety in

Brazzaville.

They then proceeded

mining center in the Katanga region 1,500
105

km

to Kolwezi, a large

southeast of Kinshasa. 90 Their
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mission was to begin the evacuation of the 3,500 French nationals and 3,000
Belgians in Zaire, 91 of whom 650 and 2,000 respectively lived in Katanga. 92 The

evacuation of over 9,000 foreign nationals from over 30 European, African and

Middle Eastern countries was completed on 2 October. 93 This was not a complete evacuation.

Some

foreigners chose to remain.

Violence in Zaire resumed on 22 October
trarily

when

President

Mobutu

arbi-

dismissed Prime Minister Tshisekedi, at which point the Belgian, French

and U.S. authorities strongly recommended a complete evacuation. This was
done and France withdrew its last soldiers on 3 1 October, with the last Belgian
troops leaving

on 4 November 1991. 94

According to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, the foreigners'safety had
depended on the temporary presence of French and Belgian troops. 95 While
President

Mobutu accused France

of seeking to destabilize Zaire, 96 Karl

I

Bond,

then the leader of the United Opposition Parties, acknowledged the humanitarian nature of the rescue operations. 97 Like the 1978 operation in Zaire (dis-

cussed in Section D) the 1991 actions of both France and Belgium in Zaire

appear to be a legitimate case of forcible protection.

M. France and Belgium
In late January 1993, the Zairian

army began an armed mutiny, with

foreigners being killed during ensuing riots.

lated to the mutiny, the
killed.

At

in Zaire. 1993.

98

several

In mysterious circumstances re-

French Ambassador to

Zaire, Philippe Barnard,

the time, 3,000 Belgian and 1,000 French nationals

Zaire. Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Claes

still

was

remained in

recommended

gians leave the country for Brazzaville, in the Republic of the Congo.

that Bel-

The

Bel-

gian government also stated that any decision regarding the evacuation of

would be made in coordination with the other
member States of the European Community, and that Belgium and France
would furnish the majority of any troops that might be dispatched. 99 Subsequently, Belgium decided to send 550 troops to Kinshasa. According to Prime
Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, the operation was coordinated with France. 100
Foreign Minister Claes emphasized that the joint action was limited to the
foreign nationals from Zaire

evacuation of civilians, primarily the 1,500 Belgians living in Kinshasa. 101

While Zairian Prime Minister Tshisekedi, recently reinstated
quested Belgian military assistance, President

Mobutu

to office, re-

strongly opposed any

Belgian presence by deploying air-defense forces to the N'Djili airport in

Kinshasa to prevent Belgian military planes from landing. Mobutu even put his
presidential yacht at the disposal of those foreigners seeking evacuation to

106
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Brazzaville, in

an

effort to

make any

Belgian action unnecessary. 102 In any

event, the Belgian evacuation forces remained in Brazzaville and never crossed
into Zaire.

On

29 January, however, France deployed 150 Marine infantry troops from

their station in Bangui, in the Central African Republic, to Kinshasa via
Brazzaville.

The same

Embassy

day, 12 of these Marines secured the French

and evacuated 400 French nationals from Kinshasa. 103 French troops began
withdraw on 4 February
mutiny. Belgian forces

after Zairian troops loyal to

left

Mobutu had

While the

Brazzaville the next day.

engaged in any rescue operation, the French

seem

a proper case of forcible protection. Interestingly, the

their

did,

quelled the

latter

making

tively

to

never ac-

their actions

French

justified

involvment on such grounds.

N. Multinational Evacuation Operation in Rwanda. 1994.
Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993 authorized a 1,000-man

multinational force to monitor peace between the
rebel forces. 104

By

early April

from over 20 countries.

105

1994 the

UN

contingent included 2,500 troops

When armed bandits threatened to kill any foreigner

unable to prove that he was not Belgian 106 and the
casualties, including 10 Belgian

Rwandan
on 8

soldiers, 107

peacekeepers

UN peacekeepers suffered

who were hacked

to death by

seven Western States organized an operation that began

April, with the purpose of evacuating

The number

Rwandan government and

Rwanda's foreign community.

of States involved and the scale of the evacuation effort

the multilateral action in

Rwanda

unique. France sent 460 troops and five

transport planes, 108 while Belgium sent 750 troops (in addition to the

gian troops already participating in the

UN

operation)

109

and nine

including seven C-130 transport planes and two Boeing 747s.
troops and three
transport plane

C-130 transport

planes.

and the Netherlands sent four planes.

two transport planes

3,900 foreigners from Kigali.

111

alert off the

430 Bel-

airplanes,

Italy sent

80

sent one

Additionally, the

Kenyan coast and

to assist in the evacuation. 112

1994 Belgian, French and Italian troops had withdrawn
113

110

Germany and Canada each

United States kept one ship with 330 Marines on
also provided

made

after

By April

15,

evacuating over

Although the number of participating States

distinguishes this rescue operation from other ones considered in this chapter,
in essence

it

constituted a legitimate case of collective, albeit not

protection.

107

UN,

forcible
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O. France in the Central African Republic. 1996.

On

19

May

1996, fighting broke out in Bangui, the capital of the Central Af-

between government forces and mutineers who were protesting
governmental decision to place the armory under the command of the presi-

rican Republic,
a

dential guard. 114

At

the behest of President Felix Patasse, France initially de-

ployed 800 troops of
Bangui.

115

On

its

1,400 troops currently stationed in the country to

20 May, these forces were supplemented with 550 members of

the French Foreign Legion and additional French paratroopers stationed in

Gabon. 116

The

stated mission of the French forces was to protect the 2,500 French na-

whom were in Bangui.

By 23 May, however, the
situation had so deteriorated that M. Jacques Godfrain, French Minister of Cooperation, announced that the objectives of Operation Almandin II had been
expanded to include protecting the democratically-elected government of
President Patasse. 117 French Defense Minister Charles Millon justified this decision under the defense agreement with Central African Republic. 118
tionals in the country, 1,500 of

expanded mission from Cameroon,
Gabon, and Senegal, all of which are former French colonies with democratically-elected presidents. 119 In the streets of Bangui, however, French forces
France received

political support o{ its

faced violent protests against their efforts to support President Patasse. Nevertheless,

France eventually employed 2,300 troops to evacuate 3,000 foreigners,

US, Japanese, and Lebanese nationals. 120
Because the French actions were in response to an invitation by the President
of the Central African Republic and consistent with the defense agreement beprimarily French but also including

tween the two countries, they shed
tionals-abroad doctrine per

little light

on the

forcible-protection-of-na-

se.
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Entebbe

The
in

to

situation in the

Congo

1976 are not considered

(Belgian and

US

rescue operations) and the Israeli raid on

in this Chapter, but are discussed in the Conclusion.

instances that have been mentioned in the literature provide

little

Other

guidance because protection

of nationals abroad arguments either were not raised or were not relevant. See,

e.g.,

Loyola, 1976,

where French citizens, taken hostage in Somalia, were freed when French soldiers responded to
Somali fire but remained within the territory of Djibouti, then a French colony; Mogadishu, 1977,
where the Somali government consented to the use of German commando units to rescue
German citizens taken hostage on a Lufthansa airplane; Lamaca, 1978, where Egypt did not
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invoke the protection of nationals rationale to

justify its

operation in Cyprus to rescue Egyptians

taken hostage aboard a Cypriot airplane, but simply explained
terrorism;

its

action as necessary to fight

and Bangkok, 1981, where Thai authorities permitted Indonesian

forces to storm

an

Indonesian airplane to rescue civilians taken hostage by terrorists.
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Id.

"Cooperant"

refers to

44.

Id.

45.

J.O. Senat, seance

46.

Id.

47.

Rouvez, supra note

48.

J.O. Senat, seance du 16 juin 1978, at 1448.

49.

Id. at

1446.

50.

Id. at

1448.

51.

Id.

du 12 mai 1978,

at 817.

3, at 154.

52.

Id.

53.

J.O. Assemblee Nationale, 3e seance
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J.O. Senat, seance

55.

J.O. Assemblee Nationale, 3e seance

56.
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du 16
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at 7417.

juin 1978, at 1448.

du 9 novembre 1978,

at 7417.

du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres
mai 1979, at 3612.

International 905, 908, citing 'Reponse
14007,' J.O. Assemblee Nationale, 10
57.

Id.

No

figures are available as to the

number

a

Q.E

Vivien, no.

or nationalities of the other foreigners

evacuated by the French.
58.

Response to question of Mr. Odru, no. 3859, J.O. Assemblee Nationale, seance du 6

avril 1979, at

59.

Id.

2438.

(author's translation). For a discussion of the defense cooperation

between France and Mauritania,

see supra text

agreement

accompanying note 40.
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61.
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et pillages a Libreville et a Port-Gentil,

Le Monde,
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26, 1990, at 3,

cols. 1-5.

63.

Renforts franqais au Gabon, Le

Monde, May

25, 1990, at

1,

col. 6.
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faits

R.G.D.I.P. 1035, 1071 (1990).
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70.
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figures are available as to the nationalities of other foreigners

evacuated by the

French.
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Oct.

Des accrochages entre forces
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Belgium, although approximately 20 Belgian troops were stationed in the country to provide
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Le Monde, Oct.

6,
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Foreign Legion troops were flown to
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4, col. 3.
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95 R.G.D.
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& Ergec, La pratique du pouvoir executif
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Revue Beige de droit international
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the terms of a 1960 defense treaty between the two countries. Representing the second largest

permanent French military presence in Africa, after that in Djibouti, they were not authorized to
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democratic power
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Nevertheless, Minister of Cooperation Jacques Godfrain

now
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[in

d'etat if a military
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1
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1996, available
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File.
le
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to the

number

or nationalities of the people evacuated are

unavailable tor the French rescue operation.
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I

A Chronological List of Cases Involving the
Landing of United States Forces to
Protect the Lives and Property of
Nationals Abroad Prior to

This Appendix contains

a chronological

World War

list

of pre- World

II*

War II cases

which the United States landed troops in foreign countries to protect the lives and property of its nationals. Inclusion of a case does not necessarily imply that the exercise of forcible self-help was motivated solely, or
even primarily, out of concern for US nationals. 2 In many instances there is
room for disagreement as to what motive predominated, but in all cases included herein the US forces involved afforded some measure of protection
in

1

to

US

nationals or their property.

The
case

is

cases are listed according to the date of the

first

use of US forces.

A

included only where there was an actual physical landing to protect

nationals

who were

tential danger.

the subject

of,

or were threatened by, immediate or po-

Thus, for example, cases involving the landing of troops to

punish past transgressions, or for the ostensible purpose of protecting nationals at

some remote time

have been omitted. While an efsituations has been made, there are a good

in the future,

fort to isolate individual fact

number of situations involving multiple landings

closely related in time or

context which, for the sake of convenience, have been treated herein as single episodes.

The

list

oi cases

is

based primarily upon the sources cited following

this

paragraph. Additional sources are noted occasionally under individual
cases. In those relatively
*

few instances where the authorities are in conflict

The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance provided by George T. Yates,
Member of the California and New York Bars, in the preparation of this Appendix.

Esq.,

III,
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about the character or details of a particular landing, the majority view generally has

been followed. In each

to provide information as precise as
to

US

an attempt has been made
possible about the nature of the threat

case, moreover,

nationals, the size of the force landed, the duration of

number

its stay,

the

of troops, nationals and other persons killed or wounded, and the

extent of property loss or damage.

Sources
1

2.

Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy [hereinafter cited
T. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (7th

as

Annual Report]

ed. 1965) [hereinafter

cited as Bailey].
3.

4.

A Diplomatic History of the United States

S.

Bemis,

J.

Clark (U.

(1936) [hereinafter cited as Bemis].

of the Department of State), Right

S. Solicitor

to Protect Citizens in

Foreign Countries by Landing Forces (3d rev. ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
17 Cong. Rec.

S5637-47

(daily ed. April 26, 1971) (remarks of Senator

Goldwater).

5.

1

6.

Department of State Historical Studies Division, Research Project No. 806A: Armed

Actions

Taken by

the

United States without a Declaration of

War 1789-1967

(1967)

[hereinafter cited as Dep't of State].
7.

Dictionary of American History

(J.

Adams ed.

1940) [hereinafter cited as Dictionary]

H. Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines 1800-1934 (US
Marine Corps Historical Section 1934) [hereinafter cited as Ellsworth].
8.

10.

G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1943) [hereinafter cited as Hackworth].
D. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (1936) [hereinafter cited as Knox].

11.

Message of

9.

the President

and Accompanying Documents, Part I, Papers Relating to
1, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. (1868-69) [hereinafter cited as

Foreign Affairs, H.R. Exec. Doc. No.

Message and Documents].

&J. Johnstone, A Chronology of the United States Marine Corps 1775-1934
(US Marine Corps Historical Branch 1965).
13. J. B. Moore, International Law Digest (1906) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
14. M. Offutt, The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States
12.

W.

Miller

(1928) [hereinafter cited as Offutt].
15.

C. Paullin, Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778-1883 (1912)

[hereinafter cited as Paullin].
16.

J.

Rogers, World Policing and the Constitution (1945) [hereinafter cited as Rogers].

The

17.

R. Rotberg, Haiti:

18.

O. Spaulding, The United

Politics of

States

Squalor (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rotberg].

Army

in

War and

Peace (1937) [hereinafter cited as

Spaulding]
19.

Staff of

House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., Background
Armed Forces in Foreign Countries (Comm. Print 1970)

Information on the Use of United States
[hereinafter cited as Background].

U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-Jun. 1965) at 89, U.N. Doc. S/6331 (1965)
Ambassador Stevenson to the President of the Security Council).
20.
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CaseNo.

1,

1831-1832

I

— Falkland Islands

American ships at port in
the Falkland Islands, while acting as the civilian and military governor of the
islands under the authority of the Government of Buenos Aires. Late in
November, Captain Duncan, sailing on the U. S. sloop Lexington, arrived at
Buenos Aires and notified its American consul of his intention to proceed to
the Falkland Islands to protect American citizens and commerce. Argentina
protested claiming that the United States had no right to use the Falklands or
In July and August 1831, Louis Vernet seized three

its

surrounding

territorial waters.

Despite the protest,

Duncan

Vernet had plundered the schooner

December 1831. The American

On

upon learning that
off Berkley Sound on 28

set sail for the Falklands,

Harriet, arriving

force

remained inactive

until

1

January 1832.

that day the Lexington proceeded to the port of St. Louis, where a small

landing force of 17
crews,

and

men went

ashore to release the American vessels and their

A reinforcement party landed from two small

arrest their captors.

boats a short time later.

The two parties took seven prisoners and dispersed

the

other inhabitants.

American citizens in the islands wished to leave, Captain Duncan agreed to give them passage to Montevideo. He sent a guard of 12
Marines ashore to protect the Americans and their property while they were
making preparations to depart. This force returned aboard ship on 2 January
Since nearly

1832.

all

the

A smaller force landed daily until 5 January. On 21 January,

a party of

Americans consisting of 20 men, 8 women, and 10 children boarded the
Lexington, which sailed the same day.

Upon
prisoners

Duncan surrendered the
Government assume respon-

reaching Montevideo on 7 February 1832,

on the condition

that the

Buenos Aires

sibility for their acts.

Sources: Ellsworth 76; Offutt 20-22;

Case No.

2,

1833

1

Moore 298-99.

— Argentina

In October 1833, insurrection broke out in Argentina. Violence was especially

no
diplomatic officers or consular agents in Buenos Aires, there were some
American citizens residing in the city. Daniel Gowland, an American
businessman, informed the commander of an American naval vessel stationed
in the harbor of the situation's gravity and requested that the Navy provide
protection for both US citizens and any foreign nationals not then represented
severe in the area around Buenos Aires. Although the United States had

by naval forces.
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on 2 1 October, an American flagship commanded by Commodore M. T. Woolsey arrived at Buenos Aires. Since the United States had
no political agent on shore, Woolsey immediately sent Commander Isaac
McKeever to reside in the city so as to keep him informed of developments.
Until 3 1 October there were only occasional outbursts, but on that date a widespread disturbance began. Woolsey landed a force of 43 officers, Marines, and
seamen, putting them under McKeever's command. They remained ashore unFive days later,

til

15

November

1833,

when peace was

restored to the city.

Source: Ellsworth 9-10.

—

1835-1836
Peru
The revolution which began in Peru in February 1835 led to American
intervention by the end of the year. General Salaverry, anxious to gain control
Case No.

3,

of the government, induced disturbances to distract attention from his secret
organization of a revolutionary army.

He

deposed President Obregoso and

proclaimed himself Head of State on 25 February 1835. Obregoso proved to be

more entrenched than Salaverry expected. He was able to reorganize those
forces which remained loyal to him and then opposed Salaverry. The ensuing
conflict created deplorable conditions

capital city, Lima,

throughout Peru, especially in the

and the chief port, Callao.

On 6 December

Lima petitioned the US
charge d'affaires for a landing party to protect them and their property. The
charge d'affaires did not take any action until 10 December, when he requested
that a force from the frigate Brandywine be landed at Callao and sent to guard
the US consulate at Lima; four men landed on the same date. Shortly after
their arrival,

1835, several

American

citizens in

both factions temporarily withdrew from the

out military or

civil

government

for several days.

Under

city,

leaving

it

with-

these circumstances,

more Marines be sent to protect foreign residents. On 17 December, the rest of the Marine guard from the Brandywine
came ashore. Several days later the British and French also made landings.
These forces prevented a general plunder of the city, especially in the foreign
quarter
where no houses were disturbed. The American force returned
aboard ship on 24 January 1836.
On 31 August 1836, the Brandywine returned to Callao to land one man
who then proceeded to Lima to guard the American consulate. He remained
ashore until 2 December 1836.
the charge d'affaires requested that

—

Source: Ellsworth 137-38.
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Case No.

4,

I

1841— Peru
commander

In 1841, Lieutenant A. Bigelow,

of the

US

schooner Shark,

intervened between two warring factions in upper Peru to save the lives and
property of Americans and other foreigners.
Source: Knox 159.

Case No.

5,

1852

— Argentina

Early in 1852, revolution again swept the Republic of Argentina.

charge d'affaires at Buenos Aires, John

S.

The US

Pendleton, believed that an

American naval presence was needed urgently. In response to Pendleton's
communications, Commodore Isaac McKeever marshaled a force of Marines
and proceeded from Montevideo to Buenos Aires. On 2 February, McKeever,
the British admiral, the senior naval officers of France, Sardinia, and Sweden,
and all the accredited diplomats in Buenos Aires met. At the meeting, they
decided to apply to the local authorities for permission to land such forces as
the circumstances might require. Permission was not granted.

On the

became known that the rebels had won a victory
of General Rosas and were marching toward Buenos Aires,

next day,

over the forces

when

it

panic spread throughout the

and

this

city.

Permission to land forces was urged again

time granted. British, French and American forces were stationed as

guards for various foreign residents and diplomats. Pillagers plundered the

city.

Disorder was widespread. During the transitional period American Marines

and sailors patrolled the streets, killing four pillagers. This ended the looting.
By 12 February, with the new provisional government in control and order restored, the Americans withdrew to their ships.
Source: Ellsworth 10-13.

Case No.

A

6,

1852-1853

small disorder arose

— Argentina
in

Buenos Aires on

11

September 1852. This

insurrection was not nearly as violent as the one earlier in the year.

Nevertheless,

American

interests

3

were endangered so on 17 September a

Marine guard landed to protect the

US

about April 1853.
Source: Ellsworth 13.
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Case No.

1853

7,

— Nicaragua
between the

government of San Juan del Norte
and the Accessory Transit Company, an American-owned

In 1852, a dispute arose

(Greytown)

company chartered

On

Arenas.

Abroad

local

in Nicaragua, over the title to a piece of property at Puntas

8 February 1853, the city council ordered the

company

off the

had taken any further action, the America sloop Cyane
arrived in San Juan on 10 March. An armed force of 24 Marines was sent
ashore to protect American citizens and their interests. After several days the
controversy apparently was settled and the landing party was recalled on 13
March. Shortly thereafter the Cyane sailed north.
land. Before either side

Sources: Clark 58-59; Ellsworth 120; Offutt 32.

Case No.

1854

8,

Commodore

— China (Shanghai)

Perry visited Shanghai, after his

first visit

to

Japan in 1853. By 7
blown; the city was

September 1853, the Taiping rebellion had become full
captured by the insurgents and skirmishing near Shanghai was constant. In
response to these events, Perry left behind the US sloop-of-war Plymouth before
sailing to

The

Japan in 1854.

encamped around

and their fleet
was anchored in the river. They committed petty hostilities toward foreigners,
with the army tearing down structures at construction sites and stealing building materials, and the navy firing without warning and searching all boats on
Imperial Chinese forces were

the river.

The

that he was

general in

no longer

command

the

city,

of the Imperial troops advised foreigners

able to protect foreign interests

and that they must pro-

tect themselves.

On
The

8

March

Imperial forces seized the

treated the crew. In response,
kill

the

commanding
attacks

tive action
rialists

on

Commodore

Kelly of the Plymouth threatened to

officer of the Imperial vessel.

release of six prisoners

The

owned American pilot boat was fired upon.
vessel, hauled down the American flag and mal-

1854, a privately

This threat resulted in the

and the return of the American boat.

foreigners continued, however,

was necessary.

A small body of British

but was driven back.

The

and by 3 April more affirmaMarines moved on the Impe-

British immediately landed another 150

seamen and Marines, and the Americans landed about 60 the following day.
These men were joined by about 30 volunteers from American merchant vessels, as well as volunteers from the foreign quarter of the city. On the same evening, the United States sent ashore an additional force of

American mission grounds. This combined
perial troops into their encampments.
120

1

1

men

to guard the

force succeeded in driving the Im-

Appendix

On 4 April,
vising

them

I

the British and Americans sent a note to the Imperialists ad-

that

if

by 4 P.M. they did not evacuate their encampments in the

Race Course, the scene of the most recent hostilities, the joint
forces would be obliged to destroy them. The Chinese ignored the warning
and the attack began at the appointed hour. The combined forces were victorious over the Imperialists, who left a number of men dead and wounded in
their retreat. The American casualties included two killed and four wounded.
The British lost one man with three others wounded. The bulk of the American force withdrew; however, two guard forces, 35 men at the American consulate and 11 at the American mission, remained ashore until 15 June. The
last of the joint forces patrolling the Race Course area reembarked two days
vicinity of the

later.

Sources: Clark 57-58; Ellsworth 21-22; Knox 185; Offutt 28-31.

Case No.

9,

1854

— Nicaragua

Shortly after the departure of the

USS Cyane from Nicaragua

the dispute between the city of San Juan del Norte and the
flared

once again. The

in

March

1853,

4

American residents

some of the Accessory Transit
on the Puntas Arenas property and stole some of the firm's
local authorities set afire

Company buildings
goods. In May 1854, in trying to seize the US minister to Central America,
Solon Borland, a mob cut his face. The American consul demanded reparation
for these wrongs,

but to no

The Cyane returned

to

avail.

San Juan on 9

to obtain any satisfactory response,

July to force reparations. Still unable

Commander

Hollins, of the Cyane, sent a

landing party of 18 seamen and Marines ashore on 12 July to seize the arms

and ammunition of the town and to post a proclamation declaring that the
town would be bombarded the following day if the demands were not met.
The Cyane opened fire at 9 A.M. on 13 July. There were three different bombardments during the day. At 4 P.M., the landing party from 12 July went
ashore to complete the destruction by fire. The force then withdrew. Although most of the town was destroyed, no lives were lost because the inhabitants had fled.
Subsequently Nicaragua asserted claims for the damage incurred during the

bombardment of Greytown. The

following

is

a portion oi Secretary of State

Marcy's response to the Nicaraguan minister, dated 2 August 1854:
Nicaragua chooses to maintain the position you assume in your note to me,
that her citizens who incorporated themselves with the community at San
Juan are still in friendly relations with her and entitled to her protection, then
If
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she approves by an implication which she

is not at liberty to deny [the acts] of
on her own soil and becomes responsible
for the mischiefs it has done to American citizens. It would be a strange
inconsistency for Nicaragua to regard the organization at San Juan as a
hostile establishment on her territory and at the same time claim the right to
clothe with her nationality its members.

that political establishment planted

The United

States also refused to pay the claims of French citizens growing

out of the bombardment. 5

On 4 December

1854, President Pierce communicated the facts of the in-

The President, the Congress,
and the Secretary of the Navy approved Commander Hollins' conduct. In
fact, he was commended for the prompt and efficient execution of his
cident to the Congress in his annual message.

duties.
Sources: Clark 59; Ellsworth 121-22; Knox 183-84; 2 Moore 414-18.

Case No.

10,

The United

1854

States

— China (Ning-Po)
made another landing in China at Ning-Po in

1854.

On 20

two armed boats landed to deliver letters to the American consul and a
missionary. Believing some disturbance was about to occur at Ning-Po, the
Americans landed an additional 12 Marines the following day. These forces
remained ashore for two days, acting as a guard. When it became apparent
that no disorder was going to take place, they returned to the ship on 23

July,

July.
Source: Offutt 31.

Case No.

11,

The United

1855

— China

States, dissatisfied with the failure of the

Chinese authorities to

provide adequate protection for American citizens in that country, maintained

naval vessels in the area so that assistance might be rendered

On 8 March

when

necessary.

1855, one such vessel put in to Shanghai, where local conditions

were reported to be chaotic.

went ashore to protect the
reembarked two days later.

No landing was made until
lives

and property of

when 41 men
American citizens. They
19 May,

Source: Ellsworth 23.

Case No.

An

12,

1855

— Uruguay

and on
25 November 1855, Commander W. F. Lynch of the sloop-of-war Germantown
landed a force of seamen and Marines to protect the lives and property of
uprising in 1855 brought severe fighting to Montevideo, Uruguay,
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American

residents. Britain, France,

the harbor, also sent detachments to
fact that

I

and Spain, who had warships present in
protect their nationals. Notable was the

Captain Lynch, an American and the senior naval

assumed the command of a

officer of all the

column which occupied the
customshouse without resistance. As the fighting intensified, more Americans
were called ashore on 27 November, bringing the total to about 100. The
reinforcements withdrew the same day.
By 29 November, the Uruguayan Government had succeeded in putting
down the revolution and the original American landing force reembarked
the following day. During reembarkation the American commander noticed that the Uruguayan Government forces were preparing to kill the insurgents, even though the latter had capitulated and had been disarmed.
The Marines commanded by Lieutenant Nicholson interposed themselves
between the Government troops and the insurgents, thereby preventing the
foreign forces,

joint

slaughter.

Subsequently, Lynch received a note from the Uruguayan

Government

thanking him for his action in protecting the customhouse and the

lives

and

property of the foreign residents.
Sources: Ellsworth 160-61; Offutt 36-37.

Case No.

On

13,

1856

— Colombia (Panama)

19 September 1856, a disturbance occurred in the Panamanian legislative

assembly which seemed certain to lead to armed conflict between the two
political factions.

Commodore Mervine, commander

of the Pacific Squadron,

requested that the American consul inform Governor Fabriga that he wished

some men to protect American citizens during the impending conflict.
The Governor granted the request and Mervine sent ashore 160 men and a
6
field gun to occupy the railroad station. The American presence had such a
dampening effect that the battle never occurred. The American forces
reembarked on 22 September.
to land

Source: Offutt 37-38.

Case No.

14,

1856

— China

autumn of 1856, fighting between the British and the authorities of
Canton seemed inevitable. Fearing injury to Americans and their property,
the American consul requested that Commander A. H. Foote of the sloop
In the

Portsmouth send a force to look after these interests. Foote sent 83 men from
the Portsmouth who landed at Canton about 23 October. When this first
force proved inadequate, an additional force of about 67 men was landed
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trom the sloop-of-war Levant around 27 October.

On

28 November, a

supplementary force of 29 Marines was landed from the steam sloop USS San
Jacinto. This detachment remained ashore only two days. About this time the

made

withdraw the forces because several Americans had
participated in a British assault on the Chinese without orders, and the
United States wished to maintain its neutrality.
decision was

to

While Foote was arranging the American withdrawal, his boat was fired on
five times as he passed Chinese installations on the river. On the following
day, 16 November, the sloop Portsmouth was brought up from Whampoa to
the nearest fort and the Americans immediately opened fire in retaliation.
The fighting escalated, and on 20 November, Foote landed 287 men who
took one fort by assault. When about 3,000 Chinese soldiers attempted to retake the fort, the American forces repulsed them. On the following day, two
more forts were captured, and on 22 November, the last fort surrendered.

The landing party returned

to their ships that afternoon, but landed again the

following day to occupy the forts and complete their destruction. This

work

continued until 6 December 1856, when the entire force withdrew. Chinese
casualties

amounted

to about 250, while the

Americans had 29 men

killed or

wounded.
Sources: Clark 60-61; Ellsworth 24-27; Knox 186-87; Offutt 38-39.

Case No.

15,

1858

— Uruguay

When a revolution broke out in Uruguay in January

1858, the

Government of

Uruguay requested that foreign troops be landed to protect the lives and
property of foreign residents. Detachments from the frigate USS St. Lawrence
and sloop-of-war Falmouth landed on 2 January 1858, and joined British naval
forces in holding the two consulates and the customhouse in Montevideo. The
American forces showed strict neutrality toward both political factions and

On

27 January, about ten days

apart, the

Marines withdrew without

confined themselves to protecting foreigners.
after the revolutionary

incident.

On

movement

the day oi the

fell

American withdrawal, an increased

British force

landed.
Sources: Ellsworth 161; Offutt 39-40; Rogers 103.

Case No.
In the

16,

1859

summer

— China

of 1859,

it

was reported among the Chinese

at

Shanghai that

some coolies had been kidnapped and taken aboard a French merchant vessel.
These reports led to a general disturbance directed against foreigners. At that
time the side-wheel steamer USS Mississippi had arrived off Woosung and the
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American consul and several American merchants requested assistance in
protecting their lives and property. On 3 1 July, the captain oi the Mississippi
sent ashore an armed party o(60 Marines to offer protection and restore order.
Having accomplished their objective, the Americans reembarked on 2 August
1859.
Sources: Clark 62; Ellsworth 27-28; Knox 189; Offutt 41.

Case No.

When it

17,

1860

— Angola (Portuguese West Africa)

appeared that the natives would attack the Portuguese settlement at

Kisembo, Angola (Portuguese West Africa) the American residents requested
,

assistance from the sloop-of-war
1

March

USS Marion which was lying in the harbor. On

1860, several officers and about 40 seamen and Marines went ashore

to guard the

American factories during the

night.

The force was withdrawn

the

following day.

On 3 March, another force of 50 men was landed to protect American interests

during a battle between the natives and the Portuguese.

several attempts to

burn the American

factories,

prevented them from achieving their objective.

The

natives

made

but the force from the Marion

The next day,

the natives hav-

been defeated, the Americans withdrew. It should be noted that the Americans remained neutral throughout the conflict, their only function being that
ing

of a guard force.
Sources: Clark 62; Ellsworth

Case No.

18,

1860

On 27 September

7;

Offutt 41-42.

— Colombia (Panama)

1860, an insurrection began in the outskirts of Panama City.

After consulting with the American consul, and at the request of the military

and the agent of the Panama Railroad, Commander William D.
Porter of the sloop-of-war USS St. Mary's landed a Marine guard to protect
railroad traffic and American interests. The necessity of the force was
demonstrated by the fact that six white inhabitants already had been killed and
intendente

three

wounded by

stray bullets.

station without opposition.

The

force landed

The Governor

of

and occupied the

Panama turned over

railroad

the city to

the joint occupation of American and British forces the following day.

On

29

September 1860, an additional force of 50 seamen landed to reinforce the
Marine guard. These forces were not withdrawn until 7 October, when the
insurrection had come to an end.
Sources: Clark 62-63; Ellsworth 46; Knox 189; Offutt 42.
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Case No.

19,

1864

Abroad

— Japan

summer of 1864, Robert H. Pruyn, United States minister to Japan, went
Yedo (Tokyo) to negotiate a settlement of American claims for several acts

In the
to

A force of 65 seamen

of hostility committed by Japan against the United States.

and Marines from the sloop USS Jamestown was landed on 14 July 1864, to act
as a guard for Pruyn during the three weeks of negotiations, the Japanese being
unable to guarantee his

safety.

According to Pruyn, however, he requested the

guard not only to insure his safety but also to

facilitate his

work.

Source: Offutt 44-45.

Case No. 20, 1865

— Colombia (Panama)

Although the revolution which erupted in Panama on 9 March 1865, was
unanticipated by American officials, it so happened that the USS St. Mary's
was anchored in the harbor ready to render assistance to protect American
lives and property. The American consuls who requested that a force be sent
ashore first sought permission from Vice President Calancha, the acting
Head of State. Since it was his government that was about to be overthrown,
he readily granted permission. A detachment of Marines was sent to occupy
the American consulate overnight. When foreign residents were not the
object of any violence, the Marines returned to their ship the following
morning.
Source: Offutt 48.

Case No. 21, 1868

—Japan

(Hiogo)

Subsequent to the opening of the ports of Osaka and Hiogo on

1

January 1868,

Japanese hostility toward foreigners became so noticeable that certain vessels
of the Asiatic Squadron under the

command

of Rear Admiral Bell were

stationed in the area so that they could offer assistance

if

American

interests

were threatened.

On

27 January, war broke out between two Japanese factions, one favoring

greater commercial relations

other nations.

The

USS
leave

Iroquois.

On

shelter for the night

also

was experiencing trouble

soldiers attacked a

commerce with

on board the steam sloop-of-war

the following day, the foreign ministers were compelled to

Osaka and they went aboard the

Hiogo

to restrict

leader of the former faction, the Tycoon, was defeated, and

on 31 January he sought
1

and the other wishing

Iroquois to Hiogo.
at this time.

On

4 February, Japanese

group of foreign residents and wounded a crew member of

the screw sloop-of-war

USS

Oneida. In order to protect the foreign settlement,
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the treaty powers present at the time

made

I

a joint landing.

The American force

withdrew on 8 February 1868.
Sources: Clark 64-65; Ellsworth 103-04; Offutt 50-51.

—

Uruguay
Case No. 22, 1868
Two landings were made at Montevideo, Uruguay, in February 1868. At that
time two-thirds of the

city's

70,000 inhabitants were foreigners. In conjunction
8

with the actions of commanders of other foreign squadrons, and at the request
of Governor Flores, Rear Admiral Davis landed a force oi 50 Marines and

seamen on

7 February, to protect foreign residents as well as the

during a political disturbance.

The

force

customhouse

withdrew the following day, but

and men had to be landed on 19 February to protect
foreign residents from the rioting which occurred after the assassination of
Flores. This force did not reembark until 26 February 1868, when the President
another force of 50

officers

of the Republic requested their withdrawal.
Sources: Ellsworth 161-63; Offutt 52.

Case No. 23, 1868

At

— Japan (Nagasaki)

American consul in Nagasaki, a small
sloop-of-war USS Shenandoah landed on 8 February 1868
the request of the

consulate during demonstrations against foreigners in that

force

from the

to protect the

city.

Sources: Ellsworth 104; Offutt 51.

Case No. 24, 1868

— Japan (Yokohama)

Antiforeign feeling was so strong in

Yokohama

officers in the city, representing France,

United States sought protection

(April)

for

that the foreign diplomatic

and the
the foreign settlement from their
Great Britain,

respective naval vessels then present in the harbor.

Italy, Prussia,

The commanders

of these

and decided upon a joint landing, which took place
on 4 April 1868. The American contribution was a party of 25 Marines from
the side-wheel gunboat USS Monocacy and the USS Iroquois. Two weeks later
another detail of Marines reinforced them. The entire Marine guard withdrew
on 12 May 1868.
vessels held a conference

Sources: Ellsworth 104; Offutt 51.
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Case No. 25, 1868

On

7 April 1868,

Abroad

— Colombia (Panama)

while local police and Colombian troops were absent from

Aspinwall (Colon), a crowd gathered in the streets of that

seem probable.

commanding

An

city

making

rioting

agent of a steamship company requested that the

officer of the

screw gunboat

USS

Penobscot land a force to

protect passengers and goods in transit. In compliance with this request, a force

of two officers and 12 seamen went ashore.

need

for protection

They were withdrawn

as

soon

as the

had passed.

Source: Offutt 52.

Case No. 26,

1868— Japan

Attacks on foreigners in

(Yokohama)

Yokohama

(July)

continued.

the foreign ministers of France, Great Britain,

At

Italy,

a meeting

on 8

July 1868,

The Netherlands,

Prussia,

and the United States decided that in view of the city's disturbed state of affairs
it would be necessary to establish four posts of foreign guards. These guards
were to assist foreigners who might be attacked or who might request
assistance, and observe the state of affairs in the foreign settlement. Under no
circumstances, however, were the guards to interfere with the activities of the

The Netherlands,
maintain one post. The

Japanese, except to defend foreigners. France, Great Britain,

and the United States each had the responsibility to
number of men furnished by each country was: France 11; Great Britain 16;
The Netherlands 16; and the United States 21. All these measures were taken
with the approval of Higashi Kuze Chiujio, the Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs.

The American

remained

until the

force arrived in

Yokohama about

13 July 1868 and

danger ceased.

Sources: Letter from R.B.

Van Valkenburgh

to

Hon. William H. Seward

(July 22, 1868),

reprinted in Message and Documents 780-1; Offutt 52.

—

Case No. 27, 1868
Japan (Niigata)
The Marine guard of the screw steamer USS Piscataqua went ashore

at Niigata

on about 25 September 1868 to protect the lives of some American
during local riots. They remained for several days.
Sources: Letter from R. B. Van. Valkenburgh to

Hon. William H. Seward (September

reprinted in Message and Documents 823-5; Offutt 52.
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Case No. 28, 1873

I

— Colombia (Panama) (May)

American consul and several American and other
American forces landed in Panama to protect American

In 1873, at the request of the
foreign residents,
citizens
as

and

their property during revolutionary disturbances.

On 7 May

1873,

opposing political factions fought over control of the government, a force of

100

men

with two

field

guns went ashore to occupy the Panama Railroad

station. This force's orders restricted

its

activity to the protection of the

and its property. When the consul requested that an additional force of
150 Marines be sent into the city to protect foreign residents, Admiral
Steedman refused because he lacked consent from the local authorities. The
railroad

next day, having obtained the consent of both contending factions, Steedman

men into the city to protect the foreigners. This force
withdrew on 11 May when open hostilities ceased. The detachment at the
railroad station remained until 22 May 1873.
sent a force

of.

100

Sources: Ellsworth 46-47; Offutt 60-61.

Case No. 29, 1873

— Colombia (Panama)

(September)

By 24 September 1873, it seemed certain that the same factions which had
9
clashed in May would renew hostilities. The Panamanian Governor notified
the US consul that his government was no longer able to protect the Panama
10
Railroad as guaranteed by the 1846 Treaty.
Under these circumstances,
Admiral Almy landed 130
party with another 60
residents

and secured

men

to

occupy the railroad

station, reinforcing this

men during the night. These troops reassured the foreign
safe transit of the

specie carried by four steamship lines,

isthmus for the passengers, freight, and

two of which were not American-owned.

American forces boarded trains as necessary to ensure this vital connection
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Hostilities ended on 6 October, and
two days later all American forces withdrew, save for a detail of 30 men which
remained to guard the railroad station for several more days.
Sources: Ellsworth 47-48; Offutt 61-62.

Case No. 30, 1874

— Hawaii

A dispute over accession to the throne of the Sandwich Islands led to rioting on
12 February 1874. In compliance with the request of the Hawaiian Minister of

Commander Belknap of the screw sloop USS Tuscarora landed
a force of 150 officers and men. The force's mission was to protect not only the
interests of American citizens, but also to help restore order. The American
Foreign Affairs,

presence did dispel the disorderly crowds, and the inauguration of King David
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Abroad

A portion of the U. S. forces withdrew on

and the remaining 33 men left on 20 February 1874.
Subsequently, the Hawaiian Government extended a resolution of thanks for
the American effort. This act was unsurprising as many consider King David to
16

February,

have owed

his

throne to the American intervention

having had such strong support that she

may

— Dowager Queen Emma

well have ascended otherwise.

Sources: Ellsworth 92; Offutt 62-64.

—

Mexico
Case No. 31, 1876
General Gonzalez, leader of revolutionary forces, informed the U. S. consul at
Matamoros, Mexico, that he intended to abandon that city because federal
There being no other civil authority, the consul
requested that a small force from the screw sloop-of-war USS Lackawanna be
landed to police Matamoros and protect foreign interests until Mexican
authority could be restored. The force landed on 18 May 1876, and remained

forces were approaching.

until after the arrival of the federal forces.
Sources: Clark 67-68; Offutt 64-

Case No. 32, Egypt— 1882
During the summer of 1882, trouble developed between the
Egyptians,
fires

and on

raged in the

British

and the

bombarded Alexandria. As great
and destroying what remained of it,

11 July 1882, the British

city,

mobs began

while the Arabs sought to

kill

looting

every Christian they could find. Scores of people

were slaughtered. In an attempt to restore order, the British landed 1,100

on

men

13 July.

Either that day or the following day the United States landed 70 Marines, 50

seamen and 6
guarded the

officers to protect

US

American

interests.

A

portion of this force

consulate while the remainder, as well as a small detachment

German hospital, aided the
British forces. One of the major tasks was to extinguish the many fires and capture the numerous incendiaries who roamed the streets.

of Germans which had been landed to protect the

Most of the Americans were recalled on 15 July, the remainder being withdrawn on 18 July, save for one detail of Marines that remained ashore until 24
July. Two of the three American vessels departed from Alexandria on 20 July,
when the British reported that they had the city completely under control. The
third vessel did not depart until 29 August.
Sources: Ellsworth 75; Offutt 65-66.
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Case No. 33, 1885

— Colombia (Panama)

I

(January)

on the Panama
Railroad. In January 1885, the President of Colombia announced that his
provincial government was no longer capable of protecting the railroad
property. At the request of the general superintendent and the US consul at
Early in 1885 a revolution in

Colon,

Commander

Panama threatened

Clark of the screw gunboat

transit

USS

Alliance landed

13

Marines to guard the railroad station on 18 January. They withdrew the
following morning.
Sources: Ellsworth 48; Offutt 66-67.

Case No. 34, 1885

— Colombia (Panama)

(March)

A more serious revolution than the one of January 1885 took place in Panama
March of that year. On 16 March 1885, insurgents led by Aizpuru captured
Panama City, whereupon Colombian troops stationed at Colon marched to

in

drive out the revolutionaries. In their absence from Colon, however, another

revolutionary force under the leadership of Prestan took over that

not until
Prestan.

1

By

city. It

was

April that the Colombian forces returned to Colon and defeated
this

cutting off rail

time Aizpuru had reoccupied

traffic;

Panama

he controlled most of the

city

City and succeeded in

and the isthmus along the

railroad line.

A force o( seamen and Marines arrived in Colon, acting under the orders of
Admiral Jouett, the commander of the

US Atlantic Squadron. The first Ameri-

can landing force of 17 Marines went ashore 16 March 1885 to protect Ameri-

Colombian forces had departed for Panama City, leaving
the foreign residents of Colon without adequate protection. Later the same day
an additional 13 men landed. Then again on 17 and 19 March 1885, more men
went ashore.
On 30 March, a group of insurgents at Colon seized the American steamer
Colon of the Pacific Mail Line. A small force from the wooden steamer USS
Galena recaptured the ship and returned her to her owners on the same day.
The following day, 3 1 March, a force of 140 seamen and Marines from the Galena landed to guard American property and fight the fires that were spreading
over much of Colon. Unfortunately, most o{ the town could not be saved. At
about the same time, a landing party went ashore at Panama City.
On 10 April 1885, Admiral Jouett sent a force to open the railroad line and
occupy the cities of Colon and Matachin. The expeditionary force, included
750 seamen and Marines who had been sent from New York, landed at Colon
in two sections on 11 and 15 April. As soon as the first section of the expeditionary force arrived it went to Panama City, and by the following day had
can interests

after the
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restored the trains to service.

The second

Abroad

section relieved the forces at Colon,

while two more companies of Marines under

Commander McCalla moved

from Colon to Panama City.

When

McCalla arrived in Panama City it was occupied by Aizpuru.
Fearing that a battle between his forces and the national troops would destroy Panama City, McCalla, on 24 April, ordered up the garrison from Colon and the reserve battalion of Marines from the squadron to occupy most
of the city. After arresting Aizpuru, he compelled him to sign an agreement
that fighting should not take place in
this

is

likely the result of a

Panama

City.

No fighting ensued,

but

conference between the nationalist leaders,

Aizpuru and Admiral Jouett, on 29 April, where Aizpuru and his forces capitulated. As the national authority of Colombia was reestablished, the

American forces began
on 25 May.

to withdraw, the last Marines leaving the Isthmus

Sources: Ellsworth 48-51; Offutt 67-70.

Case No. 35, 1888

— Korea

Unsettled political conditions in Korea kept American naval vessels in Korean
territorial

One landing was made in
Korea who feared a disturbance

waters throughout 1888.

request of the

US

Minister to

June

at the

in Seoul.

A

detachment of 25 seamen and Marines from the third USS Essex, a wooden
screw steamer, landed at Chemulpo on 19 June and marched to the capital to
protect American residents. On 30 June, when the city was again quiet, the
American force withdrew.
Sources: Clark 68; Ellsworth 59; Offutt 71.

Case No. 36, 1888-1889

— Samoa

In September 1888, there was a revolt in

Samoa

against the

Government of

Tamasese. Mataafa, leader of the opposition, proclaimed himself King and

war ensued. The subsequent fighting endangered the
foreign

residents,

the

cannibalistic customs of

former

especially

some of the

in

lives

jeopardy

civil

and property of all
considering

the

natives.

had become so serious that the US consul requested that the commander of the gunboat USS Nipsic, which was then in the
harbor at Apia, land a suitable force of Marines for the protection of American
citizens and the US consulate. A landing party of 1 1 Marines went ashore on 14
November 1888, remaining until 20 March 1889. The Germans also made
By November the

situation

landings during the disturbance.
Sources: Clark 68-69; Ellsworth 146.
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Case No. 37, 1889

I

— Hawaii

There was a revolution in progress in the Hawaiian Islands in 1889. By summer
the situation had so declined that the American Minister feared for the safety
of foreign residents and legations. Therefore, the second VSS Adams, a wooden
screw gunboat, landed a guard of Marines on 30 July 1889, to protect American
interests. They were stationed at the American legation and returned aboard
ship the following day.
Source: Ellsworth 92-93.

Case No. 38, 1890

— Argentina

There was a revolution in the area around Buenos Aires in July 1890. A
small detachment of Marines landed to protect the American consulate and
the U. S. Minister's residence. They remained ashore until 30 July 1890.
Source: Ellsworth 13.

Case No. 39, 1891

— Haiti (Navassa

Island)

For several years the Navassa Phosphate Company, an American firm

engaged in gathering guano from Navassa Island, suffered from labor
troubles with

expanded

VSS

its

native workers. In the spring of 1891, those troubles

to threaten

American

lives.

When

the

commander

of the

first

Kearsarge, a screw sloop-of-war, reached the island, he determined

demanded prompt action. He landed
Marines on 2 June to protect American lives and property.
that the situation

most of the laborers had returned

to work, the

a

detachment of

On 20 June, after

Marines returned to their

ship.
Sources: Clark 69-70; Ellsworth 119; Offutt 71.

Case No. 40,

1891— Chile

In 1891, civil war broke out in Chile between the supporters of President

Balmaceda and the Congressional

party.

After the Congressionalists

and property of
foreign residents: even foreign legations and consulates were being treated
with contempt. The American Minister, Patrick Egan, applied to Admiral
George Brown for a suitable guard for the American consulate. On 28
August, Brown sent ashore 30 seamen and 18 Marines from the cruiser VSS
San Francisco and 36 seamen and 18 Marines from the fourth USS Baltimore
(C-3) to protect the consulate and its refugees. These forces withdrew two
captured the city of Valparaiso, they endangered the

days later.
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Eventually the Congressionalists were victorious.

They were

also very re-

American intervention because US neutrality during the conflict
had worked to the advantage of Balmaceda. They were especially irritated that
the American Minister had given asylum to Balmaceda's supporters. Many incidents followed, including one in which two Americans were killed and 18
wounded. Finally, after lengthy negotiations, the governments of Chile and the
sentful of the

US

reached a peaceful settlement of their differences.

Sources: Annual Report 189 J at 158-59; Bemis 757-58; Ellsworth 16-20; Knox 326-27; Offutt 72.
,

Case No. 41, 1893

When Queen

— Hawaii

Liliuokalani

informed her cabinet that she

promulgate a new autocratic constitution by royal

planned to

some of her ministers
informed the prominent American residents of the islands. These Americans
requested the support of the US Minister, John H. Stevens, and the protection
of the US Navy. Stevens arranged to have a detachment from the fifth USS
Boston, a protected cruiser, land at Honolulu on 16 January 1893, for the
ostensible purpose of protecting American lives and property. Curious to their
stated purpose, the Americans were not stationed near American property, but
rather were located where they might most easily intimidate the Queen.

The American presence
Liliuokalani's

served

its

edict,

function

and

on

17

January,

opponents deposed her and established a provisional govern-

ment under the presidency of Sanford B. Dole. The

provisional

government re-

quested that the United States assume the role of a protectorate over the
islands.

Mr. Stevens complied with the request and raised the American

flag

on

The Boston landed another detachment of Marines that same day,
increasing the number of American forces in Honolulu to about 150 men. Sub1

February.

sequently, there was a change of administrations in Washington, with Presi-

dent Cleveland disavowing the actions of Mr. Stevens.

American

flag

On

1

April 1893, the

was hauled down and the landing force withdrew.

Sources: Baily 429-33; Ellsworth 93; Offutt 72-73.

Case No. 42, 1894

On 6 September
Brazilian

—

Brazil

1893, a large section of the Brazilian navy revolted against the

Government.

Initially,

the insurgents were quite successful and

maintained close control over the harbor at Rio de Janeiro. During

Admiral da

Gama

succeeded Admiral Mello as commander of the insurgent

naval forces at Rio de Janeiro.
vainly

this period

Once

in power,

attempted to blockade the port.
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on

1

December 1893, da Gama

Since he was

unsuccessful

in

Appendix

maintaining a blockade, da

Gama

I

then sought to prevent vessels from going to

the docks.

The United

had assembled a powerful squadron at Rio de Janeiro under the command of Rear Admiral Benham, and on 29 January 1894, one of
States

these cruisers, the third

USS

Detroit (C-10), stood in

toward the docks along-

American steamers. The insurgents had forbade American vessels
from going to the city piers. Benham advised the commanders of the American
side several

steamers that, since the insurgents lacked the status of belligerents, they were
ultra vires in interfering

with commerce.

He announced

would protect

that he

those American vessels which wished to go alongside the wharves.

moved toward

promise, a vessel

suddenly fired at

this

the pier.

With

this

When one of the insurgent gunboats

American merchant

vessel,

Benham

fired a shot

which

struck under the insurgent's bow. This shot was followed by another exchange,

which Benham advised the insurgents that he would sink their vessel if
they fired again. There was no more firing and the American merchantmen un-

after

loaded without

loss of life or property.

Subsequently, the revolt

failed.

Sources: Knox 327; 6 Moore 438-39; Offutt 74-75.

Case No. 43, 1894

The

— Nicaragua

unsettled political conditions surrounding Jose Santos Zelaya's overthrow

of President Roberto Sacasa in 1893 presented a further occasion for

intervention in Nicaragua.

Once

the lives and property of

residing in the country were in jeopardy,

USS Columbia

(C-12) and the

two American

USS Marblehead

all

American
foreigners

cruisers, the fourth

(C-ll), were stationed in

Nicaraguan waters to lend aid in case of an emergency.
Early

on the morning of 6

July 1894, the

US

consul at Bluefields requested

that a force be landed for the protection of American interests.

A detachment

on 31 July, an additional landing party from the Marblehead, the Marine guard and a company of
seamen from the Columbia, reinforced the original landing party. Both parties
withdrew on 7 August.
of Marines from the Marblehead landed the same day, and

Source: Ellsworth 122.

Case No. 44, 1894-1896

Much

— Korea

of the fighting during the Sino-Japanese

peninsula.

The USS

War

took place on the Korean

Baltimore (C-3) was instructed to proceed to

Chemulpo,

the port of Seoul, in order to watch developments and give assurance to

American missionaries

living in the area.
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US
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Seoul sent telegrams requesting an armed guard to protect the legation.

men

of 55

landed and arrived in Seoul in two sections on 25 and 26

reported that the situation in the capital was

men remained

26

until

days later on 2

when

November

latter

The Marine

July.

They

force of 22

was relieved by another
force withdrew on 29 October, and four

September,

detachment of 18 Marines. The

critical.

A force

it

1894, the Marine guard of the second

USS

Charleston (C-2) landed.

Although the war between China and Japan ended in 1895, the legation
guard remained. The force from the Charleston served until 25 March 1895,
when a force from the USS Detroit (C-10) relieved them. After the force from
the Detroit departed on 19 June, there was no guard until 11 October 1895,
when the Marine guard from the gunboat USS Yorktown (PG-1) landed. On 29
November, a force of Marines from the first USS Machias (PG-5), a schooner-rigged gunboat, landed and the next day the Yorktown force withdrew. The
Machias force remained ashore until 3 April 1896, when the United States
ceased to maintain a legation guard at Seoul.
Sources: Background 53; Ellsworth 59-60; Offutt 75-76.

— China (Newchwang)

Case No. 45, 1894-1895

In October 1894, the third

dispatched to

Newchwang

order to protect the

USS

(also

Petrel (PG-2), a fourth-rate

known

as Yingtze

gunboat, was

and Yenkow), China,

in

foreign residents. Special problems arose because the

city's

which is closed to navigation from November
until April by ice floes. Since it was necessary to remain there all winter, they
beached the vessel and constructed a fortress around it large enough to include
city

all

is

located

on the Liao

River,

the foreign residents.
It

was reported

that,

although the American force never confronted hostile

Chinese or the Japanese

forces, its

presence prevented the outbreak of rioting

and strengthened the local governor's authority. The
governor, the foreign consuls, and residents agreed that "Fort Petrel" had given
them a significant advantage in their efforts to protect life and property.

on

several occasions,

The
freeze

Petrel arrived at

was setting

in,

Newchwang on

and

it

12

November

1894, just as the winter

departed with the spring thaw on 24 April 1895.

Source: Offutt 77-79.

Case No. 46, 1894-1895

A force of 51

Marines

— China

left

the

USS

(Tientsin)

Baltimore (C-3) at

1894, and proceeded in the direction of Tientsin.
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Chefoo on 4 December

They were

to guard the

US
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legation

if

I

rioting should erupt in Tientsin during the Sino-Japanese

precaution was taken in view of the rioting which had occurred in
the approach oi the Japanese army.

The

force reached the

War. This
Peking on

US

gunboat

Monocacy on 6 December, and remained alongside a Tientsin dock until the
war ended. Germany, Great Britain, Russia, France, Italy and Spain also sent
similar forces. The American force withdrew on 16 May 1895, six days after
peace was declared.
Sources: Ellsworth 30-32; Offutt 76-77.

Case No. 47, 1895
In

March

— Colombia (Panama)

1895, the

US

consul at

Panama

reported that a Mexican

known

as

Garcia had landed in Colombia, at the border of Costa Rica, with the intention
of capturing the town of Bocas del Toro.
cruiser,

The second USS

was dispatched from Colon, arriving on

7

Atlanta, a protected

March. Having conferred

with Colombian authorities, Captain Cromwell of the Atlanta determined that
the national forces had the situation under control and he stood offshore the
following day.

Upon

well learned that Garcia's
feat at the

hands of the

on the afternoon of 8 March 1895, Cromattack of the town during the day had met with de-

town

his return to the

late

nationalists.

Beaten but not dissuaded, Garcia threaten

and ignite the town that night, leading the American consular agent
at Bocas del Toro to request that a force be sent ashore for the protection of the
consular agency and American property. Cromwell sought permission from the
local governor who failed to respond. Still, Cromwell sent 70 men ashore that
night to occupy the consulate and an American warehouse. (The governor,
who was at the consulate when the landing force arrived, expressed his approval the following day.) The night passed without incident, and on 9 March,
with assurance from local authorities that they could handle the problem, the
force withdrew at noon that day.
to return

Sources: Ellsworth 51-52; Offutt 79-81.

Case No. 48, 1896

— Nicaragua

When Zelaya's first

term

his reelection, causing a

as President of Nicaragua expired in 1896,

new wave

the disorder, the Nicaraguan

of political unrest.

commandant,

after

At

he forced

Corinto, the locus of

informing the American

consul that his forces were inadequate to protect foreigners and their property,
requested that the British and Americans land forces for the protection of their
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Both countries followed this advice. The American landing party of
34 Marines and sailors went ashore on 2 May, and there remained until 4 May.

nationals.

Source: Ellsworth 122-23.

Case No. 49, 1898

The

fighting

— Nicaragua

between Zelaya and

his political

opponents continued, and in

February 1898 there was another landing of American forces for the protection
of the lives and property of American citizens.

Marines went ashore

when

the following day

San Juan

at

the

on

del Sur

A

party of 33

seamen and

They remained until
Nicaraguan Government forces

7 February.

commander of the

gave assurances that his forces were capable of protecting the foreign

community.
Source: Ellsworth 123.

Case No. 50, 1898

— Spain (Spanish- American War)

The Spanish- American War

(21 April-10

prime example of American intervention

December 1898) has been cited
for

as a

humanitarian reasons. Clearly,

American people were aroused by reports o{ Spanish acts of inhumanity in
Cuba. Most poignant were tales of the concentration camps. The camps were a
response to the Spanish military authorities' conclusion in 1896 that it would
the

be impossible to suppress the on-going revolution as long as the rebels received
the aid of civilians throughout the country. Therefore, they ordered the

populace placed in camps surrounded with barbed wire fences. Unfortunately,
proper hygienic precautions were not observed and

American
treatment.

reported

press

The

many thousands

The

and inhumane
particular maintained that Spain was waging

numerous incidents of

"yellow" press in

died.

cruel

"uncivilized" war.

In his war message to the Congress

summarized the reasons

for

US

on

11 April 1898, President

McKinley

intervention as follows:

an end to the barbarities, bloodshed,
starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the
conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say
this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is therefore none
First.

In the cause of

of our business.

It is

humanity and

to put

specially our duty, for
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right at our door.
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Second.

We

indemnity

and

to

owe

for life

that

it

to our citizens in

Cuba

I

them

to afford

that protection

and property which no government there can or

end

to

and

will afford,

terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal

protection.

Third.

The

commerce,

may be

right to intervene

trade,

by the very serious injury to the

justified

and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of

property and devastation of the island.

Fourth, and which
in

Cuba is

is

a constant

of the utmost importance.

menace

to our peace,

enormous expense. With such a

conflict

and

The

present condition of affairs

entails

waged

upon

for years in

and with which our people have such trade and business
and

liberty of

this

Government an

an island so near us

relations;

when the lives

our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed

and themselves ruined; where our trading
seized at our very door
filibustering that

we

vessels are liable to seizure

and

are

by war ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of

are powerless to prevent altogether,

questions and entanglements thus arising

—

all

and the

these and others that

irritating
I

need not

mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our
peace, and compel us to keep

on

a semiwar footing with a nation with

which we

are at peace.

Despite Spain's frantic, last-minute efforts to avoid

voted to declare war on 19 April.

it,

the

US

Congress

On 25 April, McKinley signed the resolution

declaring war to have existed since 21 April 1898.
Sources: Bailey ch. 31; Message from the President to the Congress, [1898] Foreign Rel. U.

S.

750,

757-58 (1901); 6 Moore 211-36.

Case No. 51, 1898-1899

At

— China

the end of the Sino-Japanese War, a

spirit

movement

against the "aggressive

of Western civilization" swept through China. Antiforeign feeling swelled

community in Peking became concerned for the
safety of foreigners in the country. The US Minister to China requested that a
force be landed to guard the legation in Peking and the consulate in Tientsin.
so strongly that the diplomatic

On 4 November

1898, a force of 18 Marines landed and proceeded to Peking.

Another landing party of 30 Marines went to Tientsin on 12 November. By the
middle of the following March, conditions had improved significantly, and all
Marines withdrew on 15 March 1899.
Source: Ellsworth 32-33.
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On

Abroad

— Nicaragua

4 February 1899, a

new

revolution led by General Juan P. Reyes flared in

Nicaragua. President Zelaya requested that an American naval ship be sent to

San Juan del Norte on 9 February. By this time the British consul had cabled
government requesting that a vessel be sent to San Juan and Bluefields.

When

San Juan

rived at

USS

the second

his

Marietta (PG-15), a schooner-rigged gunboat, ar-

del Norte

on 12 February 1899, the

ready in possession of the town.

The

revolutionaries were

situation grew tense

al-

when Reyes

attempted to compel foreign merchants to pay custom charges and port dues to
his agent.

Sweden

Consular agents of the United States, Great Britain, Norway and

refused to sanction such payments.

At

the request of the foreign mer-

chants, a force of about 17 Marines and sailors from the Marietta and a small
force from a British vessel landed at

San Juan

del Norte.

The

revolution col-

lapsed within a few days and the force from the Marietta reembarked

March

on

5

1899.

By the end of March, however, there was again trouble over the payment of
duties at San Juan and Bluefields. The Zelaya government was attempting to
collect duties

under threat of "action,"

had already paid duties
posed.

The

cruiser

this

to the insurgents

USS

time from foreign merchants

who

under protest. Martial law was im-

Detroit was sent to Bluefields and soon thereafter a

peaceful settlement was reached.
Sources: Clark 72; Ellsworth 123-24; [1899] Foreign Rel. U.

Case No. 53, 1899

A

S.

554, 560 (1901); Offutt 82-83.

— Samoa

disturbance in the

Samoan

Islands over succession to the throne

was the

American intervention for the protection of the US consulate and
other American interests in the islands. The struggle was between the son of
the former king, Malietoa Tanu, favored by the British and Americans, and
Mataafa, the candidate preferred by the Germans.

basis for

When

Samoa, on 6 March
1899, the situation ashore was menacing. Indeed the British already had
landed a force to protect their consulate. Rear Admiral Albert Kautz, commander of the Pacific Squadron, landed a force of 25 men from the cruiser Philadelphia

the fourth

on

13

USS

March

warlike preparations.

lowing day.

Philadelphia (C-4) reached Apia,

to protect the

consulate in view of the Mataafaistas'

A force of Marines landed to relieve the seamen the fol-

The group of seamen,

sitions outside Apia,

US

increased to 65 men, took over defensive po-

with smaller parties being stationed inside the town.

The

Mataafa forces attacked on 15 March, and both the Philadelphia and the British
140
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cruiser

the

I

HMS Royalist bombarded the hills behind the town.

American

vessel

During the

boarded numerous refugees. Amidst scattered

March, Malietoa was

installed as King. British

conflict,

firing

on 23

and American reinforcements

landed on 24 March, bringing the total of the combined forces to 250 men.

On

1

April, a joint party of

60 Americans and 62 Britons, accompanied by

Mormon

and about 150 friendly natives,
reconnoitered the island to plan a breaking up o{ one of Mataafa's camps near
Vailele. In the engagement that followed, four seamen were killed, two of them
American and two British. The wounded included two British and five
four interpreters, two

missionaries,

American seamen. Subsequently, the

British

and American
ceased on 13

reprisals against the hostile natives. Hostilities

forces carried out

May

1899, and two

days later the Americans reembarked.
Sources: Clark 72; Ellsworth 146-49; Knox 369-71; Offutt 83-85.

Case No. 54, 1900

The Boxer

— China (Boxer Rebellion)

no means a sudden, unanticipated attack.
Chinese resentment against foreign encroachment was longstanding, and
there had been an increasing number of attacks on foreigners nearing the
century's end. During the winter of 1898-1899, the legations of the European
nations and the United States were compelled to call upon their respective
governments for guards. These forces were largely withdrawn by the spring oi
uprising of 1900 was by

1899.

The Boxers

were, in fact, only one of several patriotic groups especially re-

sentful of foreign exploitation.

The common

goal of such groups was to wipe

out "the barbarians" and their Christian converts. Eventually, they attracted

Dowager Empress and the Imperial Army. Initially they confined their acts of pillage and murder to missionaries and other foreign residents located in outlying provinces, but by 1 June 1900, they were bold enough
the support of the

to attack the foreign legations in Peking.

The

situation in Peking

sent ashore in May,

11

was

critical.

was inadequate.

The United

Much

States force of 56 Marines

larger forces

were needed. Be-

tween 24 June and 24 July 1900, 231 foreigners were killed. For a month all
communication between Peking and the outside world was severed. The West-

and Japan agreed that the situation demanded a large
interventionary force. While more than 15,000 American troops were ordered
to China, only some 5,000 or 6,000 had arrived prior to Peking's capture in August 1900. Other nations also had increased their ranks gradually, so that by 8

ern

Powers
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August, a column of more than
Tientsin

The

13

9,000

12

soldiers

began the advance from

to Peking.

relief

13 August.
siege.

1

Abroad

expedition engaged the Chinese in a fierce battle near Peking on

On

the following day the Allies entered the city and ended the

Negotiations between the Chinese and foreign representatives lasted for

more than

a year,

and on

7

September 1901, the

withdrawal of foreign troops began ten days

final protocol

was signed. The

later.

Sources: Bailey 481-82; Bemis 486-87; Ellsworth 33-39; Offutt 85-89; Spaulding 390-92.

Case No. 55, 1900-1941
In response to the

US

— China (Peking)

Legation's request for assistance at Peking after the

outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion,
Battleship
at

No.

3,

14

a force of 56 Marines from the

and USS Newark (C-l), a protected

May

Peking on 29

USS

Oregon,

cruiser, landed, arriving

1900. After the rebellion ended, the United States

decided to maintain a permanent guard of soldiers at the American legation.

American

officials justified this

Protocol of 1901,
size

15

action under Articles VII and IX of the Boxer

which had been negotiated

after the

Boxer Rebellion. The

of the guard was increased during times of trouble, as during the Chinese

revolution which lasted from 11 October 1911 until 5 July 1912.

On

25

November

1941, President Roosevelt announced that the United

American troops from China, including the legation
guard. However, the outbreak of war with Japan on 7 December 1941, somewhat delayed the implementation of this order.
States

would withdraw

all

Sources: Ellsworth 38-39; [1941] 5 Foreign Rel V.

Case No. 56, 1901

S.

583, 589 (1956); Offutt 86, 89.

— Colombia (Panama)

Revolution swept Panama once again in 1901. By November the state of affairs

was so precarious that the Governor advised Lieutenant Commander McCrea
of the gunboat

USS Machias (PG-S)

that his forces could

no longer

assure the

Americans and their property or the free transit of the Isthmus.
Thereupon, McCrea landed a force at Colon to occupy the property of the
Panama Railroad on 20 November. Two days later another force of 248 men
landed from the second USS Iowa (BB-4) at Panama City. These forces worked
with British and French forces which also were present. Troops escorted all
trains, and contending factions entered into agreements to assure the safety of
passengers and property on the trains. On 29 November, about 300 American
seamen and Marines and a detachment from the French cruiser Le Suchet
safety of
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occupied Colon. American forces began to reembark on 2 December, and by 4

December

all

of

them had withdrawn.

Sources: Ellsworth 52-53; Offutt 89-92.

Case No. 57, 1902

— Colombia (Panama)

(April)

During the Panamanian revolution of April 1902, the United States served

as a

The United States's services were varied. On 16 April,
company of seamen from the USS Machias (PG-5) landed at

neutral intermediary.

one section of a
Bocas del Toro to protect American residents and

their property.

On the night

of 17 April, the insurgent Liberals and the Colombian Nationalists

met on board

the Machias, at which time

all

agreed that the Nationalist forces would surrender

the city to

Commander McCrea, who

Once

agreement was carried out on the 18th, the Americans withdrew to

this

their ship, leaving a small

in turn

would surrender

it

to the Liberals.

guard of Marines to protect American property until

the Liberals could guarantee

its

safety.

With

the arrival of

more Nationalist

on 20 April, the situation reversed itself and McCrea transferred the city
back to the Colombian Nationalist authorities, maintaining the peace until
they were established. All US forces withdrew on 22 April 1902.
troops

Sources: Ellsworth 54-55; Offutt 92-93.

Case No. 58, 1902

Due

— Colombia (Panama) (September)

to the continued activity of the revolutionary forces in

Panama during late

1902 disturbances continued. By September the United States was compelled

and maintain free transit of the Isthmus. On
17 September, a detachment of seamen from the second USS Cincinnati (C-7)
went ashore at Colon, while another force landed at Panama City. Together
they were able to guard all the trains crossing the Isthmus. Reinforcements
from the first USS Panther (AD-6), an auxiliary cruiser, and the USS Wisconsin
(BB-9) landed on 23 and 30 September, respectively. All troops were present to
protect the lives and property of Americans, and assist in maintaining rail
traffic. By 12 November, the Nationalist forces having begun to make heavy
gains over the rebels, the Colombian Government was able to assure the safety
of American interests. On that date the Americans began to withdraw, and on
18 November 1902, the last Marine battalion embarked. A peace treaty
between the opposing political parties was signed on board the battleship
to intervene

once again

Wisconsin three days

to restore

later.

Sources: Ellsworth 55-56; Offutt 94-96.
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Case No. 59, 1903

The political

Abroad

— Honduras

unrest which beset Honduras in 1903 was the result of an effort by

President Bonilla's political opponents, both within his

own

Nicaragua, to oust his government, or at least discredit

country and in
it,

prior to the

presidential election.

During

this period of unrest, the

United States stationed a squadron of five

Honduran waters to protect American interests. At the request
of the American consul at Puerto Cortes, a guard of 13 Marines landed on 23
March 1903 to guard the U. S. consulate in that city. The guard withdrew on
naval vessels in

30 or 3 1 March. Another detachment of 30 Marines landed

at

Puerto Cortes to

guard the steamship wharf on 24 March. They embarked on 26 March.
Source: Ellsworth 94-95.

Case No. 60, 1903

— Dominican Republic

A revolutionary outbreak occurred in the Dominican Republic during March
and April 1903. The

US

cruiser

USS

Atlanta was dispatched to Santo

The

Domingo

on 30
March, and two days later a party of 29 Marines went ashore. The detachment
was quartered in the house o( the American consul general. Its presence was
intended to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. The revolution soon ended and
City to protect

interests during the insurrection.

the Marines returned to the ship

vessel arrived

on 21 April 1903.

Sources: Clark 73; Ellsworth 66; Offutt 96.

Case No. 61, 1903

—

Syria

Both the Moslem and Christian communities experienced
in

September 1903.

Two American vessels,

the second

USS

difficulties in Syria

Brooklyn (CA-3), a

heavy cruiser, and the cruiser USS San Francisco, were in the harbor of Beirut

at

the time. Admiral Cotton of the Brooklyn, believing an uprising likely, prepared
to land a force to protect the

contemplated did not

arise,

US consulate. The need for the force that Cotton

but at the request of the American consul a guard

of Marines and a few sailors did land

on

7

September 1903, remaining ashore

five days.
Source: Ellsworth 155.

Case No. 62, 1903-1914
It is

— Panama

unclear whether the United States landed troops in

Panama during

revolution of 1903 more to protect the lives and property of
144

its

the

citizens, or to
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encourage the on-going revolution. However, there

is

no doubt that the

United States welcomed the change of governments, having had
proposal for

the

Colombian Senate

construction of a Panamanian canal
in

its

rejected

treaty

by the

August 1903.

By the autumn of 1903, the United States anticipated a revolution. The
Navy Department instructed its ships to keep in readiness. The revolution
which began on 3 November was successful. On that day, the rebels captured the 500 Colombian troops who landed at Colon and sent them by special train to Panama. The Colombians, so outraged at this use of the
American-controlled railway to aid the revolutionaries, notified the

November

consul on 4

kill

two generals who were in charge of those
P.M., the Colombians would bombard Colon

that, if the

troops were not released by 2

and

US

every American citizen in the town. Just prior to the appointed

hour, 42

owned by

men were

landed with instructions to occupy a stone building

Many Americans

the railroad.

boarded two steamers made available

sought refuge there, while others

for their protection.

Although it
commander,

seemed certain that the Colombian troops would attack, their
Colonel Torres, changed his mind and offered to withdraw his troops if the
American landing party were reembarked. The Americans consented and
returned to their ship.

On

the following morning, 5 November,

Colombians had not withdrawn

as far as

when

it

was discovered that the

had been promised, the

US force again

went ashore. The American commander protested the breach of the agreement, asserting the United States's neutrality and stressing that its only interests were protecting American citizens and maintaining rail traffic across the
Isthmus. With effort, officials of the new Panamanian Government convinced
Torres to withdraw his troops. During his preparations, a second force of
Marines landed. The first landing party returned to their ship and the newly-arrived force reembarked the next day, 6 November.
Marines were stationed on the Isthmus almost continuously from 4 November 1903 to 21 January 1914 in order to protect
the construction of the

American

interests, especially

Panama Canal.

Sources: Background 54; Ellsworth 134-36; Knox 374-76; Offutt 96-99.

Case No. 63 1904
,

When

— Dominican Republic

revolution erupted in the

Dillingham of the

USS

Dominican Republic

Detroit (C-10)

in 1904,

Commander

arrived with orders to negotiate a

peaceful settlement, and to protect Americans and their property. Although
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there

is

scant proof,

incumbent regime

Upon

as

his arrival at

British vessel

it

seems that Dillingham also was told to support the

much

as possible.

Puerto Plata on 2 January, Dillingham discovered that a

was already present. Small detachments from both ships went

ashore to prevent any fighting in the

ended

city

On

Abroad

city.

After an engagement just outside the

in defeat for the rebels, they quickly retreated

from Puerto

Plata.

American Clyde Line steamer New York, was unloading
cargo at Santo Domingo when the insurgents fired upon her. Two American
naval vessels were present. While one of them opened fire on the rebels, detachments from both ships gave chase. They secured a written pledge from the
rebels that they would not further molest the New York, after which the AmeriFebruary, the

1 1

cans returned to their ships.
It

fers

was

largely

through the presence of the American naval vessels and the

of diplomatic offices by the naval

tions reached settlement.

commanders

The peace conference

of-

that the contending fac-

terminating the revolt was

held on board the Detroit in June.
Sources: Clark 13-14; Ellsworth 66-69; Knox 376; Offutt 99-100; Annual Report 1904, at 540.

Case No. 64, 1904-1905

On

— Korea

5 January 1904, a force of 102

Marines landed in Korea and proceeded to

Seoul, where they established a guard for the

American

Russo-Japanese War.

The force returned aboard ship

two months

peace treaty had been signed.

after the

1 1

legation during the

November

1905,

some

Source: Ellsworth 60.

Case No. 65, 1904

— Morocco

upon learning that a bandit, Raisuli, had
kidnapped Ion Perdicaris, an alleged American citizen and his stepson, a
British subject, from their villa three miles from Tangier on the evening of 18
May. Christians residing in the area feared that this event presaged a wave of
In 1904 the United States intervened

hostilities against

When

them.

American naval squadron, under Rear Admiral French E.
Chadwick, arrived in Tangier, the Admiral and the American consul general
met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Morocco. Since the situation remained tense, three or four Marines landed on 30 May to protect the consulate.

On

the

22 June, Secretary of State Hay, at the direction of President Roosevelt,

sent a telegram to the consul advising that the

146

US Government

"wants
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Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." Subsequently

knew

that Perdicaris was not an

to their ship

citizen.

on 26 June 1904.

Sources: Bemis 576; Ellsworth 8; [1904] Foreign Rel V.

Case No. 66, 1904

S.

503 (1905).

— Panama

In 1904 an insurrectionary

and

was discovered that Roosevelt

upon payment of a ransom. The Marines with-

Raisuli released the hostages

drew

American

it

their property.

On

7

1

Ancon, Panama, occupied

movement

in

Panama posed

November, the

a threat to

force of Marines that

Americans
was sent

to

several houses, thereby inserting themselves in a

strategic position should there be serious rioting.

become necessary because the revolt
without incident on 24 November.

collapsed,

Their protection did not

and the Marines withdrew

Source: Offutt 101-02.

Case No. 67, 1905

— Dominican Republic

In 1905, while the patrol yacht
off

VSS

Scorpion (PY-3) was anchored in the river

Santo Domingo, her commander, Lieutenant

went ashore alone and unarmed,

Commander

to quiet the unruly

Hilary P. Jones,

crowd which had

Dominican President and the American Minister.
The crowd acted in response to a false rumor that an armed force of American
seamen was about to seize the city.
threatened the

life

of the

Source: Knox 376-77.

Case No. 68, 1906-1909
Immediately following

— Cuba

Thomas

Estrade Palma's election as President oi the

Republic of Cuba in August 1906, his political opponents revolted against his

government. In

this

moment of turmoil Palma requested that the United States

send warships to Havana and Cienfuegos in order to protect the
property of foreign residents.
to

16

lives

and

President Roosevelt sent Secretary of War Taft

Cuba. By 29 September, he had established a provisional government under

the authority of the

On

American

President.

American charge d'affaires at Havana ordered American forces to land at Havana and Cienfuegos as rioting seemed imminent and
he feared that American interests and property might be endangered. The 120
seamen and Marines who landed at Havana withdrew the next day at the order
of President Roosevelt. The situation at Cienfuegos being more serious, the
13 September, the
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and there remained, being reinforced on 24 September. Their
mission was to guard American sugar plantations. These men returned to their
ships when a larger force arrived on 30 September.
force landed

The Marines remained active throughout the early stage of the crisis. The
Marine forces serving in Cuba in 1906 numbered 2,892 men. On 1 November
1906,

the Marines, save for one regiment, withdrew and army troops as-

all

sumed

their functions.

The US Army then

played the main role in this intervention in Cuba.

A

men, designated as the Army of Cuba Pacification, was sent to
October 1906. These men patrolled the island and worked with the lo-

force of 5,394

Cuba in

cal authorities.

force

remained

The presence
until 23

of this force effectively restored the peace.

The

January 1909.

Sources: Background 54; Ellsworth 62; 2 Hackworth 327; Knox 377; Offutt 102-03; Spaulding

401-02.

Case No. 69, 1907

American naval

vessels

the protection of

war

in 1907.

— Honduras
were sent to the eastern coast of Central America

American

The USS

when Honduras and Nicaragua went

interests

Marietta (PG-15) arrived at Trujillo, Honduras,

for

to

on 18

March, and discovered that the town, occupied by Nicaraguan troops, was
likely to

be attacked by the Hondurans at any moment.

A force of 10 men from

American

interests, including the

the gunboat Marietta went ashore to protect
consulate.

The commanding

command

of the guard "to extend protection to the citizens of other neutral

powers

if

officer of the Marietta instructed the ensign in

asked to do so by their consular representatives."

general, Estrada,

was advised of the

detail's

The Nicaraguan

assignment and assured of

its

neutrality.

Another force from the Marietta landed at Ceiba on the same day. On 26
March, a somewhat larger detachment landed at Puerto Cortes and proceeded
to San Pedro on 5 April, where the men served as a guard for American interests.

On

Trujillo

April, a

10 April, reinforcements from the

USS Paducah

and Ceiba and a small party landed
body of Marines went to Laguna.

at

(No. 18), were sent to

Puerto Cortes. Finally, on 18

All of these forces withdrew by 21 May, except for the Marines at Laguna,

who remained until 23 May. On that date they removed to Cholma, where they
were stationed

for the protection of foreign property until 8

Sources: Ellsworth 95-96; 2 Hackworth 328; Offutt 103-04.
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Case No. 70, 1910

The armed

I

— Nicaragua

revolt led by General

Juan J. Estrada against Jose Madriz, President

of Nicaragua, which began about the time of Madriz's inauguration on 21

December 1909, alarmed the American residents of
the basis for American intervention in Nicaragua.

The Estrada forces controlled
sided. The gunboats USS Paducah
anchor

Bluefields,

USS Dubuque

oii Bluefields during this period of unrest.

Paducah,
fighting

W. W.

and provided

where numerous foreigners

(No. 18) and

boat Maximo Jeraz arrived at the city on 16

Bluefields,

May

re-

(No. 17) were at

When the Nicaraguan gun1910, the

commander

of the

Gilmer, issued a proclamation advising both factions that no

would be tolerated within

Bluefield's city limits. (His objective

was to

safeguard the lives and property of foreign residents and other noncombatants.)
In pursuit of calm, he further advised both factions that

men would be allowed in Bluefields;

On

city,

number sufficient

since such destruction

would not serve any

18 May, Gilmer landed a force of 100

structed

to police

and preserve

he warned that the United States would not allow bombardment

order. Finally,

of the

the

no more than 100 armed

them

men to

military end.

enforce his decree.

and

to use "every effort to maintain peace

He

in-

order, resorting to

force only in the case of absolute necessity." This landing party being consid-

ered inadequate, Gilmer sent the Dubuque to Colon, Panama, on 27 May, to

embark another 206 Marines. The

vessel returned to Bluefields

on 30 May, and

Gilmer landed the newly arrived Marines the following day. All of the forces

reembarked on 5 June 1910.
There was one more landing during the 1910
of 29

men landed

at Bluefields

On 9 August

and remained on shore

Although Gilmer was instructed
to

crisis.

to maintain

until

4 September 1910.

US neutrality and is considered

have followed orders, the Madriz faction protested

States about the

1910, a force

bitterly to the

United

American involvement. In Madriz's opinion Gilmer's actions

at Bluefields clearly

helped the Estrada forces to maintain control over the

city.

Sources: Clark 75-77; Ellsworth 124-25; 2 Hackwarth 328; Offutt 104-07.

Case No. 71 1911

The United
following

— Honduras

its

States,

Great Britain and Germany made landings in Honduras

revolutionary disturbances that began on 22 July 1910.

The

on 3 November, the President of Honduras, Miguel
Davila, requested American assistance for the protection of foreigners at
Amapala. In accord with this request, the unarmored protected cruiser USS
uprising was so severe that
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Tacoma (CL-20) and the gunboat USS Marietta (PG15) were dispatched

to

Honduras.

On 26 January

1911, the

Tacoma

arrived at Puerto Cortes

and landed

a force

of 60 men. By this time, the threat to foreigners had been manifested by the

death of one American noncombatant during the capture of Ceiba the night
before.

The commander

of the Tacoma, learning that the insurgents were

marching toward Puerto Cortes, and anxious to prevent any fighting within the
city, issued an order prohibiting hostilities within the city limits. He warned

To

both factions that he would forcibly enforce the prohibition.

the

com-

mander of the Government troops which occupied Puerto Cortes, he advised
that if a superior revolutionary force should appear, the commander was expected to surrender the town or wage battle outside. On 28 January, the
Marietta and the British second-class protected cruiser, HMS Brilliant, arrived
to enforce these policies.

The United
erty

States was successful in preventing

much

of

loss

life

and prop-

through the establishment of neutral zones, and the peaceful transfer of

towns between factions.
Puerto Cortes, leaving
ican) forces,
forces, to

who then

it

On

31 January, the Government forces evacuated

under the control of the combined

(British

and Amer-

allowed General Christmas, leader of the revolutionary

occupy the town on

1

February.

A joint force

of 72

American and

seamen went by train to San Pedro, where they executed a similar transfer of San Pedro to the insurgents. Once guards were aboard on all trains in the
British

disturbed area, peace was soon restored.

can forces remained ashore, but

it

It is

not clear exactly

how long Ameri-

appears that most of them withdrew

1

Febru-

ary 1911, the day that the Marietta sailed from Puerto Cortes.

On

28 January 1911, President Davila requested American intervention in

order to terminate the war.
cial

commissioner,

Thomas

The United

States, offering mediation, sent a spe-

C. Dawson, to arrange the terms of a peaceful

tlement. Conferences were held

on board the Tacoma, the

being reached on 4 March.
Sources: Aravud Report 191

1,

at 99; Clark 77-78; Offutt 107-09.
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Authors Note
Incidents Related to the Chinese Revolution of 1911

and

the Establishment of the Chinese Republic:

Case Nos. 72-84; 87-88; 90-91; 96-97; 100; 106;
108-111; 113-116; 118-120; 122; 124-126;
128-130; 132; 134-136; 138-145

The Chinese

revolution of 1911 against the

widespread mistrust

among

Manchu Dynasty

the Chinese people of the Central

resulted from

Government
powers. More

China was about to be divided among foreign
specifically, the people were concerned about the Government's strong stand
with regard to the construction and control of the main railroad lines in the
provinces, the conclusion of foreign loans, and the refusal of Government
officials to convene an extra session of the National Assembly to discuss the
budget and loans. In short, the Government appeared insensitive to popular
demands.
Open revolt broke out in September 1911, and by year's end the revolutionary military leaders had established a new government in southern China and
the Yangzte provinces. The revolutionary government convened a new national assembly whose members unanimously elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen Provisional President of the Republic of China on 29 December 191 1. At the end of
the year Yuan Shinkai, commander of the Manchu forces, agreed to an armistice and entered into negotiations with the republican leaders. The emperor
abdicated on 12 February 1912. Subsequently, Sun Yat-sen resigned the presidency and Yuan was elected in his place. The Nanking Parliament promulgated a provisional constitution in March 1912, and in April the government
was transferred to Peking.
Revolutionary disturbances threatening foreign nationals and their property
began in 191 1 and continued throughout most of the decade. Outbreaks of violence intensified in 1920, and reached a climax in 1927.
and a

fear that

Sources: Dep't of State 7-8; [1912] Foreign. Rel. V.

Case No.

On

72,

1911

S.

46-48 (1919).

— China (Wuchang)

October 1911, the day before the revolutionaries seized Wuchang, a
landing party of 1 1 armed men, accompanied by the American consul general,
11

attempted to go ashore to evacuate some American missionaries. Opposing
soldiers

on the

shore, however, initially prevented

them from

landing.

they did land on 11 October, a Chinese rebel officer informed
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neither ingress nor egress would be permitted, but that
protected.

The

all

would be

foreigners

force then returned aboard ship.

Source: Clark 83.

Case No.

The

73, 191

1-1912

— China

(Peking)

disorder of the Chinese revolution of 191

guard at

its

1

caused the

US

to reinforce the

legation in Peking with several companies of Marines from

1

October 1911 until 5 July 1912. On 15 October 1911, the force numbered 127
men, 10 days later the total was 220. The American Minister at Peking
requested a further increase, and on 2 December 1911 another 100

men

were

landed, bringing the total to 320.
Early in 1912 the

US became

concerned that Peking's railway link with the

commanding general of the Philippine Division was ordered to dispatch more than 500 men from the Philippines and
make them available according to the wishes of the American Minister at Peking. Many of these troops had arrived at Wuhu and Nanking by 21 January.
On 3 March, the American Minister requested that they be sent to Peking,
shortly thereafter they arrived. By 6 March, the American Minister had telesea might be severed. Therefore, the

graphed

for additional troops.

On 8 March,

a

company

of Marines was dispatched from

Taku

to Peking to

army troops in that city. 1 7 About 1 1 March, after the disturbances
in Taku had quieted, the remaining company of Marines stationed in that city
were ordered to Peking to relieve another detachment of troops. 18 This action
brought the total number of Marines in Peking to about 500.
relieve the

Around 27

April, the

companies, but

this

American

was reduced by about two
By 22 May 1912, the American

force in Peking

condition did not

last long.

Minister at Peking had requested that the former force of 500
lished, since general uneasiness prevailed in the city.

nies of expeditionary troops were dispatched

men be

reestab-

The next day two compa-

from Manila to Peking.

Sources: Clark 84-86; Offua 89.

Case No.

On

74, 191

1

— China (Hankow)

13 October 1911, the

native population of

US

charge d'affaires at Peking reported that the

Hankow had been

serious outbreak until that time.

ashore at

among

Hankow

this

to guard the

number stood guard

Sources: Clark 83; [1912] Foreign Re/. U.

S.

On

engulfed by the revolution, the most

works of the Standard Oil

at the

men went
Company. One

the same day a force of 10

US

49 (1919).
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Case No.

75,

I

— China (Foochow)

1911

A landing party went ashore at Foochow on 7 November
US

191

1,

to protect the

consulate and the property of American citizens.

Source: Clark 83.

Case No.

76,

— China (Nanking)

1911

On 7 November

191

US

proceeded to the

The

entire force

On

1,

a force of

1 1

consulate; another 30

withdrew shortly

November

unarmed men went ashore

men remained

at

Nanking and

at the waterfront.

after landing.

unarmed guard was stationed at the American
consulate in Nanking. The guard, whose presence was necessitated by unsettled conditions, remained until the American citizens had been evacuated
16

from the

1911, an

city.

Source: Clark 83.

Case No.

77,

1911

— China (Woosung)

Guards were sent to Woosung to protect the American Cable Company's cable
hut around 7 November 1911.
Source: Clark 83.

Case No.

78,

1911

— China

(Chinkiang)

Two American landings occurred at Chinkiang on 9 November
USS Decatur (DD-5) landed one section of infantry,

1911.

and, second, the

First,

the

USS New

Orleans, a protected cruiser, landed a force for the protection of the

US

consulate and American citizens and their property.
Source: Clark 83.

Case No.

79, 191

1

— China (Wuhu)

Both the gunboat

USS Helena and

about 17 November 1911.

the supply ship

The Supply landed

USS

Supply were at

a force as a precautionary

measure because, even though there was no disorder,

it

was reported that there

were many robbers in the area. Protection was extended to
force

withdrew on 22 November 1911.

Source: Clark 84-
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Case No. 80, 191 1-1912

At

Abroad

— China (Taku)

American Minister, at Peking, the fourth USS Saratoga
Shanghai on 29 November 1911 for Taku, where one company of

the request of the

(CA-2)

left

Marines landed

On

for the protection of the

Methodist Mission.

4 March 1912, the American Minister telegraphed the

Commander

of

the Asiatic Fleet:

The

situation in north

China

is

very grave, practically no government. Mutinous

troops have been rioting in Peking, Tientsin and elsewhere. Local authorities

Tientsin 19 have requested foreign powers to police [the]

[in]

a vessel to

Two
Navy

city.

Can you send

Taku?

days later the Asiatic

Commander

reported to the Secretary of the

on board the second USS Cincinnati
(C-7) and L7.S.S. Abarenda (AC- 13) had been dispatched to Taku. The company on board the collier Abarenda remained in Taku until 8 March, when they
were sent to Peking. By 1 1 March, the Taku disturbances had quieted freeing
the remaining company of Marines for dispatch to Peking. 20
that two companies of Marines

Source: Clark 84-85.

Cose No. 81, 1911

One officer and

— China (Yochow)

12

armed men landed

in the vicinity of Yochow

1911, to escort a group of missionaries to that

on 4 December

city.

Source: Clark 84-

Case No. 82, 1912

A landing force
March

— China

(Kiukiang)

from the USS Elcano (PG-38) went ashore

at

Kiukiang on 7

1912, to protect concessions.

Source: Clark 85.

Cose No. 83, 1912

— China (Swatow)

The second USS Monterey (BM-6), a monitor, landed a force at Swatow on 16
March 1912, to save a woman and some children who were endangered by
fighting between government and revolutionary forces. The government forces
allowed the Americans to extract them safely.
On 3 April 1912, another force of nine men landed at Swatow to guard the
"Buttemeld & Swire's residence," and the German consulate.
Source: Clark 86.
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Case No. 84, 1912

I

— China (Nanking)

The USS Pompey

(AF-5), a torpedo boat tender, landed a force of

men

at

Nanking on 12 April 1912, to protect American interests. They were
withdrawn after a short time, even in advance of the order from the
Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to do so. Their speedy withdrawal
suggests that the perceived threat to American interests probably never
materialized.
Source: Clark 86.

Case No. 85, 1912

May

In

— Cuba

1912 there was a revolt of blacks in Cuba, organized by the

"Independientes de Color."

The

Cuban Government wished

became more serious than the
Cuban officials seemed unable to

uprising quickly

to admit.

When

control the situation, the United States asserted

its

maintenance of order, pursuant to Article

of the 1903 Treaty.

III

right to intervene for the

American Government expressed concern for the safety of the
property of the large number of US citizens residing in Cuba.

The

The

lives

disturbances centered in the far eastern part of the island near the

Naval Station

at

2,000 additional
base, there

Gomez

21

Guantanamo

and

US

Bay, to which the United States had sent about

men by the end of May. While many of them remained on the

were several landings during the

crisis.

Cuban President Jose Miguel

requested that there be no landings, even for the protection of Ameri-

would tend
to discredit his government at home and abroad. Nevertheless, four companies
of Marines were sent into the province of Oriente on 5 June, despite the fact
that there had not yet been any injury to Americans or their property. Faced
with the fait accompli, Gomez left the American forces to protect foreign property interests and then withdrew his own troops so that they could be used
against the rebels. At the request of the British charge d'affaires in Washington, the US Department of State requested that "such American protection as
might be available to American lives and property should likewise be extended
can

citizens,

because he

felt

that such action by the United States

to British subjects."

There also were two landings at Nipe Bay, Cuba. On 10 June 1912, a force of
28 Marines landed there and then traveled by rail to the site of the Spanish-American Iron Works

Two

at

Woodfred, Cuba, to protect American property.

detachment landed to relieve the first force, which
then reembarked. This second detachment remained until 14 July. One other
detachment went ashore on 19 June 1912, at El Cuero, Cuba, where it
days

later, a similar
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remained

until

1

July.

Apparently

all

the

American

forces

on Cuban

territory

withdrew near the middle of July 1912.

The Cuban Government began to assert its reign in the area by the end of
June. The gradual withdrawal of the American reinforcements from the United
States base at Guantanamo Bay was under way by the middle of July, the last of
them reembarking 5 August 1912.
Sources: Bailey 499-500; Clark 98-101; Ellsworth 62-63; 2 Hackworth 328-29; Offutt 109-11.

Case

The

hJo. 86,

1912-1925

revolt of 1912,

— Nicaragua

one of the most serious

in the history of Nicaragua,

by the Minister of War, General Luis Mena,

who had

most of the country's military supplies before the

obtained control over

uprising. Therefore, the

which actually began 29 July 1912, when Mena attempted
the capital city, Managua, was especially hard fought.

rebellion,

As

the revolt progressed, widespread fear

their lives

and property grew. The

to Nicaragua for

tion also

among

to seize

foreigners for the safety of

British consul general asked the

US assistance in protecting his nationals.

came from two American

was led

US Minister

Requests for protec-

corporations, one of which already

fered property losses at the hands of the insurgents.

When

had

suf-

these facts were

presented to the Nicaraguan Government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to the

US Minister that his government was fully occupied with the revo-

and would be unable to afford protection to foreigners. He requested
that the United States land forces to protect the lives and property of its citi-

lution

zens, and, indeed, to

On

extend protection to

all

the inhabitants of the country.

American force of 102 men landed at Corinto
and traveled to Managua to guard the American legation and protect American interests. As the situation worsened, there were many more landings. 22 By
the time the last ship arrived on 14 September, 2,350 seamen and Marines were
ashore in Nicaragua. In the words of the acting Secretary of State, Huntington
3

August 1912, the

first

Wilson, the United States intended "to take the necessary measures for an adequate legation guard at Managua, to keep open communications, and to protect

American

life

and property,"

as well as "to contribute its influence in all

appropriate ways to the restoration of lawful and orderly government in order

may resume

program of reforms unhampered by the vicious
elements who would restore the methods of Zelaya." Admiral Sutherland reported that his forces had extended their protection not only to Americans and
that Nicaragua

other foreigners, but also to

its

"all

reputable Nicaraguans."
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Apparently, the American presence did help curtail what might have been a

more lengthy struggle. Most of the fighting ended early in November, and the
American force had been largely withdrawn by the time that the new president
was elected on 14 November. Two battalions were withdrawn on 2 1 November
and the last battalion on 13 January 1913. However, on 9 January 1913, a legation guard of 105 men was detailed for duty at Managua. This guard was maintained at the legation until 3 August 1925. 23
Sources: Clark 119-22; Ellsworth 125-27; 2 Hackworth 331; Offutt 111-17.

Case No. 87, 1912

— China (Kentucky

Island)

During the four years that he ruled, Yuan was able to delay the further
disintegration of China.

He

faced formidable opposition, however.

occasions the United States found

American

lives

succeeded by Li

On

it

On several

necessary to land forces to protect

24

and property. When Yuan died on 6 June 1916, he was
Yuan-hung, who was deposed during World War I.

24 August 1912, Admiral Nicholson ordered one company of Marines

from the submarine tender USS Rainbow (AS- 7) to go ashore on Kentucky
land to protect American lives and property.

They withdrew two days

Is-

later.

Source: Ellsworth 40-41.

Case No. 88, 1912

On 26 August
Marines

at

— China (Camp Nicholson)

1912, Admiral Nicholson

deemed

it

necessary to land a force of

Camp Nicholson for the protection of American lives and property

during a disturbance.

The landing

party remained ashore until 30 August.

Source: Ellsworth 41.

Case No. 89, 1912

— Turkey

Rioting broke out in the Turkish capital in the
victorious Balkan troops

autumn

began to push the Turks back

of 1912 as the

to Constantinople.

These events endangered the lives and property of all Christians. The
Diplomatic Corps decided to land about 2,500 men and 26 guns to protect
foreign residents and their interests. Among troops who landed on 18

November
and

1912, were detachments from British, French, German, Russian

Italian warships.

There was

also a small detail

from the USS Scorpion

US legation. According to a communication
Secretary of State, the men from the Scorpion

(PY-3), which landed to guard the

Navy Department to the
reembarked on 3 December 1912.
of the

Sources: [1912] Foreign Rel. U.

S.

1352, 1353 (1919); Offutt 109 n. 112.
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Case Mo. 90, 1913

Abroad

— China (Shanghai)

China continued. When the southern forces attacked the arsenal
at Shanghai on 28 July 1913, the naval forces of several countries, including the

Civil

war

in

United States, landed troops
property. Vice

Admiral

Nawa

for the protection of foreign citizens

of the Imperial Japanese

Navy was

and

their

the senior

By 12 August, most of the members of the landing parties had
their ships without ever having engaged either southern or

officer present.

returned to

northern forces.
Source: Clark 87.

Case No. 91, 1913

— China (Chapei)

Fighting between the Chinese and the Indians at Chapei endangered the lives

and property of foreign
police,

who were

July 1913,

residents. After the

Chinese drove out the Indian

on 29
and over

protecting the Indian settlement, the foreign consuls

warned both

sides that they

would have to cease

firing into

On the next day, the consuls called forth a force of Marines to
in the city. On the same day, the Chinese Minister o{ Foreign

the settlements.

preserve order

Affairs expressed his appreciation to the Minister in Pehng, advising

American presence in Chapei had rendered protection to
that locality. The American force withdrew 17 August 1913.
the

all

him

that

the people in

Source: Clark 86.

Case No. 92, 1913
In 1913

— Mexico

Mexico underwent another period of political

considerable fighting

American

among

various factions.

citizens to leave the country,

accompanied by
The United States had warned
unrest,

but unfortunately not

all

of

them

The situation became so severe by September that a
operation was deemed necessary to assist the stragglers who now wished

followed this advice.
rescue

to depart.

On

September 1913, the USS Buffalo, an auxiliary cruiser, landed four
Marines and an American consular agent at Ciaris Estero. These men pro5

ceeded to the Richardson Construction Company's headquarters in the Yaqui
Valley to escort to the coast those Americans and foreigners

who wished

to

Twelve Americans and 83 others availed themselves of the opportunity.
The landing party and the refugees returned to the ship two days later.
leave.

Source: Ellsworth 115-16.
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Case No. 93, 1914

The United

—

I

Haiti Qanuary)

States landed forces in Haiti to protect

Americans and

their

property during a period of political unrest that led to the abdication of

on 27 January 1914, as General Zamor came to power. In
three separate landings on 27-29 January, a total of 120 seamen and Marines
went ashore at Port-au-Prince to guard the U.S. consulate and protect foreign
interests. At the same time the French and Germans landed 15 and 35 men,
respectively. The French force was reinforced on 6 February. All of these
international forces reembarked on 9 February, the day after General Zamor,
President Oreste

the successful revolutionary leader, was elected President of Haiti.

A

landing party of Marines from the composite gunboat

USS Wheeling

(PG-14) subsequently went ashore at Port-de-Paix, Haiti, on 16 February, to

American and foreign interests. They remained ashore for six days.
Theodore, one of the minor rebel leaders who had been defeated, evacuated
Cap-Ha'itien on 20 February, leaving no force to maintain order in the town.
At the request of the foreign consuls, who feared looting and widespread disorder, the commander of the Wheeling landed an armed force of 65 men for the
protection of all foreigners and their property on the same day. On 21 February,
protect

the landing party returned aboard ship, save for a small guard of Marines

remained several days longer
continued to

at the

who

American consulate. Theodore and Zamor

the former succeeding to the presidency in October 1914-

fight,

Sources: Clark 111-12; Ellsworth 88; Offutt 117-18; Rotberg ch. IV.

Case No. 94, 1914

—

Haiti (October)

The Zamor government, which came to power in Haiti in February 1914, found
itself faced with revolution in October. The revolution began in the northern
part of the country

1914, the
cruiser

US

and quickly spread

to the other regions.

Minister at Port-au-Prince reported that the

USS Tacoma (CL-20) had landed an armed

On

19 October

commander

force of 117

of the

men

at

Cap-Hai'tien for the protection of foreigners and their property. Moreover,

had been given refuge at the US consulate in that city.
Reinforcements were sent to the city on 24 October, but they were withdrawn
the same day. A portion of the original force at Cap-Ha'itien, 24 men, returned
aboard ship on 28 October, the others remaining ashore until 7 November.
By 29 October, the US Minister reported heavy fighting and looting and requested that naval vessels be sent for the protection of foreign interests. Accordingly, the third USS Hancock (AP-3), with an armed force of 800 Marines,
was dispatched to the city, arriving there 30 October. The Department of State

Zamor and his

followers
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American Minister to land such Marines from this vessel as were
necessary to protect life and property. He was informed that the USS Kansas
(BB-21) had been dispatched to Port-au-Prince, and instructed that upon the
instructed the

arrival of that vessel
life

and property

in

he should make similar dispositions

for the protection of

Gonaives and Saint-Marc. Apparently, no landings were

necessary.

The French Minister at Port-au-Prince gave refuge to some of the cabinet
members of the fallen government. Fearing a mob attack, he requested that the
American Minister make arrangements to assist in the defense of the French
legation should it become necessary. Thus, the American Minister called up a
detail of signalmen from the transport Hancock and stationed them at the
French legation on 2 November. Order finally was restored by 6 November.
Sources: Clark 112; Ellsworth 88-89; [1914] Foreign Rel U.S. 354-57, 386 (1922); Offutt 118.

Case No. 95, 1915-1934

— Haiti

President Theodore was ousted by Vilburn Guillaume
latter

holding office only four months before a

new

Sam in March

1915, the

revolution occurred.

The

forces of the revolution proved too strong for

Sam and he

sought refuge in the

French legation. This action did not deter

opponents,

who forcibly entered

the legation

on 28

July, seized

his

Sam and dragged him into the

street

where they

decapitated him.

On

9 July 1915, prior to Sam's death, the United States had sent ashore a

landing party from the cruiser

USS Washington (CA-11)

at Cap-Ha'itien to

Port-au-Prince on 27 July,

While the Washington was en route to
the commander of the vessel received word from the

American Minister of the

serious state of affairs in the capital.

arrived at Port-au-Prince

on 28

quell a disturbance in that city.

July, after

Sam's execution.

The Washington

Two battalions

of

Marines, about 140 men, landed immediately to protect foreigners and their
property.

Admiral Caperton of the Washington found

his force insufficient

and

Another 100 Marines landed at Port-au-Prince on
29 July to preserve order and protect legations. On the next day a party of Haitians attacked the American forces and killed two men. Thereupon, a force of
500 Marines was dispatched to Haiti, landing at Port-au-Prince in early August. With the addition of two more forces landed on 15 and 31 August, the total number ashore amounted to nearly 2,000 Marines. The American forces
took no offensive action against the Haitians unless provoked. However, there
were numerous confrontations with the Cacos, or hill bandits, who tried to cut
off supplies and communications.
called for reinforcements.

160

Appendix

On

I

12 August 1914, Haiti elected Dartiguenave

States forces remained in the country to assist in

its

its

new

president. United

stabilization.

The program

proved effective and a large portion of the American occupation forces were

withdrawn in May 1916. American casualties in Haiti, from the time of the first
landing in 1915 until October 1920, were 13 killed and 28 wounded. A force of
about 500 Marines remained in Haiti until 15 August 1934,

when

President

Franklin Roosevelt ordered their withdrawal.
Sources: Clark 112-13; Ellsworth 89-91; 2 Hackworth 329-30;
ch.

Offutt 124-27; Rotberg

IV

Case No. 96, 1916

A

Knox 380;

— China (Nanking)

landing party of seamen from the

USS

Quiros (PG-40)

,

a schooner-rigged

composite gunboat, went ashore at Nanking on 29 March 1916 to quell a

riot

on the premises of the International Export Company. The seamen returned
their ship

when

to

the riot was under control.

Source: Clark 88.

Case No. 97, 1916

— China (Swatow)

A few Marines were stationed at the US consulate at Swatow during the night
of 30

March

assistant salt

there.

A

1916, to safeguard the chief of police, the Taoyin's family, and the

commissioner of Chacchowfu,

few Marines also were sent to the

all

of

whom

German

had sought refuge

consulate, the agreed

meeting place of foreign residents in case of trouble. Although several Chinese

were

killed, the disorders

minor

looting.

were not

The American

had been feared, there being only
withdrew the following day.

as great as

force

Source: Clark 87-88.

Case No. 98, 1916

— Dominican Republic

Dominican Secretary of War, launched a
rebellion against the government oi President Juan Isidro Jimenez, which
thrust the Dominican Republic into a state of anarchy. Since an important
objective of both factions was to gain control over Santo Domingo, much of the
In 1916 General Desiderio Arias,

fighting took place in the capital city.

of

fire,

was struck by

The U.S.

shells several times.

legation, being in the direct line

Thereupon, the American Minister

requested that a naval force be sent for the protection of American citizens.
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A force consisting of two companies of Marines
Santo Domingo on 5

May

(about 280 men) landed at

1916. By this time, the rebels had succeeded in im-

peaching Jimenez and were in control of the
fighting,

Abroad

capital.

There was widespread

however, as the President's forces tried to regain the

bers of the

first

landing parties guarded the

the Haitian legation

— where many

US

foreigners

city.

Some mem-

legation, while others

had taken

refuge.

guarded

On

6 May,

American minister reported that the President's forces had been unable to
take the city, and that the situation had become so chaotic that the American
forces were preparing to occupy the capital and disarm the rebels. The United
States soon landed another seven companies of Marines and the city was occupied without serious difficulty on 15 May 1916, the rebels having withdrawn to
the

the interior to establish a

Having quieted the

new headquarters

capital, the

at Santiago.

Americans made plans

for the pacification of

the interior. Several landing parties of Marines were transferred from Puerto

and Santo Domingo to Monte Cristi. Another regiment oi Marines from
the United States landed at Monte Cristi on 2 1 June. Five days later, an expediPlata

tion started toward Santiago. Fortunately, a peaceful settlement

ated before the Marines reached the

city,

Santiago without opposition on 6 July.
tion forces

was negoti-

enabling the American force to enter

The peak strength of American occupa-

was three regiments, or approximately 3,000 men.

American occupation forces remained in the Dominican Republic until 1
September 1924. During this time 140 Marines were killed or died from disease, accident and other causes. Another 55 men were wounded in action.
Sources: Clark 109-10; Ellsworth 69-71; 2 Hackworth 331; Knox 380.

Case No. 99, 1917-1922

— Cuba

Cuba arising from a dispute over the
results of the presidential election of 1 November 1916. The Liberals
maintained that their candidate had won, but the Conservatives, who were in
In February 1917, there were disorders in

power, contested the election and refused to surrender the

offices.

Rioting

began on 11 February 1917, resulting in widespread looting and destruction of
property, most American-owned. There was evidence of organized revolution
in

Camagiiey and Santa Clara provinces.

onward there were numerous landings in Cuba by American forces. Most of the fighting had subsided by 20 May, the date of the inauguration. While the majority of the American forces had withdrawn by 24 May,
on 4 June there were about 600 Marines and sailors in Cuba. The number was
high because three additional regiments had landed after 24 May. On 28

From

12 February
25
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August, the remaining forces withdrew with the exception of 220

Camagiiey and 120
force at

men

at the

US

Naval Station

at

Guantanamo

men

Bay.

at

The

Camagiiey withdrew on 15 February 1922.

Sources: Clark 101-07; Ellsworth 63-64; 2 Hackworth 330; Offutt 133-37.

Case No. 100, 1917

A

— China (Chungking)

landing party from an American gunboat went ashore at Chungking on 3

December 1917, to guard the US consulate during a period of political unrest.
The guard remained for two days and two nights. British and Japanese guards
also landed at the same time to guard their respective consulates during the
crisis.

Source: 2 Hackworth 332.

Case No. 10 1, 1918

The Russian

— Soviet Union

revolution of 1917 eventually brought turmoil to

Russian Empire.

all

parts of the

The effects of the overthrow of the Czarist Government by the

Bolsheviks spread to the far eastern part of the country including Vladivostok,

where the almost constant fighting between the Czech and Bolshevik forces
exposed the foreign residents of Vladivostok to considerable danger.

On 29 June

26

1918, the Czechs occupied the city and assumed complete con-

members of the Red Guard, Austrians and Germans. On the
same day, the United States established a guard of 32 Marines at the American
consulate. Britain and China also landed forces. Conditions in the city remained unstable, and on 6 July representatives of Japan, Great Britain, China,
trol,

arresting

France and the Czechoslovak
the authority of the Czechs

Army

still

issued a proclamation stating that, while

would be recognized, the Allied Forces assem-

bled intended to take measures to defend the city against
ternal

all

dangers, both in-

and external. The American consulate guard remained

until 10

August

1918.
Sources: Ellsworth 141-42; 2 G. Kennan, Soviet- American Relations, 1917-1920, atch. VI (1958).

Case No. 102, 1918-1920

— Soviet Union

In August 1918, the United States landed about 7,000
assist in

the

city's

6 July 1918,

27

men

at

Vladivostok to

occupation. Their mission was to enforce the proclamation of

and maintain order

in Vladivostok. This force

January 1920.
Source: Background 55.
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Case No. 103, 1919

Abroad

— Soviet Union

A landing party of 32 Marines from the USS New Orleans,

a protected cruiser,

went ashore at Tyntuke Bay, near Vladivostok, on 30 July 1919, to protect
American interests during new disturbances. This force returned aboard ship 1
August 1919.
Source: Ellsworth 142.

Case No. 104, 1919

— Honduras

During August and September 1919, there was

much

political unrest in

Honduras and revolution loomed. On 8 September, a landing force from the
USS Cleveland (C-19) went ashore at Puerto Cortes to protect the lives and
property of Americans and other foreign residents. They cooperated with the
forces oi Honduras in maintaining order in a neutral zone, designated by the
Military Commander of Puerto Cortes, which the armed forces of both factions
were forbidden to enter. The revolutionary forces captured the towns of Puerto

Curva and La Laguna on 11 September. There was no further
fighting or disorder and the Americans began to return to their ship. The
remainder of the force withdrew on 12 September 1919. Both factions agreed
to a truce, and free elections were held in October. General Lopez Gutierrez,
the revolutionary leader, was elected President with more than 75 percent of
Cortes, La

the votes.
Sources: Clark 114; [1919] 2 Foreign Rel U.

Case No. 105, 1920-1922

The United
the

S.

377-95 (1934).

— Soviet Union

States landed a force of 18 Marines

American radio

guard similar to

this

station

on Russian

Island

one was maintained

on 16 February 1920, to guard
in the Bay of Vladivostok. A

until 19

November

1922.

Source: Ellsworth 143.

Case No. 106, 1920

On

14

March

— China (Kiukiang)

1920, the

commanding

officers of the

gunboats

USS

Elcano

(PG-38) and Samar (PG-41), having consulted with the British consul, landed
a force to quell a local riot at Kiukiang

and protect

ashore about two hours.
Sources: Clark 88; 2 Hackworth 332.
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The

force remained
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Case No. 107, 1920
Civil

I

— Guatemala

war between the Government and Unionist forces caused the United

States

intervene in Guatemala in

to

Fearing a

1920.

bombardment

of

Guatemala City and concerned about the threat both to the foreign legations
and US property, the US Minister, on 9 April 1920, requested that the

commander of the gunboat USS Tacoma (PG-32) (ex-CL-20) send a guard for
the legation. On the same day the Tacoma landed a force of 40 men
supplemented by an additional force of 50 men from the sixth USS Niagara
(SP-136), an armed patrol yacht. The forces arrived at Guatemala City on 10
April. Both warring factions approved of the American presence. On 13 April,
the Tacoma landed another force of 13 men at the request of the American
consular agent to guard the cable station. This guard reembarked the next day.

On

20 and 21 April, the United States withdrew 29

remaining ashore until 27 April 1920.

Guatemalan waters

Two

sailors,

the others

naval vessels were stationed in

for several days thereafter.

Sources: Clark 111; 2 Hackworth 331.

Case No. 108, 1920

The USS

— China (Lakeside)

Quiros (PG-40) landed a force to guard the property of the American

Mission at Lakeside, apparently church-owned property, on 25 June 1920.

American missionary was
looted and destroyed. The

killed

and property valued

force returned aboard ship

at

One

about $1,500 was

two days

later.

Source: Clark 89.

Case No. 109, 1920

The Kwantung

— China (Wuchow)

forces attack of Wuchow in June

foreign residents.

To

protect

them

a force of six

The men escorted the wife and child of Dr.
were associated with the
safety.

Most

of, if

not

all,

Wuchow

1920 endangered the

men landed on

Levell

lives

of

26 June 1920.

and three nurses,

all

of whom

People's Mission Hospital, to a place of

of these five people were American citizens.

Source: Clark 89.

Case No.

1

10,

On 30 June

1920

1920, the patrol

(DD-144) reported

Compound

— China (Yochow)

at

commander of the

his landing of a force to

first line

destroyer

guard the American Mission

Yochow. The mission was church-owned property.

Source: Clark 89.
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Case No.

At

I,

1 1

1920

Abroad

— China (Tungchow)

the request of the

American Mission

at

Tungchow,

a force of 12

Marines

landed on 20 August 1920 to guard the mission for a few days.
Sources: Clark 89; 2 Hackworth 332.

Case No. 112, 1922

— Nicaragua

In early 1922 political conditions in Nicaragua

Managua

legation at

An

unsettled,

and the

US

required an increase in the Marine guard to counter

On

anticipated disturbances.

went ashore.

became

25 January 1922, a landing party of 31 Marines

A second party of 53 men reinforced the first group on 29 January.

additional force of 47 Marines landed

Managua. Apparently the
returned aboard ship on

situation

1 1

improved because

all

but 40 of the 131

to

men

February.

A revolt actually broke out in May
portant role in preventing loss of
tion of Managua.

on 8 February and proceeded

The United

life

1922.

The

legation guard played an im-

as the rebels

States offered

its

had contemplated destruc-

good

offices,

enabling the rival

parties to reach a peaceful settlement without bloodshed.
Source: Ellsworth 128.

Case No. 113, 1922

— China (Peking)

A new phase

civil

fighting

of the

war in northern China began on 28 April 1922, when

commenced near Machang between

the

Chang

Tso-lin and Chihli forces.

The fighting ended in June with the restoration of Li Yuan-hung to the presidency. 2
At
in

the

commencement of the

and around Peking outside the legation

can citizens and

USS Albany
in

fighting, there

their property, a force of

were about 800 Americans

quarter. Anticipating danger to

living

Ameri-

156 seamen and Marines from the second

(CL-23) landed at Chinwangtao on 27 April 1922.

When they arrived

Peking the following day, they were added to the legation guard, bringing

strength to

more than 500 men. The

Sources: Clark 89; Ellsworth 41; [1922]

Case No. 114, 1922

On 5 May

1

force

remained

Foreign Rel. V.

S.

until 25

May

its

1922.

681, 694-96 (1938).

— China (Shanghai)

commanded by Captain Roy C. Swink
landed from the USS Huron (CA-9) at Taku and proceeded to Shanghai to
protect American interests. They remained there until 11 May 1922.
1922, a battalion of Marines

Source: Ellsworth 41.
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Case No. 115, 1922

The American

— China

I

(Tientsin)

Minister at Peking received reports on 4

May

1922, that the

won victories at Kuan and Machang and were within 20 miles
Fearing possible violence in the city, Admiral Strauss of the USS

Chihli forces had
of Tientsin.

Huron landed about 150 Marines armed with machine guns
following day. The force withdrew on 15 May 1922.
Source: [1922]

Case No.

1

1

16,

ForeignRel. V.

1922

S.

at Tientsin the

698-99, 705 (1938).

— China (Tungchow)

Fearing possible violence from retreating Fengtien forces, the American
Minister at Peking sent a detachment of Marines to

Tungchow on 5 May

1922.

Their mission was to protect American citizens and their property.
Sources: Clark 89; 2 Hackworth 332.

Case No.

1

17,

1922

— Smyrna

(Izmir,

Turkey)

During the war between Turkey and Greece in 1922, the United States found

it

necessary to intervene for the protection of American lives and property,
including the consulate, at Smyrna.

Greeks withdrew,
destroyed.

much

As

the Turkish forces advanced and the

of the city was burned and the

US

consulate was

A total of four naval vessels were dispatched to Smyrna and made

on 7, 8 and 9 September
1922, about 55 men went ashore. Both the Greek and Turkish authorities
consented to the landings. The men withdrew in three groups on 13, 14 and 16
September. A fourth vessel landed a guard for the American consulate on 16
September. These men reembarked on 2 October, their ship departing Smyrna
on 21 October 1922.
landings. In three landings from three different vessels

Sources: Background 56; Clark 129-30; 2 Hackworth 333.

Case No.

1

18,

1922

— China (Foochow)

The American consul at Foochow requested a landing force on 4 October
1922, when a threat of military invasion by the southern forces arose. A landing
party of 48 men from the light minelayer VSS Rizal (DM- 14) went ashore the
next morning. Later the same day, they were joined by about an equal number
of British and Japanese troops. The force withdrew within a few days.

On

1 1

landed at

October 1922, a force of 30 men and 2 officers from the Rizal again
Foochow after the city was captured by the southern forces. Admiral

Anderson held

a

conference

with

fleet

167

officers

and

local

American
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representatives and together they formulated a joint plan for the protection of

American nationals in Foochow and Nantai. According to a report of the
u
American consul, [t]his plan provided for the stationing of a force of 30
Marines at the consulate, with the forces of the naval vessel in port at Pagoda as
a reserve; and for the concentration of all Americans, in case of danger, at
three concentration centers on Nantai Island, where they would receive
military protection."
Source: Clark 89-90.

Case No.

1

19,

1923

— China (Masu

Island)

A party of four Marines from the first
Island

on 14 February 1923,

bandits.

The

force

USS

to protect

Asheville (PG-21) landed at Masii

Americans who were threatened by

withdrew 19 February 1923.

Source: Clark 90.

Case No. 120, 1923

On

15

November

— China (Tungshan)

1923, a detachment of eight Marines went to Tungshan, a

suburb of Canton, to protect American missionaries during fighting between

Chinese

forces.

The guard withdrew

after several days.

Source: 2 Hackworth 332.

Case No. 121, 1924

A

— Honduras

contest for the presidency of Honduras in 1924 brought

much

political

unrest to that country. Fearing an outbreak of violence, the United States

dispatched several vessels, one of which landed a small force at Amapala.
force traveled to Tegucigalpa, the capital, to protect the

American

The

legation.

There were numerous landings in February and March. Fearing that the

in-

town of La Ceiba, the United States landed a force of
59 men on 28 February, to protect the American consulate. This force declared
the compound of the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company neutral ground
and gave refuge there to Americans and other foreigners. Both of the contending factions were notified of this action and advised that the United States insurgents would attack the

tended to remain neutral in the

conflict.

On 29 February, a force of 35 men from the USS Denver (C-14)
Ceiba, remaining ashore until 3 March.
vessels

men

was landed

at

A combined force of 41

landed at La

men from two

Tela and established a neutral zone on 3 March. These

returned to their ships on 7 March.
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At

American consul

the request of the

the situation was

Cortes on 4
6 March.

critical,

I

at

who reported that
167 men at Puerto

Puerto Cortes,

the Denver landed a force of

March to establish a neutral zone. These men returned aboard ship

On the day after this force departed, a force of 70 men landed and re-

mained two

days.

Several more landing parties went ashore at La Ceiba.

A party of 41

men

landed on 8 March. Another force of 86 Marines and seamen went ashore at La

Ceiba and proceeded to Mazapon to establish a neutral zone.

A force of 24 men

from the Denver landed on 9 March. All three of these forces returned aboard
their ships

on

13 March.

Fighting temporarily ended early in March, but events necessitated one

more

landing.

On

18 March, the American Minister at Tegucigalpa reported

widespread looting, the

loss

estimated at $400,000.

Among

foreign residents,

the British and Chinese suffered the greatest property losses, but at least two

American-owned stores were looted. The American legation and consulate
were fired at and the American Minister believed that the lives of all Americans in the city were in imminent danger. Having obtained the permission of
the Commandante, an American force of 176 men landed at San Lorenzo on
18 March. Part of the force proceeded to Toncontin and established a radio
station, while the remainder traveled to Tegucigalpa. That city fell to the rebels
on 28 April, and shortly thereafter order was reestablished. The force returned
aboard ship 30 April 1924.
Sources: Clark 115-17; Ellsworth 96-98; 2 Hackworth 331.

Case No. 122, 1924

— China (Shanghai)

Beginning 3 September 1924, there was intermittent fighting between the

Chekiang and Kiangsu

forces in the vicinity of Shanghai, the nearest battle

taking place about nine miles from the

new

civil

This fighting was the beginning of a

war in northern China, one that resulted in the overthrow of

President Tsao

As

city.

Kun and

the establishment of a provisional government.

a precautionary measure, several foreign nations with naval vessels in the

harbor landed forces on 9 September. These forces included approximately 260

Americans, 360 Britons, 500 Frenchmen, 400 Japanese and 100
present was a force of about 1,000

These troops took-up

men from

Italians.

Also

the Shanghai Volunteer Corps.

stations in the city so that they could protect foreigners

Many refugees also sought protection in the
seven thousand new arrivals daily beginning 29

in the event that fighting occurred.
city,

there being from six to

August 1924- By 23 October 1924, the danger having passed, the refugees
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began returning to the
day.

Abroad

rural districts.

The American

Foreign Rel. U.

361, 371, 383 (1939); 2 Hackworth 332-33.

force withdrew the

same

29

Sources: Clark 90; [1924]

Case No. 123, 1924

1

S.

— Honduras

Disorder returned to Honduras in September 1924. Threats of murder, looting

and burning endangered American lives and property. On 10 September, the
second line cruiser USS Rochester (CA-2) landed a force of 111 men at La
Ceiba and then proceeded to Tela. The Governor, believing that the presence
of American forces would ensure the preservation of order, requested that the
Marines be left ashore, but they withdrew 15 September 1924Source: Clark 117.

Case No. 124, 1924

— China (Tungchow)

By 24 October 1924, the Kiangsu forces having captured Peking, staged a
successful coup d'etat against the government of President Tsao Kun. The
unsettled political condition and a report that the Shensi troops at Tungchow
were acting lawlessly caused the

US

legation at Peking to send a force of 10

Marines that day to protect about 100 American citizens in Tungchow.
Sources: Clark 90; [1924]

Case No. 125, 1924

The

1

ForeignRel. V.

S.

385 (1939).

— China (Peking)
Kun 30
Commander in

unsettled state of affairs following the overthrow of President Tsao

caused the American legation in Peking to request that the

Charge of the Asiatic Fleet provide reinforcements for the legation guard. A
landing party of 125 Marines arrived in Peking on 28 October 1924. A second

detachment of 100 men arrived on 4 November 1924.
Source: Clark 90.

Case No. 126, 1924-1926

— China (Shanghai)

became apparent that the provisional government of China,
established in 1924, had not successfully unified the country, including the
northern region. The Chihli forces retained much power in the Yangtze Valley
and Chang Tso-lin was the virtual ruler of Manchuria, having established his
headquarters at Tientsin in the autumn of 1924. On 2 January 1925, the
American Minister at Peking reported that the provisional government of
By 1925

it
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Marshal Tuan, Provisional Chief Executive and Prime Minister of China,
could

not

much

endure

longer

without

Chang's

Another

support.

consideration was Inspector General of the Chinese Army, Feng Yu-hsiang's,
seizure of Peking in

October 1924. In

short, the political situation in northern

China remained quite unstable.

The

various factions clashed regularly around Shanghai as early as January

1925, and the lives and property of foreigners in the city were in great danger.

The American consul general at Shanghai reported that the United States and
others landed sailors in the city on 15 January 1925. The American force took a
position with the French as guards of interned Chinese soldiers at the Haig Re-

serve School. (The force withdrew 24 January).

On

19 January, the

Heads of

Legation to China met at a meeting in Peking:
Resolved, that with a view to maintaining the neutrality of Shanghai and for the

and property therein the consular body are authorized,
as an emergency measure and during the continuance of fighting and the
presence of bodies of troops near Shanghai (but no longer) and without referring
the matter to the diplomatic body, in their discretion to expel from the
International Settlement (or to refuse admissions thereto to) Chinese military
leaders (being any officer with the rank of general now or recently having active
command of troops) and political chiefs who serve the internal affairs of such
protection of foreign

militarists
fitting

who may,

life

in the opinion of the consular body, use the Settlement for

out military expeditions or otherwise as a base of military operations or for

political agitation.

The United

States landed several forces at Shanghai to protect

Americans

and other foreigners residing in the city's International Settlement. The first
party to land was a Marine detachment of 28 men from the gunboat USS Sacramento (PG- 19) which went ashore 15 January, and remained there until 22 January. The Second Expeditionary Force, which was organized in the Philippines,
landed at Shanghai on the day that the first force departed, remaining until 9
February. A period of relative calm ensued until 2 June, when a landing party of
127 men went ashore at Shanghai to protect foreign residents. They returned
aboard ship 29 August. A Marine detachment of reinforcements from the second line cruiser VSS Huron (CA-9) landed on 1 July, and remained ashore until 29 July. For the next five months there were no incidents. Then, on 30

December 1925, new outbreaks
tachment of 69

men

at

necessitated the landing of

Shanghai. They withdrew 12

Sources: Background 56; Ellsworth 42-43; [1925]
2

Hackworth 332-33.
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Case No. 127, 1925

An

uprising

— Honduras

Honduras

in

Abroad

in

April

1925

again

resulted

in

American

American lives and property at La Ceiba were endangered by the
threat of Red Ochoa, some insurgent forces, to attack the city. The USS Denver
(C-14), with the permission of the Governor and the Commandante, landed
165 men on 20 April. The American forces quickly declared the city a neutral

intervention.

zone: as hoped,

all

subsequent fighting took place outside the

city.

After having

been ashore about 30 hours, the force reembarked the following day.
Source: Clark 117.

Case No. 128, 1925

The

— China (Nanking)

revolutionary unrest in China was accompanied by labor disputes and

strikes.

On the morning of 7 June

1925, a large crowd, apparently comprised of

the International Export Company's striking workmen, gathered outside the

company's

facility at

Nanking and attempted

which the company's

river water intake

to "rush" for the waterfront,

on

was located. At the request of the

company's manager and the British and American consuls, the USS John D.

The

Ford (DD-228) landed a small party at the plant.

abandoned the

strikers

quickly

rush.

Source: Clark 91.

Case No. 129, 1925-1926

— China (Hankow)

In 1926, Cantonese forces invaded the Yangtze Valley and disrupted the
region's organized

government. Demonstrations and

against foreigners, were widespread.

the area

became

The

situation of

on

all

foreigners residing in

perilous, especially since local authorities often

to provide adequate protection. Therefore, the
forces

rioting, often directed

several occasions to preserve

were impotent

United States again landed

American

lives

and property. (Even

before the above invasion the United States landed a force of 24

men

at

Hankow on 16 June 1925 as a part of the International Defense Force. These
men were stationed in the former Russian Concession of the city.)
The city of Hankow fell into a state of disorder when the Cantonese were
poised to move upon it in early September 1926. At the request of Chinese authorities, several

landing parties from American naval vessels landed to restore

order on 3 September. British, French, and Japanese forces also landed. Most of
the

American

forces

withdrew on 16 September; a small guard remained
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some time thereafter. As a precautionary measure, British, Japanese and
American naval units landed at Hankow on 5 November 1926, and remained
three days.
Sources: Background 56; Clark 91; Offutt 141-42.

Case No. 130, 1925

— China (Kiukiang)

The second USS Stewart (DD-224) landed a force of 20 armed men at Kiukiang
on 17 June 1925,

American

to protect

citizens during a period of revolutionary

fighting in that city.
Source: Clark 90.

Case No. 131, 1925

— Panama

Rent increases in Panama City led to rent strikes and harassment of
landlords. Tenants combined in order to hinder the collection of these
increased rents. The disorder spread as various groups of workers went on
secondary strike. When rioting broke out the Panamanian Government
found it impossible to control the situation, much less afford protection to
foreign residents. Many Americans appealed to the American charge
d'affaires in Panama and the Governor of the Canal Zone for protection
against the threats of

On

mob

violence.

Panamanian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, 600 American troops entered the city of Panama. Within three days
relative peace was restored and the force was reduced to one battalion, which
was quartered in the jail and police station in order to keep them from public
view. The situation continued to improve and the remainder of the troops
12 October 1925, at the request of the

withdrew 23 October 1925.
Source: Clark 128-29.

Case No. 132, 1925-1926

— China

(Tientsin)

During the period of revolutionary unrest in 1925 and 1926, American forces
landed at Tientsin to protect Americans and their interests. At the request of
the

American

1925.

An additional force

remained

men was sent to Tientsin on 28 October
men landed in the city on 9 November, and

legation, a force of 100

until 9

of 127

June 1926.

Sources: Clark 91; Ellsworth 42-43.
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Case No. 133, 1926

Abroad

— Nicaragua

American legation guard withdrew from Managua on 3
new period of political unrest began in Nicaragua. 31 A band of

Shortly after the

August 1925, a
government troops favoring the Conservative Party arrested various Liberal
leaders, including the Minister of Finance. Their avowed purpose was to
liberate the President from the alleged domination of the Liberal element. The
leader of the revolutionary forces, General Chamorro, steadily increased the

on the Nicaraguan Government. The disturbances increased in
number and intensity, except for an 11 -day period in September when
American naval vessels were present in Nicaraguan waters. Through highly
questionable political maneuvering, General Chamorro succeeded in gaining
executive power on 14 January 1926. The United States refused to recognize
pressure

his

government.
In

May

1926, fighting erupted

on the

east coast of Nicaragua as the Liberals'

violence increased in their opposition to Chamorro.

The American Consul

at

and property of all foreigners were endangered and requested the dispatch of an American naval vessel. On 7 May, a
force of 213 men went ashore at Bluefields. Beginning on 28 May, this force
gradually was withdrawn, the final group reembarking on 6 June. Intermittent
landings of US forces for the protection of foreign lives and property took place
Bluefields reported that the lives

throughout the remainder of 1926.
Sources: Clark 122-24; Ellsworth 128-31.

Case No. 134, 1926

When

Kiukiang

— China (Kiukiang)

fell

inhabitants of the city
British,

Cantonese forces on 4 November 1926, the
resisted little. However, as a precautionary measure,

to the

Japanese and American naval units landed forces for the protection of

foreigners. Subsequently, British sources reported further fighting during the

Northern

forces'

counterattack at Kiukiang. By 6

Cantonese completely occupied the

American

Case No. 135, 1926

1

Foreign Rel. V.

all

650 (1941);

S.

was

quiet. Consequently, the

2

Hackworth 333; Offutt 142.

— China (Chingwangtao)

In the latter part of 1926 the fighting
factions intensified to such
it

and

1926, the

forces returned aboard their ships.

Sources: Clark 91; [1926]

found

city

November

among

the various Chinese revolutionary

an extent that the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet

necessary to land a force at Chingwangtao, the center of trouble.

174

The

Appendix

force of 127 Marines from the

USS Gold

1

(AG- 12) landed on

Star

7

November

1926, and remained five days.
Source: Ellsworth 43.

Case No. 136, 1926

On

17

December 1926,

(PG38) landed
battle

ship

— China (Ichang)

at

a small force from the

Ichang to protect

US

citizens

between the Cantonese and Northern

when

American gunboat VSS Elcano
and

forces.

their property during a

The men returned aboard

the conflict ended.

Source: Offutt 142.

Case No. 137, 1926-1933

— Nicaragua

The Nicaraguan Congress named Adolfo Diaz President of Nicaragua on 1
November 1926. Six days later, the United States recognized his government.
There were
called

signs of rebellion

on the United

from the beginning of

his administration.

States to provide protection for

Americans and other

foreigners in Nicaragua from the activities of the revolutionists.
officials

believed that Diaz's real motive was to employ

of his government.

The American charge

d'affaires

Diaz

American

US assistance in support
informed Diaz that the

United States was not obligated to protect his government by physical means.
But, in view of the

many requests from American citizens for protection,

United States did land a force of Marines and
Bluefields

and Rio Grande Bar. The next day,

on 23 December 1926
additional forces went ashore
sailors

Puerto Cabezas, a stronghold of the Liberal revolutionaries.
established neutral zones in

therein to disarm.

all

The American

The United

these cities and required
force

the

all

at

at

States

Nicaraguans

even censored radio transmissions in

Department
of State. By 10 January 1927, the American force had established three more
neutral zones at Pearl Lagoon, Prinzapulka and Rama. By month's end the
American forces ashore and in the territorial waters of Nicaragua numbered
about 5,000 men.
these zones until the Liberals registered a complaint with the U. S.

Having been obstructed from fighting in the eastern region of the country by
the establishment of neutral zones, the Liberals turned their attention toward

Managua.

When it began to appear that the Liberals would succeed in cutting

seamen landed at Corinto on 20
February to guard the railroad link to Managua. The United States also then
established more neutral zones at Corinto, Managua and Grenada.
the capital city off from the sea, a force of 600
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President Coolidge sent Secretary of State Stimson to Nicaragua as his personal representative. Stimson arrived 17 April 1927, and promptly

American

Nicaraguan Government

met with

and various leaders of
the Liberal party in search of a peaceful settlement. In May, when it appeared
that a settlement loomed, the US troops stationed themselves between the opposing factions so that their arms might be received in case of an agreement.
An additional force of 800 Marines was landed to arrest the terrorism and marauding which was contributing to the general state of anarchy.
Consensus emerged, and on 15 May 1927, Stimson reported that the civil
war in Nicaragua was over. Yet, the entire American force did not withdraw
immediately. American troops remained to supervise elections and aid in the
officials,

officials,

establishment and maintenance of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. Indeed, the last of the

American

forces in Nicaragua did not depart until 2 Janu-

ary 1933.
Sources: Clark 124-27; Ellsworth 129-33; Offutt 137-40.

Case No. 138, 1927

— China (Hankow)

Although the entire city of Hankow had fallen to the Cantonese forces on 3
September 1926, there were subsequent disturbances that the Cantonese
could not control.

On

3 January 1927, for instance, serious rioting occurred

along the edge of the British concession at
called

on the

local police, including several

Hankow. The

British authorities

hundred Cantonese

soldiers, for

protection, but the police were unable to assert firm control over the situation

on the river. That evening an
of 50 Marines went ashore to protect American

even with the assistance of

British ships

American landing force
citizens and their property until evacuation could be arranged.
The American consul general reported on 5 January that the situation in
Hankow was critical, with 20 or 30 American and British citizens having been
evacuated already and three more fully-loaded ships scheduled to sail that evening. The next day about 60 more American and British women and children
went aboard the Kutwo, an American naval vessel. American naval vessels also
assisted in evacuating refugees from Kiukiang and Ichang via Hankow to
Shanghai. By 19 January 1927, approximately 583 people had been evacuated
from Hankow, including 83 Americans.
Sources: Clark 91; [1927] 2 Foreign Rel. V.

S.

237, 239, 240, 248 (1942); Offutt 142.
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— China (Shanghai)

Case No. 139, 1927

Violence broke anew in the International Settlement of Shanghai in 1927.

The

Expeditionary Battalion, consisting of three companies of Marines, landed at

Shanghai on 9 February 1927, to reinforce the forces guarding the Settlement.

A dramatic increase came when
a few small parties

went ashore

1,250 Marines arrived 24 February. Although
for brief periods prior to 16

force did not land until that date.

With

March, the entire

number of men
Shanghai numbered approximately

this addition, the total

in the foreign forces available for service at

13,000, of whom approximately 7,000 were British.

On 21

March, the

US

consul general at Shanghai reported that outside the

International Settlement in Chapei, turmoil existed. Laborers

Chinese police
Settlement.

stations.

He

had attacked

also reported demonstrations in the streets of the

The Municipal Council

declared a state of emergency and re-

quested that foreign naval forces join local volunteers and police in defending
the Settlement. American, Japanese and
day.

Dutch naval

Approximately 1,500 Marines landed

forces landed the

same

for the protection of American lives

and property.

The

on 22 March. There were armed uprisings and numerous incidents of looting and burning in the Chinese territory adjoining the
disorder continued

The

commander of the Northern
Troops in the Shanghai area, shot and killed a number of the agitators. Many
foreigners, including Americans, were evacuated under police escort. The conSettlement.

sul general at

forces of General Pi Shu-cheng,

Shanghai reported that he was attempting to evacuate Ameri-

cans in isolated areas without the use of military force. Nearly

all

foreigners in

the northern area were evacuated by 23 March.

On 25 March a landing party of 62 Marines went ashore
trol

the Settlement.

They returned aboard

at

Shanghai to pa-

ship the following day.

once again on 31 March, and remained ashore

They landed

until 3 April 1927.

Sources: Clark 91-92; Ellsworth 43; [1927] 2 Foreign Rel. V.

S.

89,

90 (1942); 2 Hackworth

333.

Case No. 140, 1927

On

— China (Nanking)

22 March 1927,

when

the entry of the Cantonese forces into the city of

Nanking appeared imminent, the United States landed a force of 1 1 men from
the USS Noa (DD-343) to protect the American consulate during any ensuing
disturbances. It seemed quite likely that the Northern forces would riot should
they be defeated or forced to withdraw.
Oil Hill, the residence of Earle

A signalman also was sent to Standard

Hobard of Standard Oil Company. This
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measure insured communication between the consulate and the Noa

at all

times.

Nanking many weeks before the actual outbreak of violence on 23 March. The foreign consuls at Nanking had been evacTrouble had been anticipated

at

uating their nationals out of the danger zone to other

Shanghai. By 23 March, around 100 American

but 68 men, 153

began

to enter

primarily

children had

left,

women and 88 children still remained. As Nationalist soldiers
the city, 104 women and 69 children were sent aboard the

American destroyers, Noa and VSS
sels,

women and

cities,

the British light cruiser

Preston (DD-327). In addition to these ves-

HMS Emerald and three Japanese destroyers were

present.

seamen from the Preston also were stationed at the Hill residence on 23
March. Looting and rioting broke out about 6 P.M. that night when about
10,000 defeated Northern soldiers, passing through the city to the Yangtze
River, returned again to the city, having discovered it would be impossible to
cross the river. The following day, Dr. J. E. Williams, an American citizen and
Vice President of Nanking University, was killed. On the same day, Cantonese troops attacked the American, British and Japanese consuls, wounding
the latter two. The American consular staff and 24 refugee foreigners who
Six

were under their protection escaped to the Hill residence before the consulate

was looted.

During

this entire time,

Mr. Davis from the American consulate had

vain to contact a responsible Cantonese
eigners.

official to

tried in

ensure the safety of

The US forces were hesitant to move because

all for-

they had been instructed

and not merely property. Therefore, when the Cantonese approached the Hill residence, the Americans did not request assistance from the Noa and the Emerald until attack was imminent. Shortly
to act only to protect

thereafter, the

from the

life

Cantonese attacked and the occupants requested landing forces

ships.

When it

appeared that the landing force would be unable to reach the Hill

residence in time to save the occupants from the Cantonese, the Emerald,

Noa

and Preston shelled the area. The Noa and Preston then sent a landing force to
rescue the 52 Americans and foreign refugees in the house. 32 However, the Hill
group missed the landing force and was picked up by the British destroyer HMS
Wolsey (D-98). There were no fatalities.
Immediately afterward, a conference of British and American naval

was held on board the Emerald. They drew up a
ese requiring: (1) the protection of
tion by 10

A.M. the next day;

(2)

all

set of demands to the

foreigners

still

officers

Canton-

ashore and their evacua-

orders to protect foreign property; and (3) the
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presence of the Cantonese general

P.M. that night to arrange

I

commander on board

the Emerald before

for the protection of foreigners.

Negotiations took place that night and the next afternoon.
replies

1

The Chinese

were insolent and evasive. Indirectly, word came that General Chiang

Kai-shek was coming to Nanking to take charge of the situation. Over 100

Americans (45 women, 90 men and 20 children), 17 British and several foreign nationals were still left in the city. Most of the Americans assembled at
Nanking University. It finally was decided that if all foreign nationals were
not released by late in the afternoon of 25 March, the USS Isabel (PY-10), the
Noa, the Emerald and the Wolsey would begin firing on salient military points
in Nanking. The Chinese general became alarmed, and by 4:30 P.M. British
Marines and all but two British civilians were returned. The Americans also
were released from the University and by 8 P.M. all were aboard the vessels.
During the incident, American ships had

had

fired 76. Six

business

Chinese

civilians

34 rounds and the Emerald
and some soldiers had been killed. Only five
fired

men and two missionaries remained in the city. A great part of the for-

eign population of Nanking, including people of many nationalities, had been

saved by the American action.
Sources: Clark 92-93; [1927] 2 Foreign Rel U.

S.

146-70 (1942); 2 Hackworth 333; Offutt

142-49.

Case No. 141, 1927

At

— China (Hankow)

the request of the manager of the Standard Oil

24 seamen went ashore at

Hankow on

Company,

a landing party of

27 April 1927, to quell a "fracas."

Source: Clark 93.

Case No. 142, 1927

On

22

May

— China (Chinkiang)

1927, landing parties from the destroyers

(DD-228) and the

HMS Wolverine

USS John

D. Ford

(D-78) went ashore at Chinkiang to fight a

which began when a shell hit a Socony fuel oil tank. Apparently the
had been fired by the Northern forces from the northern bank of the

fire

during revolutionary disturbances in that

shell

river

city.

Source: Clark 94.

Case No. 143, 1927

— China

(Tientsin)

By June 1927, the Southern forces had pushed the civil war to the northern
part of China. It seemed certain that the area around Tientsin would be the
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next target of their attack.
lives

and property of

all

The American

US

Minister to China reported that the

were in danger.

citizens

He

suggested that

additional forces be sent to Tientsin to afford Americans complete protection

and ensure that there would be no repetition of the serious incidents which had
33
occurred recently in South China.

On

2

June 1927, a force of Marines about the

from Shanghai, arriving

at

Taku Bar two days

size

later.

of one regiment sailed

On 6 June

1927, the force

reached Tientsin, where they remained until the danger had passed.
Sources: Ellsworth 44; [1927] 2 Foreign Rel V.

Case No. 144, 1927

A

S.

124-27 (1942).

— China (Canton)

two-day revolt supported by the Communists began in Canton on 11

December 1927. The same
to the

Hackett Medical College to evacuate U.

endangered by the

and proceeded
whose lives were

day, a force of nine Marines landed

rebellion.

S. citizens

Evacuated persons were taken to another part of

the city where the rebels had not been active.
Source: Clark 94-95.

Case No. 145, 1932

— China (Shanghai)

Following the outbreak of war between Japan and China, the American consul
at

Shanghai, fearing for the

lives

and property of Americans

in the city,

requested that additional forces be landed to assure their protection.

February 1932, the U.

S. transport

USS Chaumont (AP-5)

and landed a force of 1,178 men. They remained ashore

On

5

arrived at Shanghai

until

July 1932.

1

Source: Clark 97.

Notes
1

Omitted are the instances considered

has taken similar action in the post-World
2.

Some

readers

may

at length in

War

II

Chapter IV, where the United States

period.

regard this Appendix as too inclusive. Prior

contained as few as 69 cases compared to the 145

listed herein. See

lists,

for instance,

have

Wormuth, "The Nixon

Theory of the War Power: A Critique," 60 Calif. L. Rev. 623, 654 (1972). But see generally
Appendix A to Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. Va. L. Rev. 53, 88 111 (1971). If the
present compilation errs in this respect, the reader can separate the wheat from the chaff quite
easily.
3.

See Case No.

5.

4.

See Case No.

7.

5.

See Perrin v. United States, 4 Ct. CI. 543 (1868).

6.

The United

States took the position that

railroad stations of the

Panama

American

forces could be sent to

occupy the

Railroad Co. in the event of revolution under the following
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clause of Article 35 of the 1846 Treaty of Peace, Amity, Navigation,

and Commerce with

New

Granada (United States of Colombia):
and constant enjoyment of these
advantages, and as an especial compensation for the said advantages and for the
favours they have acquired by the 4th, 5th and 6th articles of this Treaty, the United
States guarantee positively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present
stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before mentioned Isthmus, with the view that
the free transit from the one to the other sea, may not be interrupted or embarrassed
in any future time while this Treaty exists.

And,

in order to secure to themselves the tranquil

6 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America

1776-1949,
7.

at

The

879-80 (1971).

executive officer of the Iroquois was none other than Alfred T.

Mahan, from

Sail to

8.

Brazil,

Mahan.

See T.

Steam 242-47 (1907).

France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain.

9.

See Case No. 28.

10.

See Case No. 13.

11.

See Case No. 55.

12.

Of these forces,

8,000 were Japanese; 4,800 Russian; 3,000 British; 2,500 American; 800

French; 40 Italian and 25 Austrian.
13.

Tientsin

14.

See Case No. 54.

fell

to the Allies

on 14 July 1900.
Article VII

15.

The Chinese Government has agreed

that the quarter occupied by the legations shall

be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive
control, in

which Chinese

shall

not have the right to reside and which

may be made

defensible.

Article IX

The Chinese Government
letter of the

has conceded to the Powers, in the protocol annexed to the

16th of January 1901, the right to occupy certain points, to be determined

by an agreement between them,

The

the capital and the sea.

for the

maintenance of open communication between

points occupied by the powers are:

Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chum-liang Ch'eng, Tang-ku,
Lu-tai,
1

Tangshan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang

tao,

Shan-hai Kuan.

C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America

1776-1917,
16.

at

306-07 (1968).

The United

Cuba, which

States

had the

right to intervene

under Article

III

of the 1903 Treaty with

stated:

The Government

of Cuba consents that the United States

intervene for the preservation of

government adequate

Cuban independence,

may

exercise the right to

the maintenance of a

and individual liberty, and
for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on
the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the Government of Cuba.
for the protection of

life,

property,

6 C. Bevans, Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America

1776-1949, at 1118 (1971).
17.

See Case No. 80.

18.

See

id.
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By 8 March 1912, the distribution of foreign troops in the vicinity of Tientsin was as
follows: about 575 American, 1,200 British, 1,500 Japanese and 100 German troops,
respectively, and about 200-225 Russian, Austrian, French and Italian troops combined.
20. See Case No. 73.
21. See Case No. 68 for the text of Article III.
22. American landings in Nicaragua, 1912:
A force of 102 men landed at Corinto and traveled by rail to Managua to
(1)3 August
guard the American legation and protect American interests.
Reinforcements numbering 354 men disembarked at Corinto and
(2) 14 August
proceeded to Managua, arriving there 15 August. This force also was used to guard the
19.

—

—

legation.

— A of 35 seamen and Marines landed Corinto
29 August — A
of 120 men landed
Corinto
duty
aboard
24 and 25 October 1912.
of 25 men went ashore
30 August — A
San Juan
Sur
(3)

28 August

force

at

1

force

(4)

ashore.

for

at

for field service.

They returned

ship

force

(5)

to protect the cable

del

at

and American interests from 30 August
September to 27 September 1912.

station

to 6

September 1912, and from 11

—A
regiment of 781 Marines disembarked
Corinto.
September — An
of 323
and Marines landed
Corinto
the
duty
September — Another 50 men landed
Corinto.
November — A
of 21 men landed
San Juan
Twelve of
men
(6)

4 September

provisional

at

additional force

(7) 5

in

sailors

for

at

field.

(8) 19

at

force

(9) 3

del Sur.

at

these

were withdrawn on 5 November and the balance on 8 November.
23.

See Case No. 112 for

more information about the

activity of the legation

guard

at

Managua.
24.

See also Case Nos. 82, 83, 84, 90 and 91.

25.

Landings by American forces in Cuba, 1917:
(1)

—A
of 32 men landed
protect
sugar
Jobabo Anchorage
They reembarked
February.
February — A landing party of 17 men from the USS Tucker (DD-57) went ashore

12 February

force

(2) 13

at

a

to

at

plantation near Trinidad.

13

Manzanillo to protect the American consulate. They were relieved on the same day by

a similar force

from the USS Dubuque (PG- 1 7) The guard was withdrawn 15 February.
.

—
20 February — The 29 men quartered on board the Cuban gunboat 24
Casilda
22 March.
landed and occupied house
They
25 February — A
of 218 men landed
Guantanamo

A force of 29 men from the USS Paducah (PG-18) disembarked and
(3) 17 February
was quartered on the Cuban gunboat 24 de Febrero until 20 February.
de Febrero

(4)

a

until

at

force

(5)

Bay.

at

transported by water to Caimanera, where they embarked by train for

With
(6)

were

Guantanamo City.

the exception of one detachment of Marines, they reembarked 6 March.

25 February

—A

force of

more than 200 Marines from three

ashore at Guacanayabo Gulf at the dock of the Francisco Sugar

American

different vessels

went

Company of New York to

Each of the three detachments
returned to their ship on a different date: 3, 4 and 7 March.
A force of 32 men landed at Nuevitas Bay and remained until 28
(7) 27 February
protect the lives and property of

citizens.

—

February.
(8) 5
(9) 7

March
March

—A
—A

force landed at Santiago.
force landed at Rio

They returned aboard

ship

on

1 1

Canto

March.

182

to protect the Rio

Canto Sugar Plantation.

Appendix

I

—

A force of 358 men landed at Santiago to protect the lives and property
(10) 8 March
endangered by the revolutionaries' bombardment of the city. About 120 of these men
returned to their ship on 17 March.

—A
Santiago, returning
of 153 Marines and seamen went ashore
March.
Santiago
Cobre mines.
8 March — A
of 12 men landed
guard the
Santiago and remained ashore
9 March — A company of Marines went ashore
21 March.
Guantanamo Bay and traveled
9 March — A party of 122 men landed
Guantanamo City where they remained
24 March.
Santiago.
9 March — Two companies of Marines landed
Santiago
the party which had
9 March — Additional men landed
was
landed there on March. This
on 10 March.
armored
10 March — Eight men from the USS Montana (ACR-13),
landed and returned
Caimanera
23 March.
Santiago, remaining ashore
10 March — Another company of Marines landed
18 March.
Preston and Lacajo where they remained
10 March — Small detachments landed
12 March, when they were
by another landing
March — A
of 13 men landed
Guara and remained there
23 March.
of 25
and Marines was stationed
Banes and San
12 March — A
(11)8 March

force

at

to their ship 18

detail

(12)

El

to

at

at

(13)

until

to

at

(14)

until

at

(15)

to reinforce

at

(16)

5

relieved

force

a first-class

(17)

to ship daily at

cruiser,

until
at

(18)

until

at

(19)

relieved

until

(20)

party.

force

1 1

force

(21)

until

at

at

sailors

Jeronimo to protect American

interests. Part of the force

reembarked on 15 March, the

remainder on 20 March.

— A landing
from
USS Machias (PG-5)
detachments which had landed
Preston and Lacajo on 10 March.
Naval Station
March — A detachment
20 Marines from the U.
(22)

12

(23)

13

March

relieved the

the

party

at

of

Guantanamo Bay was
until

sent to

Boqueron

S.

to protect

American

property.

at

They remained

24 March.

— A small detachment landed Nipe Bay protect and property
San Jeronimo. They returned
on 18 March.
March — A
landed
Batey
guard the
of the Manti Sugar Company.
They reembarked 21
when they were
by detachment of Marines.
19 March — A detachment of 20 men landed
Santiago
protect the
Cobre
mines. They returned aboard
22 March.
19 March — A
of 100 men landed
Guantanamo Bay and proceeded
Guantanamo
where they remained
22 March.
20 March — A company of Marines went ashore
where they remained
23 May.
20 March — A
of 41 men landed from the USS Machias
duty
of the
with the remainder reembarking on 23 March.
re-embarked the same
21 March — A landing party of 18 Marines and
went ashore and remained
23 March.
21 March — For
Santiago
days small detachments were landed
protect the Aguadores
bridge and the
Cobre mines.
22 March — A
of two
companies and
landed
Santiago
detachment of Marines, re-embarking 23 March.
22 March — A company of Marines was sent
Guantanamo
They returned
(24) 15

March

to

at

lives

to ship

at

(25) 17

force

at

mill

to

relieved

April,

a

El

to

at

(26)

ship

force

(27)

to

at

City,

until

at Daiquiri,

(28)

until

force

(29)

force

for

ashore. Part

day,

sailors

(30)

until

several

(31)

daily at

railroad

force

(32)

to

El

infantry

special details

to relieve a

to

(33)

aboard ship 23 May.
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— A company of Marines disembarked Guantanamo Bay, remaining
of 46 men landed
22 March — A
Guara and Nipe
25 March.
They returned aboard
Cienfuegos, reembarking the same
24 March —
seamen landed
—
A detachment of Marines landed Santiago guard the Cobre
24 March
mines. They reembarked 28 March.
Santiago each night through 27 March
24 March — A small detachment landed
the Aguadores
men landed
25 March — A detachment of
Guara, returning aboard
27 March — A detachment of 10 men landed
remaining
28 March — A small detachment landed
Cienfuegos
the protection of
(34) 22

March

at

ashore until 30 March.

force

(35)

to relieve forces at Preston,

ship

Bay.

Fifty

(36)

day.

at

18

(37)

at

El

to

at

(38)

to protect

Bridge.

13

(39)

ship 7

at

April.

at Pelton,

(40)

the Aguadores Bridge. Another force of 21

mines. These

31

(42)

men were

—A

March

detachments.

It

(45)

men

relieved 15 April by a

company

for

landed there to protect the El Cobre

company

of Marines.

of Marines landed at Nipe Bay to relieve various

reembarked 24 May.

April — A company of Marines landed
detachment
Cienfuegos.
25 April — A small
landed
returning aboard
26
Regiment disembarked
Guantanamo Bay and
27 August — The Marine

(43) 15
(44)

until 2 April.

daily at

(41)

to relieve a

ship

7 th

remained there

until

at

at Preston,

force

April.

at

28 August 1919.

World War I, the Czechs had fought in a special unit of the
Russian army called the Druzhina. The Czech Corps was in the Ukraine when the Germans
resumed their offensive against Russia in February 1918. The Czechs made arrangements with
26.

From

the beginning of

Bolshevik leaders to evacuate the Corps via the Trans-Siberian Railway and Vladivostok.
Subsequently, the Bolsheviks changed their minds and decided to draft the Czechs into the
Soviet army.

The Czechs

resisted

27.

See Case No. 101.

28.

See Case No. 87.

and

hostilities

29.

See also Case Nos. 124 and 125.

30.

See Case No. 124.

3

The U.

1

months

S.

broke out on 26

May

1918.

Government announced its intention to withdraw the legation guard about 14
At the request of President Martinez, who

prior to the actual date of withdrawal.

apparently believed that the guard was necessary to preserve order, the United States had

delayed the withdrawal. Martinez sought to reverse the American decision but met with no
success.

The occupants

American civilians,
two officers from the Emerald, five British civilians, two Scandinavians, two Russians, two
Signalmen from the destroyers and the guard of six seamen from the Preston.
33. For example, the Nanking incident of March 1927. See Case No. 140.
32.

of the house included Mr. and Mrs. Hobart, several
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Introduction

The

United States has long viewed military intervention in foreign counprotect the lives and property of US nationals as a proper use of

tries to

US Navy

Regulations dating back to 1775 have provided naval

commanders with the

authority to undertake such action. Additionally,

naval power. 1

throughout

much of this period

the accepted norms of international law coun-

tenanced such activity under such headings
intervention.

as self-preservation or nonpolitical

2

In recent years, however, the international political and legal context has

changed

drastically.

With

the emergence of the United Nations and the

post-colonial proliferation of independent States,

new norms and new needs

have been generated. For instance, under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter the
use of force is proscribed, except when used in self-defense or when sanctioned
by the United Nations. Article 51, however, preserves the
valid use of force in situations involving self-defense.

At

possibility of the

the same time, emer-

gent nations have demonstrated an anti-colonial attitude bent on the elimination of

many

formerly accepted practices, such as intervention for the

protection of foreign nationals and their property, which are

now viewed

as

tools of imperialistic control. 3

Despite this substantial
ing the conduct of the

shift in international

US Navy

in this area

norms, the regulations govern-

remained

essentially

unchanged

With the promulgation of the 1973 and 1990 Regulations however,
that the Navy Regulations have become more congruent with the re-

until 1973.
it

appears

alities

of present-day international

life,

thus attenuating

criticism regarding their compatibility with

much

of the former

contemporary international law. 4

This Appendix constitutes a textual analysis of the regulations which have
guided and continue to guide the

US

US Navy in its use of force to protect the lives

The analysis proceeds with a listing of
those regulations in each edition of US Navy Regulations that relate to the proand property of

nationals abroad.

tection of nationals and then following each by a brief
to the question of how

current

Navy

each edition

fits

commentary addressed

in with the overall

development of the

regulations.

The regulations analyzed in this study begin with the British Navy Regulations
of 1749 and 1772 and continue with their offspring, 5 the US Navy Regulations of
1775, 1799, 1802, 1814, 1818, 1821, 1841, 1853, 1858, 1863, 1865, 1869, 1870,
187
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1876, 1893, 1896, 1900, 1905, 1909, 1913, 1920, 1948, 1973 and 1990. Histories

US Navy Regulations until

of the various editions of British or

1973 are not

avail-

explained in the paragraph that follows.

able, for reasons partially

Although the Constitution grants Congress sole authority to issue regulations for the armed forces, 6 Congress, except for the first three Regulations of
1775, 1799 and 1800, merely ratified the rules compiled by the President and
the Secretary of the Navy. 7 Even this limited supervisory rule was abdicated in
1862,

when Congress gave

Navy the authority to issue
President. 8 As a practical matter,

the Secretary of the

ulations subject to the approval of the

regthis

delegation probably ensured that regulations were written and revised at the

behest of senior naval

officers.

cess in the formulation of US

9

In any event, records of the administrative pro-

Navy Regulations

prior to 1973 are unavailable.

Therefore, authorship and the intended results remain unclear for earlier regulations.

This leaves the actual language of the regulations and the interpreta-

tions subsequently given to

them by naval commanders

as the only sources of

interpretative standards.

As noted above,

the regulations in force until 1973 did not differ greatly

from those regulations in force during the nineteenth century. The 1973 and

1990 Regulations vary considerably from their predecessors by omitting
out-of-date passages from earlier regulations.
analysis to

examine the extent

US Navy Regulations
I.

into line

Regulations

Article VI.

the Navy.
lished,

he

To

which these new revisions have brought the
with contemporary international law.

And Instructions

to

At Sea

Flag'Officer or

Relating

(11th ed.

To His

1772)

Commander-in-Chief

Naval Officers abroad, according to the Rules of
Foreign Parts, where Naval or other Officers are estab-

direct the

When he is in
is

the purpose of the following

to

Majesty's Service

The

It is

conform himself,

as

much

as possible, to the standing

Rules of

the Navy, in such Directions as he shall have Occasion to give them; and never
to put

them upon any extraordinary Expenses,

unless the Service shall abso-

lutely require the same.

The Captain
Article XLII.

Not

or

Commander

to go into Port unnecessarily.

He

is

not to go into any

other Port than such as his Orders direct him, unless by inevitable Necessity,
188
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and then to make no unnecessary Stay there. If he is employed in a cruising Station, he is to keep the Sea the Time required by his Orders; but if he is compelled by any Accident to return sooner into Port, he is to send in Writing the
Reasons thereof to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and also to the Commander-in-Chief, if any such be there, and to put to Sea again so soon as the

Wants are supplied.
Article XLV. To demand

Ship's

Seamen out

English

meets with any Foreign Ship or Vessel, he
inquire

if

any Seamen,

demand

all

But

is

this

His Majesty's Subjects,

such, obliging their Masters to pay

to be

esty's Officers,

ment

who are

to send a

is

done with

who are

civil

and

When

of foreign Ships.

them

Commission Officer
be on Board her, and

their

friendly Behavior

he

Wages

on the

to
to

to that Day.

Part of His Maj-

to be very careful not to offer any Violence or

ill

Treat-

to the Subjects of His Majesty's Friends or Allies. 10

Commentary
The Eleventh

Edition of Regulations and Instructions Relating

Service at Sea, established by His Majesty in

cestor of all subsequent editions of US

ment of

the

Council in 1772,

Navy Regulations. This

Sixth Edition, published in

to

is

His Majesty's

the direct an-

text

is

a restate-

1749 to update British Navy

Regulations from a code which originated during the reign of Henry VIII.

The

three articles cited above are identical in both the Sixth and Eleventh Editions.

VI is concerned with the relationship between a Flag-Officer or
Commander-in-Chief and the agents of the British government already established in foreign ports. The "unless" clause at the end of the article qualifies the
instructions to conform to the "Rules of the Navy" and the rule against extraorArticle

dinary expenditures placing the needs of the service paramount.
cer, as the senior officer present in foreign waters,

is

The

Flag-Offi-

the person best-qualified to

determine the needs of the service.

On the other hand, according to Article XLII, a Captain or Commander acting independently

may not even enter a

evitable necessity" forces

him

to

do

so.

foreign port without orders unless "in-

Again the Captain

determines whether inevitable necessity

was the

XLV was

the cause of

legal justification

much

the person

The second sentence, dealing
the home port of the ship.

hostility in the

United

used for impressment of American

Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. While

this

States, since

sailors

it

during the

rule provided a vehicle

whereby British sailors could be liberated from foreign employment,
was used to conduct a forced draft.
189
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it

often
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Rules For The Regulation

Abroad

Of The Navy Of The

United Colonies Of North America (1775)
Article 2

come

1

.

If

any ships of the Thirteen United Colonies

into port in

want of

provisions, the warrant of a

happen to
Commander-in-Chief
shall

be sufficient to the agent or other instrument of the victualling to supply

shall

the quantity wanted; and in urgent cases where delay

may be

rant of the Captain of the ship shall be of equal effect.

hurtful, the war-

11

Commentary
As

stated in the Introduction to this Appendix, 12 for the most part these

were copied from the British Regulations of 1749 and 1772. They are con-

rules

cerned with the prerogatives and responsibilities o( command and matters

af-

VI and XLV of the
British Regulations were not included. The only provision which might be said
to govern conduct in foreign ports short of an actual engagement is Article 21,
which corresponds roughly to Article XLII of the British Regulations. Referfecting supply, discipline

and conduct

ence to purchases in foreign
sistent

III.

ports,

in action. Articles

however,

omitted. This omission was con-

is

with the coastal character of the continental Navy.

An Act for the Government of the Navy of the United

States (1799)

Warrant for supply of provisions. If any ships of the United States
shall happen to come into port in want of provisions, the warrant of the commander oi the squadron, or of a captain where there is no commander of a
Article 18.

squadron present,

shall

be sufficient to procure the supply of the quantity

wanted, from the agent, or navy agent at such port. 13

Commentary
Article 18

Navy

is

based on Article 21 of the 1775 Rules for the Regulation of the

of the United Colonies of North America,

pendence won two decades

engagement

in

earlier.

amended

Perhaps in recognition of the infant Navy's

an undeclared war with France in the West

ron commander's warrant was

now

to reflect the inde-

sufficient

even

in

Indies,

any squad-

non-urgent cases.

This provision was not included in the 1800 revision, which repealed the

1799 statute

entirely. 14

No

reason for this omission
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II

Navy Regulations (1802)

Duties of a Commander-in-Chief, or

When he

Article 16.

he

tablished,

is

to

in foreign parts

is

Commander

of a Squadron

where naval or other

conform himself as much

officers are es-

as possible to the standing rules of

the navy, in such directions as he shall have occasion to give them, and never
to put

them under any extraordinary expenses,

unless the service should abso-

lutely require the same.

Of the
Article 40.

He

is

Duties of a Captain or

not to go into any port, but such as are directed by

ders, unless necessitously obliged,
if

employed in

Commander

cruising,

he

is

to

and then not

to

make any unnecessary

keep the sea the time required by

give reasons for acting to the contrary.

his orstay;

his orders, or

15

Commentary

Of the

Duties of a Commander-in-Chief, Article 16,

is

almost an exact

re-

production of Article VI of the 1772 British Regulations for the Flag-Officer or

American Commander-in-Chief identical
discretion as to expenditures as his British counterpart, and similarly ignores
the situation of where provisions are located in a port where naval authorities
are not established. It is reasonable to assume that both the British and American regulations were concerned more with the possibility of commanders
putting into port too often or making extravagant purchases than with any
Commander-in-Chief.

It

allows an

danger of intervention by force in foreign countries.

Of the

Duties of a Captain or

of the 1799 Rules.

It is

the

Commander.

reinsertion of both these articles

US Navy by

this

Article 40, succeeded Article 18

a close paraphrase of Article XLII of the 1772 British

Regulations for the Captain or

The

Commander,

may be explained by

the fact that

time had become transoceanic and had begun a series

of engagements in the Mediterranean using ships of substantial size and

fire-

power. Visitation of foreign ports by necessity was thus a distinct possibility.

There

is

no

indication, however, that the necessity standard refers to any-

thing other than matters concerning the administration and operation o{
the vessel

itself.
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V. United States Navy Regulations (1814)

Of the

When he

Article 16.
tablished,

he

Duties of

to

is

is

Commander

in foreign parts,

conform himself,

as

of a Squadron

where naval or other agents are

much as possible,

es-

to the standing rules of

the navy, in such directions as he shall have occasion to give them; and he

is

never to put them under any extraordinary expenses, unless the service should
absolutely require the same.

Of the
Article 4 1

He

.

Duties of a Captain or

Commander

not to go into any port, but such as are directed by his or-

is

and then not to make any unnecessary stay;
keep the sea the time required by his orders, or

ders, unless necessitously obliged,
if

employed in

cruising,

he

is

to

give reasons for acting to the contrary. 16

Commentary
Article 16
duties o{ a

repeated from Article 16 of the 1802 Regulations governing the

is

Commander-in-Chief or Commander of

clarifying changes.
parts.

eral

"Agents"

The words "he is"

are

is

a

substituted for "officers"

added

at the

Squadron with certain

who may be

beginning of the

in foreign

last clause, as are sev-

commas.

Article 41 repeats Article

of a Captain or

40 of the 1802 Regulations governing the Duties

Commander.
VI. United States

Commanders
Article 15.

Conform

Navy Regulations (1818)
of Fleets or Squadrons

to established rules.

He

shall

conform

to the stand-

ing rules of the navy, in such directions as he shall give to established
agents,

and incur no expense that the public service does not render abso-

lutely necessary.

Regulations for the Promotion of Discipline, Cleanliness,
Article 28.

any

port, but

To visit no port without orders. He

such

as

[the Captain]

may be directed by his orders,
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and then not to make any unnecessary stay. If employed in cruising, he is to
keep the sea, the time required by his orders, or give reasons for acting to the
contrary, to the Secretary of the Navy. 17

Commentary
Article 15 repeats the substance of Article 16 of the 1814 Regulations gov-

erning Squadron

The

Commanders but with

significant differences.

"Commanders of Fleets or
Squadrons" to reflect the increased size of the Navy in the preceding four years.
The language referring to "foreign parts" was omitted, applying the regulation
section of the regulations was entitled

everywhere there were "established agents." This

latter

term replaced the

phrase "where naval or other agents are established." "Extraordinary" was deleted from the last clause,

Article 28

is

for clarity.

derived from Article 41 of the 1814 Regulations governing the

duties of a Captain.
for the

which was reworded

The

subject matter

is

now under the heading "Regulations

Promotion of Discipline, Cleanliness,

expanding navy. The remaining changes are

etc.,"

Commanders

tions as

he

is

now

specified to

Navy.

VII. United States

Article 15.

The
be made

for purposes of clarification.

report of reasons for not keeping to sea as required
to the Secretary of the

perhaps also reflecting the

Navy Regulations (1821)

of Fleets or Squadrons

He shall conform to the standing rules of the navy,

shall give to established agents,

in

such direc-

and incur no expense that the public

service does not render absolutely necessary.

Regulations for the Promotion of Discipline, Cleanliness, etc.
Article 28.
ders, unless
If

He is not to go into any port but such as may be directed by his or-

by absolute necessity, and then not to make any unnecessary

employed in

cruising,

he

is

to

keep the sea the time required by

stay.

his orders, or

give reasons for acting to the contrary to the Secretary of the Navy. 18

Commentary
The 1821

Regulations are identical to the 1818 Regulations with respect to

these articles.
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Navy Regulations (1841)

Commanders

of Vessels

When directed to cruise, he is to keep the sea the time required

Article 186.

by his orders, or produce satisfactory reasons for acting to the contrary.

He

Article 187.

is

not to go into any port but such as

may be

permitted by his instructions, unless from necessity, and then to
necessary stay.

designated or

make no un-

19

Commentary
The 1841 edition of the regulations was never approved by Congress, but evidently the Navy adhered to them as if they had been.
Article 28 of the 1821 Regulations concerning the Promotion of Discipline,
Cleanliness, etc. was split into two articles, 186
tions.

Reasons

cally to

port

is

for failure to

and 187,

in the 1841 Regula-

keep to the sea (Article 186) are no longer

specifi-

be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy. Entering an undesignated

now

permitted merely "from necessity."

The

other changes are for pur-

poses of clarity.

The

the 1821 Regulations governing the duties

rons

is

Navy in Article 15 of
of Commanders of Fleets or Squad-

direction to conform to the standing rules of the

omitted from

this

and succeeding

IX. United States

Navy Regulations (1853)

Commanders
Article 21.

When directed

editions.

to cruise,

of Vessels

he

is

to

keep the sea the time required

by his orders, or produce satisfactory reasons for deviating from them.
Article 22.

He

is

not to go into any port but such as

may be

permitted by his instructions, unless from necessity, and then to

designated or

make no un-

necessary stay. 20

Commentary
Articles 21

and 22 are identical

to Articles 186

and 187 of the 1841 Navy

Regulations, except for a clarifying change to Article 2 1

not keep to the sea the time required by his orders,
194

Commander does
he must now produce
.

If a

Appendix

satisfactory reasons for "deviating

II

from them" rather than

for "acting to the

contrary."

X. United States Navy Regulations (1858)

Commanders

To keep

Article 28.
to cruise,

he

is

of Vessels

the sea the time required by his orders.

keep the sea the time required by

to

When directed

his orders, or

produce

satis-

factory reasons for deviating from them.

Article 29.
into any port

To visit no port not designated in his instructions. He is not to go
but such as may be designated or permitted by his instructions,

unless from necessity,

and then

to

make no unnecessary

stay. 21

Commentary
Articles 28

and 29

and 22 of the 1853

are identical to Articles 21

Regulations.

XL

United States Navy Regulations (1863)
Article

VL

General Duties of Line Officers

The Commander-in-Chief of a

To
United

Fleet or

Squadron

place himself in communication with the diplomatic agents of the
States.

On arriving within the limits of his station on foreign service,

he

is

to place

himself in communication with the diplomatic agents of the government of the

United States thereabouts, and he
such aid and cooperation in
they

may

require,

and

as

all

to afford them,

on

his

own responsibility,

matters for the benefit of the government as

he may judge to be expedient and proper.

Officers

To keep

is

Commanding

Vessels

the sea the time required by his orders.

When directed to cruise, he is to keep the sea the time required by his orders,
or produce satisfactory reasons for deviating from them.
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To visit no port not designated in his instructions.
He is not to go into any port but such as may be designated
his instructions, unless

or permitted in

from necessity, and then to make no unnecessary

stay. 22

Commentary
That portion of the 1863 Regulations governing the duties of officers commanding vessels is identical to Articles 28 and 29 of the 1858 Regulations.
However, that portion oi the 1863 Regulations governing the duties of the
Commander-in-Chief of a fleet or squadron reflects the different Navy of 1863.
In contrast to Article 15 of the 1821 Regulations concerning commanders of
fleets or squadrons, there is no mention of the "rules of the navy" or "expenses,"
but rather "co-operation in

all

matters for the benefit of the government."

The

emphasis shifted from the simple maintenance of ships in foreign waters to the

implementation of foreign policy through the use of naval

forces.

Moreover, the actions of the Commander-in-Chief are "on

and

sibility"

individual

matic

as

commander with

he sees

if he feels

fit.

Presumably, he

commanders were given the
own hands and intervene in foreign lands

under the umbrella phrase

XIL United

may exceed

such action to be appropriate. This

instance where naval

matters into their
tionals

respon-

the discretion to aid and cooperate with diplo-

officials in foreign ports as

first

own

he judges to be "expedient and proper." The regulations vest an

recommendations
the

his

"for the benefit of the

States

article,

their

then,

is

authority to take
to protect

US

na-

government."

Navy Regulations (1865)

General Duties of Line Officers

The Commander-in-Chief of a
Article 310.

communication with the diplomatic agents of the government

of the United States thereabouts, and he

such aid and cooperation in

as they

may

Squadron

On arriving within the limits of his station on foreign service, he is

to place himself in

bility,

Fleet or

require,

and

as

all

is

on

his

own responsi-

matters for the benefit of the government

he may judge to be expedient and proper.

Officers

Article 346. Should he find

Commanding

it

Vessels

necessary to go into a port not designated or

make no unnecessary stay, and will report
and of any delay that may occur. 23

permitted by his instructions, he will
the cause of the necessity

to afford them,
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Commentary
These 1865 Regulations are the

last

of the original sailing instructions that

were closely related to the 1775 and 1802 editions of the Regulations.
Article

310 repeats verbatim that portion of Article VI of the 1863 Regula-

tions pertaining to the

Commander-in-Chief of a

fleet or

squadron previously

quoted.
Article

346

is

based on that portion of Article VI of the 1863 Regulations

commanding vessels to keep to sea the time required by his orders. The revised version no longer prohibits entry into an
undesignated port. The change in tenor reflects the Navy's increased role. For
the first time, however, the commanding officer must report the cause of the
necessity for entering the undesignated port and of any delay that may occur.
pertaining to the duty of officers

No longer is there a requirement to keep to the sea when directed to cruise.
XIII.

United States Navy Regulations (1869)

Instructions for Officers, Afloat:

Commander-in-Chief

The Commander-in-Chief is not to attempt the arrest of a deserter, whatever may be his class, by sending an officer under his command after him, but he is to make the proper application to the civil authorities of the
place where he may be.
Article 52.

No Commander-in-Chief is ever to take upon himself the power
of inflicting punishment upon the subjects of any civilized nation, with whom
Article 53.

we have

treaties, for

any alleged violation of treaties or international law.

Article 54. In the absence of a United States Minister he

lomatic discussions

on

all

is

to enter into dip-

matters of this kind, with the nation which

posed to be the aggressor, and

is

sup-

opportunity to lay the

will take the earliest

correspondence before the United States Government.
Article 157.

protect

A Commander-in-Chief

American commerce

Article 165. If he finds
vessel

who complains

if

on

all

occasions to do his utmost to

in all quarters.

an American seaman employed on board

that he

necessary inquiries, and

is

is

there contrary to his

will,

he finds that the said seaman

is

he

a foreign

will institute all

improperly detained,

the Commander-in-Chief will apply to the proper authority to have
leased and will give

him

a passage to the nearest
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port.

him

re-
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Article 169.

der his

The Commander-in-Chief should

command comply

He

is

observe himself that

with the laws of blockade

blockaded by a nation with
Article 170.

Abroad

whom we

when

all

un-

a harbor or port

is

are at peace.

to observe the strictest neutrality,

and

afford

no

assis-

tance to either party not called for by the interests of humanity.

He

same time to make every effort to protect the lives
and property of American citizens that may be within the lines of the
Article 171.

is

at the

belligerents.

Commander-in-Chief will cause
observed by those under his command.

Article 172. In time of war, a
neutrality to be strictly

Article 173.

the laws of

A Commander-in-Chief will also take upon himself to exercise
American letters-of-marque and privateers that
of his command, and will ascertain if they have made
or captured vessels belonging to neutral powers, which

particular authority over

come within

all

the limits

any fraudulent seizures

all

they had no right to capture.
Article

1

74.

He will exercise his judgment as to what disposal to make of said

privateers or letters-of-marque.

Article 175. In every case investigated by the Commander-in-Chief, he will

send a report to the Secretary of the Navy as soon
Article 176.

When on

a foreign station,

it is

as possible.

desirable that the best feeling

should exist between the Commander-in-Chief of a United States

fleet or

squadron and the American Minister, Charges and Consuls, but while every
courtesy should be paid to these

mander-in-Chief
acts

is

officials, it

must be understood that the Com-

responsible to the Secretary of the

Navy

alone, for his

24

Commentary
These regulations, which Secretary of the Navy George M. Robeson promulgated after the Civil War, are direct ancestors of the 1990 Regulations currently in effect. The most obvious explanation for the break between the 1865
and 1869 Regulations is the emergence of a powerful ironclad US Navy during
the Civil War. Although the Royal Navy resumed its role as the most powerful
afloat in the

icant force.
fact,

decade

after the Civil

War, the United States had become

Navy Regulations from 1869

have reflected

this

in foreign waters

and

to the present day

dealing extensively with the duties of

commanders

a signif-

ports.

This edition of the regulations was in effect for only one year. Yet the direct
ancestors of the articles quoted below from the 1990 Regulations
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appear for
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time in 1869. Textually, these articles are the

ulations. Geopolitically, they are

an extension of the 1865 Regulations

they reflect the Navy's increased awareness of
Article 52

is

"modern" Navy

first

new

its

reg-

in that

foreign relations role.

a clear prohibition against sending forces ashore in a foreign

land to pursue and arrest a deserter from a

US ship,

such matters are

left to

the

local civil authorities.

Article 53
tions.

The

is

repeated in conjunction with Article 54 in several other ediagainst

prohibition

mander-in-Chief acting on
nation[s] with
,

whom we

[the

his

retorsion

own

or

by a naval

reprisal

authority

United States] have

is

restricted

treaties."

to

Com-

"civilized

Presumably, "civi-

meant European or Latin American ones. In any event, the regucontains an open invitation to ignore treaties or international law with

lized" States

lation

regard to "savage" nations such as Hawaii, most African tribal kingdoms, and

most East Asian kingdoms. The article is thus narrow
Commander-in-Chief to punish in most instances.

in

its

scope and permits a

Article 54 requires diplomatic discussions with an alleged civilized aggressor

with

whom

the United States has treaties. Those areas excluded from Article

These articles establish the Commander-in-Chief as the arbiter oi whether there has been a breach of treaty or
violation of international law towards the United States. They further leave it
to him to determine whether a nation is civilized. Freedom to use force is contingent on these determinations.
53

are

similarly

excluded

here.

Article 157 appears in one form or another in

Regulations.

It

makes the

all

succeeding editions of the

US Navy the guardian of US commerce both on the

no element of discretion. A Commander-in-Chief must do everything he can to protect American commerce.
high seas and in foreign waters. There

is

Article 165 corresponds roughly to Article

XLV of the

1772 British Regula-

The US counterpart does not allow boarding, and it becomes operative
only when a complaint is received. It may be implemented only by foreign authorities. The only affirmative actions a Commander-in-Chief may make in
tions.

such a case are "necessary inquiries" and passage of the seaman to the nearest

American

port.

Article 169, in conjunction with the following seven articles,

some form

is

repeated in

in all succeeding editions of the regulations. In this edition Articles

169 through 176 should be read together.
Article 169 specifically requires compliance with the laws of blockade

the United States

mands

that

US

is

at

when

peace with the blockading nation. Article 170 com-

naval forces shall remain neutral in the face of a blockade, ex-

cept where assistance

is

called for in the interests of humanity. Article 171
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Commander-in-Chief the responsibility to protect the "lives and
property of American citizens within the lines of the belligerents." Article 172

gives the

commands US
States

is

forces shall

remain neutral "in time of war" when the United

not a party. Article 173 gives American Commanders-in-Chief juris-

diction over letters-of-marque and privateers operating in areas under their

command and makes them a prize court of original jurisdiction.

Article 174 au-

judgment on letters-of-marque and privateers within the jurisdiction
of a Commander-in-Chief. Article 175 requires that a report of such cases be
sent to the Secretary of the Navy. Article 176 makes the Commander-in-Chief
thorizes

solely responsible to the Secretary of the

Navy

for his acts while

on

foreign

station.

The

respect blockades by friendly

when

Commanders-in-Chief are urged to
nations and to comply with the laws of neutrality

thrust of these seven articles

the United States

is

is

that

not at war. At the same time, Commanders-in-Chief

own

are authorized,

on

United States

not a party on humanitarian grounds. Commanders-in-Chief

is

their

initiative, to

intervene in wars to which the

Ameriwhich the United

are also obliged to engage in forcible self-help for the protection of

can

and property, at least with respect to wars to
not a party. They must justify such actions only to the Secretary of the

lives

States

is

Navy.

XIV. United

States

Navy Regulations (1870)

Duties of Commander-in-Chief
Section 52.

He

will preserve, so far as in

him

lies,

the best feeling and the

most cordial relations with the ministers and consuls of the United States on
foreign stations,

and

will

extend to them every

duly consider such information as they
terests of the

and he

will

United States, but he

official courtesy.

may have

will

to give

He

him relating

will also

to the in-

not receive orders from such sources,

be responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, in the

first

place, for his

acts.

Section 53.

He

will

not take upon himself the power of inflicting punish-

ment upon the people of any
for

civilized nation

with

whom we

have

treaties,

any violation, alleged or otherwise, of such treaties or of international

law.

Section 54. In the absence of a diplomatic representative of the United
States,

he

will enter into

thorities of the nation

correspondence on matters of

which may be supposed
200
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kind with the au-

have been the aggressor, and
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opportunity to communicate

will take the earliest

the information in his

all

possession to the government of the United States.

Section 55.

He

will

do

utmost on

his

all

commerce

occasions to protect the

of the United States.

Section 94. During wars to which the United States

not a party, he shall

is

himself observe the strictest neutrality between the belligerents, and shall re-

command

quire every one under his

Section 95.
is

He shall comply with the laws of blockade, when a harbor or port

blockaded by a nation with

He shall at

and property of
belligerents, and

whom

the United States

at peace,

is

command.
the same time make every effort

quire the like compliance by

Section 96.

to practice the like observance.

citizens

all

under

and

will re-

his

to protect the lives

of the United States within the lines of the

will so instruct the

Commanding

Officers of his fleet or

squadron.

Commanding

Officers

Section 247.

Vessels

When not acting under the orders of a superior officer,

be governed by the regulations for the Commander-in-Chief, so
be applicable to his case.

far as

he

will

they

may

25

Commentary
Section 52 repeats the substance of Article 176 of the 1869 Regulations.
Sections 53 through 55 repeat the substance of Articles 53, 54 and 157 of the

1869 Regulations. Section 94 generally repeats Articles 170 and 172 of the
1869 Regulations. The regulation clarifies the scope of responsibility by placing
the context as
wise,

it is

" [d]

uring wars to which the United States

a combination of the

two

is

not a party." Other-

earlier articles.

Section 95 repeats Article 169 of the 1869 Regulations, while Section 96
peats

171

Article

of

the

mander-in-Chief is to extend
his

squadron or

1869

Regulations.

In

his responsibility to the

addition,

the

commanding

re-

Com-

officers of

fleet.

Section 247 incorporates the regulations for a Commander-in-Chief by reference, the

first

captain's responsibilities while

The most

no indication of a
mentioned previously.

instance of such an incorporation, and there

on

foreign station except as

is

what they do not include. Omitted from the 1869 Regulations are Article 52 on the arrest of deserters, Article 165 on American seamen held aboard foreign vessels, and
interesting aspect of the 1870 Regulations
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and 175 on letters-of-marque and

Articles 173, 174

nations" distinction

is

self-help to protect

The

"civilized

retained in Section 53, however, so that the right to con-

many

duct reprisals in

privateers.

areas of the world remains along with the right of

American

XV. United

lives

States

and property.

Navy Regulations (1876)

Instructions for Officers, Afloat: Commanders-in-Chief

Punishment of people of any civilized nation. He will not inflict
punishment upon the people of any civilized nation with whom the United
Article 2

1

.

States has treaties, for any violation, alleged or otherwise, of such treaties or of

international law; but in the absence of a Diplomatic Representative, he will

enter into correspondence with the authorities o{ the nation, and will take the
earliest

opportunity to communicate

all

the information in his possession to the

Navy Department.
Article 22. Protection of commerce of the United States.

most on

all

occasions to protect the

He

commerce of the United

neutrality

and require the same of everyone under

when

ply strictly with the laws o{ blockade,

nation with

his

will

do

his ut-

States.

Article 49. Neutrality of the United States; Protection of lives

During wars in which the United States are neutral, he

will

and property.

observe the strictest

command. He

a harbor or port

is

will

com-

blockaded by a

whom the United States is at peace, making every effort to protect

the lives and property of citizens of the United States within the lines of the
belligerents,
fleet or

and

will so instruct the

commanding

officers of the vessels of his

squadron.

Officers

Article 101. Acting singly.

Commanding

When

Vessels.

acting singly, he will be governed by the

regulations for the Commander-in-Chief, so far as they
case.

may be

applicable to his

26

Commentary
and 54 of the 1870 Regulations. Article
22 repeats Section 55 of the 1870 Regulations. Article 49 consolidates Sections
94, 95 and 96 of the 1870 Regulations. Article 101 repeats in substance Section
Article 21 consolidates Sections 53

247 of the 1870 Regulations.
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States

11

Navy Regulations (1893)

A Commander-in-Chief
Duties in

Article 276.

To

Time

War

of

protect and convoy merchant vessels.

tection and convoy, so far as

it is

He

shall afford pro-

within his power, to merchant vessels of the

United States and to those of allies.

war between

Article 277. Duties during a

United States. During a war between
at peace, he,

and

civilized nations

under his command,

States

is

trality

and respect a lawful blockade, but

effort that

is

at the

with which the United

shall observe the laws of neu-

same time make every

possible

consistent with the rules of international law to preserve and pro-

tect the lives

and property of citizens of the United States wherever

Article 278.
tions.

all

peace with the

civilized nations at

To observe

situated.

the principles of international law and treaty obliga-

When the United States is at war, he shall require all under his command

to observe the rules of humane warfare

When dealing with neutrals,

he

and the

shall cause all

principles of international law.

under

his

command

to observe

the rules of international law and the stipulation of treaties, and expect and exact a like observance from others.

Article 283. Intercourse with Foreigners.
1.

Territorial authority.

mand

shall exercise great care that all

under

his

com-

scrupulously respect the territorial authority of foreign civilized nations

in amity with the
2.

He

United

States.

No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise,

target practice,

funeral escort, or other purpose shall be landed without permission from the local authorities;

nor shall large bodies of men be granted leave to

without a similar permission; nor shall
3.

No target practice within.

gets, shall

men be

which shots may

fall

territorial

where injury

at floating tar-

waters or at any point from

therein, without permission.

Article 284. Violation of international law
sions

the shore

landed to capture deserters.

Great-gun target practice, even

not take place within foreign

visit

to the

United States or to

and

treaty obligations.

citizens thereof

is

On occa-

committed or

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights,

he

shall consult

States,

with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United

and take such

steps as the gravity of the case

diately to the Secretary of the

Navy

all

203

the facts.

demands, reporting imme-

The

responsibility for

any

Forcible Protection of Nationals

action taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly

Abroad

upon the commanding offi-

cer thereof.

Use of force. The use of force against a foreign and friendly
State, or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of
self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its
honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer
Article 285.

irreparable injury.

The

conditions calling for the application of the right of

self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but

judgment of responsible

who

officers,

must be

left to

the sound

are to perform their duties in this respect

and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in
time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation
as above defined. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment
for acts already committed. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only
to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required.
with

all

possible care

Article 286. Landing an

armed

Whenever in the
become necessary to

force in foreign territory.

application of the above-mentioned principles

it

shall

land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political disturbance

where the

local authorities are unable to give

property, the assent of such authorities, or of

obtained,

if it

can be done without prejudice

Article 288.

To

protect the

commerce of

adequate protection to

some one of them,

life

and

shall first

be

to the interests involved.

the United States. So far as

lies

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief and captains of ships shall protect
all

merchant

vessels of the

United States in lawful occupations, and advance

the commercial interests of their country, always acting in accordance with international law and treaty obligations.
Article 289. Dealings with foreigners.

men that when in foreign ports it is

He

shall impress

to the local laws, customs, ceremonies,

ings with foreigners
feeling of

good

will

officers

and

their duty to avoid all possible causes of of-

fense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due deference

them

upon

must be shown by

and regulations; that

in all deal-

moderation and courtesy should be displayed; and that a

and mutual respect should be

cultivated. 27

Commentary
This edition of the regulations

is

the earliest to use the text

still

1948 Navy Regulations, which remained in force until 1973. The

found in the
articles deal-

ing with conduct and intervention in foreign lands reflect the policy of wide
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promote

discretion intended to

II

maximum

flexibility

expressed in the 1869,

1870 and 1876 editions.
This edition, however,
foreign land

is

even more

insistent

when an American interest is

on the duty

to intervene in a

threatened. Article 285 in particular

sets forth the right of self-preservation as the justification for self-help

by the

Although the doctrine of self-preservation must be read against
1893 falls in the midst of the age of imperialthe background of the times
ism it also must be remembered that similar language was retained through
the 1948 edition of the regulations, which until 1973 were the law of the
Navy. 28
United

States.

—

—

Article 277 corresponds in substance to Article 49 of the 1876 Regulations.

For the

first

time the "civilized nations" qualification

and blockade

rule,

no longer confined

the 1876 Regulations.

The

to the

responsibilities

is

applied to the neutrality

punishment rule. See Article 21 of
the article imposes upon a Com-

mander-in-Chief remained unchanged.
Article 284 corresponds roughly to Article 21 of the 1876 Regulations.
thrust of the article

port here

is

is

changed from punishment

to prevention.

The

The

clear im-

Commander-in-Chief is to take only such action as is necinjury to the United States or its citizens or to put a stop to

that the

essary to forestall

harmful acts in progress. The necessity to report to the Secretary of the Navy

unchanged, but the responsibility

for

any action taken

rests entirely

is

with the

Commander-in-Chief himself.
Article 285

is

similar to Article

277 in that

it is

designed to give

US

manders-in-Chief the authority to intervene in situations where
are threatened. Unlike Article 277

voked

and

its

Com-

interests

predecessors, Article 285 can be in-

in peacetime. All previous regulations permitting intervention in foreign

countries to protect

American

lives

and property either

refer to a

wartime

ation or call for consultation with local authorities before action

is

situ-

taken, ex-

cept in the most extreme circumstances. While the exercise o{ "sound

judgment of responsible

officers"

may

give rise to the use of force only as a last

end the threat to American interests, the breadth of the right of self-preservation means that any prospect of
violence that could threaten the United States or its citizens may be sufficient
resort,

and then only

grounds
It is

for intervention

friendly state."

to

in

by a naval force.

noteworthy that the

this article. Instead,

is

to the degree necessary to

There

"civilized nations" qualification

mention
is

no

is

made

in the

first

is

not included in

sentence of "a foreign and

indication, however, that application of Article 285

any way limited to friendly States. The essential prerequisite

US

interests,

wherever they

are.
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the threat
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Commander-in-Chief to seek the assent of local authorities before he lands an armed force pursuant to Article 285. The wording
of this article makes it clear that "local authorities" can mean any of the factions which might claim to rule a city or country. Also, assent is to be obtained
Article 286 requires the

only

does not involve further danger to

if it

US

interests.

Thus,

this article

is

not an important limitation on the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief. Article

286

is

otherwise interesting because

rather than consultation
tion. If nothing else,
its

it

when

the

it is

first

to

mention consent

dealing with the prospect of armed interven-

on the

reflects a desire

part of the United States to justify

actions through the consent of the authority structure in the locality in

which

it is

intervening.

Article 288 repeats in substance Article 22 of the 1876 Regulations.

duty to protect the commerce of the United States

merchant

vessels in lawful occupations.

narrowed

Advancement

to include only

o{ the commercial in-

United States, which involves the policing of sea lanes and other

terests of the

tasks

is

The

which ensure the

free flow of commercial traffic,

must be accomplished

accordance with international law and treaty obligations. The effect of this
ticle is to

make

the protection of commerce a less-aggressive task. There

attempt to hold
as

all

American ships

might be inferred from the
Article 289

is

a

inviolate,

is

in

ar-

no

no matter what actions they take,

earlier regulations.

new rule requiring moderate conduct on the part of US Navy

personnel while in foreign ports as invitees.

XVII. United States Navy Regulations (1896).

A Commander-in-Chief
Duties in

Article 277.

tection

To

Time

of

War

protect and convoy merchant vessels.

and convoy, so

far as

it is

He

shall afford pro-

within his power, to merchant vessels of the

United States and to those of allies.
Article 278. Duties during a war

between

United States. During a war between
at peace, he,

and

civilized nations

under his command,

States

is

trality

and respect a lawful blockade, but

effort that

is

all

civilized nations at

at the

peace with the

with which the United

shall observe the laws of neu-

same time make every

possible

consistent with the rules of international law to preserve and pro-

tect the lives

and property of citizens of the United States wherever
206

situated.
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To observe the principles of international law and treaty obligations. When the United States is at war, he shall require all under his command
Article 279.

to observe the rules of humane warfare

When dealing with neutrals,

he

shall

and the

cause

all

principles of international law.

under

his

command

to observe

the rules of international law and the stipulation of treaties, and expect and exact a like observance from others.

Article 284. Intercourse with Foreigners.
1.

Territorial authority.

mand

tice,

shall exercise great care that all

under

his

com-

scrupulously respect the territorial authority of foreign civilized nations

in amity with the
2.

He

No

armed

United

States.

forces to be landed.

No armed

force for exercise, target prac-

funeral escort, or other purpose shall be landed without permission from

the local authorities; nor shall large bodies of men be granted leave to visit the

men

shore without a similar permission; nor shall

be landed to capture

deserters.
3.

No target practice without permission.

Great-gun target practice, even at

floating targets, shall not take place within foreign territorial waters or at any

point from which shots

may

fall

therein, without permission.

Article 285. Violation of international law
sions

where injury to the United States or to

and

treaty obligations.

citizens thereof

is

On occa-

committed or

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights,

he

shall consult

States,

with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United

and take such

steps as the gravity of the case

diately to the Secretary of the

Navy

all

the facts.

tion taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly

demands, reporting imme-

The

responsibility for

any ac-

upon the commanding officer

thereof.

Use of force. The use of force against a foreign and friendly
State, or against any one within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of
self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its
honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer
Article 286.

irreparable injury.

The

conditions calling for the application of the right of

self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but

judgment of responsible

officers,

who

must be

left to

the sound

are to perform their duties in this respect

and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in
time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation
as above defined. It can never be exercised with a view of inflicting punishment

with

all

possible care
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for acts already

to the extent

committed.

which

is

It

must be used only

and then only
accomplish the end required.

absolutely necessary to

Article 287. Landing an

armed

Abroad

as a last resort,

Whenever, in the
become necessary to

force in foreign territory.

application of the above-mentioned principles,

it

shall

land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political disturbance

where the

local authorities are unable to give

some one of them,

property, the assent of such authorities, or of

obtained,

if it

adequate protection to

can be done without prejudice to the

Article 289.

To

protect the

commerce of

life

and

shall first

be

interests involved.

the United States. So far as

lies

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief and captains of ships shall protect

merchant vessels of the United States in lawful occupations, and advance
the commercial interests of this country, always acting in accordance with inall

ternational law

and

treaty obligations.

Article 290. Dealings with foreigners.

men that when in foreign ports it is

He

shall impress

to the local laws, customs, ceremonies,

ings with foreigners
feeling of

good

will

officers

and

their duty to avoid all possible causes of of-

fense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due deference

them

upon

and

must be shown by

regulations; that in

all

deal-

moderation and courtesy should be displayed; and that a

and mutual respect should be

cultivated. 29

Commentary
Articles 277, 278, 279, 284, 285, 286, 287,

289 and 290 of the 1896 Regula-

tions are identical to Articles 276, 277, 278, 283, 284, 285, 286,

288 and 289,

respectively, of the 1893 Regulations.

XVIII. United States

Navy Regulations (1900 and 1905)

A Commander-in-Chief
Duties in
Article 297.

To

Time

of

War

protect and convoy merchant vessels.

and convoy, so far as it is within
United States and to those of allies.
tection

Article 298. Duties during a

war between

United States. During a war between
at peace, he,

and

under

civilized nations at

trality

and respect a lawful blockade, but

his

208

at the

peace with the

with which the United

command shall observe

is

shall afford pro-

power, to merchant vessels of the

civilized nations

States

all

his

He

the laws of neu-

same time make every

possible
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effort that

is

consistent with the rules of international law to preserve and pro-

tect the lives

and property of citizens of the United States wherever

Article 299.
tions.

When

mand

to

To observe

observe

ties,

the

is

of

rules

When

situated.

the principles of international law and treaty obliga-

the United States

international law.

command

II

at war,

he

humane

under

shall require all

and the

warfare

dealing with neutrals, he shall cause

to observe the rules of international law

and expect and exact a

like

his

com-

principles

of

under

his

all

and the stipulation of trea-

observance from others.

Article 304. Intercourse with Foreigners.
1.

Territorial authority.

mand

under

shall exercise great care that all

his

com-

scrupulously respect the territorial authority of foreign civilized nations

in amity with the
2.

He

United

States.

No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise,

target practice,

funeral escort, or other purpose shall be landed without permission from the local authorities;

nor shall large bodies of men be granted leave to

without a similar permission; nor shall
3.

men be

visit

the shore

landed to capture deserters.

No target practice without permission. Great-gun target practice,

even

floating targets, shall not take place within foreign territorial waters or at

point from which shots

may fall

where injury

to the

any

therein, without permission.

Article 305. Violation of international law
sions

at

United States or to

and

treaty obligations.

citizens thereof

is

On occa-

committed or

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights,

he

shall consult

States,

with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United

and take such

steps as the gravity of the case

diately to the Secretary of the

Navy

all

the facts.

tion taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly

demands, reporting imme-

The

responsibility for

any ac-

upon the commanding officer

thereof.

Use of force. The use of force against a foreign and friendly
State, or against any one within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of
self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the State, its
honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citizens may suffer
Article 306.

irreparable injury.

The

conditions calling for the application of the right of

self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but

judgment of responsible

officers,

who

must be

left to

the sound

are to perform their duties in this respect

and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in
time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of self-preservation
as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and then only to the

with

all

possible care
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extent which

is

Abroad

end required. It can
punishment for acts already

absolutely necessary to accomplish the

never be exercised with a view to

inflicting

committed.
Article 307. Landing an

armed

Whenever, in the
become necessary to

force in foreign territory.

application of the above -mentioned principles,

it

shall

land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political disturbance

where the

local authorities are unable to give

some one of them,

property, the assent of such authorities, or of

obtained,

if it

adequate protection to

can be done without prejudice to the

Article 309.

To

protect the

commerce

life

and

shall first

be

interests involved.

of the United States. So far as

lies

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief and captains of ships shall protect

merchant vessels of the United States in lawful occupations, and advance
the commercial interests of this country, always acting in accordance with inall

ternational law

and

treaty obligations.

Article 310. Dealings with foreigners.

men that when in foreign ports it is

He

shall impress

their duty to avoid

all

to the local laws, customs, ceremonies,

ings with foreigners
feeling of

good

will

and

officers

and

possible causes of of-

fense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due deference

them

upon

must be shown by

regulations; that in

all

deal-

moderation and courtesy should be displayed; and that a

and mutual respect should be

cultivated. 30

Commentary
These

articles of the

1900 and 1905 Regulations are identical to their 1896

counterparts.

XIX. United States Navy Regulations (1909)

A Commander-in-Chief
Duties in
Article 333.

To

Time

War

protect and convoy merchant vessels.

and convoy, so far as it is within
United States and to those of allies.
tection

Article 334. Duties during a war

he and

under

trality

and respect a lawful blockade, but

his

210

shall afford pro-

civilized nations at

command

is

He

power, to merchant vessels of the

civilized nations

States

all

his

between

United States. During a war between
at peace,

of

at the

peace with the

with which the United

shall observe the laws of neu-

same time make every

possible
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effort that

is

consistent with the rules of international law to preserve and pro-

tect the lives

and property of citizens of the United States wherever

Article 335.
tions.

II

To observe the principles of international law and

situated.

treaty obliga-

When the United States is at war, he shall require all under his command

to observe the rules oi humane warfare

When dealing with neutrals,

he

and the

shall cause all

principles of international law.

under

his

command

to observe

the rules of international law and the stipulation of treaties, and expect and exact a like observance from others.

Article 340. Intercourse with Foreigners.
1.

Territorial authority.

mand

under

shall exercise great care that all

his

com-

scrupulously respect the territorial authority of foreign civilized nations

in amity with the
2.

He

United

States.

No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise,

target practice,

funeral escort, or other purposes shall be landed without permission from the
local authorities;

nor

shall large bodies of

men

be granted leave to

men

shore without a similar permission; nor shall

visit

the

be landed to capture

deserters.
3.

No target practice without permission. Great-gun target practice,

even

floating targets, shall not take place within foreign territorial waters or at

point from which shots

may

fall

where injury

to the

any

therein, without permission.

Article 341. Violation of international law
sions

at

United States or to

and

treaty obligations.

citizens thereof

is

On occa-

committed or

threatened, in violation oi the principles of international law or treaty rights,

he

shall consult

States,

with the diplomatic representative or consul of the United

and take such

steps as the gravity of the case

diately to the Secretary of the

Navy

all

the facts.

tion taken by a naval force, however, rests wholly

demands, reporting imme-

The

responsibility for

any ac-

upon the commanding officer

thereof.

Use of force. Self-preservation. The use of force against a foreign and friendly State, or against anyone within the territories thereof, is illegal. The right of self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States as
well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection of the
State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its citizens
against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citiArticle 342.

zens

may

suffer irreparable injury.

The

conditions calling for the application o(

the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be

the sound judgment of responsible officers,
this respect

ercised in

who

left

to

are to perform their duties in

and forbearance. In no case shall force be extime of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of
with

all

possible care
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self-preservation as above defined.

must be used only

and
then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts
It

as a last resort,

already committed.
Article 343. Landing an

armed

Whenever in the
become necessary to

force in foreign territory.

application of the above-mentioned principles

shall

it

land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political disturbance

where the

some one of them,

property, the assent of such authorities, or of

obtained,

adequate protection to

local authorities are unable to give

if it

can be done without prejudice to the

Article 345.

To

protect the

life

and

shall first

be

interests involved.

commerce of the United

States.

So

far as lies

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief and captains of ships shall protect

merchant vessels of the United States in lawful occupations, and advance
the commercial interests of their country, always acting in accordance with inall

ternational law

and

treaty obligations.

Article 346. Dealings with foreigners.

men that when in foreign ports it is

He

shall impress

to the local laws, customs, ceremonies,

ings with foreigners
feeling of good will

officers

and

their duty to avoid all possible causes of of-

fense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due deference

them

upon

and

must be shown by

regulations; that in

all

deal-

moderation and courtesy should be displayed; and that a

and mutual respect should be

cultivated. 31

Commentary
The substance

of these articles

is

identical to that of the

1900 and 1905

Regulations.

XX. United

States

Navy Regulations (1913)

A Commander^m-Chief
Duties in

To

Time

of

War

and convoy merchant vessels. The Commander-in-Chief shall afford protection and convoy, so far as it is within his
power, to merchant vessels of the United States and to those of allies.
Article

1632.

protect

Article 1633. Duties during a war

between

civilized nations at

peace with

the United States. During a war between civilized nations with which the

United States

is

at peace, the

Commander-in-Chief and
212

all

under his

command
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and respect a lawful blockade, but

shall observe the laws of neutrality

at the

same time make every possible effort that is consistent with the rules of international law to preserve and protect the lives and property of citizens of the
United States wherever situated.

To observe

Article 1634.
gations.

quire

When the
under

all

his

the principles of international law and treaty obli-

command

to

principles of international law.

under

his

Commander-in-Chief shall reobserve the rules of humane warfare and the

United States

command

is

at war, the

When dealing with neutrals,

to observe the rules of international law

and expect and exact a

tion of treaties,

he

like

shall cause all

and the

stipula-

observance from others.

Article 1645. Intercourse with Foreigners.

The Commander-in-Chief shall exercise great care
that all under his command scrupulously respect the territorial authority of forTerritorial authority.

1.

eign civilized nations in amity with the United States.

No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise,

2.

target practice,

funeral escort, or other purposes shall be landed without permission from the
local authorities;

nor shall large bodies of

men

be granted leave to

men

shore without a similar permission; nor shall

visit

the

be landed to capture

deserters.

No target practice without permission. Target practice with guns or torpe-

3.

does shall not take place without permission from the government of the coun-

concerned within foreign

try

may

fall

territorial

waters or at any point from which shots

or torpedoes enter therein.

Article 1646. Violation of international law

where injury

sions

to the

United States or to

and

treaty obligations.

citizens thereof

is

On occa-

committed or

threatened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights,
the Commander-in-Chief shall consult with the diplomatic representative or

consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case de-

mands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy
sponsibility for

the

any action taken by a naval

commanding

Article 1647.

force,

all

however,

the facts.

rests

The re-

wholly upon

officer thereof.

Use of force.

Self-preservation.

The

use of force against a for-

eign and friendly State or against anyone within the territories thereof,
gal.

The right of self-preservation, however,

well as to individuals,
State,

its

honor, and

against arbitrary

zens

may

and

is

a right

in the case of States

to States as

includes the protection of the

and property of its citizens
violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citiits

possessions,

suffer irreparable injury.

and the

it

which belongs

is ille-

The

lives

conditions calling for the application of

the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be
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the sound judgment of responsible officers,

who

Abroad

are to perform their duties in

and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application of the right of
self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and
then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts
this respect

with

all

possible care

already committed.

armed force in foreign territory. Whenever, in the
application o( the above-mentioned principles, it shall become necessary to
land an armed force in foreign territory on occasions of political disturbance
where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection to life and
property, the assent of such authorities, or of some one of them, shall first be
obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests involved.
Article 1648. Landing an

Due

which the Navy Department can be communicated
with from all parts of the world, no Commander-in-Chief, division commander,
or commanding officer, shall issue an ultimatum to the representative of any
foreign Government, or demand the performance of any service from any such
representative that must be executed within a limited time, without first communicating with the Navy Department, except in extreme cases where such
2.

action

is

to the ease with

necessary to save

Article 1650.

To

life.

protect the

commerce

of the United States. So far as

lies

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief, division commanders, and com-

manding officers of ships shall protect all merchant vessels of the United States
in lawful occupations, and advance the commercial interests of this country, always acting in accordance with international law and treaty obligations.
Article 1651. Dealings with foreigners. The Commander-in-Chief shall impress upon officers and men that when in foreign ports it is their duty to avoid
all

possible causes of offense to the authorities or inhabitants; that

due defer-

ence must be shown by them to the local laws, customs, ceremonies, and regulations; that in all dealings

displayed,

and that

with foreigners moderation and courtesy should be

a feeling of

good

will

and mutual respect should be

culti-

vated. 32

Commentary
Articles 1632, 1633, 1634, 1645, 1646

and 1647 repeat Articles 333, 334,

335, 340, 341 and 342 of the 1909 Regulations. Article 1648(1) repeats Article

343 of the 1909 Regulations. Article 1648(2) was added by Change No. 7 of
September 15, 1916. It takes into account the Navy's use of radio
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communications. The sentence forbidding ultimatums to foreign governments
without prior consultation with the Navy Department

restricts the right of a

Commander-in-Chief to apply the self-preservation doctrine. Henceforth, the
right to self-preservation can be invoked by a Commander-in-Chief, acting on
his own, only when it is a life-or-death situation calling for immediate action.
Article 1650 repeats Article 345 of the 1909 Regulations, except that the

words "division commanders, and commanding

word

officers" are substituted for the

"captains." This change reflects organizational growth in the Navy.

346 of the 1909 Regulations, except that the
phrase "The Commander-in-Chief is substituted for the pronoun "he," a
Article 1651 repeats Article

change

for clarity's sake only.

XXI. United States Navy Regulations (1920)

A Commandeivin'Chief
Duties in

Article

714.

mander-in-Chief

To

protect

Time

and convoy merchant

vessels.

The Com-

and convoy, so far as it is within
of the United States and to those of allies.

Article 715. Duties during a

war between

United States. During a war between
is

War

shall afford protection

power, to merchant vessels

States

of

at peace, the

civilized nations at

all

peace with the

with which the United

civilized nations

Commander-in-Chief, and

his

under

his

command,

shall

observe the laws of neutrality and respect a lawful blockade, but at the same

time

make

very possible effort that

law to preserve and protect the

is

consistent with the rules of international

lives

and property of

citizens of the

United

States wherever situated.
Article 716.
tions.
all

To observe

When the United States is at war, the Commander-in-Chief shall require

under

his

command

to observe the rules of

ples of international law.
his

the principles of international law and treaty obliga-

command

treaties,

humane

When dealing with neutrals

warfare and the princi-

he

to observe the rules of international law

and expect and exact a

like

shall cause all

under

and the stipulation of

observance from others.

Article 721. Intercourse with foreigners.

The Commander-in-Chief shall exercise great care
that all under his command scrupulously respect the territorial authority of for1.

Territorial authority.

eign civilized nations in amity with the United States.
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No armed force to be landed. No armed force for exercise,

2.

target practice,

funeral escort, or other purposes shall be landed without permission from the
local authorities;

nor shall large bodies of

men

be granted leave to

men

shore without a similar permission; nor shall

visit

the

be landed to capture

deserters.

No target practice without permission. Target practice with guns or torpe-

3.

does shall not take place without permission from the Government of the

country concerned within foreign

may

shots

fall

waters or at any point from which

territorial

or torpedoes enter therein.

Article 722. Violation of international law

where injury

sions

to the

United States or to

and

On occa-

treaty obligations.

citizens thereof

is

committed or

threatened, in violation of the principles o{ international law or treaty rights,
the Commander-in-Chief shall consult with the diplomatic representative or

consul of the United States, and take such steps as the gravity of the case de-

mands, reporting immediately to the Secretary of the Navy
sponsibility for

any action taken by a naval

commanding

the

Article 723.

force,

all

however,

The re-

the facts.

rests

wholly upon

officer thereof.

Use of force.

Self-preservation.

The

use of force against a for-

eign and friendly State, or against anyone within the territories thereof,

is

illegal.

The

right of self-preservation,

well as to individuals,
State,

its

honor, and

against arbitrary

may

zens

and

however,

is

a right

in the case of States

to States as

includes the protection of the

and property of its citizens
violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citiits

possessions,

suffer irreparable injury.

and the

it

which belongs

The

lives

conditions calling for the application of

the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be
the sound judgment of responsible officers,

who

left

to

are to perform their duties in

and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time oi peace otherwise than as an application of the right of
self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and
then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts
this respect

with

all

possible care

already committed.
Article 724. Landing an
1

.

come

Whenever,

armed

force in foreign territory.

in the application of the

above-mentioned

necessary to land an armed force in foreign territory

principles,

it

shall be-

on occasions of political

disturbance where the local authorities are unable to give adequate protection to
life

and property, the assent of such

be obtained,

if it

authorities, or of

some one of them,

can be done without prejudice to the
216

shall first

interests involved.
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which the Navy Department can be communicated
with from all parts of the world, no Commander-in-Chief, flag officer, or commanding officer shall issue an ultimatum to the representative of any foreign
Government, or demand the performance of any service from any such representative that must be executed within a limited time, without first communicating with the Navy Department, except in extreme cases where such action
2.

is

Due

to the ease with

necessary to save
Article 726.

To

life.

protect the

commerce of the United

within their power, Commanders-in-Chief, division

So far as lies
commanders, and comStates.

manding officers of ships shall protect all merchant vessels of the United States
in lawful occupations, and advance the commercial interests of this country, always acting in accordance with international law and treaty obligations.
Article 727. Dealings with foreigners.
press

upon

officers

and

The Commander-in-Chief

men that when in foreign ports it is their duty to avoid all
due deference

possible causes of offense to the authorities or inhabitants; that

must be shown by them
that in

all

and

to the local laws, customs, ceremonies,

feeling of good will

regulations;

and courtesy should be

dealings with foreigners moderation

and that a

shall im-

and mutual respect should be

displayed,

cultivated. 33

Commentary
726 and 727 repeat Articles 1632,

Articles 714, 715, 716, 721, 722, 723, 724,

1633, 1634, 1645, 1646, 1647, 1648, 1650 and 1651 of the 1913 Regulations.

XX1L United

Navy Regulations (1948)

States

Commanders-in-Chief and Other Commanders
Article 0505. Observance of International Law.
1.

In the event of war between nations with which the United States

peace, a

commander

shall observe,

principles of international law.

and require

and protect the
United States wherever situated.

When the United States is

mand

command

at war,

lives

he

and property oi

shall observe,

to observe, the principles of international law

warfare.

He

at

to observe, the

He shall make every effort consistent with those

principles to preserve

2.

his

is

and require

and the

shall respect the rights of neutrals as prescribed

law and by pertinent provisions of

treaties,

from neutrals.
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and

citizens of the

rules of

his

com-

humane

by international

shall exact a like

observance

Forcible Protection of Nationals

The Senior

Officer Present

Article 0613. Violations of International

where injury to the United States or

Abroad

Law and

Treaties.

to citizens thereof is

On

occasions

committed or

threat-

ened, in violation of the principles of international law or treaty rights, the senior

officer

present

with

consult

shall

representatives of the United States,

if

the

possible,

the gravity of the situation demands.

The

a naval force, however, rests wholly

upon the

7

immediately report
Article 0614.
1

The

all

diplomatic

and

shall take

responsibility for
7

The

may

as

senior officer present.

He

shall

Use of Force Against

a Friendly State.

use of force by United States naval personnel against a friendly for-

right of self-preservation,

its

honor, and

against arbitrary

zens

such action

the facts to the Secretary of the Navy.

as well as to individuals,

the State,

consular

any action taken by

eign State, or against anyone within the territories thereof,
2.

or

and

however,

is

a right

in the case of States

it

is illegal.

which belongs

to States

includes the protection of

and property of its citizens
violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or its citiits

possessions,

suffer irreparable injury.

The

and the

lives

7

conditions calling for the application of

the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but must be
the sound judgment of responsible officers,

who

left to

are to perform their duties in

and forbearance. In no case shall force be exercised in time o( peace otherwise than as an application of the right of
self-preservation as above defined. It must be used only as a last resort, and
then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accomplish the end required. It can never be exercised with a view to inflicting punishment for acts
this respect

with

all

possible care

already committed.

Whenever, in the application of the above-mentioned principles, it shall
become necessary to land an armed force in a foreign territory on occasions of
political disturbance where the local authorities are unable to give adequate
protection to life and property the assent of such authorities, or of some of
them, shall first be obtained, if it can be done without prejudice to the interests
3.

7

,

involved.
Article 0620. Protection of

Commerce

of the United States. So far as

lies

within his power, acting in conformity with international law and treaty obliga7

tions, the senior officer present shall protect all

7

commercial vessels and

aircraft

of the United States in their lawful occupations, and shall advance the com-

mercial interests of this country.
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Article 0622. Territorial Authority of Foreign Nations.
1.

The

senior officer present shall, in the exercise of his

command, scrupu-

lously respect the territorial authority of nations in amity with the

United

States.
2.

Unless permission has been obtained from local authorities:

a.

No armed force

for exercise, target practice, funeral escort, or other pur-

poses shall be landed.
b.

No persons shall be

allowed to

the shore, except as necessary to con-

visit

duct

official business.

c.

No men shall be

3.

Target practice with guns, torpedoes, rockets, guided missiles or other

weapons

shall

landed to capture deserters.

not take place, without permission from the government of the

country concerned, within foreign

which

waters and at any point from

territorial

projectiles, torpedoes, or missiles

may

Article 0623. Dealings with Foreigners.

enter therein.

The

senior officer present shall

uphold the prestige of the United States. He shall impress upon officers
and men that when in foreign ports it is their duty to avoid all possible
causes of offense to the authorities or inhabitants; that due deference
must be shown by them to the local laws, customs, ceremonies, and regulations; that in all dealings with foreigners, moderation and courtesy should
be displayed; and that a feeling of good will and mutual respect should be
cultivated. 34

Commentary
Article 0505 restates in substance Articles 715

The

tions.

old term "civilized nations"

is

finally

and 716 of the 1920 Reguladropped. The phrase was an

anachronism and had become offensive to many countries by 1948. The phrase

and
respect a lawful blockade." This change is not significant, since Article 715 had
mentioned the "rules of international law." In short, Article 0505 reflects the
same rules that had been used since 1893.
"principles o{ international law" takes the place of "the laws of neutrality

Article

minor

0613

is

alterations.

a restatement of Article

"[T]he senior

mander-in-Chief in the
'

sular representatives

is

first

to be

officer present"

as

its

is

is

substituted for the

"Com-

sentence. Consultation with diplomatic or con-

had

"if possible.

to be reported to the Secretary of the

the change in priority

722 of the 1920 Regulations, with

."
.

.

The

facts of the

Navy immediately,

obvious. Again, this article

1893 counterpart.
219

is

problem are

as in Article 722,

but

fundamentally the same
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0614 repeats in substance Article 723 of the 1920 Regulations. The
phrase "by United States naval personnel" is inserted in section 1 and the
words "friendly" and "foreign" are reversed. Section 2 repeats the second paraArticle

graph of Article 723. Section 3 repeats verbatim Article 724 of the 1920
Regulations.

0620 is a close paraphrase of Article 726 of the 1920 Regulations.
Enforcement is now in the hands of the "senior officer present" and protection
is extended to "ail commercial vessels and aircraft. ..." Otherwise the article is
Article

identical to

Articles

its

predecessor.

0622 and 0623 repeat the substance of Articles 721 and 727 of the

1920 Regulations.

XXIIL United

States

Navy Regulations (1973)

Commanders-in-Chief and Other Commanders
Article 0605.
shall observe,

tional law.

Observance of International Law. At

and require

Where

his

command

is

authorized.

Officer Present

Article 0914. Violations of International

ened

commander

necessary to fulfillment of this responsibility, a departure

The Senior

injury to the

times a

to observe, the principles of interna-

from other provisions of Navy Regulations

when

all

United States or to

Law and

citizens thereof

Treaties.
is

On

occasions

committed or

threat-

in violation of the principles of international law or in violation of rights

existing under a treaty or other international agreement, the senior officer

present shall consult with the diplomatic or consular representatives of the

United States,

if

possible,

and he

shall take

demanded by the
involving the use of force may

such action as

gravity of the situation. In time of peace, action

is

be taken only in consonance with the provisions of the succeeding
these regulations.

upon the

The

responsibility for

senior officer present.

He

any application of force

shall report

immediately

all

article of

rests

wholly

the facts to the

Secretary of the Navy.
Article 0915.
1.

The

Use of Force Against Another

State.

use of force in time of peace by United States naval personnel against

another nation or against anyone within the

territories thereof is illegal

an act of self-defense. The right of self-defense may arise in order
either the use of force or an immediate threat of the use of force.
as
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to counter
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conditions calling for the application of the right of self-defense can-

not be precisely defined beforehand, but must be

the sound judgment of

left to

who are to perform their duties in this respect with
and forbearance. The right of self-defense must be exercised

responsible naval personnel
all

possible care

only as a

last resort,

and then only

to the extent

which is absolutely necessary to

accomplish the end required.
3.

Force must never be used with a view to inflicting punishment for acts

al-

ready committed.
Article 0916. Territorial Integrity of Foreign Nations.

The

senior officer

present shall respect the territorial integrity of foreign nations. Unless permission has
a.

been obtained from foreign

No armed force

authorities:

for exercise, target practice, funeral escort, or other pur-

poses shall be landed.
b.

duct

No persons shall be allowed to visit the shore,

except as necessary to con-

official business.

No men shall be landed to capture deserters.
d. No target practice with guns, torpedoes, rockets,
c.

guided missiles or other

weapons shall be conducted within foreign territorial waters or
from which projectiles, torpedoes or missiles may enter therein.
Article 0917. Dealings with Foreigners.

hold the prestige of the United States.
that,

when

in foreign ports,

it is

He

The

at

any point

senior officer present shall up-

upon

shall impress

officers

and

men

their duty to avoid all possible cause of offense

and inhabitants; that due deference must be shown by them
to local laws, customs, ceremonies, and regulations; that moderation and courtesy should be displayed in all dealings with foreigners; that a feeling of good
to the authorities

will

and mutual respect should be

cultivated.

Article 0920. Protection of Commerce of the United States. Acting in con-

formity with the international law and treaty obligations, the senior officer

present shall protect, insofar as

United States in
cial interests

lies

within his power,

their lawful occupations;

and he

all

commercial

shall

craft of the

advance the commer-

of this country. 35

Commentary
Article 0605

is

a

rough paraphrase of Article 0505 of the 1948 Regulations.

somewhat different. By deleting the sentence exhorting
the commander "to preserve and protect the lives and property of citizens of
the United States wherever situated," the Article becomes less self-serving and
appears to place primary emphasis upon observance of the principles of
Its thrust,

however,

is
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international law. Further evidence of this shift in emphasis
that the

commander

the statement

authorized to ignore other provisions of Navy Regula-

is

where necessary

tions

is

for the fulfillment of his general responsibility to observe

the principles of international law. Thus, the effect of the article

is

to

make

explicit the subordination of Navy Regulations to the principles of inter-

more

national law.

The

administrative history of this article clearly establishes that such subor-

dination was the drafter's intent.

The

first

sentence [of Article 0605]

reflecting the traditional

Navy

second sentence provides necessary
or treaty ratified by the

is

a simple

and

straight forward statement

position with regard to international law.
flexibility in

The

those areas where a convention

United States might make other

Navy

specific

Regulations inapplicable or inappropriate in a given circumstance. Because the

one in which rules in the international arena change so
and because the United States often takes a leading role in these

present world situation
rapidly,

changes,

it is felt

is

that flexibility

is

necessary in this general

article. 36

The second paragraph of Article 0505 was deleted from the 1973 Regulations "to make clear that Commanders shall observe international law" at all
times. The 1973 revisers felt that "as currently phrased, [Article 0505] might
support an interpretation which restricts the application of international law to

They correctly pointed out
and has never been the Navy position." 37

situations of war or
this

is

true

Article

The

0914

armed

conflict."

restates in substance Article

only substantial change

made

is

that "certainly

0613 of the 1948 Regulations.

the insertion of a sentence emphasizing

that in time of peace action involving the use of force

is

proscribed except in

self-defense, as described in Article 0915.

which a commander may be justified in
the use of force in self-defense, roughly parallels Article 0614 of the 1948 Regulations. However, both the language and the thrust of the article have been alArticle 0915, defining the criteria by

The more modern phrase "self-defense" is substituted for that
of "self-preservation." The 1973 Regulation states that the right of self-defense
tered somewhat.

"may

arise in

order to counter either the use of force or an immediate threat of

the use of force."

The 1948 Regulation states

ing "the protection of the State,

its

a

honor, and

much broader rationale,
its

possessions,

and the

includ-

lives

and

property of its citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby
the State or

its

citizens

may

suffer irreparable injury."

The

deletion in the 1973

Regulation of language specifically authorizing the forcible protection of the
lives

and property o(

US

nationals abroad indicates that the circumstances
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under which a commander may

II

justifiably resort to force for

such purposes are

greatly restricted today.

The

administrative history clearly indicates that the above changes were de-

signed to bring the regulations into conformity with contemporary international law. Article 0614.1,

discusses restraints

Navy Regulations

on the use of force

1984, according to the drafters,

against a friendly State.

It

could be viewed

by implication then that there are no prohibitions on the use of force against an
unfriendly State.

Such a

distinction has

no foundation

in international law. 38

Further, the drafting history refers to the applicable provisions of the

UN

Charter and to Security Council practice prescribing the permissible uses o(
force as the basis for these revised articles.

Article

The

first

0916

is

a modernization of Article

sentence of Article 0916

is

0622 of the 1948 Regulations.

based on Article 0622, section

for the territorial integrity of foreign nations

is

1.

Respect

now properly extended to all na-

and is no longer limited by implications to those nations "in amity with
the United States." Such was the drafters' intent:

tions,

[Article

0622, section

1]

contains a phrase limiting the

applicability to nations "in amity" with the

article's

general

United States. Such a grammatical

construction could lead to the interpretation that the principles of this article do

not apply to nations not in amity with the United States. This view

is

inconsonant with international law and the view of the United States. 39

In the second sentence of Article 0916, "foreign" has been substituted for

make

whose permission is required to do the subsequently
listed acts. Subparagraphs a, b and c are duplicates of Article 0622, section 2,
subparagraphs a, b and c of the 1948 Regulations. Subparagraph d is based on
Article 0622, section 3, only grammatical changes have been made.
"local" to

clear just

Article 0917, other than a
clause,

is

minor repositioning of words

in the penultimate

almost a verbatim copy of Article 0623 of the 1948 Regulations.

0920 restates in substance Article 0620 of the 1948 Regulations.
The thrust of both articles is identical.
Article

XXIV. United

States

Navy Regulations (1990)

Commanders-in-Chief and Other Commanders
Article 0705. Observance of International Law.
shall

observe, and require their

commands
223

At

all

times,

to observe,

commanders

the principles of

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

Where necessary to fulfill this responsibility,
provisions of Navy Regulations is authorized.

international law.

from other

The Senior

Officer Present

Law and

Article 0914- Violations of International

when injury to

a departure

Treaties.

On

occasions

the United States or citizens thereof is committed or threatened

in violation o{ the principles of international law or in violation of rights exist-

ing under a treaty or other international agreement, the senior officer present
shall consult

with the diplomatic or consular representatives of the United

demanded by

the gravity of

the situation. In time of peace, action involving the use of force

may be taken

States,

if

possible,

and

shall take

such action

as

is

only in consonance with the provisions of the succeeding article of these regulations.

The

responsibility for

nior officer present.
facts to the

National

command and
The

Command

the

Navy informed.

Use of Force Against Another

State.

is

illegal

except

Naval personnel have a right of self-defense against
intent (imminent threat to use force) This right includes
.

defending themselves, their subunits and,
izens, their property

The

territories thereof

self-defense.

hostile acts or hostile

and

US

commercial

when

appropriate, defending

US cit-

assets in the vicinity.

conditions calling for application of the right of self-defense cannot

be precisely defined beforehand, but must be
sponsible naval personnel
all

all

se-

use of force in time of peace by United States naval personnel against

an act o(

2.

wholly upon the

Authority, keeping the operational chain of

another nation or against anyone within the
as

rests

senior officer present shall report immediately

the Secretary of the

Article 0915.
1.

The

any application of force

who

left

to the

sound judgment of re-

are to perform their duties in this respect with

and forbearance. The use of force must be exercised only as a
and then only to the extent which is absolutely necessary to accom-

possible care

last resort,

plish the
3.

end required.

Force must never be used with a view to inflicting unlawful punishment

for acts already

committed.

Article 0916. Territorial Integrity of Foreign Nations.

The

senior officer

present shall respect the territorial integrity of foreign nations. Unless permission has been obtained from foreign authorities:
a.

No armed

force for exercise, target practice, funeral escort or other pur-

pose shall be landed.
b.

duct

No persons shall be

allowed to

visit

official business.
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No persons shall be landed to capture deserters.
d. No target practice with guns, torpedoes, rockets,
c.

guided missiles or other

weapons shall be conducted within foreign territorial waters or
from which projectiles, torpedoes or missiles may enter therein.
Article 0917. Dealings with Foreigners.

any point

senior officer present shall up-

He or she shall impress upon officers and

hold the prestige of the United States.
enlisted personnel that,

The

at

when in foreign ports,

it is

their duty to avoid all possi-

and inhabitants; that due deference
customs, ceremonies and regulations;

ble cause for offense to the authorities

must be shown by them to local laws,
that moderation and courtesy should be displayed in all dealings with
ers; and that a feeling of good will and respect should be cultivated.

foreign-

Article 0920. Protection of Commerce of the United States. Acting in con-

formity with international law and treaty obligations, the senior officer present
shall protect, insofar as lies within his or

United States in

her power,

all

commercial

craft of the

their unlawful occupations. 40

Commentary
0605 of the 1973 Regulations, the only difference being the substitution of the pronoun "their" for
the pronoun "his." Similar changes in the interest of gender neutrality, made
Article 0705

is

a nearly verbatim repetition of Article

throughout the 1990 regulations,

will

not be mentioned below.

0914 repeats in substance Article 0914 of the 1973 regulations. Under the 1990 Article, the senior officer present reports to the "National Command Authority, keeping the operational chain of command and the Secretary
Article

of the

Navy informed." The 1973

Article requires a report only to the Secretary

of the Navy.
Article 0915 includes a broader description of the right to use force as an act

of self-defense than was found in Article 0915 of the 1973 Regulations.

Under

the 1990 Regulations, "[n]aval personnel have a right of self-defense against
hostile acts or hostile intent

(imminent threat to use force)," while under the

1973 Regulations the right "may

arise in order to

counter either the use of force

or an immediate threat of the use of force." Further, under the 1990 Regulations,

naval personnel

propriate,

.

.

vicinity." In

.

US

may defend

"themselves, their subunits and,

citizens, their property

and

US

commercial

when

ap-

assets in the

comparison, Article 0915 in the 1973 Regulations does not define

the ambit of the right of self-defense.
Articles
tively, in

0916 and 0917

are exact replicas of Articles

the 1973 regulations.
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0920 omits the requirement that the senior officer present "shall advance the commercial interests of this country" but is otherwise a verbatim repetition of Article 0920 in the 1973 regulations.
Article

Summary
In summary,

for nearly a century

— the Navy Regulations governing the use of

1973
als

can be seen that

it

and

their property abroad

remained

virtually

— between 1893 and

force to protect

US nation-

unchanged. With the promul-

gation of the 1973 Regulations, however, a shift in attitude toward the use of
forcible self-help in

such cases

is

evident. Omission of phrases relating directly

to the protection of nationals, as well as the inclusion of positive statements relating to

the supremacy of international law, indicate that the type of

interventional practice sanctioned by prior regulations no longer passes muster.

The 1990 Regulations make no change

in this regard. Just

what measures

of forcible self-help to protect nationals abroad remain permissible today
controversial question,

some

upon which

it is

hoped Chapters IV and

V have

is

a

shed

light.
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Conclusion

At

the time of his death, Professor Lillich's manuscript was lacking only a

concluding statement of the contemporary law governing the forcible protection
of nationals abroad. Although
substantive alteration,
possible.

An editorial

we

we were determined

to present his

work without

did want this volume to be as comprehensive as

consensus emerged that we should append a chapter as a

complementary snapshot of the law

as

it

exists today.

The

following article,

written by a co-editor of this volume and originally published in the Dickinson

Law Review in the Spring of 2000, fit the bill. It is reproduced here with the kind
permission of The Dickinson Law School of The Pennsylvania State University."*"

We

hope that

it

is

an appropriate punctuation mark

research and analysis, and that
scholars

who

will build

on

may

it

serve as a point of departure for those

his impressive

body of work
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Introduction

As

the two epigraphs above demonstrate, perhaps the best criterion for

discriminating tyrannies from democracies

human

placed upon the value of a single
nationals abroad,
is

when undertaken by

the sincere, proven emphasis

is

The

life.

forcible protection of

a sovereign for non-pretextual reasons,

the clearest expression of that distinction in state practice.

challenge in evaluating such uses of force

is

The academic

to distinguish such protection

from

other legitimate uses oi force, and then to distinguish these uses from other,
illegitimate uses of force.

Such an examination

historical context of the threat,

is

heavily dependent

and of the acting

Jackson has stated, "a text without a context

is

To properly understand the "text" involved,

state. For, as the

a pretext."

it is

upon the

Rev. Jesse

3

important to have as clear a

Arend and Beck define "protection of nationals" as "the
use of armed force by a state to remove its nationals from another state where
their lives are in actual or imminent peril." 4 Arend and Beck add four qualifica-

definition as possible.

tions to this definition. First, consent obviates the analysis, rendering the oper-

ation something other than coercion or intervention. 5 Second, the threatened
nationals need not be within the territory of the threatening state, merely

within

its

exclusive jurisdiction.

from a ship

The

classic

example of this would be a rescue

flying the threatening state's flag. 6 Third, a

Chapter VII authoriza-

Assuming
the Security Council is not acting ultra vires, a use of force pursuant to such an
authorization is almost by definition lawful. 7 Fourth, and finally, an intervention would, like consent of the territorial state, obviate the analysis.

tion to protect the citizens of the threatening state
tion,

is

a humanitarian interven-

not the protection of nationals abroad. While the primary discriminator is

the nationality of the victims rescued, the dimensions of the two types of inter-

vention can vary significantly.

abroad
ation

is,

at

itself.

its

The

use of force in the protection of nationals

most pure, a rescue operation,

lasting

no longer than the evacu-

Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, can involve

lengthy nation-building or even government-replacement in the territorial
state. 8

A lengthier, but more

precise, definition

would then

read: "the use or

imminent use of armed force by a state to safeguard, and usually remove, its nationals from the territory or exclusive jurisdiction of another state,
threat of

without the consent of that state or the authorization of the

UN

Security

Council, where the lives of those nationals are in actual or imminent peril."

This

article will briefly

examine the

historical foundation for the forcible

protection of nationals abroad, recount a
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number of post-Charter

uses of force
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to protect nationals, describe

and evaluate alternate modern theories support-

ing such actions, and conclude with a description of the law today.

Historical

Development

While an exhaustive

historical review of the legality of the use of force in the

protection of nationals could
licists

consume

several volumes, the views of three pub-

provide a firm basis for the subsequent, principally post-Charter analysis.

Vattel wrote what

is

perhaps the seminal paragraph on the protection of

nationals:

Whoever

offends the State, injures

prejudice in any

manner whatsoever,

himself to be justly punished for
the State, which

its rights,

is

bound

it.

disturbs

declares himself

Whoever

tranquility, or does

its

its

uses a citizen

to protect this citizen;

it

a

enemy, and exposes
ill,

indirectly offends

and the sovereign of the latter
if possible, oblige him to
would not obtain the great end

should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and,

make

reparation; since otherwise the citizen

full

o( the civil association, which

The

is,

safety. 9

justification for intervention in

becomes

a duty of the sovereign.

The

such a case

is

duty, however,

more than
is

just a right;

it

tempered by a respect

for the sovereignty of other nations:

The

prince

.

.

.

ought not to interfere in the causes of

his subjects in foreign

and grant them protection, excepting in cases where justice is refused,
or palpable and evident injustice done, or rules and forms openly violated, or,
finally, an odious distinction made, to the prejudice of his subjects, or of
countries,

foreigners in general. 10

This duty, and

this tension,

has been echoed by

all

subsequent thoughtful

commentators.

end of the 19 th Century, returned to the fundamental
duty: "At the root of state life lies the circumstance that the

Hall, writing at the

nature of this

bond which
latter issue

exists

between

a state

from the national

and

its

territory."

11

subjects

is

not severed

when

However, Hall adds with

British

understatement, "the clashing laws of states of European civilization
place

many persons in situations

serious."

12

It is

the

still

that are frequently difficult and occasionally

at this point that the sovereign's

emerges:
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correlative to the rights of a sovereign over his subjects;

bond between a state and its subjects while they are
the former must watch over and protect them with in the due

the maintenance of the

abroad implies that

limit of the rights of other states.

...

It

enables governments to exact reparation

them otherwise than by
process of law; and it gives the means of guarding them against the effect of
unreasonable laws, laws totally out of harmony with the nature and degree of
civilization by which a foreign power affects to be characterized, and finally of an
for oppression they

have

suffered, or for injuries

done

administration of laws bad beyond a certain point.
state grossly fails in

its

duties;

when

it is

to

When

in these directions a

either incapable of ruling, or rules with

patent injustice, the right of protection emerges in the form of diplomatic

remonstrance, and in extreme cases of ulterior measures. 13

The nature and extent
concern in the 19

th

of these "ulterior measures" were principally a British

Century, but became an American concern early in the 20

Century, as the United States
ability to

th

Navy and Marine Corps extended America's

respond to "laws bad beyond a certain point."

Borchard, an American writing early in the 20 th Century, addresses with

textbook matter-of-factness the use of such force in the protection of nationals
abroad:

The

display of force

effective

and the threat

means of obtaining

to use

it

.

.

.

have frequently proved an

redress .... This display of force usually takes the

form of a national war-ship appearing before the port of the foreign country
alleged to be in default.
vessel

is

and ...

great,

The moral

influence exerted by the presence of a war

in quarters of the world subject to frequent domestic

disorder has served not only to prevent an abuse of aliens' rights, particularly of

the nationals of the country to which the vessel belongs. 14

Although such

displays

were frequently

effective, they occasionally escalated

to actual uses of force:

The army or navy

has frequently been used for the protection of citizens or their

property in foreign countries in cases of emergency where the local government

has

failed,

through

inability or unwillingness, to afford

the persons or property of the foreigners in question.

15

adequate protection to
.

.

.

The

occasions

on

which troops have been landed have varied, although it has always been under
circumstances where the protective faculties of the local government have been
so weakened that the security of aliens, particularly nationals of the interfering
state, seemed so precarious that some measure of self-help was deemed
necessary. 16
While the landing of troops in the cases above mentioned has
.

.

.
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been purely protective, they have not always been able
operations to effect their purpose.

to avoid belligerent

17

and Borchard describe a legal regime which existed from the
early 17 th Century until the middle of the 20 th Century. It was only with the entry into force of the U.N. Charter that an entirely new analytical framework
Vattel, Hall,

was put into place, ostensibly outlawing the aggressive use of force, but preserv-

Although centuries of

ing the "inherent" right of self-defense.

state practice

were not entirely irrelevant, future uses of force to protect nationals abroad

would have

The

first

new Charter paradigm.
understanding this new framework is to review

to be justified within the

step in

the

signifi-

cant uses of force in the Charter era (post- 1945), providing the factual back-

ground

for testing theory

and examining

state practice.

Uses of Force in the Charter Era
United Kingdom Threatens Intervention in Iran

— 1946

When rioting broke out in Iran in the summer of 1946, less than a year after the
Charter had entered into force, the British government was concerned for the
safety of British residents

working

for the

the permission of the Iraqi government,

18

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. With
Britain dispatched a contingent of

troops to Basra, Iraq, near the Iranian border.

They

The U.K.

also ordered

may be

two

hand
for the protection, should the circumstances demand it, of Indian, British and
Arab lives, and in order to safeguard Indian and British interests in South
19
Persia, troops are being sent from India to Basra."
The rioting subsided, and
no entry was necessary. The Iranian government still protested the threat of
force as a violation of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter and an infringement of
20
Iranian sovereignty. Britain responded that it would have intervened in case
21
of a "grave emergency," that is, if the Iranian government had been unable or
warships to anchor off Basra.

did this "in order that they

at

unwilling to protect the lives of British residents.

Second Threat of Intervention

The

in Iran by

U.K.

—

1

Iranian government precipitated another

Company

The

95
crisis

when

it

nationalized the

government once again
feared that the heightened tensions between the two countries might put
Anglo-Iranian Oil

in 1951.

British

British residents in Iran at risk. Accordingly, the

number of combat aircraft to British
statements on the move were unusually clear

warships to Iraqi waters, and deployed a
bases within Iraq.

22

British policy

U.K. dispatched several
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and

to the point. Foreign Secretary

and indeed the duty

right

before the

As

I

Abroad

Morrison stated that Britain had "every

to protect British lives."

23

He went on

to elaborate

House of Commons:

have repeatedly informed the House, His Majesty's government are not
idly by if the lives of British nationals are in jeopardy. It is the

prepared to stand

government

and order are
maintained and that all within the frontiers of Persia are protected from
violence. If, however, that responsibility were not met it would equally be the
right and duty of His Majesty's government to extend protection to its own
responsibility of the Persian

to see to

it

that law

nationals. 24

Iran,
its

on the other hand, saw the

own

positioning of air and naval forces just outside

borders as a threat of force unwarranted by the situation. Iran stated

that the U.K.

had no right

to "intimidate" Iran,

the master of the situation."

26

25

and that Iran was "completely

Iran took this policy position one step further,

and declared before a meeting of the Sixth Committee of the
Assembly that even

if

British nationals

intervene and protect

UN

General

had been mistreated, any action

them could not be

to

justified as a lawful exercise of

self-defense.

The Cairo Riots— 1952

A

more

when

more

subtle response to a

serious threat occurred in January, 1952,

large-scale rioting broke out in Cairo. This time, British property

damaged and

were

British lives

contingency plan to use

and Alexandria

to

its

on January 27
for all damage

,

lost.

was

In response, the U.K. developed a

move in to Cairo
29
residents.
The British

troops in the Suez Canal zone to

protect

government communicated
th

28

stating that

its
it

endangered British

willingness to take action in a diplomatic note

held the government of Egypt

to British property

and any threat

fully responsible

to the safety of British

residents in Egypt. Further, the note warned, the U.K. reserved the right to

take whatever action was required to safeguard the lives and property of
30

its

The note had the desired effect, and the previously quiescent
Egyptian army moved in to put down the rioters. Then-Foreign Secretary Eden
explained, "the belief that we had the forces and the conviction that we were
prepared to use them were powerful arguments in prodding the Egyptian army
nationals.

to quell the riots."

31
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Anglo-French Intervention

in

Egypt

in

956

1

Suez

(the

Crisis)

Fearing that their nationals were threatened by Israeli-Egyptian war in

October, 1956, Britain and France

a series of diplomatic entreaties for

When this course failed, the British and the

the belligerents to cease hostilities.

French bombed Egyptian

made

near the Suez Canal and, four days

airstrips

inserted a contingent of troops to occupy key points along the canal.

later,

While

France emphasized other rationales, Britain relied heavily on the right to
protect

own

its

citizens abroad.

32

The

speaking before the Security Council,

In Egypt there are

many thousands

and

hostilities

have

moves

[sic]

created

a

.

.

.

that

we should
longer than

certainly not
is

want

The chain of

into Egypt has developed into

disturbed

situation.

circumstances, British and French lives must be safeguarded.

moment

UN,

said:

of British and French nationals.

events which began with the Israel
hostilities

British Representative to the

I

In

those

again emphasize

to keep any forces in the area for

one

necessary to protect our nationals. 33

Then-Prime Minister Eden stated before the House of Commons that "there is
nothing ... in the Charter which abrogates the right oi a Government to take
such steps as are essential to protect the
explain that,

when

had the

right to intervene "in

the lives of nationals abroad.

3

He added

inherent Article 5 1 right to self-defense,

—

that

is,

36

He went on to

its

and that

citizens before

an emergency,"

it

this right

first

was

in

to protect

that this right was based

the injured state need not

an armed attack against
threat.

34

the Security Council was paralyzed by a veto (as

this case), that states

anticipatorily

lives of their citizens."

on the

could be exercised

receive the equivalent of

moving preemptively

against the

37

Foreign Secretary Lloyd outlined three criteria for the lawful exercise of the
right of protection of nationals abroad within the larger right of self-defense:
first,

that the nationals of the intervening state be under "an

of injury;" second, that there

is

imminent threat

a "failure or inability" by the local sovereign to

protect foreign citizens; and third, that the action of the intervening state be
"strictly

confined to the object of protecting the nationals against injury." 38

Finally, the

Lord Chancellor, before the House of Lords, stated that

defence undoubtedly includes a situation in which the

lives

abroad are threatened and

on

protection."

it is

necessary to intervene

"self-

of a State's nationals

that territory for their

39

In addition to this rationale, the British and the French also pursued the military

operation to maintain international freedom of navigation through the
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canal,

and

to stop hostilities

between Egypt and

Abroad

Israel. 40

The problem

of over-

lapping justifications will reappear frequently in state practice.

The Belgian

Intervention in the

Immediately upon declaring

Congo

— 1960

independence from Belgium

its

Congo's army mutinied and touched off a week of

in July 1960, the

and
atrocities against foreign nationals.
As the Congolese government was
completely unable to maintain order, Belgium ordered a contingent of
rioting,

looting,

41

Congo

and other threatened
foreign nationals.
Before the Security Council, the Belgian Ambassador to
the UN stated that his government had "decided to intervene with the sole
purpose of ensuring the safety of European and other members of the
paratroopers already in the

to protect Belgian

42

population and of protecting

human

pure self-defense (protecting a

lives in general."

state's

own

43

This rationale mixes

nationals), collective self-defense

(protecting other foreign nationals within another state),

and humanitarian

intervention (protecting the citizens of the threatened state)
In Security Council debate, France argued that the Belgian troops' "mission
of protecting lives and property
lese authorities

and

is

is

the direct result of the failure of the Congo-

in accord with a recognized principle of international

on humanitarian grounds." 44 Argentina based its
support of the Belgian intervention not on the legality of self-defense, but on
law, namely, intervention

the moral imperative of the situation:

Now, we

and honour of individuals
is a sacred duty to which all other considerations must yield. We cannot reproach
the Belgian government for having assumed this duty when Belgian nationals
were in danger. Any other State would have done the same thing. 45
are convinced that the protection of the

The United

life

more guarded in its statements, and urged that Belgium should withdraw once the UN had provided military forces to stabilize the
situation. In an interesting gloss on the doctrine of humanitarian intervention,
Belgium actually adopted the U.S. position in a statement that is a model of
concise legal advocacy: Belgium would withdraw "its intervening troops as
soon as, and to the extent that, the United Nations ensures the maintenance of
order and the safety of persons." 46
States was

United States Intervention

in the

Dominican Republic

— 1965

Dominican
Cabral's National Reconstruction Government

In April, 1965, the Constitutional Party forced the resignation of

President

Reid

Cabral.
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immediately organized to regain control of the country. By the end of the

month, the situation was

out of hand that the United States

sufficiently

felt

compelled to land 400 Marines to evacuate American citizens and other
foreign nationals from the country.

47

UN

According to U.S. Ambassador to the

Adlai Stevenson,
In the absence of any governmental authority,

Dominican law enforcement and

Embassy that the situation was completely out of
control, that the police and the Government could no longer give any guarantee
concerning the safety of Americans or of any foreign nationals, and that only an
immediate landing of United States forces could safeguard and protect the lives
of thousands of Americans and thousands of citizens of some thirty other
military officials informed our

countries. 48

This introduces a hybrid form of invitation

—

less

than the pure consent

rendered by an invitation from the de jure sovereign, but more than a simple,
unilateral decision to intervene based

The warnings and
arguably

analysis of the situation.

requests of mid-to-high level officials of the defeated but

lawful

still

on an external

government

fall

squarely within this gray area. While this

type of request does not forestall a legal analysis of the grounds for intervening
(as

would an invitation from the sovereign)

,

it

does add weight to the factual

arguments establishing the state of chaos in a country, and therefore helps

weed out

instances of purely pretextual intervention.

However valid the basis for forcible protection of nationals may have been at
the outset, U.S. involvement quickly escalated and policy diversified. The
number of troops increased, their stay in-country was extended, and subsequent government statements announced that the United States was acting to
prevent the establishment of a second communist government in the Western
Hemisphere. 49 To no one's surprise, Britain supported the initial deployment,
France was ambivalent, and Cuba was opposed. 50
The Mayaguez

Incident

On May

1975,

12

th
,

— 1975

Cambodia

claimed the Mayaguez was in

seized

an American merchant

its territorial

waters,

and on a

Cambodia
spy mission. The
ship.

United States insisted that the ship had been in international waters
time of its seizure, and that
U.S.

demanded she be

it

had not been on

a spy mission.

released within 24 hours.

On May

13

The Cambodians

still

did not comply, so

237

th
,

the

Cambodia did not comply,

the United States launched an airstrike against the facility at which

being held.

at the

on May 14

th
,

it

so

was

the U.S.

Forcible Protection of Nationals

mounted

a heliborne

Marine infantry

Abroad

assault against the ship. This did achieve

the desired result, and the ship and crew were freed.

Between the

on the

airstrike

13 th and the assault

51

on the 14 th the U.S.
,

quested the assistance of the Secretary General of the

UN

re-

in securing the re-

lease of the ship. In the request, the U.S. reserved the right to take "such

measures

as

may be

necessary to protect the lives of American citizens and

property, including appropriate measures of self-defense under Article 5 1 of

the

UN Charter."

52

Cambodia condemned the assault, claiming it was "a brutal act of aggression." 53 Cambodia also stated that the attack was not militarily necessary, in
that it had already begun preparations to release the ship. 54 China sided with
Cambodia, labeling the

condemned

assault

an "act of piracy." 55 Algeria and Thailand

the attack, the latter because

area for the assault team.

The Evacuation of U.S.

its

also

bases had been used as a staging

56

Citizens

from Lebanon

— 1976

When the long-running civil war in Lebanon reached

a threshold threatening

the lives oi the few Americans remaining in the country, the United States

evacuated a small group to a warship on June 28
27

th 5
'

.

th
,

1976, and again on July

no domestic authority before the

Interestingly, the U.S. consulted

first

evacuation, but pursued a different course before the second. Instead of
requesting the approval of the de jure Lebanese government, whose influence

over events asymptotically approached irrelevance, the U.S. coordinated with

— the

PLO

and several other
While this coordination, like that with the Dominican
Palestinian groups.
had little influence on the academic
quasi-authorities eleven years earlier
those

actually

in

control o{ the

territory

58

—

legality of the operation,

it

did provide an improved chance of conducting the

operation with as few casualties as possible. In this case, no U.S. servicemen or

Lebanese

civilians

The

Israeli

On

June 27

were

killed.

Raid on Entebbe
th
,

59

— 1976

1976, a French airliner enroute from Tel Aviv to Paris was

hijacked by four Palestinian terrorists. After a brief stop in Libya, the aircraft
flew to Uganda, where

it

was joined by

six additional terrorists.

The

terrorists

of the non-Israeli passengers, and specifically threatened the lives of

freed

all

those

who

remained.

The government

of Uganda was at best uncooperative in

attempts to negotiate a settlement, and appeared to be providing support to the
terrorists.

60
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The evening

of July 3 rd and 4 th Israeli
,

commandos stormed

nal at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. Killed were

holding 96

Israelis hostage,

of the terrorists

along with several hostages

who

termi-

who were

stood up in the

commando.
also destroyed the operational Ugandan fighters

middle of the melee, a number of Ugandan

To prevent pursuit,

all

main

the

the Israelis

soldiers,

and one

Israeli

(approximately 10) on the tarmac. 61

The unique

aspect of this raid was that the nationals in question were taken

to the foreign country against their will. 62 This suggests that the foreign nationals

to

concerned were

and

responsible for weighing the risks involved in travelling

less

living in the

dangerous country in question.

It is

also

more

difficult for

the intervening state to fashion a pretext in the rush of a terrorist event than

over the course of a long-deteriorating

civil situation. Finally,

the actions re-

quired to rescue people in a confined hostage setting are necessarily

than to secure an area with a foreign capital against

sive

reasons appear to

make

riots.

less intru-

These three

intervention in the case of a terrorist event

less

prob-

lematic than even traditional protection of nationals abroad.

made a forceful case for its rescue mission at a meeting of the Security
Council on July 9 th It claimed that it had the right "to take military action to
Israel

.

protect

its

nationals in mortal danger." 63 This right, Israel claimed, was based

on the inherent

right of self-defense, "enshrined in international law

Charter of the United Nations," and supported by state practice. 64

and the

Israel stated

met the standard of the Caroline case: "Necesoverwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no

that this exercise of self-defense
sity

of self-defense, instant,

moment

for deliberation." 65 Finally, Israel

not directed at Uganda per
sary to secure

and extract

The United

se,

its

and employed only

nationals.

first

tion of the
is

much

force as

was neces-

make

a clear statement support-

the same Security Council meeting, the

stated that the intervention was "a temporary breach of the territorial

integrity of Uganda." 67

"There

At

as

66

States was the only country to

ing the legality of the Israeli raid.

U.S.

explained that the use of force was

UN

While

this sort

of breach

is

normally considered a viola-

Charter, this case, the U.S. argued,

fit

within an exception.

a well-established right," said the U.S., "to use limited force for the

protection of one's
a situation

own nationals from an imminent threat of injury or death in

where the State

in

whose

ing or unable to protect them."

68

territory they are located

The

is

either unwill-

U.S. stated that this right flows from the

inherent right of self-defense and allows "necessary and appropriate" force to
protect a nation's

on Entebbe was

own citizens. 69 By these criteria,

the U.S. concluded, the raid

a lawful use of force under international law.
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U.S. found
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the force used to be proportional to the limited goal of freeing the passengers,

and the use of force had ended once
France also supported the

While

stating that "at

first

this goal

had been achieved. 70

manner of speaking.
attack by an armed force on a

Israeli intervention, in a

sight

.

.

the surprise

.

an objective" appeared

foreign airport for the purpose of achieving by violence

had not been designed to infringe
independence of Uganda, but merely to save

to violate international law, the Israeli action

the territorial integrity or political

The French brought up an

lives. 71

additional legal point, that the

UN General

Assembly's Resolution on the Definition of Aggression

listed acts

only prima facie evidence of acts of aggression, and that

was up

Council to determine
sion

if,

it

which were

to the Security

"in the light of other relevant circumstances," aggres-

had actually been committed. 72

— 1978

The French Threat

to Intervene in the

On October

1978, two French technicians were captured in Mauritania

by Polisario

25

th
,

guerillas.

Two

days

rule out a military raid to free

Western Sahara

the French Defense Minister refused to

later,

A French parachute corps was moved to

them.

on Polisario military
December 23 rd the two

Senegal, and French aircraft participated in airstrikes

formations on December 12

th

13

,

th

and 18

,

technicians were turned over to the

Although the force was not applied
application had the desired result.
The Egyptian Raid on Lamaca

The

first

UN

in the

th
.

On

,

Secretary General in Algeria.

form of a rescue mission,

all

indirect

its

— 1978

non- Western use of force to protect nationals abroad was,

learning experience for

73

commandos

involved. Egypt sent a planeful of

Larnaca, Cyprus, on February, 19

th

to free Egyptian

at best, a

to

and other hostages taken

the day before. Although the Egyptians received permission to land, they did

not receive permission to storm the

aircraft.

The

Cypriot authorities were

successfully concluding negotiations with the terrorists,

begun

to leave the aircraft,

military

opened

fire

hostages to safety.

The

when

and the passengers had

the Egyptians decided to attack.

on the Egyptians,

arrested the terrorists,

The

Cypriot

and helped the

74

Egyptians defended their actions

less as

the protection of nationals

abroad (although several of the hostages were Egyptian, and an Egyptian had

been

killed

by the

terrorists in the initial seizure of the hostages)

an amorphous commitment "to
such methods to

fight terrorism

justice." 75
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and

to bring

all

,

and more

those

who

as

use

Conclusion

The U.S. Hostage Rescue Attempt

On the evening of 24-25 April,
raid into Iran to rescue

the previous year.

in Iran

J

980

commando
November 4 th of

1980, the United States launched a

50 hostages

The

—

who had been

raid ultimately failed

held since

due

to weather,

equipment

malfunction, and bad luck.

Although the hostage incident preoccupied the United States from late
1979 to early 1981, and was responsible for an enormous amount of diplomatic
maneuvering, the specific question of using force in the protection of nationals
abroad was
dered on

fairly straightforward.

May 24

th
,

The

IC] decision in the hostages case, ren-

characterized the actions of the "students" holding the hos-

tages as fairly educible to the Iranian government: "[T]he approval given to

these nacts by the Ayatollah

and the decision

Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian

State,

to perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the

Embassy and detention of the hostages into

acts of that State." 76 This retro-

spective linking of the "students" actions to the Iranian State permitted action
against that state as though

it

had perpetrated those actions

in the

first

place.

President Carter stated:

I

ordered

this rescue

mission prepared in order to safeguard American

to protect America's national interests,

and

lives,

to reduce the tensions in the world

The
been caused among many nations as the crisis continued.
was a humanitarian mission. It was not directed against Iran; it was
mission
not directed against the people of Iran. It was not undertaken with any feeling of
hostility toward Iran or its people. 77
that have
.

.

.

.

.

.

In his report to Congress, he declared: "In carrying out this operation, the

United States was acting wholly within

its

right, in

accordance with Article 5

of the United Nations Charter, to protect and rescue

government of the
protect them."

territory in

which they

are located

is

its

citizens

where the

unwilling or unable to

78

While usual countries supported or condemned the raid in political terms,
the Italian Foreign Minister Colombo, echoing Reisman, provided an illuminating legal comment:
on the part of Iran alone an extremely serious infringement oi the
rules of international law. The State which falls a victim to such an infringement
has the power, under international law, to resort to self-help. Even the United
Nations Charter recognizes this right as inherent, the exercise of which is
subordinate to the powers and duties conferred on the Security Council, for
There was

...

restoring the rule of law.

But the Charter also recognizes the
241

right of

each
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permanent member of the Security Council to veto. Each permanent member
must be aware of the responsibility it takes upon itself when vetoing a resolution
of the Security Council, by pointing the way to self-help. 79

US.

On

Intervention in

October 25

th

amphibious and

,

Grenada

— 1983

1983, the U.S. launched Operation Urgent Fury, a large

air assault

on the

was in

island nation of Grenada. This

response to an increasingly anarchic situation, precipitated earlier in the

month by

a coup d'etat against the island's Marxist Prime Minister, Maurice

Bishop, by hard-line

members of his own government.

On October 19

th

Bishop

,

and scores of others were killed in an unsuccessful attempt to regain control of
the island's government. Later that same day, General Hudson Austin, head of

new "Revolutionary

announced a four-day, 24-hour,
shoot-on-sight curfew. Concerned for the safety of American tourists and
medical students on the island, and alarmed by the presence of a large number
of armed, Cuban paramilitary construction workers on the island (completing
work on an airstrip large enough to support heavy military aircraft) the United
the

Military Council,"

,

States took action.

Although the Grenadian operation appeared

to

have the

classic factual

predicate for a traditional forcible protection of nationals scenario,
for

two

specific reasons. First, the operation

was conducted

it

was not

at the request of

the Governor-General of Grenada, whose constitutional authority, particularly
in the absence of any other de jure government,

claimant to power.

81

was unsurpassed by any other

Second, the operation was a textbook example of collec-

tive self-defense, in that the

United

States' assistance

was

forcefully

gently requested by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.

82

and

ur-

Despite

the fact that there appear to be three independently sufficient legal justifications for the

U.S./OECS

some level of
General Assembly

intervention, 79 governments expressed

disapproval of the operation, and

on November

2

nd
,

the

UN

voted 108 to 9 to condemn the intervention as a "violation of international
law." 83 This
tion

was somewhat

offset

by the overwhelming support for the opera-

shown by the people of Grenada. 84

The US.

Intervention in

Panama

— 1989

Six years later, another small nation in the Western Hemisphere had had

its

democratic election invalidated by a military strongman, and the latent threat

and foreign nationals gradually escalated
As Arend and Beck describe:

to local citizens
levels.

242

to unacceptable

Conclusion

On

December 20, 1989, the United States launched an invasion of Panama
code-named Operation 'Just Cause.' In a special press briefing given that day,
Secretary of State James Baker emphasized that the 'leading objective' of the

US

had been 'to protect American lives.' [footnote omitted] Earlier
on D-Day, President Bush had tersely explained the rationale for his decision to
use force: 'Last Friday, [General Manuel] Noriega declared his military
dictatorship to be in a state of war with the United States and publicly
threatened the lives oi Americans in Panama.' On Saturday, 'forces under his
command shot and killed an unarmed American serviceman, wounded another,
arrested and brutally beat a third American serviceman and then brutally
military action

interrogated his wife, threatening her with sexual abuse. That, said the president,
'was enough!' [footnote omitted]

Two factors make

It

was time to

act. 85

more difficult. First is the
sheer scale of the operation: ten thousand American troops eventually seized
control of the entire country, removed the de facto head of state to face drug
trafficking charges in the U.S., and reinstalled the de jure, democraticallyelected government. 86 Second, President Bush cited four overlapping justificathe analysis of the intervention

tions for the intervention: "to safeguard the lives of

Americans, to defend de-

Panama, to combat drug trafficking and to protect the integrity of
the Panama Canal Treaty." 87 Of these, claimed Secretary of State Baker, the
protection of American lives was "the leading one." 88
mocracy

in

Reaction to the invasion was generally negative
89

—mildly

so in Europe,

The communist world was

and

condemnatory, with the Soviet Union calling the operation "a violation of the United Nations Charter and of the universally accepted norms of behavior between
sovereign states." 90 China simply labeled it "a violation of internal law." 91 The
United States, Britain, and France vetoed a Security Council resolution condemning the invasion. 92
stridently so in Latin

The U.S.

On

America.

Intervention in Liberia

also

— 1990

th

August 5
1990, the United States landed 255 Marines in the Liberian
capital of Monrovia to evacuate U.S. and any other nationals desiring to leave
the country. This was in immediate response to an announcement the day
,

before by rebel leader Prince Johnson,

who

called for the arrest of

all

foreign

nationals in the capital. Johnson apparently wished to attract international

attention to his rebel faction, and provoke an international response to the

seven-month-old rebellion.

93

In

this,

he was successful.

Without seeking or receiving permission from embattled President Samuel
K.

Doe

or either of the rival rebel faction leaders, the Marines evacuated
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approximately one thousand foreign nationals from Monrovia over a two-week

On

period. 94

Monrovia

August 24 th

West African peacekeeping

a

,

to enforce a cease-fire.

Professor Lillich

drew

this

force arrived in

95

conclusion from the international community's

reaction to the evacuation:
[T]he renewed assertion by the United States of the right of forcible protection
o(

its

nationals during the Liberian disorder, the fact that hundreds of other

what must have
governments, and the

foreign nationals from dozens of States were evacuated with

been the enthusiastic

not explicit) approval of their

(if

near-complete absence o( legal or other criticism of the rescue operation

combine

to indicate that the international

the post-Cold

War

period,

is

community, now more than ever

prepared to accept, endorse

or, at

all

in

the very least,

tolerate the forcible protection of nationals abroad in appropriate cases. 96

Theoretical Bases for Action

The two major

theories addressing the legality of the use of force in the

protection of nationals abroad are the "restrictionist" theory, which views any

such use of force as unlawful, and the "counter-restrictionist theory," which, as
its

name

implies, holds the opposite view.

Within the

counter-restrictionist

theory, there are several intermingled sub-theories supporting the general

premise of allowing intervention.

The

Restrictionist

Theory

This theory, which states that there
of nationals abroad, rests

on three assumptions.

security.

force,

Second,

it

for the forcible protection

assumes that the sole

First, it

is

the maintenance of international peace

holds that the

UN has a monopoly on the lawful use of

principal goal of the United Nations

and

no lawful basis

is

with the narrow exception for self-defense in the case of armed attack on

the territory of a state. Third,

it

maintains that

if

states

were permitted to use

beyond clear
narrow mandate,

force to protect their nationals abroad, or for any other reason

individual or collective self-defense, they

using

it

as a pretext for

Restrictionists

would broaden

any desired policy ends.

concede

that,

this

97

under the pre-Charter

legal regime, states did

have the right to use force unilaterally in the protection o{

However, they say,
this practice,

was often abused, placing weak states

mercy
advance national policy through violence. To end

this right

of stronger ones wishing to

their nationals.

they conclude, the framers of the

lawed the unilateral use of force, except

for the
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UN

at the

Charter specifically out-

most obvious cases of national

Conclusion

self-defense against

armed

and then only

attack,

to the extent that the Security

Council had not yet acted. According to Ian Brownlie, "[t]he whole object of
the Charter was to render unilateral use of force, even in self-defense, subject
to

UN control." 98
Arend and Beck

concisely summarize the textual basis for the restrictionist

argument:
For their rendition o( the jus ad bellum, the restrictionists draw heavily upon
Articles 2 (4)

and

5

1

of the

UN

Charter. In their view, the language of Article

2 (4) clearly indicates a general prohibition

omitted]

No

state

is

on the use of force by states, [footnote

permitted to threaten or use force 'against the

independence of any

integrity or political

state, or in

territorial

any manner inconsistent

with the Purposes of the United Nations.' Article 51, which provides for
'individual

the

and

general

collective self-defense,' constitutes merely a

prohibition

of

[footnote

2(4).

omitted]

narrow exception to
States may defend

themselves, restrictionists argue, but only after an actual 'armed attack'

upon

state territory has occurred, [footnote omitted] Typical of the restrictionist

view

is

that described by Waldcock, himself a counter-restrictionist: '2(4) prohibits

entirely

any threat of use of armed force between independent States except in

individual or collective self defense under Article 5 1 or in execution of collective

measures under the Charter
omitted]

The

UN

for

Charter's

suggests, has the broadest range

maintaining or restoring peace.' [footnote

prohibition,
it is

the

French

restrictionist

Viraly

possible to imagine.' [footnote omitted] 99

The restrictionist theory, in its purest form, allows no use of force against any
terrorist or other groups who are using force below the invasion-level of an armored column

crossing a national border.

The Counter -Restrictionist Theory

The counter-restrictionist theory is

actually a constellation of four overlapping,

nonexclusive subtheories.

The

first

subtheory involves the survival or revival of the pre-Charter cus-

tomary rule allowing

forcible protection of nationals abroad.

gues for the survival of the customary rule.

He

Derek Bowett

ar-

believes that a reading of the

Charter's travaux preparatoires shows that the framers intended to preserve the

"inherent" right of self-defense, with the contours acquired from customary international law up to that point.
since the Charter

was

have exercised the
international law

ratified

More

persuasively for Bowett, state practice

has confirmed that a significant

number of states

right to protect nationals abroad, extending the

norm

into the present.
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The other version of this subtheory holds
the modern era. Arend and Beck explain:
In their view, the

UN

Abroad

that the

norm has been revived

founders mistakenly assumed that

'self-help'

in

would no

longer be necessary 'since an authoritative international organization [could

now] provide the police

facilities

for

enforcement of international

rights,

[footnote omitted] Unfortunately for the international system, submit Michael

Reisman, Richard

and other

Lillich,

have been confounded

scholars, the

UN enforcement mechanisms

at virtually every turn by dissension

among

the Security

Council's permanent membership, [footnote omitted] Article 2(4)'s prohibition

must hence be conditioned on the
United Nations' capacity to respond effectively. When the UN fails to do so,
customary law revives and states may intervene to protect nationals, [footnote

on the

threat or use of force, they assert,

omitted]

101

In summary, this subtheory posits that, whether
force of the Charter, or

was extinguished by

mis-, or nonfeasance, the

it

and

it

later revived

missible use of force

"All

Members

by

UN

mal-,

customary norm under international law permitting

the use of force in the protection of nationals abroad

The second subtheory

survived the entry into

is

alive today. 102

describes the protection of nationals abroad as a per-

below the Article 2(4) threshold. The

article itself directs:

shall refrain in their international relations

from the threat or

use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in

any way inconsistent with the UN's purposes." 103 Here, the key

is

that Article 2(4) has two dimensions: a quantitative aspect regarding the

amount of violence or coercion, and a

which the violence or coercion is

may

2(4)

qualitative aspect regarding the

directed.

end

to

An oversimplified reading of Article

leave the impression of a simple, and low, threshold, forbidding

all

uses or even threats of force not flowing from self-defense or Chapter VII
authorization.
".

.

.

The two-dimensional approach, however,

keys

on the language

against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state

A legitimate use of force in the protection of nationals abroad does not take or
hold

Such

territory, or

threaten the government elected, or tolerated, by the people.

a use of force

is

qualitatively different,

of the Charter, with fresh memories of

sought to circumscribe.

and not the type which the framers

German and Japanese

aggression,

A brief operation which, at its conclusion, has affected

neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of the threatening state

would not appear

to

have violated the qualitative prong of the Article

104
2(4) prohibition.
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Conclusion

The

complement of the second; it holds that a threat to
even a single national abroad is the equivalent of an "armed attack" against the
nation, allowing for a protective, and not punitive, response proportional to
the injury received or threatened. That is, the forcible protection of nationals
abroad

third subtheory

is

is

a

permissible self-defense under Article 51. 105 Since Article 51 appears

not to create, but to simply recognize, "the inherent right of self-defense," counterrestrictionists believe the

Charter provides "a local habitation and a name" for

the customary right of the

first

subtheory.

The problem with

pears to be that, like Article 2(4), Article 5

The former fits

tive aspects.

well with the

1

suggests that there

low which the use of force

The counterargument

is

is

subtheory ap-

has both qualitative and quantita-

first

subtheory, in that an "inherent"

right could quite plausibly follow the contours of

The latter, however,

this

customary international law.

a high threshold,

"armed attack," be-

inappropriate.

to this last point

is

that

it is

difficult to

imagine that

the framers of the Charter would create a legal no-man's land, wherein a rogue

would be able to inflict violent injury, but the aggrieved state would not
be able to respond in self-defense. 106 The key to reconciling this apparent
state

lacuna

is

proportionality: self-defense operates across the spectrum of violence,

and a small "armed attack" against
sary

a national abroad

may be met with

and proportional nonpunitive response designed

from further harm.

To

to protect the victim

the extent that Article 51 permits reaction against

less-than-overwhelming uses of force,
scope, duration,

it

demands

on the

a reciprocal limitation

and intensity of the protective response. The customary

national legal doctrines comprising the law of armed conflict
sity,

a neces-

and chivalry

proportionality,

—provide

—

inter-

military neces-

these limitations even in the

absence of an absolute prohibition by Article 5 1
Finally, the fourth
cifically,

subtheory

is

McDougal and Reisman

grounded in a respect

for

human rights.

reject the restrictionist premise that the

Spe-

UN

has one overriding purpose, the maintenance of international peace and security.

They argue

that the

UN has two such fundamental premises, each deserv-

ing equal weight: the maintenance of international peace

protection of human rights.

This view

is

grounded in the Preamble, Articles

and growing corpus of human

rights law.

108

Under

Council

fails

to act

security,

and the

55,

and 56, and

and

a large

human rights vio-

security. If the

Secu-

under Chapter VII, McDougal and Reisman argue, "the

cumulative effect of articles
unilateral self-help."

1,

this view,

lations are themselves threats to international peace
rity

and

107

1,

55,

and 56 [would be]

109
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Conclusion
This

article

defined

forcible

protection

of nationals

reviewed

abroad,

th

commentary on the concept by publicists from the late 18 Century to the end
of the pre-Charter era, and then surveyed the major uses o( force in the
protection of nationals abroad during the Charter era.

Lessons of State Practice

Arend and Beck provide an outstanding structural review of state practice in
the Charter era. They examine four broad areas
the nature of intervening

—

states, the

circumstances of intervention, the scope of intervention, and state

justification for intervention

— and explore

emerge several fascinating points about how
110
nationals beyond their borders.
analysis

The nature of the

From

subcriteria within each.
states

their

have protected

intervening states reveals two patterns: they have been

most exclusively Western, and there have been very few of them. Of the 16

al-

epi-

sodes they describe, 13 involved the use of force by just four countries: the

United States, Great

and Belgium. Generally, these powers
a position to effectively project military power in a

Britain, France,

have been the only ones in
troubled region. 111

The circumstances

The number of endangered nationals has ranged from the thousands (in the Congo and
the Dominican Republic) to just two (in the Western Sahara). The governof the intervention have varied considerably.

mental situation has also varied, from the anarchy of no government
beria,

the

Dominican Republic)

to

a

at all (Li-

malevolent government

threatening the nationals concerned (Uganda, Iran).

The

actively

nationality has like-

wise varied, from the rescue of own-country nationals (Entebbe, Mayaguez) to

the evacuation of

all

foreign nationals in a troubled area (the Congo, Liberia,

Grenada) Interestingly, almost
.

all

such operations have occurred in areas that

were, until the Charter era, under "Great Power" protection, usually as former

Cambodia, the Congo, the Dominican Repuball were under
lic, Lebanon, Uganda, the Western Sahara, Grenada, Panama
varying degrees of Great Power control until recently. This resulted in two situations: the turbulence which often accompanies recent independence, and a
colonies. Iran, Palestine, Egypt,

—

power which is both familiar with and,

in a

moral sense, responsible

for,

the for-

112

mer territory.
The scope of the intervention ran the gamut from
in

brief excursions

measured

minutes (Entebbe, Mayaguez) to months-long stays (the Dominican Repub-

lic,

Egypt).

The

longer-term operations, however, were only
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ized as the protection of nationals abroad.

Once

that phase of the operation

had passed, new missions with new justifications took their place. The true protective missions were extremely limited in the territorial scope, temporal duration,

and

military intensity of their effects. 113

Finally, the state justifications for the interventions varied as well.

states

have

on multiple

relied

Most

rationales for their operations, with the protec-

most cases. However, as operations
lengthened or diversified, new justifications would be advanced once the nationals sought to be protected were secure. 114
tion of nationals near the top of the

list

in

A Coherent Legal Model for the Protection of Nationals Abroad
The

four subtheories advanced by the counter-restrictionists each contain

helpful elements.

A model which includes the most authoritative portions of all

four would provide a solid legal basis for undertaking such operations in the

Charter

era.

115

The first subtheory, regarding the survival or revival of the customary
norm allowing protection of nationals, is perhaps best understood as a synthesis

of the two.

To the extent that such an understanding does not run afoul of

the plain language of the Charter,

it

appears that a narrowly construed form

of self-defense did survive the entry into force of the Charter, and that a long
line of customary international

of this argument, however,

is

law informs

the

UN did not deliver on the security

more
it

its

use today.

controversial.

The second

To

promised in return

portion

the extent that the

on the
expand

for a limitation

national exercise of self-defense, that inherent right must necessarily

meet the new threats. Without violating the plain meaning of the Charter,
nations should and must protect their citizens when no another authority,
to

national or international,

is

willing or able. In this sense, this additional por-

tion of the inherent right of self-defense has

proved incapable,

as

been revived

as the

UN has often

an organization, of maintaining international peace and

security.

The second subtheory,
of Article 2(4),

cord with the
terially

is

that such actions are below the qualitative threshold

a close call, but, in the case of a pure rescue operation, in ac-

facts. If no territory is held,

threatened,

it is

difficult to

and if the

political structure

is

not ma-

argue that a rescue operation breaks the

2(4) threshold.

The

third subtheory, that such operations are lawful exercises of the inher-

ent right of self-defense, guaranteed by Article 51,

is

perhaps the strongest

gument. By allowing the threshold of an "armed attack" to

ar-

float at the level of

the provocation, a militarily necessary, proportionate, and chivalrous response
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will

guarantee compliance with international law.

If

a single citizen

harm's way, and only that force necessary to bring her to safety

is

is

placed in

employed,

then the protecting nation has gained no military advantage over the threatenmaintained, and international peace and security

ing nation, the status quo

is

are preserved. Again,

difficult to see

ject

it is

how such an outcome violates

the ob-

and purpose of the Charter, or the intentions of its framers.
subtheory argues for the equality of human rights with in-

Finally, the fourth

and security. Since the framing o{ the Charter, we have
learned more and more about the nature of regimes which threaten international peace and security. None of these governments have the requisite respect for the individual which is the basis for civil protections against tyranny.
Far from being in tension with international peace and security, human rights
ternational peace

are very

much the foundation of international peace and security.

the Charter which places these two concepts in opposition

is,

A reading of

consciously or

not, of greater service to the Benito Mussolinis of history than the

Theodore

Roosevelts.

Notes
Benito Mussolini, quoted by Gen. Smedley D. Butler, reprinted

1

QUOTATIONS 379 (Henry

in

THE POCKET BOOK OF

Davidoffed., 1952).

3.

Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in BARBARA TUCHMAN, PRACTICING HISTORY 115 (1981).
Rev. Jesse Jackson, remarks on Nightline, December 15, 1987.

4.

Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J.

2.

Beck, International

of force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm 94
5.

Id.

Law and the Use

(1993).

Ronzitti further restricts the scope of consent with several criteria:

First of all,

consent must come from an authority whose expression of will

to the local State.

...

is

ascribable

Secondly, the expression of will of the local State must be valid,

not vitiated by the so-called 'vices de volonte.'.

.

.

[T]he consent of the injured State

must not only not be given by error, obtained by fraud, or procured by coercion but
must also comply with the territorial sovereign's internal provisions regarding
competence to be bound.
Thirdly, the action by the intervening State must be
.

strictly

whose nationals are
is

.

.

confined to the limits of the consent given by the local sovereign.
in mortal danger,

even

if it is

not automatically allowed to resort to force,

The

permitted to enter foreign

if it

lacks authorization to

State

territory,

do

so.

...

Moreover, the action of the intervening State must not infringe upon the rules by

which

a State

is

duty bound not as regards a particular subject of international law but

as regards the international

cannot function

as

community

as a whole.

an erga omnes defence.

...

...

[T]he consent of the State

Finally, the

consent must not be

contrary to a peremptory rule of international law. [footnotes omittedl

Natalino Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion
and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity 84-86 (1985). Ronzitti continues, stating
that treaties are a valid vehicle of consent: "Practice shows that, by virtue of a treaty, a right to
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intervene in foreign territory for carrying out activities which would certainly be unlawful

without the treaty so providing,

sometimes given, [footnote omitted]

is

examination of treaty-based intervention,

Can

Say No?, 62 U. CHI.

AREND AND

6.

L.

see

7.

Id.
Id.

9.

E.

BECK, supra note

VATTEL, THE

at 115.

For an

Who

REV. 607 (1995).
4, at 94.

See also RONZITTI, supra note 5 at 135-148.

Ronzitti also addresses the use of force against pirates

8.

Id.

David Wippman, Treaty-Based Intervention:

LAW OF NATIONS

and

slavers. Id. at 137-141.

161 0- Chitty ed. 1883). See also Louis B. Sohn,

Basic Human Rights, in RICHARD B. LlLLICH AND JOHN NORTON
Naval War College International Law Studies: Readings in
International Law from the Naval War College Review 1947-1977, Vol. 62, 587,

Law and

International

Moore

eds, U.S.

588 (1980). Professor Sohn traces the use of force in the protection of nationals abroad back
far as the

th

1

Century.

VATTEL,

supra note 9 at 165.

10.

E.

1 1

William Edward Hall,

OF THE BRITISH

as

Id.

CROWN

a Treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction

2 (1894). Hall continues, describing the connection

between the

sovereign and the subject, and the sovereign's power over the subject:

The

legal relations

by which a person

residence cannot be wholly put aside

which he may do outside

encompassed

in his country of birth

and

when he goes abroad for a time; many of the

acts

is

his native state

have inevitable consequences within

it.

He

may for many purposes be temporarily under the control of another sovereign than his
own, and he may be bound to yield to a foreign government a large measure of
obedience; but his own state still possess a right to his allegiance; he is still an integral
member of the national community. A state therefore can enact laws, enjoining or
forbidding acts, and defining legal relations, which oblige

common with those within its dominions.

its

subjects abroad in

can declare under what conditions

it

will

regard as valid acts, done in foreign countries, which profess to have legal effect;

it

can

visit

others with penalties;

it

It

can estimate the circumstances and

facts as

it

chooses.

Id.

12.

Id.

13.

Id. at 4.

14.

EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 446

at 3.

(1928).
15.

Id. at

16.

Id.

448.

at 450.

Among

Borchard

lists

the bases for intervention:

the various purposes for which troops and marines have been landed, are the

following:

[footnote omittedl

(1)

for the simple protection of

American

citizens in

disturbed localities, the activity of the troops being in the nature of police duty; [footnote

omitted]

(2) for

the punishment of natives for the murder or injury of American citizens

in semi-civilized or
riots,

backward countries; [footnote omitted]

(3) for

the suppression of local

and the restoration and preservation of order; [footnote omitted]

(4)

for the

collection of indemnities, either with or without the delivery of a previous ultimatum;

[footnote omitted] (5) for the seizure of custom-houses, as security for the
claims;

[footnote omitted]

and

for purposes

such

as

government, the destruction of pirates infesting certain
Id.

at 449-50.
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objects.
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452.
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18.

AREND AND

BECK, supra note
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22.
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23.

Id. at

24.
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25.
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26.
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27.
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28.
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4, at 95.

4, at 26.

26-27.

at 27.

at 27-28.

Id. at 28. The troops were present in the Canal Zone pursuant
government of Egypt, signed on August 26, 1936. Id.

29.

30.

Id.

31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

Id.

at 29.

35.

Id.

Foreign Secretary Lloyd echoed this

House of Commons, and
incapable of taking swift and decisive action. Id.

added that the Security Council was, in any case,
36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.

Id.

39.

Id.

40.

AREND AND BECK,

41

RONZITTI, supra note

•

42.

Id

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

at 31.

45.

Id.

at 32.

46.

Id.

at 31.

Two

comment

to a treaty with the

before the

supra note 4, at 96.
5, at 30.

other instances in Africa, both in 1964, do not meet the criteria of

protection of nationals abroad in that they were undertaken with the approval of the local
sovereign. This, of course, renders the action a cooperative one

between nations, and not an

intervention with adversary sovereigns.

The

first

was the evacuation of British

citizens in Zanzibar, following a coup d'etat against the

The new government quietly invited the British, who had dispatched a warship to the
area, to evacuate its own citizens. Id. at 32.
The second incident was a joint U.S. - Belgian operation, again in the Congo, to rescue foreign
nationals from rebels. AREND AND BECK supra note 4, at 97. According to Professor Lillich,
sultan.

diplomacy and alternative measures had gotten nowhere: "[T]he United Nations got bogged

down in debate upon it. They finally decided to let the Organization of African Unity attempt to
do something: they tried and they were very, very unsuccessful." Richard B. Lillich, Forcible
Under International Law, in RICHARD B. LILLICH AND JOHN NORTON MOORE EDS,
Naval War College International Law Studies: Readings in International
Law from the Naval War College Review 1947-1977, Vol. 62, 587, 597 (1980)

Self-Help
U.S.

[hereinafter

Forcible Self-Help].

The subsequent

intervention was highly successful, and

conducted with the permission of the Congo's government. However,
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this situation highlights

Conclusion

the tenuous nature of such permission: Congolese Foreign Minister
operation, but after

The

had been

it

set in

Bomboko consented

motion, Prime Minister Patrice

practical effect of the post hoc withdrawal of permission

was

Lumumba

negligible, but

to the

overruled him.
it

does serve to

emphasize the role of timing in such operations. M. Akehurst, The Use of Force to Protect
Nationals Abroad, INT'L REL. 5: 7 (1977). Professor Sohn noted that, while the scope of the
mission was

strictly limited to

rescue of the hostages, a certain

effect their release: "In the process of rescuing

amount of force was required

them, the army of rebellion was more or

to

less

destroyed, but that was purely incidental." Sohn, supra note 9, at 597.
47.

RONZITTI, supra note

throes of anarchy."

5, at

33. Ronzitti states that

"

the island was, to

all effects,

in the

Id.

48.
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49.

RONZITTI, supra note

50.

AREND AND BECK, supra

51.
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5, at

397-98.

5, at 33.
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5, at

4, at 98.
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at 36.

52.
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53.
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54.
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55.
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56.
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60.
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61.
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62.
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63.
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64.

Id.

65.
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66.

Id.

67.

31 U.N.

BECK, supra note

supra note 4, at 98.
5, at 36.

BECK, supra note
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4, at 98.

5, at 36.

4, at

97-98.

4, at 99.

5, at 37.

note

4, at 99.

5, at 37.

(1941 st mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1941 (1976), quoted

in

Richard B.

Volume II: The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General International
Legal Issues, in RICHARD B. LlLLICH AND JOHN NORTON MOORE EDS, U.S. NAVAL WAR
College Intern ationaI Law Studies: Readings in International Law from the
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, VOL. 62, IX, XI (1980) [hereinafter Introduction].
Lillichy

Introduction to

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

RONZITTI, supra note

72.

Id.

5, at

38.

at 40.

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at

40-41.

at 41.

75.

Id.

76.

Id. at

77.

Id.

44.

This Presidential Statement places an unusual emphasis on feelings.

present at a

White House conversation, when

would have

killed the Iranian "student"

recover. "Let's just say," replied the

emotional event in his

life."

The author was

a participant in the rescue mission

was asked

if

he

guarding the three Americans he had been assigned to

commando,

"that meeting

Notes of conversation on
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file

me would have been

with the author.

a significant
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78.

Id. at

45. Ronzitti provides

Abroad

an excellent explanation:

[Under Reisman's theory,] [t]he Charter does not abrogate a State's right to resort to
armed force, which belongs to it under customary

self-help, including the use of

international law.

The Charter simply suspends

the right to resort to self-help, since

entrusts the Security Council with the task of safeguarding the rights of
States.

Whenever

this

the Security Council

mechanism does not
is

function, for example

when

it

member

the action of

paralysed by veto, the States are free to resort to self-help,

under the terms permitted by customary international law.
Id.

79.

Id.

at 46.

80.

AREND AND

81.

Moore, supra note 80,

BECK, supra note 4, at 101. See generally John Norton Moore, Grenada and
the International Double Standard, 78 A. J. I. L. 145 (1984) and Ronald M. Riggs, The Grenada
Intervention: A Legal Analysis, 109 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
at

148 and 159-61. Moore explains:

Constitutional niceties of internal authority are difficult to construct

when

the only

general Constitution of a nation has been previously suspended in express violation of
its

provisions and a subsequent attempted coup has

Government
power.

It

announced the

dissolution of the

that suspended the Constitution but was unable to consolidate effective

does seem clear in this setting, however, that the authority of the

Governor-General to represent Grenada was stronger than that of anyone
Id. at

else.

159.

82.

Id.

at 147-48.

AREND AND

BECK, supra note 4, at 101. President Reagan reported that the
condemnatory General Assembly vote had not "upset my breakfast at all." Id.
83.

Moore, supra note 80, at 151-53. Moore quotes the results of a CBS News poll,
conducted on November 6 th 62% felt the Americans had come "to save the lives of Americans
living here," 65% said they believed the airport under construction was being built for Cuban and
Soviet military purposes, 76% stated they believed Cuba wanted to take control of the
Grenadian government, 81% said the American troops were "courteous and considerate," 85%
84-

:

stated they felt they or their family were in danger while General Austin was in power,

85%

said

American purpose in invading was to "free the people of Grenada from the Cubans,"
and 91% were "glad the Americans came to Grenada." Id. at 152.
85. AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 93. Professor Lillich recommended the following
additional sources on the invasion of Panama:
they

felt

the

Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, in:
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (Colum. J. Trans. L.) vol. 29, 1991, 281, with

Compare Abraham
Louis Henkin,

The

Invasion of

Panama Under

International Law:

A Gross Violation,

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (Colum. J. Trans. L.) vol. 29, 1991, 293.
See also Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to
Tyranny, in AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 516; Tom Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter
Paradigm, in: AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 503; Ved Nanda, The Validity of the United States
in:

Intervention in
Quigley,

The

Panama Under

International Law,

in:

Legality of the United States Invasion of

1990, 276; James P. Terry,

The Panama

Intervention:

AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 494; John

Panama,

Law

in

in:

Yale JIL, vol. 15,

Support of Policy,

in:

Naval War College Review, vol. 43, 1990, no. 4, 1 10; Panel, The Panama Revolution,
in: American Society of International Law Proceedings (ASIL Proc), vol. 84, 1990,
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182; Recent Developments, International Intervention

of Panama,

Richard B.

Lillich,

Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad:

States Invasion

ILJ), vol. 31, 1990, 633.

The

Liberian "Incident" of

German Yearbook of International Law

35

1990,

—The United

Harvard International Law Journal (Harv.

in:

205,

206

(1993)

[hereinafter Liberia]

86.

AREND AND

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

Id.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

BECK, supra note

4, at 102.

Included in the evacuated were French, Canadian,

Italian,

Lebanese, and even Iraqi

citizens i.W.

95.

102-103. For a more in-depth treatment of the incident, see Richard B.

Id. at

The

Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad:

Yearbook of International Law
96.

Lillich, Liberia,

97.

AREND AND
AREND AND

98.
99.

Liberian "Incident" of 1990, 35

205 (1993).

Lillich,

Lillich,

GERMAN

supra note 85, at 205.

supra note 85, at 222-23.

BECK, supra note

4, at 105.

BECK, supra note

4, at 106.

See also Riggs, supra note 80, at 22.

Id.

100.

Id. at

101.

Id.

107.

Reisman himself continues: "A

rational

and contemporary interpretation of the

Charter must conclude that Article 2(4) suppresses self-help lonly] insofar as the organization
can assume the role of enforcer." When the
fails in its mission "self-help prerogatives revive."

UN

Any

which fails to take this into account would merely
provide "an invitation to lawbreakers who would anticipate a paralysis in the Security Council's
decision dynamics." Michael Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement, in C. Black and R. Falk (eds),
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER, 3: 850 (1971), quoted in AREND AND
BECK, supra note 4, at 107-08.
[footnote omitted].

102.

Professor

[T]he

interpretation

McDougal summarized
important fact

first

is

this position eloquently:

that the machinery for collective police action

projected by the Charter has never been implemented.

We

don't have the police

United Nations, the collective machinery that was expected to replace
In other words, there has been a failure in certain of the major provisions for

forces for the
self-help.

implementing the Charter.
If,

in the light of this failure,

we

consider

how we can implement

the principal

purposes of minimizing coercion, of insuring that states do not profit by coercion and
violence,

I

submit to you that

members of one
aircraft or

it is

simply to honor lawlessness to hold that the

state can, with impunity, attack the nationals

other assets

—

—

individuals, ships,

of other states without any fear of response. In the absence of

machinery to protect against attack and deprivation,

would suggest that
the principle of major purpose requires an interpretation which would honor self-help
against prior unlawfulness. The principle of subsequent conduct would certainly

collective

confirm

this.

.

.

.
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Myers McDougal, Authority
28-29 (Dec. 1967), quoted
103.

AREND AND

104.

But

to

Use Force on

High Seas, 20 NAVAL

WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 19,

Introduction, supra note 67, at XL

in Lillich,

BECK, supra note

RONZITTI, supra note

see

the

4, at 108.

5, at 8-9.

105.

Riggs, supra note 80, at 24.

106.

Ronzitti acknowledges the problem of assuming that an

"armed attack" can involve only

aggressive international war:
[P]ractice

shows

that,

so in one of two ways:

when
i)

a State intends to wrongfully use

armed coercion,

exerting armed coercion within

its

does

it

by using force against the territory of another State, or

ii)

own territory against foreign instrumentalities

by

(e.g.

embassies) or citizens (individuals or State organs, such as foreign representatives).

Whereas

in the former case the victim

not possible, since

RONZITTI, supra note

it is

may

react in self-defence, in the latter this

is

declared that there has been no 'armed attack'.

5, at 66.

He

continues:

[I]n recent years, particularly unpleasant episodes

have repeatedly occurred, such

as

the taking of hostages, and transnational terrorism. These events are the cause of a

continual state of danger. Unless the international community acquires suitable
instruments, capable of preventing and representing

[sic]

such criminal events,

armed force is likely to continue to increase on the part of those
whose nationals become the victims of terrorist attacks, in order to fill the
vacuum created by the lack of effective control mechanisms.
resorting to unilateral

States

Id.

107.
108.

AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 109. See also Riggs, supra note 80, at 23.
AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at 109. Arend and Beck summarize McDougal

Reisman's position:

The

Preamble's "repeated emphasis upon the

common

interests in

human

rights,"

argue Reisman and McDougal, "indicates that the use of force for the urgent
protection of such rights

Under

is

no

less

authorized than other forms of self-help," [footnote

and encouraging respect for
human rights" is set out as a fundamental purpose of the United Nations, [footnote
omitted] Similarly, Article 55 of the Charter points to the UN objective of promoting
"human rights" observance, while Article 56 authorizes "joint and separate action [by
Members] in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
omitted]

set

Article 1(3), they suggest, "promoting

out in Article 55." [footnote omitted]

Id.

109.
1

10.

AREND AND BECK, supra note 4,
AREND AND BECK, supra note 4, at
Id.

111.

Id.

112.

Id.

at 103-04.

113.

Id.

at 104.

114.

Id.

115.

Riggs, supra note 80, at 25-33.

at 109. See

103.
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ako RONZITTI, supra note

5, at 2.

and

Conclusion

Bibliography
Akehurst, M., The Use of Force

to Protect

Nationals Abroad, INT'L REL.

Arend, Anthony Clark and Robert J.

Beck, International

(1977)

5: 7

Law and the Use of

Force: Beyond the UN Charter Paradigm 94 (1993)
Borchard, Edwin M., The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 446 (1928)
D'Amato, Anthony, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, AJIL, vol. 84,
1990,516
Davidoff, Henry ed., THE POCKET BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 379 (1952)
Farer, Tom, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, AJIL, vol. 84, 1990, 503
Hall, William Edward, A Treatise on the Foreign Powers and Jurisdiction of
the British Crown 2 (1894)
Henkin, Louis,

The

Invasion of

Panama Under

International Law:

Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (Colum. J. Trans. L.) vol.
Jackson, Rev. Jesse, Remarks on Nightline, December 15, 1987
Lillich,

35

Richard B., Forcible Protection of Nationals Abroad:

German Yearbook of International Law 205

A

29, 1991,

The

Gross Violation,

293

Liberian "Incident" of 1990,

(1993)

Volume II: The Use of Force, Human Rights, and General
RICHARD B. LILLICH AND JOHN NORTON MOORE EDS, U.S.
Naval War College International Law Studies: Readings in International Law
from the Naval War College Review 1947-1977, Vol. 62, ix, xi (1980)
lillich, Richard B., Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, in RICHARD B. LILLICH AND
John Norton Moore eds, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies:
FIeadings in International Law from the Naval War College Review 1947-1977,
Lillich,

Richard

B.,

Introduction to

International Legal Issues, in

vol. 62,

xi (1980)

ix,

Moore, John Norton, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AJIL. 145 (1984)

Nanda, Wed, The Validity of the United States Intervention
Law, AJIL,

vol. 84, 1990,

The Panama

Panel,

in

Panama Under

International

494

Revolution, American Society of International

Law Proceedings (ASIL

Proc.),vol.84, 1990,182

The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, Yale JIL, vol. 15, 1990, 276
Recent Developments, International Intervention The United States Invasion of Panama,
Harvard International Law Journal (Harv. ILJ), vol. 31, 1990, 633
Reisman, Michael, Sanctions and Enforcement, in C. Black and R. Falk (eds) The Future of the
Quigleyjohn,

—

International Legal Order,
Riggs,

Ronald M.,

3:

850 (1971)

The Grenada

Ronzitti, Natalino,

Intervention:

A Legal Analysis,

109 MIL.

L.

REV.

1

(1985)

Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and Intervention

on Grounds of Humanity 26 (1985)
Sofaer,

Abraham, The Legality of the United States Action

Transnational

Law (Colum.

J.

in

Panama, Columbia Journal of

Trans. L.) vol. 29, 1991, 281

Law and Basic Human Rights, in Richard B. Lillich and John
Naval War College International Law Studies: Readings in
International Law from the Naval War College Review 1947-1977, Vol. 62, 587, 588 (1980)
Terry, James P., The Panama Intervention: Law in Support of Policy, Naval War College
Sohn, Louis B., International

Norton Moore

Review,

eds,

U.S.

vol. 43, 1990, no. 4,

1

10

Tuchman,

Barbara, Practicing History 115 (1981)

Vattel, E.,

The Law

of Nations 161 Q. Chitty ed. 1883)

Wippman, David, Treaty-Based Intervention:

Who Can Say No?, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607

257

(1995)

Index

Abarenda, USS: 154

Abeche, Chad: 105
Abyssinia: 9, 27-28
Accessory Transit Company: 120, 121-22
Accioly, H.: 19-20

Act for The Government of the Navy of the United
Adams, USS: 133
Adoula,

Cyrille:

50

Aizpuru: 131, 132

Al-Matni, Nasib

il:

44

Albania: 33-34

Albany, USS: 166

Alexandria, Egypt: 130, 234

240
USS: 131

Algeria: 237,
Alliance,

Almy, Admiral: 129

Amapala, Honduras: 149-50, 168
American Cable Company: 153

American Mission compounds
Ancon, Panama: 147

in China:

165-66

Anderson, Admiral: 167
Angles: 2

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company: 233

Angola: 125
Apia, Samoa: 132, 140-41

Arab League: 44
Arab nationalism: 43-44
Arend, Anthony Clark: 230, 242, 244-45, 247
Argentina: 10, 25-26, 99, 117-18, 119, 133, 236
Arias, General Desiderio: 161

Aristodemus: 2
Ariston of Tyre: 2

Army

Cuba

of

Asheville,

Pacification: 148

USS: 168

Asiatic Fleet: 154, 155, 170, 174-75
Asiatic Squadron: 126

Aspinwall (Colon), Panama: 128
Atlanta,

USS:

137, 144

Atlantic Squadron: 131

Attican law: 1-2

Attwood, William:

51,

54-55

Austin, General Hudson: 241

States,

An

(1799): 188, 190

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

Austria: 10

Austria-Hungary: 31

B
Baker, James: 106,242^13

Balmaceda: 133-34
Baltimore,

USS:

133, 135-37

Bani-Sadr: 65

Barbary States: 4
Barnard, Philippe: 106
Basra, Iraq: 233

Bayard, Secretary of State: 14
7

Beck, Robert

J.:

230, 242, 244-45, 247

Lebanon: 44, 46-47, 48-49, 144

Beirut,

Belgium: 247

and the Congo: 49-57, 98-99, 235-36
and Rwanda: 104-05, 107
and Zaire: 100-101,105-07
Belknap, Commander: 129-30
Bell,

John: 27-28

Bell,

Rear Admiral: 126

Benham, Rear Admiral: 135
Bennett,

W.

Tapley: 60-61

Benoit, Colonel: 60

Berard, M.: 99

Bigelow, Lt. A.: 119

Bishop, Maurice: 241

Blockades: 199-200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 206, 208-09, 210-11, 212-13, 215, 219
of Argentina: 25-26
of Venezuela: 33
Bluefields, Nicaragua: 135, 140, 149, 174, 175

Bluntschli,

J.

M.:

7,

8-10, 28

Bocas del Toro, Panama: 137, 143

Bond, Karl

I.:

106

Bonfils, H.: 10, 18, 26, 27, 30, 31,

Bonilla:

33

144

Borchard, Edwin: 14-15, 32, 232
Borland, Solon: 121

Bosch, Juan: 57-59, 60
Boston,

USS: 134

Bowett, Derek: 35, 245
Boxer,

USS:

59,

60

Boxer Protocol of 1901: 142
Boxer Rebellion: 15-16, 31-32, 141-42
Brandywine: 118
Brazil: 26,

134-35

260

Index

Brilliant,

British

HMS:

Navy

Brooklyn,

150

regulations: 188-89, 190, 191, 199

USS: 144

Brown: 72

Brown, Admiral George: 133
Brownlie, Ian: 36-37, 244

Buenos Aires, Argentina:
Buffalo, USS: 158
Bush, George: 242-43
Butler, General Smedley

Butterfield

Caamano,

25, 117-18, 119, 133

D.:

229

& Swire's residence

(China): 154

Francisco: 60

Cabral, Reid: 236
Cairo, Egypt: 234

Calancha: 126
Callao, Peru: 118

Camaguey, Cuba: 162-63
Cambodia: 237, 248
Cameron, Capt. C. Duncan: 27-28

Cameroon: 108

Camp Nicholson,

China: 157

Canada: 107
Canton, China: 123-24, 168, 180
Cap-Haitien, Haiti: 159, 160

Caperton, Admiral: 160
Caracas, Venezuela: 33
Carlson, Paul: 51
Caroline case: 14, 239
Carter, Jimmy: 64, 66, 71-72, 240-41

Carthage: 2
Cartiguenave: 161

Cave, Stephen: 30
Central African Republic: 108

Chad: 101-02, 103, 105
Chadwich, Rear Admiral French
Chamorro, General: 174

Chamoun, Camille: 43,
Chang Tso-lin: 170-71

E.:

146

44, 45-46, 47

Chapei, China: 158, 177

USS: 136
Chaumont, USS: 180
Chebab, General: 44, 46
Chemulpo, Korea: 132, 135-36
Chiang Kai-shek: 179
Charleston,

261

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

133-34

Chile:

Chin Kiang, China:

153, 179

China: 237, 243. See also particular

cities

interventions in during the Boxer Rebellion: 15-16, 31-32, 141-42
interventions in during the Chinese Revolution of 1911: 151-55, 157, 158, 161, 163,

165-68, 169-71, 172-73, 174-75, 176-80

Japanese occupation

of:

18-19, 35-36

and Russia: 163
U.S. intervention

in:

120-21, 122, 124-25, 136-37, 139, 151-55, 157, 158, 161, 163,

165-68, 169-71, 172-73, 174-75, 176-80

Chinwangtao, China: 166, 174-75
Chiujio, Higashi Kuze: 128

Cholma, Honduras: 148
Christians

and the Barbary

States: 4

Lebanon: 42-48

in

missionaries: 14

protection

and

of:

13-14, 135-36, 151-52, 154, 157, 165-66, 168

right of forcible protection: 2

Christmas, General: 50
Christopher, W.: 70, 72

Chung

King, China: 163

Ciaris Estero, Mexico: 158

Cienfuegos, Cuba: 147-48
Cincinnati,

USS:

143, 154

Civil

war or insurrection and

Civil

War

right of protection of nationals in the affected State: 9, 11

(United States): 10, 198

Civil wars
in China: 15, 16, 31-32, 141-42, 151-55, 157, 158, 161, 163, 165-68, 169-71, 172-73,

174-75, 176-80
in the

Congo: 49-57

in the

Dominican Republic: 59-63

in

Guatemala: 165

in Haiti:
in
in

159-61

Lebanon: 44, 46-47, 48-49, 238
Nicaragua: 175-76

in Venezuela: 16, 33

Claes, Willy: 106

Clark,

Commander: 131

Clark,

J.

Reuben:

13,

14,29

Clark, Ramsey: 64

Cleveland, Grover: 134

USS: 164
Cold War: 43-44
Cleveland,

Colombia: 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131-32, 137, 142-43, 144-45

Colombo: 241
Colon: 131

262

Index

Colon, Panama: 128, 131-32, 142-43, 145, 149
Columbia, USS: 135

Concentration camps
in

Cuba: 138-39

Congo: 49-57, 98-99, 235-36, 247-48

Congo Republic

(Brazzaville)

:

54

Constantinople, Turkey: 32, 157

Contractual claims, right to protect nationals in foreign countries regarding:

1

1-12

Convention of Lebanon (1861): 26-27
Coolidge, Calvin: 176
Corfu: 18-19, 33-34
Corinto, Nicaragua: 137-38, 156, 175

Cotton, Admiral: 144

Covenant of the League of Nations: 36
Creditors of foreign governments, right to protect nationals

who are:

8, 10, 1

1-12, 15-16, 30-31,

32-33
Cromwell, Captain: 137

Cuba: 138-39, 147-48, 155-56, 162-63, 237, 241

Cumae: 2
Cyane, USS:

120, 121

Cyprus: 240

Czechoslovakia: 36-37, 163

D
da Gama, Admiral: 134-35

Damascus,

Syria:

34-35

David, King of the Sandwich Islands: 129-30
Davila, Miguel: 149, 150

Davis, Rear Admiral: 127

Dawson, Thomas C: 150
de Lesseps, Ferdinand: 29

Deby,

105

Irdiss:

Decatur,

USS: 153

Dehaene, Jean-Luc: 106
Demetrius, King: 4
Denver, USS: 168-69, 172
Detroit,

USS:

135, 136, 140,

145-46

Diaz,Adolfo: 175
Dillard: 67

Dillingham,

Commander: 145-46

Diplomatic personnel, protection of
in Argentina: 119, 133

in China: 15, 16, 31-32, 120-21, 122, 136-37, 141-42, 152, 153, 154, 161, 163, 167-68,

170, 171, 177-78, 180
in the

Dominican Republic: 161-62

in Egypt:

130

263

Forcible Protection of Nationals

in

Abroad

Guatemala: 165
160

in Haiti: 159,

in Hawaii: 133

in

Honduras: 168-69
166

in Nicaragua: 156, 157,
in

Panama:

126, 137

in Peru: 118
in Russia: 163
in

Samoa: 140-41

in

Smyrna: 167

in Turkey: 157

Dixon, Pierce: 98

Doe, Samuel

243

K.:

Dole, Sanford

B.:

134

Dominican Republic: 57-63,
Pacifico case: 9-10

70, 144, 145-46, 147, 161-62, 236-37,

Don

Dubuque, USS: 149

Dumas, Roland: 104
Duncan, Capt.: 117
Dunn, Frederick: 18

Eden, Anthony: 234, 235
Egan, Patrick: 133
Egypt: 10, 11, 29-30, 43, 44, 97, 98, 130, 234-35, 240, 248

Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 45-46, 48

Eisenhower Doctrine: 43-44
El Cuero,

Elcano,

Cuba: 155-56

USS:

Elf-Aquitaine
Elis:

154, 164, 175
oil refinery:

103-04

2

Emerald,

HUS: 178-79

Emma, Dowager Queen

of the Sandwich Islands: 130

Entebbe, Uganda: 41, 67, 97, 238-39, 248
Essex,

USS: 132

Estaing, Giscard

d':

101

Estrada, General Juan

J.:

European State system:

148, 149

1

Evacuations of foreigners

from the Central African Republic: 108

from Chad: 105
from China: 151-52, 153, 154, 176, 177, 178-79, 180
from the Congo: 49-57, 98-99, 105-06

from the Dominican Republic: 59-63, 236-37
from the Falkland

Islands: 117

from Lebanon: 238

264

248

Index

from

243

Liberia:

from Mexico: 158
from Rwanda: 107
from Samoa: 141
from Zaire: 106-07

Fabriga: 123

Falkland Islands: 117
Falmouth: 124
Fauchille, P.: 16, 27, 32, 33
Fish,

Hamilton: 11-12

Flores: 127

Foochow, China: 153, 167-68
Cmdr. A. H.: 123-24

Foote,

Forcible protection of nationals abroad

Belgium

in the

Congo: 49-57

collective action to provide: 16, 19, 41-42, 46, 47, 52, 107, 127,

drawbacks

to: 10, 31,

definition of:

242

33

30

Great Britain in China: 120-21, 123-24, 137
Great Britain in Egypt: 234-35
Great Britain in Iran: 233-34
Great Britain in Nicaragua: 140

Great Britain in Panama: 126

Mayaquez incident: 237
need for congressional authorization
United States in Angola: 125
United States in Argentina: 117-18
United States in Brazil: 134-35
United States in Chile: 133-34

of:

15

United States in China: 120-21, 122, 123-25, 136-37, 139, 141-42, 151-55, 157, 158,
161, 163, 164, 165-68, 169-71, 172-73, 174-75, 176-80
United States in Columbia: 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 137, 142-43
United States in the Congo: 51-57
in Cuba: 147-48, 155-56, 162-63
United States in the Dominican Republic: 57-63, 144, 145-46, 147, 161-62, 236-37

United States

United States in Egypt: 130
Unites States in Grenada: 241-42

United States in Guatemala: 165

United States in

Haiti: 133,

159-61

United States in Hawaii: 133, 134
United States in Honduras: 144, 148, 149-50, 164, 168-69, 170, 172
United States in Japan: 126-27, 128
United States in Korea: 132, 135-36
United States in Lebanon: 42, 45-49, 238

265

Forcible Protection of Nationals

United States

in Liberia:

Abroad

243

United States in Mexico: 130, 158
United States in Morocco: 146-47

United States in Nicaragua: 120, 135, 137-38, 140, 144, 149, 156-57, 174, 175-76
United States in Panama: 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 137, 142-43, 144-45, 147, 173,

242-43
United States in Peru: 118, 119
United States in Russia: 163-64
United States in Samoa: 132, 140-41
United States in Soviet Union: 163-64
United States in

Syria:

144

United States in Turkey: 157
United States in Uruguay: 122-23, 124, 127
used as an excuse for political and/or economic intervention: 26, 35-36, 62-63, 100, 101,
237, 242-43, 248
in Zaire: 100-101,

106-07

Formosa: 16
France:

2,

36, 41, 42, 43, 99, 163, 236, 237, 239, 243, 247

action against Mexico: 10, 15-16, 26-27

and Argentina: 119
blockade of Argentina ports: 10, 25-26

and the Central African Republic: 108
and Chad: 101-02, 103, 105

and China: 31-32, 137, 169, 171, 172-73
and Egypt: 10, 11, 29-30, 234-35
and Gabon: 103-04
and Haiti: 159, 160
and Japan: 127, 128
and Mauritania: 99-100, 101, 103, 239-40
and the Ottoman Empire: 11, 34-35
and Panama: 142-43
and Portugal: 30-3
and Rwanda: 104-05, 107
and Turkey: 32-33, 157
and Zaire: 100-101, 105-07
Friedmann: 63
Frolinat (front de liberation rationale
Fulbright, William:

du Tchad): 99-100

62-63

Gabon: 103-04, 108
Galena, USS: 131
Galley, Robert: 102

Garcia: 137
Garibaldi, Giuseppe: 17

Garnet, R.: 44

266

Index

Gbenye, Christophe: 50, 51
Germantown: 122-23

Germany:

16,

31-32, 33, 36-37, 107, 130, 132, 137, 140, 149-50, 157, 159, 161

Ghotbzadeh: 65
Gilmer,

Commander W. W.: 149

Godfrain,

Gold

Star,

M. Jacques: 108
USS: 174-75

Gomez, Jose Miguel: 155
Gona'ives, Haiti: 160

Gonzalez, General: 130

Gowland, Daniel: 117
Great Britain: 36, 43, 99, 146, 237, 243, 247

and Abyssinia;

9,

27-28

action against Mexico: 15-16, 26-27

and Argentina:

25, 26, 119

and China: 31-32, 120-21, 123-24, 137, 163, 167, 169, 172-73, 174, 176, 177, 178-79
and Corfu: 33-34
and Egypt:

10, 11,

and Honduras:
and

Iran:

29-30, 97, 98, 130, 234-35

29,

149-50

233-34

and Japan: 127, 128
and Nicaragua: 137-38, 140
and the Ottoman Empire:

1

and Palmerston Circular of 1848: 8
and Panama: 125, 142-43
reply to the

King of Prussia (1753):

7

and Russia: 163

and Samoa: 140-41
and the Suez Canal: 29-30, 43,
and Turkey: 157

97,

98

and Uruguay: 24

and Venezuela:

16,

33

Greece
conflicts with Turkey: 10, 167

and Corfu: 18-19, 34
early law: 1-2

Grenada: 241-42, 248

Grenada, Nicaragua: 175

Greytown, Nicaragua: 120, 121-22
Grotius, H.: 1-3, 4,

7, 8,

20

Grundy: 51, 55

Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba: 155-56

Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua: 176
Guatemala: 165

Guatemala

City,

Guatemala: 165

Guiringaud, Louis de: 101, 102, 103
Gutierrez, General Lopez: 164

267

Forcible Protection of Nationals

H
Habre, Hissene: 105

Habyarimana: 104
Hackett Medical College: 180

Haig Reserve School: 171
Haiti: 133, 159-61
Hall,

William Edward: 231-32

Hancock, USS: 159-60

Hankow, China:

152, 172-73, 176, 179

Harriet: 117

Havana, Cuba: 147-48
Hawaii: 129-30, 133, 134

Hay, John: 146-47
Helena,

Henry

USS: 153

VIII:

189

Hindmarsh, A.: 18-19, 34, 36
Hiogo, Japan: 125-26
Hobard, Earle: 177-78
Hodges, Henry: 13-14
Hollins,

Commander:

Homer:

2

Honduras:

121, 122

16, 29, 144, 148,

149-50, 164, 168-69, 170, 172

Honolulu, Hawaii: 134
Hostages

Americans held

as:

attempted rescues
Belgians held

as:

50-57, 63-73, 240-41

of:

65-73, 240-41

50-57

British subjects held as:

Egyptians held

French held

as:

Indians held

as:

Italians held as:
Israelis

held

as:

Pakistanis held

rescues

of:

50-52

240
99-100, 103-04, 239-40

as:

50-51, 52, 53

50-52
238-39
as:

50-51, 52, 53

523-57, 103-04, 238-40

taken in the Congo: 50-57
taken in Gabon: 103-04
taken in Iran: 63-73, 240-41
taken in Mauritania: 99-100, 239-40
taken in Morocco: 146-47

Human

rights violations: 247, 249
Humanitarian missions: 230, 235-36
in the Congo: 52-53, 54-55, 57, 99

in Iran:

66

in Mauritania: 100

and the Spanish- American War: 138-39

268

Abroad

Index

Rwanda: 104-05

in

in Zaire:

106

Huron, USS: 166, 167, 171

Hyde, Charles Cheney:

16,

32

Ichang, China: 175, 176
2

Iliad:

Impressment of sailors: 189
India: 158,

233

International

Committee of the Red Cross: 51

International Court of Justice: 64-65, 67-68, 71, 240
International Defense Force (in China): 172
International Export

Company:

161, 172

International law, principles of justifying a state's protection of nationals abroad. See Right of
forcible protection

and international law; United Nations Charter.

Iowa, USS: 142
Iran:

63-73, 233-34, 240-41, 248

Iraq:

45-46, 48, 233

Iroquois,

USS:

126, 127

USS: 179

Isabel,

Ismail:

30
234-35, 238-39, 248

Israel: 41, 67, 97,
Italy: 16,

Izmir,

18-19, 31, 33-34, 99, 107, 127, 128, 137, 157, 169, 241

Turkey: 167

J
Jackson, Jesse: 230

Jamestown, USS: 126
Japan: 18-19, 31, 35-36, 108, 126-27, 128, 136-37, 139, 141, 158, 163, 167, 169, 172-73,
174, 177, 178, 180

Jimenez, Juan Isidro: 161-62

John D.Ford, USS: 172, 179
Johnson, Lyndon

B.: 52,

57-58, 60, 61-63

Johnson, Prince: 243

Johnson Administration: 58
Johnson Doctrine: 62
Joint Chiefs of Staff: 65

Jones, Lieutenant
Jouett, Admiral:

Commander

Hilary

P.:

147

131-32

Justice, denial of, as basis for protection of citizens abroad: 1-2, 4-5, 7, 9, 11,

269

13-14

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

K
Kansas, USS: 160

Kanza, Thomas: 51
Karlsbad Program: 36

Katanga: 49-50, 98-99, 100-101, 105-06
Kautz, Rear Admiral Albert: 140
Kearsarge,

USS: 133

Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928: 36

Commodore: 120
Kennedy Administration: 57-58
Kelly,

Kentucky

Island,

China: 157

Kerr: 46

Khomeini, Ayatollah: 64, 70, 240
Kigali,

Rwanda:

104, 107

Kindu, the Congo: 50, 51
Kinshasa, Zaire: 105, 106-07

Kisembo, Angola: 125
Kiukiang, China: 154, 164, 173, 174, 176
Kolwezi, Zaire: 100-101, 105-06

Korea: 132, 135-36, 146

Kuan, China: 167
Kutwo: 176

La Ceiba, Honduras: 148, 150, 168, 169, 170, 172

La Curva, Honduras: 164
Lackawanna, USS: 130
Laguna, Honduras: 148, 164
Lakeside, China: 165

Larnaca, Cyprus: 240
Latin America, U.S. intervention

Law

in: 15.

See also particular countries.

of Nations: 12

be Suchet: 142-43

League of Nations: 34, 35-36, 42
Lebanon: 42^9, 108, 238, 248
Leblanc, Admiral: 25
Legal Aspects of the Beirut Landing, by Potter:
Leprette,

M.

47-48

Jacques: 100

Letters-of-marque:

2,

198, 200,

201-02

Levant: 123-24
Levell, Dr.: 165

Lexington: 117
Li

Yuan-hung: 157, 166

Liao River: 136
Liberia: 243,

248

270

Index

Libreville,

Gabon: 103-04

Liliukalani,
Lillich,

Queen

Richard

B.:

of Hawaii: 134
229, 243, 245

Lima, Peru: 118
Lloyd, Selwyn: 98, 235

Lodge, Henry Cabot: 46

Lumumba: 99
Lynch, Cmdr.

W.

F.:

122-23

Lytton Commission: 35-36

M
Machang, China: 166, 167
Machias, USS: 136, 142, 143
Madriz, Jose: 149

Malietoa Tanu: 140-41
Malik, Charles: 44-45

Managua, Nicaragua:

Manchu

156, 157, 166, 174, 175

Dynasty: 151

Manchuria: 18-19,35-36, 170-71
Marblehead, USS: 135

Marcy, Secretary of State: 121

USS: 140, 148-50
Marion, USS: 125
Marietta,

Martens: 104
Masii Island, China: 168

Mataafa: 132, 140-41

Matachin, Panama: 131-32

Matamoros, Mexico: 130
Mauritania: 99-101, 103, 239-40, 247-48

Maximilian, Archduke Ferdinand, of Austria: 10, 27

Maximo J eraz: 149
Mayaguez: 67, 237, 248

Mazapon, Honduras: 169
McCalla, Commanderr: 132

McClintock, Robert: 46

McCrea, Lieutenant Commander: 142, 143
McDougal, Myers: 247
McKeever, Commodore Isaac: 118, 119
McKinley, William: 138-39
Mello, Admiral: 134-35

Mena, General Luis: 156
Merchant vessels, protection
Merewether, Col. W. L: 28
Mervine, Commodore: 123

of:

203, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 221, 225, 237

Methodist missions: 154

Mexico:

10,

15-16, 26-27, 130, 158

271

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

64

Miller, William:

Millon, Charles: 108

Missionaries

murdered

in

murdered

in the

protection
Mississippi,

China: 141

of:

Congo: 5

13-14, 135-36, 151-52, 154, 165-66, 168

USS: 124-25

Mobutu: 106-07
Monocacy, USS: 127, 137

Monroe Doctrine: 15
Monrovia, Liberia: 243

Monte

Dominican Republic: 162
Monterey, USS: 154
Cristi,

Montevideo, Uruguay: 122-23, 124, 127

Moore, John Bassett: 12
Morocco: 146-47

Morozow, Judge: 68-69
Morrison, Herbert: 233

Mukden, China: 35
Munich agreement of 30 September 1938: 36
Murphy, Robert: 47, 48-49
Muslims in Lebanon: 42-43
Mussolini, Benito: 34, 229
Mytilini:

32-33

N
Nagasaki, Japan: 127

Nanda: 63
Nanking, China: 152, 153, 155, 161,

172,

177-79

Nantai, China: 168
Napier, Robert: 28

Napoleon: 10
Nasser, Gamal: 43

National

Command

Authority: 224, 225

Nationals in foreign countries
diplomatic protection
domiciliary: 8,
transient: 8,

Naval force,

Navy
Navassa

of: 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18,

30, 32, 33, 36, 65

11,29-30

1

right to use to protect nationals abroad: 13, 14-15, 16, 18-19. See also

United States

Regulations.
Island: 133

Navassa Phosphate Company: 133

Navy
Navy

of The United Colonies of North America, Rules for the Regulation of The (1775): 190

of the United States, An Act
Nawa, Vice Admiral: 158
N'Djamena, Chad: 102, 103, 105

for

The Government

272

of the: 190

Index

Nesselrode, Prince: 9-10
Nestor: 2

Netherlands: 107, 128, 177

New Orleans, Louisiana: 10
New Orleans, USS: 153, 164
New York: 146
Neward, USS: 142

Newchwang, China: 136
Niagara, USS: 165

Nicaragua: 15, 16, 120, 121-22, 135, 137-38, 140, 144, 148, 149, 156-57, 166, 174, 175-76

Nicholson, Admiral: 157
Nicholson, Lieutenant: 123
Niigata, Japan: 128

Nimitz,

USS: 65-66

Ning-Po, China: 122
Niobe: 29

Nipe Bay, Cuba: 155
Nipsic,

USS: 132

Noa, USS: 177-79
Noriega, Manuel: 242

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 16
Norway: 140

o
Obregoso: 118
Offutt, Milton:

17-18

Olivier, M.: 102

Omoa, Honduras: 29
Oneida, USS: 126

Operation Almandin

II:

108

Operation Just Cause: 242-43
Operation Lamentin: 100, 101
Operation Requin: 104

Operation Tacaud: 02
Operation Urgent Fury: 241

Oppenheim,

L.: 12,

18

Oregon, USS: 142
Oreste: 159

Organization of African Unity: 54-56

Ad Hod Commission on

the Congo: 5

Organization of American States (OAS): 57, 61, 62
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States: 242

Ottoman Empire:

11,

34-35, 42

273

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Pacific

Mail Line: 131

Pacific

Squadron: 123, 140

Abroad

Paducah, USS: 148, 149

Pagoda, China: 168
Palestinians: 238-39,

Thomas

Palma,

248

Estrade: 147-48

Palmerston Circular of 1848:

8,

10

Panama: 123, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131-32, 137, 142-43, 144-45, 147, 173, 242-43, 248

Panama Canal: 145, 173
Panama City, Panama 125, 131-32, 142-43, 173
Panama Railroad: 125, 129, 131-32, 142-43, 145
USS: 143
Pao Ting Fu, China: 32

Panther,

Patasse, Felix: 108

Congo: 50, 52, 56

Paulis, the

Pearl Lagoon, Nicaragua: 175

Peking, China: 31-32, 137, 139, 141-42, 152, 154, 166, 167, 170-71

Pelew

Islands: 14

Pendleton, John
Penobscot,

S.:

119

USS: 128

Perdicaris, Ion: 146-47,

Perry,

229

Commodore Matthew C: 120

Peru: 118, 119
Petrel,

USS: 136
USS: 140-41

Philadelphia,

Philippine Division: 152
Phillimore, R.: 7-8
Pierce, Franklin: 122

Piscatagua,

USS: 128

Plowden, Walter: 27-28
Plymouth: 120

Poland: 99

Pompey, USS: 155
Potential injury, right of a State to protect citizens abroad against:

Port-au-Prince, Haiti: 159, 160
Port-de-Paix, Haiti: 159

Gabon: 103
Cmdr. William D.: 125
Portsmouth: 123-24
Portugal and France: 30-31
Portuguese Railway Company: 30-3
Port-Gentil,
Porter,

Portuguese West Africa: 125
Potter:

47-48

Pradier-Fodere,

F.: 11,

18,30

Prestan: 131
Preston,

USS: 178

274

2,

235

Index

Prinzapulka, Nicaragua: 175

Property rights and State's right of forcible protection: 10, 33, 138
Prussia: 127, 128

King

Prussia,

of: 7

Pruyn, Robert H.: 126

Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua: 175

Puerto Cortes, Honduras: 144, 148, 150, 164, 169
Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic: 146

Puntas Arenas, Nicaragua: 120, 121

Q
F.: 46-47
USS: 161, 165

Qubain,
Quiros,

R
Railroads, U.S. intervention to protect in

Panama: 125, 129, 131-32, 142-43, 145

Rainbow, USS: 157
146-47, 229
Rama, Nicaragua: 175
Rassam, Hormuzd: 28
Regulations and Instructions Relating
Raisuli, Sherif Mulai:

to His Majesty's Service at

Sea (1772): 188-89, 190, 191,

199

Reid Cabral, Donald: 58-59

Reisman, Michael: 241, 245, 247

Remedial measures open to a protecting State: 1-2

Rendjambe, Joseph: 103
Reprisals: 12, 19, 35, 141, 199,

202

Retortion: 12, 199

Reyes, General John

P.:

140

Richardson Construction Company: 158
Right of forcible protection
acceptable measures that

may be

taken: 14

and Accioly: 19-20

and
and
and
and
and
and

Arend: 230, 242, 244-45, 247
Beck: 230, 242, 244-45, 247
Bluntschli:

8-9

Bonfils: 10

Borchard: 14-15
Clark: 13

counter-restrictionist theory: 243-44,

245-49

criteria for exercise of: 4-5, 7, 9, 12, 18, 98,

231-32, 235, 239, 247

and Dunn: 18
and Fauchille: 15-16
Grotius and: 2-3, 4

and Hindmarsh: 18-19

275

Forcible Protection of Nationals

development of the concept
and Hodges: 13-14

historical

of:

1-5,

Abroad

230-33

and Hyde: 16
and international

law: 8, 9, 13, 14-16, 17-19, 20, 28, 29, 32, 41-42, 47-49, 62-63, 67-73,

97, 98, 187-88, 232-33, 234-35, 236, 239, 241, 242,243-49

and Moore: 12
andOffutt: 17-18
and Oppenheim: 12
potential abuses

18-19, 36-37, 63, 70-71, 98

of:

and Pradier-Fodere:

1

restrictionist theory:

243-45

and Stockton: 12-13
and Vattel: 3
andWinfield: 16-17

and Wolff:

3

Rio de Janeiro,

Brazil:

134-35

Rio Grande Bar, Nicaragua: 175

USS: 167-68
Robeson, George M.: 198
Rochester, USS: 170
Rizal,

Roman

Empire:

Ronzitti, N.:

2,

4

69

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 142, 161
Roosevelt, Theodore: 146-48, 229
Royalist,

VMS:

140-41

Rules for the Regulation of

The Navy

of

The United Colonies

190
Russia: 31,

137,157

Russian Island: 164
Russian Revolution of 1917: 163
Russo-Japanese War: 146

Rwanda: 104-05, 107

Sacasa, Roberto: 135

Sacramento, USS: 171
Said,
St.

Mohammed: 29

Lawrence, USS: 124

St. Louis,

Falkland Islands: 117

Saint-Marc, Haiti: 160
St.

Mary's,

USS:

125, 126

Salaverry, General: 118

Sam, Vilburn Guillaume: 150
Samar, USS: 164

Samoa: 132, 140-41
San Francisco, USS: 133, 144

276

of

North America (1775):

188,

Index

San

Isidro Air Force

Base Dominican Republic: 59, 60, 61
:

San Jacinto, USS: 124

San Juan del Norte, Nicaragua: 120, 121-22, 140
San Juan del Sue, Nicaragua: 138
San Lorenzo, Honduras: 169

San Pedro, Honduras: 148, 150
Sandwich Islands: 129-30
Santiago, Dominican Republic: 162
Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic:
Saratoga, USS: 154

58, 59, 60, 63, 144, 146, 147,

161-62

Saxons: 2
Schachter, O.: 69, 70-71,72

Schwarzenberg, Prince: 9-10
Scorpion,

USS:

147, 157

Second Expeditionary Force: 171
Secretary of the Navy: 154, 188, 193, 194, 198, 200, 203, 205, 207, 209, 211, 213, 216, 218,

219,220,224,225
Senegal: 108, 239-40
Seoul, Korea: 132, 135-36, 146

Seward, William: 11-12

Seymour, Admiral: 3
Shanghai, China: 120-21, 122, 124-25, 158, 166, 169-71, 176, 177, 178, 180

Shanghai Volunteer Corps: 169
Shark: 119

Shenandoah, USS: 127

Ship transportation, U.S. protection of in Panama: 128, 129

Shu-cheng, General
Siciliy:

Pi:

177

17

Sino-Japanese War: 135-37, 139
Slater,

J.:

59,

60

Smyrna: 167

Admiral Emilio: 34
South Manchurian Railway: 35
Solari,

Sovereign, rights of the: 2-5

Soviet Union: 43-44, 64, 99, 163-64, 243

Spain
action against Mexico: 10, 15-16, 26-27

and China: 137
and the Spanish-American War: 138-39
Spanish- American Iron Works: 155

Spanish- American War: 138-39

Standard Fruit and Steamship

Company 168

Standard Oil Company: 152, 177-78, 179
Stanleyville, the

Congo: 50-51, 52,

53, 54, 56, 57

State responsibility to protect citizens abroad: 1-2,

Steedman, Admiral: 129
Stein: 67-68, 71

277

3, 4, 9, 10, 11,

17-18, 20, 99, 231-32, 233

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Abroad

Stevens, John H.: 134

Stevenson, Adlai: 51, 52, 55-56, 57, 236
Stewart,

USS: 173

Stimson, Henry: 176
Stockton, Charles H.: 12-13
Stracber, General: 29
Strauss, Admiral: 167

Sudetenland: 36-37

Suez Canal: 29-30, 43, 97, 98, 234-35

Sugar plantations: 148

Sun Yat-sun: 151
Supply, USS: 153
Sutherland, Admiral: 156

Swatow, China: 154, 161
Sweden: 140
Swink, Captain Roy
Syria:

C: 166

34-35, 42, 43, 44, 144

Tacoma, USS: 149-50, 159, 165
Taft,

William Howard: 147-48

Taku, China: 31-32, 152, 154, 166, 180
Tamasese: 132
Tangier, Morocco: 146
Tarazi, Judge: 69

Tarquins: 2
Tegucigalpa, Honduras: 168, 169

Tehran, Iran: 63-64, 66
Tela, Honduras: 168, 170
Tellini,

General Enrico: 34

Terrorist operations: 238-39, 240, 245

Thailand: 237

Theodore: 159, 160

Theodore, Emperor of Abyssinia: 27-28
Tientsin, China: 31-32, 136-37, 139, 142, 154, 167, 170-71, 173, 179-80

Tindemans: 101
Tokyo, Japan: 126
Toncontin, Honduras: 169
Torres, Colonel: 145
Trujillo,

Honduras: 148

Trujillo, Rafael:

TsaoKun:

57

169, 170

Tshisekedi: 106

Tshombe, Moise:

50, 54, 55

Tuan, Marshal: 170-71

Tungchow, China:

166, 167, 170

278

Index

Tungshan, China: 168
Tunisia: 99

Turkey:

10, 14, 32, 33, 157,

167

Tuscarora, USS: 129-30
Tyntuke Bay, Russia: 164
Tyre: 2

u
Uganda: 104, 238-39, 248
United Arab Republic: 44-45
United Nations:

16,

244

Commission of Inquiry: 65
and Dominican Republic: 62
multinational force in Rwanda: 107
Secretary General: 237, 240

United Nations Charter: 41, 223, 232-33, 235, 239, 243, 244, 247, 248-49
Article 2(4): 36-37, 41-42, 48, 68, 69, 187, 233, 244, 245-46, 249
Article 39: 64, 98
Article 40: 98
Article 41: 64, 98
Article 51: 41-42, 46, 47, 48, 66-67, 68, 69, 73, 97, 98, 103, 187, 235, 237, 241, 244-45,

246-47, 249

Chapter VII: 246, 247
United Nations General Assembly
meetings: 234

Resolution on the Definition of Aggression: 239
votes:

242

United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) 45
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC): 49-50, 236

United Nations Security Council

and the Congo: 49-50,

51, 52, 53, 55-56, 98-99,

235-36

and Egypt: 234-35
and Entebbe: 239
failure to act: 244, 245, 247,

248-49

and
and

forcible protection of nationals: 130, 239, 241,

and

Israel:

Iran: 64, 66,

243

67

239

and Lebanon: 44-45, 46
and Mauritania: 100
and Panama: 243
Resolution 872: 107

United Province of Rio de

la Plata:

25

U.S. consulates

guards

for: 18,

119, 120-21, 122, 126, 127, 130, 132, 133-34, 135-37, 139, 140-42,

144, 146-48, 152, 153, 156, 157, 159, 161-62, 163, 165, 166, 167-68, 170,

177-78, 180

279

Forcible Protection of Nationals

U.S. Department of the Navy: 145, 214-15, 217
U.S. Department of State

and Cuba: 155
and the Dominican Republic: 59
and Haiti: 159-60
and Lebanon: 45
and Nicaragua: 175
and rescue of hostages
and

in the

Congo: 52

right to forcibly protect nationals abroad: 13

United States Intervention

U.S. Naval Station,

in

Lebanon, The, by Wright: 48

Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba: 155-56, 163

United States Navy Regulations: 187, 189
1802: 191
1814: 192, 193
1818: 192-93

1821:93-94, 196
1841: 194
1853: 194-95
1858: 195

1863: 195-96, 197
1865: 196-97, 199
1869: 197-200, 201-02, 204-05

1870: 200-202, 204-05
1876: 202, 204-05, 206

1893: 203-06, 208, 219

1896:206-08,210
1900 and 1905: 208-10, 212
1909: 210-12, 214, 215

1913:212-15,217
1920:215-17,219,220
1948: 204, 217-20, 221, 222, 223
1973: 187, 188, 220-23, 225-26
1990: 187, 188, 198-99, 223-26

Upshur, USS: 165

Urena, Rafael Molina: 58, 60

Uruguay: 122-23, 124, 127
Usbecks: 4

Valparaiso, Chile: 133-34
Vattel,E.:

1,3-5,8,11,20,231,232

Venezuela: 16, 33

Vera Cruz, Mexico:

26, 27

Vernet, Louis: 117
Victor

Emmanuel

II:

17

280

Abroad

Index

Victoria,

Queen

of England: 28

Vladivostok, Russia: 163, 164

w
Waldcock: 245

Waldheim, Kurt: 100
Washington, USS: 160

Weissman,

57

S.:

Wessin, General Wessin

y:

59,

60

Western Sahara: 239-40, 247-48. See

also Mauritania.

Westlake,J.: 11-12
Wheeling,

USS: 159

Wigny, M.
Williams,

Pierre:

J.

E.:

99

178

Wilson, Huntington: 156
Winfield: 16-17

Wingfield,

Thomas C: 229

Wisconsin,

USS: 143

Wolff,

C: 1,3,20

HMS: 178, 179
Wolverine, HMS: 179
Wolsey,

Woodfred, Cuba: 155
Woolsey,

Commodore M.

T.:

118

Woosung, China: 124-25, 153

World War

I:

33-34

Wright: 47, 48

Wuchang, China: 151-52

Wuchow, China:

Wuchow

165

People's Mission Hospital: 165

Wuhu, China:

152, 153

Yangtze Valley, China: 170-71, 172

Yedo (Tokyo), Japan: 125
Yenkow, China: 136
Yingtze, China: 136

Yochow, China:

154, 165

Yokohama, Japan: 127, 128
Yorktown, USS: 136
Young: 50
Yu-hsiang, Feng: 171

YuanShinkai: 151, 157

281

Forcible Protection of Nationals

Zaire:

49-57, 100-101, 105-07

Zamor, General: 159
Zelaya, Jose Santos: 135, 137-38, 140, 156

Zouerate, Mauritania: 99-100, 101

282

Abroad

